Proactive Behaviour and Causality

[Paul Mawdsley]

Where, in causality, does proactive behaviour fit in?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Paul,

Proactive behavior is an attribute of life?

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

In reactive behaviour, as suggested by Newton's laws of motion, the energy for action comes from outside the thing that acts; energy is considered to transfer between entities when they interact. The source of energy, in reactive behaviour, is conceived to proceed through an unbroken chain of causality from antecedent events. This is the essence of action-to-action causation.

Proactive behaviour is initiated from within a given entity and is conceived to have no prior necessitating event. In proactive behaviour, where does the energy to initiate action come from? How can our view of causality account for proaction?

Proaction is any action that is initiated from within the entity without an external antecedent cause. Proaction has no external necessitating event. The energy for the initiation of action is contained within the entity. (My dictionary does not contain the word proaction. If there is no such word, consider it invented. There is clearly a concept here waiting to be named.) I think we will find that the entity-to-action view of causation is required to account for proaction.

Proaction is a name for the type of action involved in living things that is distinct from inanimate matter. Self-generated action that is found in animate matter and human will, cannot be integrated into action-to-action causation. It is this self-generated action, or proaction, that is at the heart of Objectivist thinking about existence, especially human existence. How can we integrate proaction into our causal understanding of existence without ending up with causal dualism?

Something to ponder.

Paul

[Dragonfly]

The energy for actions of living beings comes from the food they eat, and the energy therein comes ultimately from the sun. So the energy does come via an unbroken chain of causality from outside the entity.

[Paul Mawdsley]

Dragonfly,

I think you missed the point.

I have to bath the kids and help with homework. I'll be back.

Paul

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

Going back to the very beginning of life with the first microorganism, could you say conclusively that the sun was the energy that caused the birth-growth-death cycle? I'm only mulling...

Paul,

You mentioned causal dualism. That would only happen with existential dualism - and frankly there are two kinds of entities: inanimate and living. I don't see any problem at all with the causation for living things including the same causation as for inanimate ones, but having an added metaphysical attribute. Life is a specific form of existence, so why cannot there be some laws that are specific to it?

When you go quantum, this is one hell of a premise to check.

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

Mid-bath-time:

This brings me back to the discussion that's awaiting the post I promised to Roger re: Dual Aspect theory.

Paul

[Dragonfly]

Michael:

Going back to the very beginning of life with the first microorganism, could you say conclusively that the sun was the energy that caused the birth-growth-death cycle? I'm only mulling...

Energy by radioactive decay in the Earth (with a small role played by meteorite impacts and gravitational energy) may have played a role in the development of the first microorganisms, but now we all get our energy from the sun (perhaps some microorganisms deep down in the Earth excepted, like their predecessors).

[Paul Mawdsley]

Dragonfly,

I don't deny any of what you are talking about but it is not what I am talking about.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

Dragonfly states:

The energy for actions of living beings comes from the food they eat, and the energy therein comes ultimately from the sun. So the energy does come via an unbroken chain of causality from outside the entity.

I did not ask where the energy for action comes from. I asked:

In proactive behaviour, where does the energy to initiate action come from?

The argument for the existence of human will centres on the capacity to initiate actions not necessitated by antecedent events. This idea is causally distinct from the idea that human actions are the result of the same unbroken chain of action-reaction that has been used to describe the motion of inanimate matter.

I will agree with Dragonfly's claim that the energy for most actions of the body comes from an unbroken causal chain of interactions, with origins outside the body, resulting in the storage of potential energy in the body's cells. Where I disagree with Dragonfly is on the point of how this potential energy gets released.

As best as I can determine (Dragonfly, correct me if I am wrong.), Dragonfly's claim is that the potential energy contained inside the cells of the body is only released as the result of the brains REACTIONS to external forces. This is precisely in alignment with Newton's laws of motion and action-to-action causation.

I am saying that this potential energy can be released by one other means, an act of will. The act of making a choice can initiate the release of the body's potential energy and begin a causal chain that was not necessitated by the antecedent conditions inside or outside the body. If this is the case, there is a breakdown in classical physics, and in the action-to-action view of causation upon which it is based.

This would leave us with a state of causal dualism. Classical physics, constructed from the principles of action-to-action causation, is required to explain the actions of the body. Some form of agent-to-action causation– agents being made of a fundamentally different, perhaps unextended substance– would be required to explain an act of will. (This then becomes causal pluralism if we take quantum physics into account.)

Dragonfly denies such causal dualism and rejects agent-to-action causation as a viable option. To discard agent-to-action causation he must argue that the evidence that supports human will is invalid, leading us to a distorted or illusory view of causation in the human psyche. Once this is done, he can maintain a relatively consistent account of existence within the action-to-action causal framework.

I disagree with Dragonfly’s a priori rejection of the evidence of introspection. I don’t just think I witness myself making choices which initiate actions; I do witness myself making choices which initiate my actions. If I don’t doubt the evidence that supports human will, then I must question the nature of causation.

Michael, on the other hand, acknowledges the existence of human will, but does so by obscuring the fact that two distinct concepts of causality are required to account for all the evidence. (At least two, as I have suggested before, current interpretations of quantum theory require two more. Better left for another discussion, but I would suggest that there is a common factor that connects two of the transgressions from action-to-action causation of classical physics, human will and quantum events.)

If different entities, animate and inanimate, are not made of the same stuff, operating on the same principles, then what is the stuff that makes things proactive? Are we not back at substance dualism? Causal dualism is simply the corollary of substance dualism. Fundamentally different stuff interacts in fundamentally different ways. Unextended entities must interact in fundamentally different ways to extended entities.

I’m still struggling to understand just what it means to have “an added metaphysical attribute.” We have divided our experience into inanimate matter, animate matter, and conscious matter. By saying that each of these is an attribute of matter, we are not adding anything to our understanding. We are no closer to understanding WHY these things are different and WHY they behave as they do. This gives the illusion of an explanation without the substance of an explanation. In essence, we are saying matter behaves in three different ways because there are three different ways matter behaves.

I’m not looking to make enemies. Michael and Dragonfly, I respect and like you both. I’ve been wanting to start down this path for some time now. While it may appear that I am being confrontational, I am also seeing this process as one of sharing ideas for a common goal of increasing understanding. I have points of agreement and points of disagreement with you both. It just so happens, at this point in the discussion, I am emphasising my disagreements. One of my main goals is to give you, and anyone else who wants to join in, a target to shoot at. I want to expose my position so others can help me find holes in it. Only when I know I’m mistaken can I seek to improve my thinking. (Charles, how do you like that?)

I want to make it clear where my thinking is coming from. I believe that the basic stuff of reality is fundamentally physical. I believe that one concept of causation can integrate the whole of reality. I believe Aristotle, Ayn Rand, and Nathaniel Branden are on the right track but have not completed the journey. I believe entity-to-action causation is the beginning, but must be developed further. I believe that right here, right now, we are being part of the process.

Fire away.

Paul Mawdsley

[Dragonfly]

Paul:

I am saying that this potential energy can be released by one other means, an act of will.

But what is an "act of will"? It sounds like some mysterious Deus ex machina without any explanation.

The act of making a choice can initiate the release of the body's potential energy and begin a causal chain that was not necessitated by the antecedent conditions inside or outside the body.

How do you know that it was not necessitated by antecedent conditions inside or outside the body? That we still know very little about all those mechanisms doesn't mean that they don't exist. Perhaps one day Jenna can tell us more about those mechanisms.

If this is the case, there is a breakdown in classical physics, and in the action-to-action view of causation upon which it is based.

Right, but before we conclude that classical physics (by which you mean the currently generally accepted physical theories, I assume) must break down for an explanation, I think we'd better look if we can't find an explanation for which such a drastic step is not necessary.

Dragonfly denies such causal dualism and rejects agent-to-action causation as a viable option. To discard agent-to-action causation he must argue that the evidence that supports human will is invalid, leading us to a distorted or illusory view of causation in the human psyche. Once this is done, he can maintain a relatively consistent account of existence within the action-to-action causal framework.

Before you conclude that I must argue that the evidence that supports human will is invalid, you'll have to define what exactly the "human will" is.

As I've argued elsewhere on this forum, the fact that it seems to us as if there are at a certain moment different choices possible, leading to different futures, does not imply that different futures are really possible at that moment. This extremely convincing illusion may very well be explained by the fact that we are not aware of the mechanisms behind our thinking and we therefore can't predict what our thoughts will be. So the choice we'll make will necessarily seem to us still to be open, it's the only way we can think. So I don't deny the concept of "free will" as long as it's realized that this concept only applies to the content of our conscious thoughts (that's what we have to deal with in our daily life), but not to the physical possibility of different futures.

I disagree with Dragonfly’s a priori rejection of the evidence of introspection. I don’t just think I witness myself making choices which initiate actions; I do witness myself making choices which initiate my actions. If I don’t doubt the evidence that supports human will, then I must question the nature of causation.

I don't a priori reject the evidence of introspection, but I think we should not draw hasty conclusions from that evidence. Just as it seems obvious to us that the moon is larger when it's near the horizon than when it's high in the sky (if we didn't know better), it may seem obvious that at any moment different futures are possible, but that is no proof that they are (just as the moon illusion is no proof that the moon is really larger near the horizon). Witnessing yourself making choices is not incompatible with physical mechanisms that have only one outcome, those mechanisms are just invisible to us, by introspection we can observe only our conscious thoughts, not the mechanisms behind those thoughts, and these are the ultimate driving force. This gives a perfect and consistent explanation of why we perceive our consciousness as having free will without the necessity to pose new and mysterious physical theories. The interesting thing is that Searle in one of his articles almost arrives at the same conclusion, were it not that he admits that he just feels that he can't accept it (which seems to me to be more a psychological problem than a scientific argument) and he tries to find solace in the vague notion that the indeterminism of quantum mechanics will somehow solve his uneasiness.

I’m not looking to make enemies. Michael and Dragonfly, I respect and like you both. I’ve been wanting to start down this path for some time now. While it may appear that I am being confrontational, I am also seeing this process as one of sharing ideas for a common goal of increasing understanding. I have points of agreement and points of disagreement with you both. It just so happens, at this point in the discussion, I am emphasising my disagreements.

I see nothing confrontational in your posts. That someone disagrees with you doesn't make him an enemy (although I admit that some people think it does, if you see the behavior on certain forums, but fortunately this is not one of them). For me at least there is a big distinction between attacking some ideas and attacking the person who holds such ideas.

[Roger Bissell]

Paul, you wrote:

If different entities, animate and inanimate, are not made of the same stuff, operating on the same principles, then what is the stuff that makes things proactive? Are we not back at substance dualism? Causal dualism is simply the corollary of substance dualism. Fundamentally different stuff interacts in fundamentally different ways. Unextended entities must interact in fundamentally different ways to extended entities.

I have two questions about this paragraph.

1. Who believes that animate entities are made of different stuff from inanimate entities? As far as I know, there are 100+ chemical elements, and this is the only "stuff" for which we have evidence. All inanimate entities are made up of one or more of these elements, and all animate entities are made up of a number of these elements. Is anyone on O-L seriously entertaining the idea that there is another kind of "stuff" than the chemical elements (and their subatomic particles)?

2. Who believes that there are "unextended" (i.e., non-physical?) entities? As far as I know, extended (physical) entities -- some of which are inanimate and some of which are animate (and of the latter, some are also conscious) -- are the only kinds of entities for which we have evidence. Is anyone on O-L seriously entertaining the idea that there is another kind of entity than the physical entities, some of which are also living and conscious?

Also, I wonder why there is any thought that "stuff" interacts -- let alone "different kinds of stuff" interacting. First, it is entities that interact, not stuff. Secondly, while Descartes, for religious reasons, speculated that there were two kinds of stuff or entities (spiritual and material) that co-inhabited human beings and "somehow" interacted, this dualism has been dumpstered long ago. Are we considering trying to resurrect it on O-L?

REB

[DavidMcK]

Isn't i (the square root of -1) an unextended entitiy?

David

[Roger Bissell]

David wrote:

Isn't i (the square root of -1) an unextended entitiy?

I literally do not know what an "unextended entity" is or could be. I am tempted to be extremely brief and simply say that there is no such thing.

Also, there is no such thing/entity as 1, let alone the square root of -1. These are not entities, but ways that certain entities (human beings) measure things that do exist. (See below.)

But I'm sure that would not be satisfying to you, and it wouldn't get us very far in the discussion.

The glitch between our views is probably due to the fact that you are using a different definition of "entity" that I use. In my understanding, which I base on Peikoff's lectures and Rand's comments in ITOE, an entity is a cohering physical object that persists through time. Every other use of the term "entity" is metaphorical and derives its meaning from this primary meaning. For instance, the mind is not some entity separate or distinct from the body, but instead just a set of capacities and things that a human organism does. (Compare with digestion, which we would not consider as being and "entity.") A number is not some entity separate or distinct from physical entities, but instead just the way a human being grasps something about entities, actions, attributes, and relationships (i.e., measures or counts them); it is a way of being aware of quantity.

But enough about me. Please tell me what you mean by "entity." If you simply mean something that exists, then I think we are already at cross purposes, because in my understanding, there are several kinds of things that exist: entities, attributes, actions, and relationships -- and the latter three are aspects of entities. Aristotle recognized several more kind of things that exist, or Categories, including quantity, but quantities (including numbers) are all quantities of entities. Quantities do not exist apart from entities, except as abstractions -- and abstractions do not exist apart from an entity that takes a special perspective (quantitative) on things that exist.

REB

[Paul Mawdsley]

Roger says:

Who believes that animate entities are made of different stuff from inanimate entities? As far as I know, there are 100+ chemical elements, and this is the only "stuff" for which we have evidence. All inanimate entities are made up of one or more of these elements, and all animate entities are made up of a number of these elements. Is anyone on O-L seriously entertaining the idea that there is another kind of "stuff" than the chemical elements (and their subatomic particles)?

Whether or not anyone on O-L is entertaining the idea that there is another kind of substance than the known elements of physics and their properties is besides the point. Somehow, without changing the physical elements, we go from inanimate to animate matter. How? If we accept the idea that life acts on the principle of self-generated, goal directed action, how do we account for this fundamentally different principle of causation?

The elements of inanimate matter have been shown to operate on the principles of Newton’s laws of motion (at least until we get to quantum events). As I have said, Newton’s laws of motion are the formalization, for the purpose of mathematical manipulation, of action-to-action causation. All properties are abstracted out of entities with the exception of those properties that can be quantified, measured, and mathematically manipulated. On this view, entities are conceived of as being composed of only those properties that can be objectively measured– ie. mass, volume, velocity, etc., and their actions are determined, again, by phenomena that can be objectively measured– ie. momentum, force and energy. In its conception, Newton’s laws of motion assume actions can only be initiated from outside the entity. An external force is required to change momentum. Interaction results in an exchange of energy. On principle, the energy always comes from without.

If the defining nature of life is self-generated action, where does the energy come from to initiate this action? Again, here I am speaking of the initiation of action, not the energy for action in general. Once an action has been initiated, Newton’s laws fit fine.

The way I see it, this problem can be solved one of three ways. Dragonfly suggests we take the first way out: lets assume that proactive behaviour is just an illusion. Every action and interaction in existence can be accounted for in terms of reactions. What I have called “proaction” is just a chain of reactions to an antecedent event, but we cannot observe all the mechanism of these interactions. I find this unsatisfying. (I will try to address Dragonfly’s points more fully shortly.)

The second way of coping with the principle of proaction in a reactive world was provided by Descartes. Substance dualism, with the accompanying causal dualism, allows us to account for the two types of actions we witness, reactions and proactions. This, however, leads us to compatibility problems that are well known.

The third solution is to consider all actions and interactions fundamentally proactions. In this case, inanimate matter would have to be considered a special case. Somehow, something that is intrinsically energetic must account for inanimate matter. Newton’s laws of motion must arise from a proactive foundation. This would take us in a very new direction.

I don’t know if anyone on O-L is “seriously entertaining the idea that there is another kind of "stuff" than the chemical elements (and their subatomic particles).” I don’t know if anyone on O-L is “seriously entertaining the idea that there is another kind of entity than the physical entities, some of which are also living and conscious.” I have seen people disagree with Dragonfly and I have seen no-one suggest that there are proactive entities at the foundation of existence. So I guess I thought the door was being left open to substance and causal dualism.

I happen to agree that dualism should be trashed. Unless I have missed something, that means we should all agree with Dragonfly, or we should start to think about the possibilities of a fundamentally proactive existence. Either way, the idea that we think we can get away with matter having manifestations must be exposed for what it is, self-deception. It has no explanatory power. All it says is that matter is observed as sometimes behaving reactively and sometimes behaving proactively. This is simple categorization of phenomena, adding nothing to our understanding of what things ultimately are or why they behave as they do. Having the illusion of an explanation, it does tend to stop further investigation though.

I will state for the record though, I take option three. I think that makes me very strange indeed. The funny thing is, I think this is the reason I find my view resonates with N. Branden’s ideas about “the mind body problem.” I have eliminated the other options.

Paul Mawdsley

[DavidMcK]

I was seeking an answer, not giving an answer.

David

[Paul Mawdsley]

David,

I tend to think of all numbers as special kinds of fictional entities. We create numbers, in the mind's eye, by abstracting out all properties of entities except for quantity. What makes this fictional entity special is how it can be integrated with specific combining principles to produce the realm of mathematics, and how this realm can be relevantly and powerfully applied to the objective world. Since numbers are entities without spacial dimension, I would say they are unextended entities.

The question is, do these unextended entities interact with the body to cause actions? (Just for fun!)

I just had another connection occur to me. Rand's novels are something like mathematics. In them, by identifying and abstracting out the qualities of characters she had known in her life and reintegrating these elements, she created fictional entities or characters. This established the identity of the entities. She then applied her notion of causality as the combining principle. Along with the general context of each novel, these elements created an idealized reality, a new realm. What makes her fiction special, as with mathematics, is how these fictional realms can be relevantly and powerfully applied to the objective world.

Paul

[DavidMcK]

So would you say Paul, that the ability to regard entities as units is essential to conceptualizing, as well as the ability to regard units as entities (temporarily for the purpose of understanding a relationship)?

Thus i (sorry my italics isn't working) is an imaginary number, existing (imaginition is the genus, number is the differentia) so it is technically not an entitiy, but an aspect of consciousness, but we treat it as an entity for the purpose of performing some mathematical procedures.

? Comment please, your previous post was helpful, and that is a novel way of looking at a novel.

David

[Dragonfly]

All mathematical "entities" are purely abstract, you shouldn't confuse the application of a theory with the theory itself. And don't attach any special meaning to the term "imaginary" in "imaginary number", it's just an arbitrary term, like the term "color" that's used to distinguish different kinds of quarks.

[Roger Bissell]

Paul wrote:

Somehow, without changing the physical elements, we go from inanimate to animate matter. How? If we accept the idea that life acts on the principle of self-generated, goal directed action, how do we account for this fundamentally different principle of causation?  

The elements of inanimate matter have been shown to operate on the principles of Newton’s laws of motion (at least until we get to quantum events)...In its conception, Newton’s laws of motion assume actions can only be initiated from outside the entity. An external force is required to change momentum. Interaction results in an exchange of energy. On principle, the energy always comes from without.  

If the defining nature of life is self-generated action, where does the energy come from to initiate this action? Again, here I am speaking of the initiation of action, not the energy for action in general. Once an action has been initiated, Newton’s laws fit fine.

I thought that all living entities get their energy "from without," too. We eat and drink and take in air and sunlight &c, and we convert the matter and energy into chemicals that our bodies burn for fuel for our metabolism, growth, reproduction, physical motion, awareness, etc.

But perhaps you are asking why or how it is that living entities are able to initiate motion, if we are not just passive responders to our environment. Well, I think it has everything to do with the stored energy that we have taken in previously. For instance, suppose you reach a certain state of low blood sugar. This triggers feelings of hunger, which in turn impel you to seek food. It is you who initiated the action of food-seeking, yet it is the antecedent condition (low blood sugar) that provided the context for stored energy in your body to be released to cause you to feel hungry and then to seek food. In the interest of survival, we are so evolved as to use stored energy in being active responders to both our outside and our inside environments. But in being responders to such conditions, we are being proactive, rather than just letting things (such as starvation or an elephant stampede) happen to us.

In principle, I don't see a conflict or something that needs explaining beyond this. However, I'm sure you could come up with a more complex case that would be too hard for me to deal with. Simple examples like the above (which I think we should stick to, by the way) pretty much exhaust my knowledge of biology.

REB

[Paul Mawdsley]

Roger,

I agree with you fully: if we are to think about basic principles, let's keep the examples simple. When we deal with complex scenarios and complex, or too abstract, language we can loose sight of the truth. I tend to think in very simple terms, even if it is about very complex phenomena. I understand that Einstein believed the closer you got to the truth, the simpler were your descriptions of reality.

You believe that the self-generated action of animate matter, and the action of human will I would assume, can be understood on the principle of active responding. On this point I believe you and Dragonfly are saying the same thing: self-generated action and human will is the result of the consciousness reacting to antecedent conditions which initiate the actions of consciousness. On this view, there is no action of consciousness without a necessitating antecedent event.

I, on the other hand, believe there is a fundamentally proactive element involved in the self-generated action of animate matter and human will. There is a way to causally account for self-generated action and human will whereby actions of consciousness are not initiated by necessitating antecedent events. Although I know this is very strange, when considered against the backdrop of the history of science, I do not make this statement lightly. This is the conclusion I reached 17 years ago in my attempts to identify and integrate the basic principles of Objectivism, both explicit and implicit, that were presented by Ayn Rand and developed further by Nathaniel Branden. I have questioned the idea of proactive causation, I have doubted it, at one point I even disowned it. Despite the fact my life would have been made easier to ignore it, I have always come back to it.

I will try to respond to both your and Dragonfly’s objections as one. I must admit this takes some considerable focus and thought, and may take more than one attempt, because you both have well designed and integrated perspectives. I hope you two don’t mind being “roomies” for the purposes of this discussion. I have started my response but the difficulty of the challenge, and my time constraints, may require some patience. Man, I like a challenge!

Thanks,

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

There is something I find interesting about the dynamics of this discussion. I feel like I am taking the minority position. I am the renegade. I do understand why. In the context of scientific world-views, the position I am taking on the issue of human will is strange, nonsensical, and almost distasteful; the equivalent to claiming the ether exists. But I would say, the idea of proactive causation has a long history, has been implicitly held by more people and is more consistent with the principles of Objectivism than reactive causation.

Consider some statements made by Nathaniel Branden regarding free will:

I write of responsibility as causal agency, as in “I am the cause of my choices, decisions, and actions– I am responsible for them,” (In Aristotle’s formulation: “The principle of motion is within.”)... Self-responsibility implies free will....(Taking Responsibility, p. 43)

Our free will pertains to the choice we make about the operation of our consciousness in any given situation– to focus it with the aim of expanding awareness or unfocus it with the aim of avoiding awareness. (The Six Pillars of Self-Esteem, p. 31)

Free will– in the widest meaning of the term– is the doctrine that human beings are capable of performing actions that are not determined by forces outside their control, that we are capable of making choices that are not necessitated by antecedent factors. (Honoring the Self, p.17)

Don’t worry. I have no interest in making an argument from authority. What Branden says here just resonates with my perspective. I have focussed the discussion on “human will” rather than “free will.” The reason I did this is because I initially wanted to focus on the “will” part of free will. However, I don’t think I should try to escape the need to discuss the “free” part.

The “free” part of free will represents the freedom from the need to react to the incoming causal chain; freedom from action necessitated by antecedent events. The “will” part of free will represents the capacity to initiate a new causal chain not necessitated by antecedent events. This capacity to initiate new causal chains grants us the power and the responsibility to be the architect of our own identity, of our relationships, and of our world. It gives us the power to create new understanding, where none previously existed, by proactively piecing together the elements of existence and building our models of the world. The will is the chisel, the imagination is the clay, where passion first finds expression in the mind, then in the world. The will is the core of the philosopher, the scientist, the craftsman and the artist.

The will does more than simply make choices. This is where my view departs from Branden’s. Branden focusses on the aspect of free will that initiates a specific type of action of consciousness, the act of choice. Specifically, he focusses on the choice “...of expanding awareness or...of avoiding awareness.” While I acknowledge the importance of this, I see will as the core proactive force of the psyche. It is the source of creative energy. Without human will, thinking is automatic, art is automatic, love is automatic, existence is automatic, passion is dead!

“Active responding” does not capture the spirit of passion and creativity I witness in myself. What I do is not just processing information and respond to it according to some complex algorithm. I am able to see the world anew and reevaluate. I create new information that has never before existed. And I am attracted to those who also create new information that has never before existed. Reactive causation cannot account for the creative spirit. The creative spirit is essentially proactive. As a creative spirit, I am essentially proactive.

The funny thing is, reactive causation might be able to account for the actions of the later Ayn Rand and her orthodox followers, but it cannot account for the production of the earlier Ayn Rand. The creative genius that was Ayn Rand was created by continuous, passionate, relentless acts of will. Her fictions can never be understood as “active responding” or “information processing.” Atlas Shrugged is not a reaction, or even a chain of reactions. It is the result of proaction. It is at once an act of, and an intimate description of, the spirit of proaction. It is passionate and heroic creativity symbolized and personified. Atlas Shrugged captured my imagination precisely because it touched my passionate, creative, proactive soul. I will never be convinced it is all just an illusion.

You know, this is not the post I sat down to write tonight. I had about 10 different angles to approach this topic from all lined up in my mind. My difficulty was with organizing the options and choosing my approach. I had, and still have, a multi-levels of abstraction approach coming together in my mind. I was going to talk about the physics of human will. I was going to talk about the physiology of human will. I was going to talk about the perceptual/conceptual information processing of human will. I was going to talk about the effects of human will on individual behaviour (Ethics). I was going to talk about the effects of human will on group dynamics (Politics). I was going to say that each level of abstraction should be perfectly consistent with the others if our perspective is to remain relevant to reality. I was going to say that we assume it is one reality regardless of the level of abstraction we are applying to it and, as such, we should be prepared to examine any level of abstraction.

I set everything I planned to say aside because I could sense that there was something missing from what I was thinking of saying about human will. I knew there was something immediate in my moment-to-moment experience of human will that was lost in the translation to such objective discussions. I wanted to capture what living with free will, here and now, was like because it’s the one perspective missing from my “levels of abstraction” approach. And it’s the one that contains the most personal meaning. Too often we loose ourselves in the objective orientation of consciousness. That is how we can come to loose sight of our own authentically creative, passionately personal perspective. When we loose sight of this perspective, that is when we are vulnerable to losing ourselves in the perspective of others. If we are to have an integrated view of existence, this personal perspective needs to be integrated too.

Paul Mawdsley

[Ellen Stuttle]

Paul wrote:

I see will as the core proactive force of the psyche.

I see will as the core proactive force of animalian motion -- and the problem of "will" as beginning with the first evolutionary hint of voluntary motility.

I'm sorry not to have any time to spare at this juncture for posting on this thread (or any thread where I'd need more than a few minutes' thought in forming a comment). But just to say, you aren't totally the odd man out, Paul. You wrote that you "feel like [you are] taking the minority position."

I'm probably more extreme than you are. (On the other hand, I don't think that Roger and Dragonfly are agreeing, even if at times they might seem to be, since Roger is talking agent causality and Dragonfly is talking strict physics determinism.* I think that on one of the other threads -- I've forgotten which -- there's a post by Dragonfly which I never got around to reading addressing the difference in Roger's and his views of what "determinism" is.)

Ellen

* Edit: on the volition issue. I believe I'm correct in saying that Dragonfly thinks that there's indeterminism on the quantum level. But he thinks that quantum effects wouldn't be relevant in the brain's functioning, that the brain can be considered as a Newtonian system.

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[Roger Bissell]

I have a very interesting book edited by Mary Louise Gill and (Objectivist) James G. Lennox entitled Self-Motion from Aristotle to Newton (1994, Princeton University Press).

I think that Susan Meyer's essay (chap. 4) looks quite intriguing (from skimming it); it's called "Self-Movement and External Causation," and it goes into Aristotle's view that there could be considered to be two causes of a person's actions -- one external to the person and one internal (and thus allowing us legitimately to talk of the person as causing his own actions aka "agent causation"). This suggests to me that Aristotle could be viewed as holding a sort of Compatibilism -- i.e., a view that was compatible with both determinism and self-causing one's own actions, which is my own view.

Two more chapters relate more specifically to the issue of people initiating mental actions (i.e., the free will/determinism issue): Michael Wedin's "Aristotle on the Mind's Self-Motion" and Christopher Shields' "Mind and Motion in Aristotle."

I would like to suggest that we delve into this material. One possible way: others could buy the book, and we could do a chapter study. Another possible way: I could digest/summarize the book, and we could analyze that material.

Any takers on this idea?

REB

[Ellen Stuttle]

I have a very interesting book edited by Mary Louise Gill and (Objectivist) James G. Lennox entitled Self-Motion from Aristotle to Newton (1994, Princeton University Press).

[....]

I would like to suggest that we delve into this material. One possible way: others could buy the book, and we could do a chapter study. Another possible way: I could digest/summarize the book, and we could analyze that material.

Any takers on this idea?

I'm willing to buy the book, but doing so might present problems for others (e.g., Dragonfly would have to buy it at overseas prices). How much is it?

Ellen

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