Proactive Behaviour and Causality

[Dragonfly]

Roger, seeing that you persist in making personal digs I bow out of this discussion, I've had enough, this is becoming too much like Solopassion.

[Roger Bissell]

Man, talk about a thin skin! Talk about someone who likes to dish it out in spades and then can't take a little gentle ribbing! Sorry, you're not going to get away with it, not here.

Personal digs? Like Solo Passion? Sorry, the comparison is laughable. We're not even in the same universe of scorn and vitriol as those folks.

You really do need to look in the mirror, Dragonfly, and realize that you HAVE been condescending and sarcastic toward others on this list, as well as on Rebirth of Reason.

Also, I see your overwrought protest as a way of distracting attention from the fact that you DID say that math and logic are not about reality. Were you hoping no one would call you on it?

REB

[Dragonfly]

Again a cheap insinuation. For the record: I stand fully behind my statement that mathematics and logic are abstract constructions that do not refer to anything in the physical world, but that may of course be applied to the physical world.

[Roger Bissell]

If mathematics is not ABOUT reality, what is the justification for APPLYING it TO reality? That it...somehow..."works"?

REB

[Dragonfly]

Yes.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

This seems more like semantics than anything else to me.

From one angle, I see Dragonfly's point. Obviously a number does not refer to any specific entity in reality and it can be used for all of them. Yet from another angle, it does refer to the individuality of things - thus it refers to a general characteristic of most everything in reality. Essentially I see numbers being derived from an axiom (identity).

Another part of the derivation is man's capacity for differentiation (noticing similarities and differences), especially when there is more than one similar entity around to look at (or perceive through another sense).

This capacity also allows him to measure similar entities by comparison. By projecting an abstract entity (a unit of measurement), he can learn a lot more about the entities he is examining. He might use an abstract entity for this (unit of measurement), but he got the original numbers and the idea of individual entities from observation of reality.

The mental manipulation of numbers is part of the brain's integrating mechanism and derives from axioms, just like the syntax of logic does (thus from observing reality). However the capacity to abstract and integrate is not derived from observation - it comes built-in to the mind (therefore it's actual operations are not based on observation, despite using observations in its operations).

Axioms derive from both observation (using the senses) and differentiation (isolating the greatest similarity to perceived entities, such as "existence" and "identity"), then integrating this into a concept that also applies to all unperceived entities.

The purpose of axioms is to provide the grounds for, and validate, the rational operations of the mind - to connect the mind to reality, so to speak. Since axioms are so general and are not restricted to any single entity or group of entities, they seem trivial, but by dismissing them, mental operations like mathematics and the syntax of logic seem disconnected from reality.

The capacity to process information with mathematics and logic is built-in, but the actual information that is processed comes from observation of reality.

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

Aristotle would say quantity is abstracted from the things we observe. In this way numbers are a quality of real entities.

Plato would say quantity exists in a separate realm that we access directly via our minds. Today's twist on Plato would be that numbers exist only as entities created in the imagination. On this view, numbers do not exist in the realm of physical objects.

I would say both views are right. It is just looking at the same existent through two different lenses-- ie: via two different orientations of consciousness. Roger is looking through one lens; Dragonfly is looking through another; and Michael is flipping the channels between both.

Paul

[MichaelJoyous]

Hi Paul:)

I cannot talk about proactive behavior until I first understand better what "free will" is. As I see it, "free will" is the ability to transcend our previous emotional or cognitive responses when focusing upon the current situation, when deciding how the current situation is like and unlike past situations; then acting upon that new information.

Within that definition, we all have a limited amount of free will, depending upon inborn capacity and the degree of stress to which we are subjected at any one moment in time.

"Acting proactively" means, within that context, integrating the fact that we have limited time to achieve ends, (and that acting quickly to do so is, in the long run, far more productive than procrastinating) and that it is in our long-term self-interest to act in accordance with our deepest values, even though doing so may be harmful in the short-term.

Causality is, as you or Roger note in later posts, about entities causing changes in other entities, all within their innate capacities and limitations.

Since the only beings capable of integrating time into their behaviors are human beings, proactive behavior only applies to humans. Bears who eat much and then hibernate during the winter do not engage in proactive behavior, *as far as I know*. As I write this, it occurs to me that bears, beavers, and ants may have some concepts of time that motivate them. What an interesting topic for the physiological psychology of animals!

Causality, as it refers to human beings, is about the way we are affected, more or less, by the happenings around us and inside of us. It includes the involuntary workings of our bodies. It includes the way we react to circumstances habitually. In also includes those times that we choose to be in full focus, knowing precisely what is happening to us to some degree, and choosing to act in accordance with our understanding of limited time or of our deepest values.

best wishes,

Mike Rael

Where, in causality, does proactive behaviour fit in?

[MichaelJoyous]

Hi Dragonfly:)

I rather like Frege's definition of number as the set that contains all sets having the same number of elements within them. Frege sees clearly that a "number" is an abstraction gained from viewing many different entities having the same number of elements within them.

This kind definition helps explain why, for example, 3 groups of 5 (that is, 3 elements, each of which has 5 things in it) has the same amount of total elements in it as 5 groups of 3. It is axiomatic that a x b = b x a, but it is definitely not obvious.

And thus is the point made, Dragonfly: the fact that a x b = b x a was discovered by exploring different numbers and finding out that those different ways of getting a total number yield the exact same number!

The concept of number and the numerical axioms are at the base of all mathematical thinking, Dragonfly--at least of mathematicl thinking of *this* reality! They come from looking first at reality and then noticing similarities and differences:)

best wishes always,

Mike Rael

Again a cheap insinuation. For the record: I stand fully behind my statement that mathematics and logic are abstract constructions that do not refer to anything in the physical world, but that may of course be applied to the physical world.

[Dragonfly]

The concept of number and the numerical axioms are at the base of all mathematical thinking, Dragonfly--at least of mathematicl thinking of *this* reality! They come from looking first at reality and then noticing similarities and differences:)

That abstract entities like numbers and other mathematical constructs were originally derived from properties of real things does not imply that they are not abstract... Now real numbers may be commutative, but there are also noncommutative numbers, for example quaternions. On what real things are these based?

[MichaelJoyous]

Hi Dragonfly:)

We don't need to seek out imaginary numbers to know that some properties are not commutative. For example, a-b does not equal b-a.

The imaginaries are based on trigonometric functions, which are quite real.

I'm not sure about quaternions.

In any case, all I'm saying is that the number is based on reality and is about reality. Abstractions don't exist in the mind as frozen concepts, Dragonfly.

best wishes always,

Mike Rael

That abstract entities like numbers and other mathematical constructs were originally derived from properties of real things does not imply that they are not abstract... Now real numbers may be commutative, but there are also noncommutative numbers, for example quaternions. On what real things are these based?

[Dragonfly]

Hi Dragonfly:)

In any case, all I'm saying is that the number is based on reality and is about reality. Abstractions don't exist in the mind as frozen concepts, Dragonfly.

I've no idea what a frozen concept is, it sounds rather cool. But a unicorn or a fairy is not about reality, even if these concepts are derived from elements of reality. The same for an infinite-dimensional complex Banach space.

[MichaelJoyous]

Hi Dragonfly:)

It's very cool, especially in the summer heat:) I meant a concept without a referent, one that revolves in the mind in a kind of haze. It can move about, though--after all, the number of angels dancing on a pin changed from time to time, depending on who read the Bible. So, I guess it's not really frozen, just kinda slurpy:)

An infinite dimensional space exists to solve problems with many many factors in them.

If it's a *complex* space, that's very different and exists more as a plaything for mathematicians than anything else. Or as a way to associate with that which *does* exist in real space, even though it does not!

Is a univorn equivalent to the square root of minus one? Maybe. When dragons fly!

Friend Dragon, have you considered that I'm only interested in numbers that have real referents?

best wishes always,

Mike Rael

I've no idea what a frozen concept is, it sounds rather cool. But a unicorn or a fairy is not about reality, even if these concepts are derived from elements of reality. The same for an infinite-dimensional complex Banach space.

[Dragonfly]

Friend Dragon, have you considered that I'm only interested in numbers that have real referents?

That's fine with me, but you'll miss a lot of mathematics that is really cool with all those frozen concepts.

[Paul Mawdsley]

Mike,

Welcome to OL. I recognized the style and the spirit of your writing immediately. I’m sure you’ll find the people here good natured and challenging. I think you will recognize many of them.

you wrote:

*I cannot talk about proactive behavior until I first understand better what "free will" is. As I see it, "free will" is the ability to transcend our previous emotional or cognitive responses when focusing upon the current situation, when deciding how the current situation is like and unlike past situations; then acting upon that new information.*

Unfortunately, your definition of “free will” does not provide enough precision to distinguish whether or not proactive or reactive causation should apply. Here are some quotes from NB I posted earlier:

I write of responsibility as causal agency, as in “I am the cause of my choices, decisions, and actions– I am responsible for them,” (In Aristotle’s formulation: “The principle of motion is within.”)... Self-responsibility implies free will....(Taking Responsibility, p. 43)

Our free will pertains to the choice we make about the operation of our consciousness in any given situation– to focus it with the aim of expanding awareness or unfocus it with the aim of avoiding awareness. (The Six Pillars of Self-Esteem, p. 31)

Free will– in the widest meaning of the term– is the doctrine that human beings are capable of performing actions that are not determined by forces outside their control, that we are capable of making choices that are not necessitated by antecedent factors. (Honoring the Self, p.17)

Note that NB is talking about “causal agency.” Borrowing from Aristotle he says, “The principle of motion is within.” Keep in mind, we are talking about metaphysics here. To say the principle of motion is within, is to suggest some fundamentally distinct process of energizing an impulse to action unlike reactive causation.

On the subject of free will, I wrote previously:

*The “free” part of free will represents the freedom from the need to react to the incoming causal chain; freedom from action necessitated by antecedent events. The “will” part of free will represents the capacity to initiate a new causal chain not necessitated by antecedent events. This capacity to initiate new causal chains grants us the power and the responsibility to be the architect of our own identity, of our relationships, and of our world. It gives us the power to create new understanding, where none previously existed, by proactively piecing together the elements of existence and building our models of the world. The will is the chisel, the imagination is the clay, where passion first finds expression in the mind, then in the world. The will is the core of the philosopher, the scientist, the craftsman and the artist.

The will does more than simply make choices. This is where my view departs from Branden’s. Branden focusses on the aspect of free will that initiates a specific type of action of consciousness, the act of choice. Specifically, he focusses on the choice “...of expanding awareness or...of avoiding awareness.” While I acknowledge the importance of this, I see will as the core proactive force of the psyche. It is the source of creative energy. Without human will, thinking is automatic, art is automatic, love is automatic, existence is automatic, passion is dead!*

Mike:

*"Acting proactively" means, within that context, integrating the fact that we have limited time to achieve ends, (and that acting quickly to do so is, in the long run, far more productive than procrastinating) and that it is in our long-term self-interest to act in accordance with our deepest values, even though doing so may be harmful in the short-term.*

On a metaphysical level acting proactively has a deeper meaning. It refers to the source of energy for initiating the action of an entity to be intrinsic to that entity. Dragonfly and Jenna previously suggested that potential energy stored in our cells can account for this appearance of proactive causation. This is not so. The idea of “free will” and the idea of “[t]he principle of motion is within” suggest that causal chains can come to an end– actions of human consciousness are not necessitated by antecedents– and can have a beginning– actions of human consciousness can initiate a chain of necessity in matter. Whether or not free will is real or an illusion is a valid consideration. Whether or not potential energy stored in human cells can account for the appearance of free will is not.

Mike:

*Causality is, as you or Roger note in later posts, about entities causing changes in other entities, all within their innate capacities and limitations.*

You’ll have to dig up the quote for that one. It sounds awfully close to a description of action-to-action causation. Neither Roger nor I support this view of causation.

Mike:

*Since the only beings capable of integrating time into their behaviors are human beings, proactive behavior only applies to humans.*

Why? If proactive causation is a fundamental principle of metaphysics, it must apply to much more than human beings. If it applies at and beyond the quantum limit, surely it applies to other animals. Free will, however, is another question. Just because free will entails proactive causation, it doesn’t mean proactive causation entails free will.

Mike:

*Causality, as it refers to human beings, is about the way we are affected, more or less, by the happenings around us and inside of us.*

The “we” that is “affected” is the part of us we are trying to identify. It is the soul, the ego, the core of the self. All too often such descriptions of consciousness lead us back to a seemingly impenetrable black box called an homunculus. When you use the language of action-to-action causation to discuss the inner workings of consciousness, the proactive element of consciousness is impenetrable. Reactive models cannot account for a proactive existent. However, proactive models can account for a reactive existent. One of the reasons I found myself compelled to explore the idea of proactive causation is the fact that reactive causation couldn’t penetrate the core of my consciousness and produce understanding. Proactive causation makes possible breaking through the shell of the homunculus. It has also helped my thinking to break through the shell of the quantum limit and better understand the causation that underlies physics. I know, we are told causation does not underlie physics. I think this is just an example of the exercise of “faith” in the culture of science.

Paul

[Dragonfly]

On a metaphysical level acting proactively has a deeper meaning. It refers to the source of energy for initiating the action of an entity to be intrinsic to that entity. Dragonfly and Jenna previously suggested that potential energy stored in our cells can account for this appearance of proactive causation. This is not so.

Really? How do you know? Where is your evidence? This will be new to biologists and neuroscientists.

The idea of “free will” and the idea of “[t]he principle of motion is within” suggest that causal chains can come to an end– actions of human consciousness are not necessitated by antecedents– and can have a beginning– actions of human consciousness can initiate a chain of necessity in matter. Whether or not free will is real or an illusion is a valid consideration. Whether or not potential energy stored in human cells can account for the appearance of free will is not.

You seem to be rather certain of your conclusion, so I suppose you have good evidence for it (which may result in a trip to Stockholm).

It has also helped my thinking to break through the shell of the quantum limit and better understand the causation that underlies physics. I know, we are told causation does not underlie physics. I think this is just an example of the exercise of “faith” in the culture of science.

If you don't have "faith" in the culture of science you should throw your computer out of the window. What do you really know about physics that you can better understand the causation that underlies physics than all those pesky physicists? Or is it just mystical revelation?

[Paul Mawdsley]

Dragonfly, you wrote:

**(Paul Mawdsley @ Aug 5 2006, 08:07 AM)

On a metaphysical level acting proactively has a deeper meaning. It refers to the source of energy

for initiating the action of an entity to be intrinsic to that entity. Dragonfly and Jenna previously

suggested that potential energy stored in our cells can account for this appearance of proactive

causation. This is not so.*

Really? How do you know? Where is your evidence? This will be new to biologists and

neuroscientists.*

My evidence is in the same place as your evidence for the metaphysics supporting your view of

causation. It is a construct in my mind created to connect the evidence I have perceived. I just think

proactive causation is a better construct for connecting the evidence than reactive causation.

One more point: the statement you quoted above is a statement of knowledge as far as it goes. I am

not saying, nor have I ever said, that I KNOW proactive causation is a fact of reality. From where I

stand, it seems to be the best fit for the evidence. Saying that energy can be stored in a form that

has the potential to be released does not, in principle, exclude the idea of proactive causation. The

question is: can the release of potential energy be initiated by an action that, itself, was not

NECESSITATED by antecedents. Note the difference here between “necessitated” and “caused.” I

am not talking about acausal actions of entities. I am talking about actions of entities that are causal but not necessitated by the actions of other entities. It is in this difference that the element of choice and free will come into play. Of course, this assumes free will is not just an illusion.

**The idea of “free will” and the idea of “[t]he principle of motion is within” suggest that causal

chains can come to an end– actions of human consciousness are not necessitated by antecedents–

and can have a beginning– actions of human consciousness can initiate a chain of necessity in

matter. Whether or not free will is real or an illusion is a valid consideration. Whether or not

potential energy stored in human cells can account for the appearance of free will is not.*

You seem to be rather certain of your conclusion, so I suppose you have good evidence for it

(which may result in a trip to Stockholm).*

Within the context of the statement I am certain of my conclusion. The idea of “free will” does

suggest that causal chains come to an end and human consciousness can initiate unnecessitated

causal chains. I made no claim here that I know we have free will. I happen to think we do but the

subject is open to discussion and evidence. The evidence for the idea of free will suggesting a break in the

reactive causal chain is in the definitions of free will. At its foundation, I view free will to be

about freedom from necessitation and the ability to initiate actions not necessitated. Is this

mistaken?

**It has also helped my thinking to break through the shell of the quantum limit and better

understand the causation that underlies physics. I know, we are told causation does not underlie

physics. I think this is just an example of the exercise of “faith” in the culture of science.*

If you don't have "faith" in the culture of science you should throw your computer out of the

window. What do you really know about physics that you can better understand the causation that

underlies physics than all those pesky physicists? Or is it just mystical revelation?*

I do actually have faith in the culture of science. What I meant to say is: I think this is just an

example of the exercise of “faith” WITHIN the culture of science. It is not about what I know about

physics. The question is: what do physicists know about the epistemological and metaphysical

basis of the constructs they claim as knowledge. I sit quietly in awe of what a physicist can teach

me about physics. I do not sit so quietly, nor so in awe, of the epistemology behind a physicist’s

metaphysical interpretations of the evidence. Questions about the nature of causation are not

questions that a physicist is more qualified answer than a tradesman, a salesman, a janitor, a

businessman, or a philosopher. On questions of the nature of knowledge and the underlying nature

of existence, no one has special status that automatically elevates their opinions above the rest.

The only question is whether or not someone’s view integrates all the available evidence without

contradiction. That and what should be considered evidence.

Paul

[Dragonfly]

Within the context of the statement I am certain of my conclusion. The idea of “free will” does

suggest that causal chains come to an end and human consciousness can initiate unnecessitated

causal chains. I made no claim here that I know we have free will. I happen to think we do but the

subject is open to discussion and evidence. The evidence for the idea of free will suggesting a break in the

reactive causal chain is in the definitions of free will. At its foundation, I view free will to be

about freedom from necessitation and the ability to initiate actions not necessitated. Is this

mistaken?

I don't think that the idea of "free will" suggests that causal chains come to an end. What happens is that you can't trace back those causal chains while those mechanisms are invisible to your consciousness. Let's suppose that suddenly some thought comes up in your mind; you have no idea why you just had that thought. Does that mean that you have to pose some mysterious action in the brain that can't be explained by current physics theories? I don't think so! Whatever that thought was, it was not something entirely disconnected from your earlier experiences. Supposing that you're not fluent in Sanskrit, that thought will not have been some sentence in Sanskrit, it will probably be in English and its elements will be more or less familiar to you, so it's probably based on memories and associations in your brain. The fact that you don't know how these memories came to form that particular thought does not imply that there is no logical chain in forming that thought from your memories. Such a logical chain is the simplest hypothesis which is consistent with current scientific knowledge. That we can't reconstruct that chain (yet?) is the logical consequence of the fact that we still know very little about the exact mechanisms of thinking. But the mere fact that we can't reconstruct that chain is in itself not enough evidence to suppose that there is no causal chain. To do so is to introduce unnecessary extra hypotheses, which seem to contradict current physical knowledge, without giving any better explanation. Time to apply Occam's razor!

I do actually have faith in the culture of science. What I meant to say is: I think this is just an

example of the exercise of “faith” WITHIN the culture of science. It is not about what I know about

physics. The question is: what do physicists know about the epistemological and metaphysical

basis of the constructs they claim as knowledge. I sit quietly in awe of what a physicist can teach

me about physics. I do not sit so quietly, nor so in awe, of the epistemology behind a physicist’s

metaphysical interpretations of the evidence. Questions about the nature of causation are not

questions that a physicist is more qualified answer than a tradesman, a salesman, a janitor, a

businessman, or a philosopher.

Here I beg to disagree. It is in physics that we have discovered that the standard ideas of causality and epistemology are not universally correct. This is a quite complex field where no simple ready answers are available. I'm just reading a book by Joos et al. Decoherence and the Appearance of a Classical World in Quantum Theory in which such fundamental questions are discussed as: what is exactly a quantum state? Is it merely a mathematical construct or is it a real physical entity, does it denote an ensemble of possible configurations? How can the classical causality of the macroscopic world be derived from QM with its probabilistic characteristics? What exactly is the probabilistic element in QM? The opinions are divided and the arguments are quite technical and I'm afraid quite beyond the expertise of the average salesman or non-scientific philosopher.

[Paul Mawdsley]

Dragonfly,

I'm still thinking.

The batteries seem to be running a little low on my Turing machine.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

While I am looking for the time to write I would like to ask a question and share some thoughts as an aside. Pure mathematics is born in the creation of a realm where entities have no qualities with the exception of quantity. Applied mathematics abstracts from observable, measurable entities, all qualities except quantity and defines things according to their measured numbers. Today physics has become dominated by perspectives shaped by mathematics. Is it possible that, despite the value mathematics offers as a tool to expand our understanding of the world, mathematical descriptions of the universe might distort our vision of existence because they necessarily miss certain qualities that are part of reality?

Hypothetically, if existence has a fundamentally physical foundation– if it is made up of indivisible physical particles, entities that have extension, motion, and duration through time and space– then could our mathematical descriptions of the universe that suggest the existence of singularities be mistaken? The idea of singularities assumes point particles at the foundation of existence (as well as gravitation being the dominating force shaping the universe). What if gravity was a derived force from some more basic attribute of a physical fundamental particle? As things approach the point of mathematical singularity our mathematical description would begin to break down because they do not contain a description of an indivisible physical particle and they assume gravitation to apply to all scales of the universe.

I tend to think of mathematics as a great tool for guiding our intuitive understanding along in its development but it does not replace our need to interpret our world. In my mind, one of the greatest influences in modern physics had more in common with a janitor, a tradesman, or a salesman than a mathematician. Michael Faraday advanced our understanding of the physical world by generating an intuitive view of existence that gave birth to Maxwell’s equations, and Relativity. Today Relativity and the Copenhagen interpretation tell us to give up on our intuition. Reality is not only not observable beyond the quantum limit, it is unimaginable. It is a waste of time to even bother trying to imagine it. Our mathematical descriptions of the universe have demonstrated that our eyes cannot observe the underside reality and our “limited” imaginations cannot make sense of reality. What would Faraday have accomplished if he started with these assumptions?

I think it is exactly the intuitive approach of Faraday that has been lost in modern physics. Our intuition has stumbled and we have lost faith. But it is our intuition that tells which direction to point our mathematical tools. And it is through our intuition that our mathematical descriptions of the world must be interpreted. I think electro-magnetic phenomena, Special Relativity, General Relativity, and quantum physics can have an intuitive physical interpretation and description. What is needed is to raise the level of our intuitive perspective rather than assuming its impotence. Of course, I think the way to raise the level of our intuitive perspective is to reevaluate our notions of causation. The reason I tend to disagree with the view of the establishment in physics is because I believe that there is a physical, not mathematical, reality at the foundation of existence. It seems ironic that physicists tend to argue that the physical world is not basically physical. I guess that’s what happens when the physical world is viewed through a mathematical lens without questioning the possible distortions that lens might create. While mathematics doesn’t lie, it may not tell the whole truth. We need a standard to measure whether or not our mathematical descriptions of reality are telling the whole truth.

Paul

Edited August 19, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley

[reason.on]

Where, in causality, does proactive behaviour fit in?

I'm jumping in mid-stream here, and may have missed something akin to this having already been said, but I think that part of the answer to the question is contained in a very general mistake very often made when we think of "causality"; this key observation is presented here in the words of Searle:

"This [...] mistake derives in part from a flawed conception of causation. In our official theories of causation we typically suppose that all causal relationships must be between discrete events ordered sequentially in time [event-event causation]. For example, the shooting caused the death of the victim.

"Certainly, many cause-and-effect relations are like that, but by no means all."

As ES has said before and elsewhere (paraphrasing), we create a whole host of intractable problems when we attempt to describe or understand "consciousnesss" using a particular *thought process* which happens to be good for the goose, but not for the gander. In other words, the way in which we *think* about the scientifically (third-person) verifiable world (the domain of physics) simply doesn't apply well to the first-person nature of consciousness (that which thinks).

To say it in yet another way, not all truths in the universe are strictly "scientific".

RCR

[Paul Mawdsley]

Warning: This is not intended for anyone who thinks strictly by the methods of applied mathematics when thinking about the nature of existence.

Where, in causality, does proactive behaviour fit in?

I'm jumping in mid-stream here, and may have missed something akin to this having already been said, but I think that part of the answer to the question is contained in a very general mistake very often made when we think of "causality"; this key observation is presented here in the words of Searle:

"This [...] mistake derives in part from a flawed conception of causation. In our official theories of causation we typically suppose that all causal relationships must be between discrete events ordered sequentially in time [event-event causation]. For example, the shooting caused the death of the victim.

"Certainly, many cause-and-effect relations are like that, but by no means all."

I agree. NB disagreed with action-to-action causation. So what are the other concepts of causation? Entity-to-action causation points in a good direction but is very vague if it is to be used to direct the building of mental models of existence. How do we account for the causation in social dynamics, especially group dynamics where the behaviour of the group determines the actions of the individual? If we don't assume random action to be fundamental to the physical universe (I know, a big IF), how do we account for the causation in quantum fields? How do we account quanta, for that matter? How do we account for causation in the actions of consciousness? By what principle does consciousness move itself?

Paul

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Paul,

Good question:

By what principle does consciousness move itself?

I have been discussing this at length elsewhere, but on a life basis instead of consciousness. So far, I am inclined to call it a primary state (both life and consciousness). I have heard the term "nonphysical existence" spoken, but I don't find much affinity with this concept.

Where I think Dragonfly and I get bogged down is that he wants me to show life as a physical element like a light wave and I am using it in the manner of "state of existence."

Just as the existence of a subparticle, for example, is a primary, an end-in-itself, a starting point, a building block, a "state of existence" for more complex structures, so is life.

Also, I don't like "self-generated action" as a definition of life. This presupposes that nonliving things that generate action can be considered as alive. I much prefer something along the lines of "a temporary state of being as a physical body characterized by birth, growth, death, reproduction, belonging to a group of similar entities (species), and self-generated action." I would also state that the body's existence is neither micro nor macro, but mid-level (I am including the smallest single-cell organisms in "mid-level" size). I just devised that, so it probably could stand some improvement.

That's the best I can do so far.

In light of this, I say that the principle that allows consciousness to move itself is in its very nature. It gives rise to the principle, the principle does not give rise to it. Consciousness does as consciousness is.

Michael

[reason.on]

I agree. NB disagreed with action-to-action causation. So what are the other concepts of causation? Entity-to-action causation points in a good direction but is very vague if it is to be used to direct the building of mental models of existence. How do we account for the causation in social dynamics, especially group dynamics where the behaviour of the group determines the actions of the individual? If we don't assume random action to be fundamental to the physical universe (I know, a big IF), how do we account for the causation in quantum fields? How do we account quanta, for that matter? How do we account for causation in the actions of consciousness? By what principle does consciousness move itself?

Such good and vexing questions...

With regard to "social dynamics", you might find Searle an interesting read. He has written quite a bit about the social domain.

He has one essay online which addresses itself to this topic...

"Social Ontology: Some Basic Principles"

And with regard to consciousness, I can recommend a couple of online repositories that will keep you reading forever...

CogPrints

Chalmer's Online papers

And although I don't know enough at this stage in my life to say with any great confidence whether or how Velmans might be right or wrong, I find his discussions on the relationship between causality and consciousness informative and stimulating. I find myself drawn to his approach, but there are other factors that keep me from accepting it fully...

A few notable excerpts below:

Velmans, Professor Max (2002)

MAKING SENSE OF CAUSAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS AND BRAIN.

Journal of Consciousness Studies

<Rather than contrasting epistemological dualism with epistemological pluralism, in my own work I combine these. That is, I support the view that there are many forms and levels of explanation within both first- and third-person accounts. As Van Gulick notes, pluralism is commonplace in third-person science, with well-defined hierarchies defined by the size and level of organisation of the phenomena, typically ranging from microphysical, macrophysical, chemical, biological, neurophysiological, cognitive/functional, and social levels of organisation.

Nonreductive physicalism usually identifies conscious experience with just one level of this hierarchy, typically the cognitive/functional level that, in turn, supervenes on the brain's neurophysiology.

In my view this is an oversimplification.

Like the forms of material organisation that they accompany, first-person experiences can be described at different levels and may have an ontology at different levels. Some experiences appear to be socially determined, being, in part, social constructions grounded in culture and history (e.g. what it is like to be the Prince of Wales). Others (such as empathy) are quintessentially interpersonal, requiring the presence of at least one other human being (see readings in Thomson, 2001 Between Ourselves). Yet others, such as visual and auditory percepts appear to be largely individual, resulting from the binding of sensory features within an integrated human brain. Under appropriately controlled conditions these features can be further decomposed into the minimally discriminable phenomenal differences studied by psychophysics and so on.[3]

It is important to note that so-called "nonreductive physicalism" is reductive in that it claims conscious experiences to be nothing more than a form of higher order *material organisation* or *cognitive functioning*.

While dual-aspect theory accepts that every distinct experience has a distinct set of third-person physical and/or functional correlates (at social, personal or subpersonal levels of organisation) it resists the physicalist suggestion that such conscious experiences are reducible to their correlates at any of these levels.

Rather, first person accounts of experience and third person accounts of accompanying physical functioning remain complementary and mutually irreducible, *whatever the level of organisation*.>

[snip]

<Unlike "nonreductive physicalism" I do not claim that first-person experiences somehow enter into third-person physical functioning, so I do not need to reduce these experiences to physical events to make good that claim.

Within dual-aspect theory there is a more intuitively plausible option. If the mind is genuinely psychophysical, then an entirely third-person physical view of it gives only a partial view of both its nature and its causal operations. Brain states are genuine phenomena (manifestations of ur mind), viewable from a third-person perspective, but conscious experiences are also genuine phenomena (manifestations of ur mind) viewable from a first-person perspective. Descriptions of brain states can be used to give a detailed account of the operations of mind in terms of its physical manifestations. Descriptions of first-person experience can be used to give an account of the operations of mind in terms of its conscious manifestations. For scientific purposes, third-person accounts are more useful. For everyday purposes, first-person accounts are often more useful. Both are required for an account of mind to be complete.[6]>

[snip]

<However the ontological monism, combined with epistemological dualism that underpins this analysis is not just linguistic philosophy. It is a claim about the basic ontology of mind, its manifestations, and about how we can know its nature and its manifestations. For example, the proposal that first- and third-person perspectives of the mind are complementary and mutually irreducible is a claim about mind and how we can know it in the same sense that wave-particle complementarity is a claim about the nature of light, or electromagnetic energy is a claim about the unified nature of electricity and magnetism. >

[snip]

<Compare this with physicalism. Physicalism draws its scientific respectability from its namesake "physics". However physicalism is a philosophical thesis about the ontological nature of conscious experience, not a field of science. Its claim that first-person phenomenology reduces, without remainder, to states of the brain has no real evidence in its favour (neural causes and correlates are not identities), and massive evidence to the contrary (conscious phenomenology does not resemble brain states). This makes it basically a *faith* in the all-encompassing nature of third-person science—a commitment to a worldview that is immune to falsifying evidence.

If one is looking for an unfalsifiable theory, here it is.>

[snip]

<I develop a dual-aspect, reflexive monism that treads a careful path between taking either a first- or third-person approach to be more privileged or fundamental. Rather, these perspectives are complementary and mutually irreducible.>

[snip]

<I conclude for example that:

"Human minds, bodies and brains are embedded in a far greater universe. Individual conscious representations are perspectival. That is, the precise manner in which entities, events and processes are translated into experiences depends on the location in space and time of a given observer, and the exact mix of perceptual, cognitive, affective, social, cultural and historical influences which enter into the "construction" of a given experience. In this sense, each conscious construction is private, subjective, and unique. Taken together, the contents of consciousness provide a view of the wider universe, giving it the appearance of a 3D phenomenal world. This results from a reflexive interaction of entities, events and processes with our perceptual and cognitive systems that, in turn, represent those entities, events and processes. However, conscious representations are not the *thing-itself*. In this vision, there is *one* universe (the *thing-itself*), with relatively differentiated parts in the form of conscious beings like ourselves, each with a unique, conscious view of the larger universe of which it is a part. In so far as we are parts of the universe that, in turn, experience the larger universe, we participate in a reflexive process whereby the universe experiences itself." (UC, p233).

Later, I add, "In this sense, we participate in a process whereby the universe observes itself – and the universe becomes both the subject and object of experience. Consciousness and matter are intertwined in mind. Through the evolution of matter, consciousness is given *form*. And through consciousness, the material universe is *real-ized.*" (UC, p280). >

RCR

[Paul Mawdsley]

Christian,

Again, thank you! I can see many of my own images in the passages you have quoted. What Valmans says is very real in my mind's eye. It was a moving experience for me to read.

I've never heard of Valmans before now. I have to read more. No, I mean I need to read more! It is my intuitive images, at least as far as it overlaps my own interests and as far as I can tell from these brief snips, put into formal language.

Paul