Theories Of Morality

[studiodekadent]

I have posted this thread because I believe that Ayn Rand's classification of other ethical theories is slightly mistaken, specifically on her use of the term "Altruism" to describe all forms of selflessness.

Altruism (in the Comtean sense, which is the sense that Rand used in her definition of the term) is not merely selflessness. Selflessness means that one's action is not pursued on the basis of self-interest (i.e. your motive is external to the self). Altruism says that your motive must be other people. Hence, the difference is that 'selflessness' refers to what your motive is not, wheras Altruism refers to what your motive is. As a result, altruism is a species of the genus 'selflessness.' The terms are not precise synonyms.

Given the above, allow me to list what I consider to be a more accurate taxonomy of selfless moral theories

1. SELFLESSNESS (Genus), a morality that demands the motive of one's actions be other than the self

1a. Altruism (Species), a morality that demands the motive of one's actions be the good of other people

1ax. Restricted Altruism (Subspecies), a morality that demands the motive of one's actions be the good of some other people (i.e. your race, your economic class)

1b. Kantianism (Species), a morality that demands the motive of one's actions be one of duty to logically-universalizable acontextual maxims

1c. Religionism (Species), a morality that demands the motive of one's actions be obedience to assorted supernatural entities (or a specific supernatural entity)

Utilitarianism would not fit under selflessness. The reason is that Utilitarianism is a consequentialist morality wheras all forms of selflessness are deontological moralities.

[BaalChatzaf]

I have posted this thread because I believe that Ayn Rand's classification of other ethical theories is slightly mistaken, specifically on her use of the term "Altruism" to describe all forms of selflessness.

Altruism (in the Comtean sense, which is the sense that Rand used in her definition of the term) is not merely selflessness. Selflessness means that one's action is not pursued on the basis of self-interest (i.e. your motive is external to the self). Altruism says that your motive must be other people. Hence, the difference is that 'selflessness' refers to what your motive is not, wheras Altruism refers to what your motive is. As a result, altruism is a species of the genus 'selflessness.' The terms are not precise synonyms.

Given the above, allow me to list what I consider to be a more accurate taxonomy of selfless moral theories

1. SELFLESSNESS (Genus), a morality that demands the motive of one's actions be other than the self

1a. Altruism (Species), a morality that demands the motive of one's actions be the good of other people

1ax. Restricted Altruism (Subspecies), a morality that demands the motive of one's actions be the good of some other people (i.e. your race, your economic class)

1b. Kantianism (Species), a morality that demands the motive of one's actions be one of duty to logically-universalizable acontextual maxims

1c. Religionism (Species), a morality that demands the motive of one's actions be obedience to assorted supernatural entities (or a specific supernatural entity)

Utilitarianism would not fit under selflessness. The reason is that Utilitarianism is a consequentialist morality wheras all forms of selflessness are deontological moralities.

What ever happened to Good Manners? If one shows Good Manners to those who have Good Manners we can forget about all these fine philosophical distinctions. The Rabbis and Sages had a saying: Derech Eretz kadmat l'Torah.

Good manners come before God's Law.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[studiodekadent]

What ever happened to Good Manners? If one shows Good Manners to those who have Good Manners we can forget about all these fine philosophical distinctions. The Rabbis and Sages had a saying: Derech Eretz kadmat l'Torah.

Good manners come before God's Law.

Im not precisely sure what your comment relates to. I admit that some of these distinctions are fine, certainly, but they are important distinctions to make. There are cases when fine distinctions in philosophy can produce mass death (eg. "the thing as it appears" versus "the appearance of the thing," the latter alternative producing the (skeptical interpretation of) Kantian philosophy, resulting in german idealism (and its political consequences via Fichte and Hegel) and postmodernism (and its political consequences, such as the West's refusal to celebrate its own virtue, resulting in moral cowardice in the face of religious totalitarianism)). Of course, these distinctions do not produce philosophical determinism or anything of that ilk (as Peikhoff seems to allege) but they are undeniably important.

Of course, if you are asking about the place of good manners in morality, well a code of manners can be practiced out of regard for many codes of ethics. i.e. an altruist may consider good manners a demonstration of putting others before themselves, an egoist may find that practicing a certain code of manners makes the social environment more friendly to himself and his interests, a Kantian may practice good manners out of duty towards a basic principle of 'be polite to others,' etc.

[BaalChatzaf]

Of course, if you are asking about the place of good manners in morality, well a code of manners can be practiced out of regard for many codes of ethics. i.e. an altruist may consider good manners a demonstration of putting others before themselves, an egoist may find that practicing a certain code of manners makes the social environment more friendly to himself and his interests, a Kantian may practice good manners out of duty towards a basic principle of 'be polite to others,' etc.

A well behaved society of well behaved people is the easiest to live in. Folks can get about their rightful, harmless and sometimes productive business with the least complication and cost. Government in such a society can be a rather minimal affair, therefore less likely to produce the litany and dirge of governmental evils.

Your observation that philosophical position do NOT determine political outcomes is quite on point. Philosophical positions, particularly the bad ones, can enable evil-doing or at least disarm objections to it, so they can be dangerous to human life. If both the slave and the task-master accept that slavery is necessary for social existence, then there will be slavery. If otherwise decent folk accept that a certain amount of purging and culling is a requirement for an orderly social-economic-political life then dreadful purges there will be (most likely). Those who object on emotional grounds (galloping compassion and kindness) will not have the weapons necessary to fight off determined killers in the political sphere.

Decent folk have to have the wherewithal for good, just as evil folk must have the wherewithal for evil. So ideas (abstract in and of themselves) have a role to play.

Let me ask you a peripheral question. Would you favor the forceful suppression of Kantian teaching on the grounds that it ultimately leads or -might lead- to totalitarian excesses?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited July 3, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[studiodekadent]

A well behaved society of well behaved people is the easiest to live in. Folks can get about their rightful, harmless and sometimes productive business with the least complication and cost.

I agree entirely. In economic parlance, widespread acceptance and practice of a shared code of courtesy lowers transactions costs.

Let me ask you a peripheral question. Would you favor the forceful suppression of Kantian teaching on the grounds that it ultimately leads or -might lead- to totalitarian excesses?

Well, I am an Objectivist so the answer should be obvious here, but I would emphatically say no to forceful suppression of Kantian teaching. For one, how do we define Kantian? Kant's epistemology, if one uses the skeptical interpretation (i.e. we dont perceive reality) is dangerous as hell, but it is not a settled question whether Kant himself actually advocated this. Second, Kant's ethics, although selfless and duty-based, have some level of individualism in them. He said one should develop one's own moral principles independently of the group (his "Formula of Autonomy") and he was also a political individualist and classical liberal, owing to his belief that the state should not use individuals as a means to its ends. If anything, it was Kant's successors (who substantially modified his system), the German Idealists, that purified and magnified his system's toxicity. Fichte introduced nationalist collectivism, used Kant's epistemology to argue for 'racial truths' and eventually inspired Nazism. Kant reached Marx via Hegel's spiritualism and determinism, and Marx simply replaced "weltgeists" with economic determinism. Bring on Stalin and Mao. However, as shown, it was not Kant himself who introduced the true poison, even though he did make the fatal error (the noumena-phenomena split). As such, determining what counts as Kantian is hard enough.

Secondly, ideas as such are bulletproof. In the age of the internet, suppressing ideas is basically impossible. The only way to defeat bad ideas is by arguing against them.

Thirdly, and most importantly, to suppress Kantianism would violate freedom of conscience. Kantianism in and of itself is not evil, it is wrong, and people have a right to be wrong. People have a right to be stupid, illogical, sexist, racist, homophobic redneck flat-earth creationists, and as idiotic as those ideas are, holding them is not a crime. There can be no such thing as thoughtcrime.

[BaalChatzaf]

Thirdly, and most importantly, to suppress Kantianism would violate freedom of conscience. Kantianism in and of itself is not evil, it is wrong, and people have a right to be wrong. People have a right to be stupid, illogical, sexist, racist, homophobic redneck flat-earth creationists, and as idiotic as those ideas are, holding them is not a crime. There can be no such thing as thoughtcrime.

I agree. Only actions can be crimes. You opinion of Kant is somewhat at odds with Rand's. She characterized Kant as the most evil person whoever lived. Nowhere does she excoriate Hitler or Stalin to the degree she denigrates Kant. Very strange. Rand would have us believe that Kant is The Prince of Darkness. Not so. At worst he is the Prince of Insufficient Light. Mostly he was just wrong. His idea of an indefeasible categorically true synthetic a priori judgment is just plain bogus. It is at the root of all the nonsense in -Critique of Pure Reason-.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Adrian]

What ever happened to Good Manners? If one shows Good Manners to those who have Good Manners we can forget about all these fine philosophical distinctions. The Rabbis and Sages had a saying: Derech Eretz kadmat l'Torah.

Good manners come before God's Law.

Im not precisely sure what your comment relates to. I admit that some of these distinctions are fine, certainly, but they are important distinctions to make. There are cases when fine distinctions in philosophy can produce mass death (eg. "the thing as it appears" versus "the appearance of the thing," the latter alternative producing the (skeptical interpretation of) Kantian philosophy, resulting in german idealism (and its political consequences via Fichte and Hegel) and postmodernism (and its political consequences, such as the West's refusal to celebrate its own virtue, resulting in moral cowardice in the face of religious totalitarianism)). Of course, these distinctions do not produce philosophical determinism or anything of that ilk (as Peikhoff seems to allege) but they are undeniably important.

Of course, if you are asking about the place of good manners in morality, well a code of manners can be practiced out of regard for many codes of ethics. i.e. an altruist may consider good manners a demonstration of putting others before themselves, an egoist may find that practicing a certain code of manners makes the social environment more friendly to himself and his interests, a Kantian may practice good manners out of duty towards a basic principle of 'be polite to others,' etc.

Could the idea of "good manners" perhaps be related/compared to the (neo-)Objectivist virtue of "benevolence" proposed by David Kelley? As I understand it this is a general predisposition towards finding the possibility of fruitful trading/co-operation with others.

Best regards

Adrian

[studiodekadent]

I agree. Only actions can be crimes. You opinion of Kant is somewhat at odds with Rand's. She characterized Kant as the most evil person whoever lived. Nowhere does she excoriate Hitler or Stalin to the degree she denigrates Kant. Very strange. Rand would have us believe that Kant is The Prince of Darkness. Not so. At worst he is the Prince of Insufficient Light. Mostly he was just wrong. His idea of an indefeasible categorically true synthetic a priori judgment is just plain bogus. It is at the root of all the nonsense in -Critique of Pure Reason-.

You are correct that I disagree with Rand's interpretation of Kant. I think that she misconstrues Kant's ethics; she calls them a form of altruism, when although they are a form of selflessness, they are not altruism in the Comtean sense. Nonetheless, I do disagree with Kant's ethics. In epistemology, Rand interprets Kant as an extreme skeptic, and although it is correct that Kant's epistemology did push philosophy in the direction of skepticism and the idea that knowlege is <insert collective here> constructed, whether he himself advocated this is not a settled debate amongst Kant scholars.

As such, I think that Rand's condemnation is best reserved for Kant's successors rather than Kant himself. Kant should be seen not as the most evil man in history, but the most tragically mistaken philosopher of the enlightenment.

[studiodekadent]

Could the idea of "good manners" perhaps be related/compared to the (neo-)Objectivist virtue of "benevolence" proposed by David Kelley? As I understand it this is a general predisposition towards finding the possibility of fruitful trading/co-operation with others.

To an extent you are correct. I would not say that all codes of manners are good (i.e. codes that demand deferring to monarchs, or mass conformity, etc). However it is correct that if a bunch of people agree on a common set of social mores, those people will find it easier to trade with eachother (ceteris paribus). As such, those mores will serve the same purpose as benevolence.

[BaalChatzaf]

You are correct that I disagree with Rand's interpretation of Kant. I think that she misconstrues Kant's ethics; she calls them a form of altruism, when although they are a form of selflessness, they are not altruism in the Comtean sense. Nonetheless, I do disagree with Kant's ethics. In epistemology, Rand interprets Kant as an extreme skeptic, and although it is correct that Kant's epistemology did push philosophy in the direction of skepticism and the idea that knowlege is <insert collective here> constructed, whether he himself advocated this is not a settled debate amongst Kant scholars.

Kant was trying to -undo- the skepticism of David Hume. Kant was no skeptic. He believed knowledge was possible, to wit, knowledge of the phenomena. Of the ding an sich we could know nothing, but of the phenomena given to us in our senses we could have knowledge.

Where Kant differed from the empiricists (and Rand) was believing the mind was an active player in our grasp of the phenomena. He attributed spatial and temporal categories to mind-work, rather than as derivatives of the senses. So for him, mind was not completely primary to sense, but it was an active agent in comprehending and shaping our perceptual and conceptual space.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

... ideas as such are bulletproof. In the age of the internet, suppressing ideas is basically impossible. The only way to defeat bad ideas is by arguing against them.

Andrew,

That is very well said. This is the greatest threat of all to systems of irrational ethics and dictatorships everywhere on earth.

Michael

[studiodekadent]

Kant was trying to -undo- the skepticism of David Hume. Kant was no skeptic. He believed knowledge was possible, to wit, knowledge of the phenomena. Of the ding an sich we could know nothing, but of the phenomena given to us in our senses we could have knowledge.

I would disagree that Hume was a pure skeptic (he certainly rejected the possibility of Cartesian-esque intrinsic knowlege, however that does not imply actual skepticism), for one he believed that at least in political economy we can reach truth (i.e. his defense of classical liberalism, his criticism of mercantilism as economically impossible because continual trade surplusses are inflationary, etc), and also in psychology/ethics (his theory of moral sentiments, although I dont consider it true, he did, so he did believe at least some truth is accessible).

Your interpretation of Kant is certainly a viable one. Im simply pointing out that the skeptical interpretation of Kant (which began with Fichte arguing that Kant's own logic meant that we could not even know that there was a 'thing in itself') is more prevalent and (unfortunately) influential. It certainly held sway over many german idealists, including the aforementioned Fichte. Eventually it was transmitted, via Nietzsche, to Foucault, and as such postmodernist 'sociology of knowlege' and its derivatives (such as so-called multiculturalism, ethical subjectivism, etc) were born.

Where Kant differed from the empiricists (and Rand) was believing the mind was an active player in our grasp of the phenomena.

That is completely correct. Kant believed that our apriori concepts structured our perception (his successors changed this to our economic caste/race/culture/etc structuring our perception). Rand (and Locke (Im not so sure about other Empiricists)) argue that we volitionally use our mental focus and logical integration/differentiation to structure the data from our senses into our concepts, so as such the order is reversed relative to Kant's. However Rand did not believe that the mind was not an active player in acquiring knowlege, quite the opposite (Im sure you have read Kelley's "Evidence Of The Senses" on this point) rather that the mind did not 'interfere' (wrong word) with sensory perception: we perceive things as they appear, rather than (as Kant said) the appearances of things. So yes, the mind has a role according to Rand, but it comes after the senses rather than before/concurrently with the senses.

[studiodekadent]

Andrew,

That is very well said. This is the greatest threat of all to systems of irrational ethics and dictatorships everywhere on earth.

Michael

Michael,

Sincere thanks. Tyranny as we both know depends on restricting knowlege and information. Information and truth are in the end the ultimate foe of statism, which at least partly explains the China-Google affair. But again, thankyou for your compliment.

[BaalChatzaf]

rather than (as Kant said) the appearances of things. So yes, the mind has a role according to Rand, but it comes after the senses rather than before/concurrently with the senses.

Here is a little bit of physiology for you. The retinas of the mammalian eye are forward extensions of the visual cortex which is in the back of the brain. In short, the retina is part of the brain. Now visual perception begins when photons strike the rods and cones in the retina causing a chemical reaction that sends a nerve impulse back to the visual cortex.

Question: where does the brain end and the mind begin? Vision is brain activity from the git-go. -Visual Processing- is brain activity from the git go. There is no before/after. Tell us how to distinguish the mind from the brain. If the mind processes what the eye gathers, where does the pass-off between the eye and the mind take place?

To put the matter straightforwardly where, if anywhere is -your- mind?

I don't have that problem. I do not have a mind. I have three very nice MRI images showing my brain and there is not one sign of a mind. I know for a fact that I have a brain. I have the pictures to prove it. But there is not the slightest clue of a mind located in my head, so if it exists, it must be elsewhere.

I think it is perfectly fair to ask where your mind is located, of what does it consist and what are its laws of operation, since it is you who insists that your mind handles what your senses gather in. Also please suggest a physical method whereby I can detect your mind. Is it possible for -me- to detect -your- mind. How can I verify or test any assertion you make about -your- mind?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited August 11, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

rather than (as Kant said) the appearances of things. So yes, the mind has a role according to Rand, but it comes after the senses rather than before/concurrently with the senses.

Here is a little bit of physiology for you. The retinas of the mammalian eye are forward extensions of the visual cortex which is in the back of the brain. In short, the retina is part of the brain. Now visual perception begins when photons strike the rods and cones in the retina causing a chemical reaction that sends a nerve impulse back to the visual cortex.

Question: where does the brain end and the mind begin? Vision is brain activity from the git-go. -Visual Processing- is brain activity from the git go. There is no before/after. Tell us how to distinguish the mind from the brain. If the mind processes what the eye gathers, where does the pass-off between the eye and the mind take place?

To put the matter straightforwardly where, if anywhere is -your- mind?

I don't have that problem. I do not have a mind. I have three very nice MRI images showing my brain and there is not one sign of a mind. I know for a fact that I have a brain. I have the pictures to prove it. But there is not the slightest clue of a mind located in my head, so if it exists, it must be elsewhere.

I think it is perfectly fair to ask where your mind is located, of what does it consist and what are its laws of operation, since it is you who insists that your mind handles what your senses gather in. Also please suggest a physical method whereby I can detect your mind. Is it possible for -me- to detect -your- mind. How can I verify or test any assertion you make about -your- mind?

Ba'al Chatzaf

This explains everything.

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

x

This explains everything.

--Brant

How so?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

x

This explains everything.

--Brant

How so?

Ba'al Chatzaf

"I do not have a mind."

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

x

This explains everything.

--Brant

How so?

Ba'al Chatzaf

"I do not have a mind."

--Brant

If I have one it is not in my head nor in my thorax (I have seen x-rays of my thorax). So where is my mind? I have a brain and that is sufficient for me to get along. I consider Mind right up there with Spirit and Soul. All bogus concepts. Boojums, is what they are. No empirical evidence for any of the above.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

x

This explains everything.

--Brant

How so?

Ba'al Chatzaf

"I do not have a mind."

--Brant

If I have one it is not in my head nor in my thorax (I have seen x-rays of my thorax). So where is my mind? I have a brain and that is sufficient for me to get along. I consider Mind right up there with Spirit and Soul. All bogus concepts. Boojums, is what they are. No empirical evidence for any of the above.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Mind is only a concept which indicates the conscious and unconscious functioning of the brain. You are denying the existence of concepts. A concept has never shown up on an x-ray, after all, yet every word that is not a proper noun is a concept including all concrete-bound scientific, empirical, interpreted data.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Someone once asked Nathaniel Branden what consciousness was made out of. He replied, "Consciousness."

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

Mind is only a concept which indicates the conscious and unconscious functioning of the brain. You are denying the existence of concepts. A concept has never shown up on an x-ray, after all, yet every word that is not a proper noun is a concept including all concrete-bound scientific, empirical, interpreted data.

--Brant

No one is denying anything.

Concepts are epiphenomena of neural activity. They are the physical result of electro-chemical activity. There is nothing going on in your brain or mine that is not physical. Democritus and Hobbes were right.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

Mind is only a concept which indicates the conscious and unconscious functioning of the brain. You are denying the existence of concepts. A concept has never shown up on an x-ray, after all, yet every word that is not a proper noun is a concept including all concrete-bound scientific, empirical, interpreted data.

--Brant

No one is denying anything.

Concepts are epiphenomena of neural activity. They are the physical result of electro-chemical activity. There is nothing going on in your brain or mine that is not physical. Democritus and Hobbes were right.

Ba'al Chatzaf

If you are saying epistemology is a subcategory of metaphysics, I agree. But then, mind does exist, both as a concept and the associated "electro-chemical activity." You can find a brain in a corpse.

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

If you are saying epistemology is a subcategory of metaphysics, I agree. But then, mind does exist, both as a concept and the associated "electro-chemical activity." You can find a brain in a corpse.

--Brant

And you can't find a mind in a live person if that person is not you. No one has ever found a mind in a body he did not occupy. The only things that are found are physical stuff doing physical things according to the laws of physics.

I suppose one way of finessing the question is to -call- Mind an emergent phenomenon of the underlying physical system. When one says X is en emergent of Y he is really saying I don't understand fully how Y works, and -somehow- a miracle (namely X) happens.

I am a tad uncomfortable with emergence. That is because I am a materialist, reductionist, concrete bound barbarian "mystic of muscle". Muscles, at the very least, are real. Wenn Ich hoehre "emergence" ich entsichern meine Uzi. (When I hear "emergence" I release the safety catch on my Uzi).

Ba'al Chatzaf