Science and philosophy? Or philosophy and science?


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It was a paper on a mathematical and theoretical physics subject, not a paper on philosophy. You didn't read the paper, did you?

Ba'al Chatzaf

The paper contains some philosophical claims and arguments. (I'm beginning to think that you haven't read the paper, at least not carefully.) Why do you think section 11 is titled "Philosophical Remarks related to the Free Will theorem"? Is this merely a fanciful metaphor as well?

I would have no problem if Conway and Kochen had stuck with mathematical and theoretical physics and stayed away from philosophy. They may be brilliant mathematicians, but they stink as philosophers. If some of the philosophical claims they make had been made by a philosopher, you would be all over those claims like a fly on shit. But no, they are mathematicians, and mathematicians never speak nonsense or reason fallaciously, so we should, in effect, put smiley faces after every absurd thing they say.

That's some double standard.

Ghs

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Seems to me that those who know the most about sub-atomic particles don't know enough for their macro-extrapolations which they have the gall to hit us over the head with like the priests speaking Latin guiding the illiterate flock.

--Brant

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It was a paper on a mathematical and theoretical physics subject, not a paper on philosophy. You didn't read the paper, did you?

Ba'al Chatzaf

The paper contains some philosophical claims and arguments. (I'm beginning to think that you haven't read the paper, at least not carefully.) Why do you think section 11 is titled "Philosophical Remarks related to the Free Will theorem"? Is this merely a fanciful metaphor as well?

I would have no problem if Conway and Kochen had stuck with mathematical and theoretical physics and stayed away from philosophy. They may be brilliant mathematicians, but they stink as philosophers. If some of the philosophical claims they make had been made by a philosopher, you would be all over those claims like a fly on shit. But no, they are mathematicians, and mathematicians never speak nonsense or reason fallaciously, so we should, in effect, put smiley faces after every absurd thing they say.

That's some double standard.

Ghs

You didn't read the paper, did you? The main point of their paper was a mathematical result.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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As I said before, the philosophical aspects of this paper are a mess.

Although my Ph.D is in physics, and I know less about philosophy than George, I agree with his comment above and with the substance and spirit of his other comments on the paper.

P.S. I have skimmed the Conway/Kochen article, "The Free Will Theorem," and saved it for study of the technical details.

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It was a paper on a mathematical and theoretical physics subject, not a paper on philosophy. You didn't read the paper, did you?

Ba'al Chatzaf

The paper contains some philosophical claims and arguments. (I'm beginning to think that you haven't read the paper, at least not carefully.) Why do you think section 11 is titled "Philosophical Remarks related to the Free Will theorem"? Is this merely a fanciful metaphor as well?

I would have no problem if Conway and Kochen had stuck with mathematical and theoretical physics and stayed away from philosophy. They may be brilliant mathematicians, but they stink as philosophers. If some of the philosophical claims they make had been made by a philosopher, you would be all over those claims like a fly on shit. But no, they are mathematicians, and mathematicians never speak nonsense or reason fallaciously, so we should, in effect, put smiley faces after every absurd thing they say.

That's some double standard.

Ghs

Fair is fair. Philosophers stink as mathematicians and physicists. Let the reader understand what the main points of a paper are and ignore or down rate the other stuff. Here is the bottom line. There are no deterministic factors that can account for certain quantum states. It is as simple as that. What the observers can observe cannot account for quantum states and measurable quantities associated with the particles themselves cannot account for the quantum states. They just happen. If someone wants to call that "free will" let him do so at the peril of being thought silly. But the main points still hold.

Here is the bottom line:

"Conway and Kochen do not prove that free will does exist. The definition of "free will" used in the proof of this theorem is simply that an outcome is "not determined" by prior conditions, and some philosophers strongly dispute the equivalence of "not determined" with free will." (quoted from the Wiki article on the Free Will Theorem)

I see no problem with this. Do you?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Ba'al Chatzaf

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The paper contains some philosophical claims and arguments. (I'm beginning to think that you haven't read the paper, at least not carefully.) Why do you think section 11 is titled "Philosophical Remarks related to the Free Will theorem"? Is this merely a fanciful metaphor as well?

I would have no problem if Conway and Kochen had stuck with mathematical and theoretical physics and stayed away from philosophy. They may be brilliant mathematicians, but they stink as philosophers. If some of the philosophical claims they make had been made by a philosopher, you would be all over those claims like a fly on shit. But no, they are mathematicians, and mathematicians never speak nonsense or reason fallaciously, so we should, in effect, put smiley faces after every absurd thing they say.

That's some double standard.

Ghs

You didn't read the paper, did you? The main point of their paper was a mathematical result.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I said nothing about the "mathematical result" of the paper, and that has never been an issue in this discussion. I am in no position to assess the mathematical result. My comments were confined solely to the philosophical points. Even if every technical argument in the paper is flawless, the philosophical problems remain.

Why is it so hard for you to understand this? Suppose the authors had attributed the indeterminism of fundamental particles to God instead of to free will, and thereby claimed to have proved the existence of God. Would you still roll over and play brain dead, or might you voice an objection?

I quoted some passages from the paper and stated my objections to them. All you have done so far is fuss and fume. As I have said repeatedly, if you want to defend the points about fundamental particles having "free will" and making "decisions," then be my guest.

I'll even make this easy for you; here is a passage that I didn't quote before:

"However, if our physical axioms are even approximately true, the free will assumption implies the stronger result, that no theory, whether it extends quantum mechanics or not, can correctly predict the results of future spin experiments. It also makes it clear that this failure to predict is a merit rather than a defect, since these results involve free decisions that the universe has not yet made." (My italics.)

Please explain how this talk of "free decisions" by the universe (such terminology recurs throughout the paper) follows from the "mathematical result" of the paper. Do you think the universe makes decisions?

Ghs

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Yes, I read the article. Have you?

Sure.

If you think I have been unfair to Conway, then state what you think is his basic argument (regarding his use of terms like "free will"), and I will respond.

He discusses experiments with spin 1 particles, measuring the square of the spin component of the particles in a certain direction, where the assumption is that the choice of these directions by the experimenter is independent of the information available to him, the information in his past light cone (that is his definition of free will). He then proves that if that assumption is true, the response of those particles in the experiment is also independent of the information that is available to those particles, i.e. the information in the past light cone of those particles. By analogy of the independent decisions of the experimenter he calls that property of the particles then the "free will" of the particles. This is a purely physical definition that has nothing to do with treating particles as conscious entities. That is for example similar to use the term "design" in biology, which does not imply that biological structures are designed by some conscious entity (what the ID proponents of course claim, after all they use the term intelligent design).

As for Rand supposedly being excused for using idiosyncratic definitions, do you excuse her? Have others on OL excused her? On the contrary, she has often been criticized for this practice, and I have been among the critics.

My problem with Rand is not that she uses her own definitions - everyone is free to give his own definitions - but her claim that these are the only true definitions, claiming that the arguments of people who don't use her definitions are therefore wrong.

So why do you give Conway a pass? Because you are impressed by his mathematical abilities? Why should that exempt him from criticism of his sloppy use of philosophical terms?

What is his sloppy use then? The fact that you don't agree with his definition? What is your definition of free will by the way?

In the final analysis, Conway is defending indeterminism, and he doesn't understand that this is not the same thing as free will.

What Conway does is to show that if the experimenter has free will according to his definition, then the particles in those experiments also have free will (according to the same definition). Later in the article he even shows that this assumption is not needed for theories with arbitrary initial conditions (the free state theories). He prefers to use the term "free" over "indeterminate", because the behavior of those particles is not completely random, but that's just a semantic quibble.

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Please explain how this talk of "free decisions" by the universe (such terminology recurs throughout the paper) follows from the "mathematical result" of the paper. Do you think the universe makes decisions?

That's the same thing as blaming Einstein for using the phrase "God doesn't play dice" by taking it literally, while it was obviously a metaphor. When Conway writes about the universe making decisions he means of course just that what happens in the universe at a certain event in space-time, whether that depends on the information of the past light cone of that event. Such anthropomorphizing terms are quite common in science, like particles that "see" something or atoms that "want" something, etc. Nothing to get excited about.

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Please explain how this talk of "free decisions" by the universe (such terminology recurs throughout the paper) follows from the "mathematical result" of the paper. Do you think the universe makes decisions?

That's the same thing as blaming Einstein for using the phrase "God doesn't play dice" by taking it literally, while it was obviously a metaphor. When Conway writes about the universe making decisions he means of course just that what happens in the universe at a certain event in space-time, whether that depends on the information of the past light cone of that event. Such anthropomorphizing terms are quite common in science, like particles that "see" something or atoms that "want" something, etc. Nothing to get excited about.

And that is precisely what is wrong, the cry to not get excited over anthropomorphizing - because it too quickly turns to being taken more than as 'colorful' speech, to say nothing of the fact it has no business in science writing... that it is considered 'quite common' betrays the science in which it appears...

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Please explain how this talk of "free decisions" by the universe (such terminology recurs throughout the paper) follows from the "mathematical result" of the paper. Do you think the universe makes decisions?

That's the same thing as blaming Einstein for using the phrase "God doesn't play dice" by taking it literally, while it was obviously a metaphor. When Conway writes about the universe making decisions he means of course just that what happens in the universe at a certain event in space-time, whether that depends on the information of the past light cone of that event. Such anthropomorphizing terms are quite common in science, like particles that "see" something or atoms that "want" something, etc. Nothing to get excited about.

And that is precisely what is wrong, the cry to not get excited over anthropomorphizing - because it too quickly turns to being taken more than as 'colorful' speech, to say nothing of the fact it has no business in science writing... that it is considered 'quite common' betrays the science in which it appears...

Qualified anthropomorphism do have a place in science writing. They make the papers more interesting and easier to grasp. Anthropomorphism is an "intuition pump" to use Dennett's term. As long as the technical points made by the paper are not confused or distorted by anthropomorphic terminology, there is no harm done. There is no Law of Nature that says scientific and mathematical writing has to be dry and constipated.

The use of simile and metaphor in scientific writing is perfectly permissible as long as the substantial points being made are not lost in the facon de parler.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited by BaalChatzaf
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Qualified anthropomorphism does have a place in science writing. They make the papers more interesting and easier to grasp. Anthropomorphism is an "intuition pump" to use Dennett's term. As long as the technical points made by the paper are not confused or distorted by anthropomorphic terminology, there is no harm done. There is not Law of Nature that says scientific and mathematical writing has to be dry and constipated.

The use of simile and metaphor in scientific writing is perfectly permissible as long as the substantial points being made are not lost in the facon de parler.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Bob,

I apologize for not having followed all the nuances of this elaborate discussion. I would just like clarity on one point: you still deny the existence of consciousness and human volition, right?

There is some solace to be found in immutability.

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What is his sloppy use then?

Oh, I don't know -- I guess it's things like the claim that "fundamental particles are continually making their own decisions," and that if prediction is impossible, this is "for the very good reason that they may not yet have decided what this will be!" -- and that "these results involve free decisions that the universe has not yet made."

Such passages (and there are more) strike me as very sloppy uses of the term "decisions" and "decided." But then Einstein said that God doesn't play dice with the universe, so I guess Conway and Kochen can say whatever they like -- they could even say that fundamental particles move according to the arbitrary decrees of a frivolous god -- and you would defend them. (Never mind that Einstein didn't publish the "dice" remark in a technical paper. It is a paraphrase of something he wrote in a letter to Max Born.)

The fact that you don't agree with his definition?

The authors do far more than play fast and loose with the term "free will." As noted above, they speak of the "decisions" of fundamental particles, and they say we cannot predict their behavior because the particles haven't "decided" what they are going to do yet.

What is your definition of free will by the way?

I'm not going to get into that here, but I will tell you this much: Before something can have "free will" it must first have a will. And before something can make decisions, it must first be able to deliberate.

He prefers to use the term "free" over "indeterminate", because the behavior of those particles is not completely random, but that's just a semantic quibble.

I suppose if the authors spoke of fundamental particles as being "angry" or "in love," that would be a semantic quibble as well.

Aristotle claimed that objects fall to earth because they are seeking their natural resting place. Of course, to disagree with Aristotle would just be a semantic quibble, because objects do in fact fall. He was just using colorful, anthropomorphic language.

Ghs

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Qualified anthropomorphism does have a place in science writing. They make the papers more interesting and easier to grasp. Anthropomorphism is an "intuition pump" to use Dennett's term. As long as the technical points made by the paper are not confused or distorted by anthropomorphic terminology, there is no harm done. There is not Law of Nature that says scientific and mathematical writing has to be dry and constipated.

The use of simile and metaphor in scientific writing is perfectly permissible as long as the substantial points being made are not lost in the facon de parler.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Bob,

I apologize for not having followed all the nuances of this elaborate discussion. I would just like clarity on one point: you still deny the existence of consciousness and human volition, right?

There is some solace to be found in immutability.

Human volition is a manifestation of neurons a-popping. I certainly do not deny that. Human conscious is a physical process which we do not understand all that well.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Aristotle claimed that objects fall to earth because they are seeking their natural resting place. Of course, to disagree with Aristotle would just be a semantic quibble, because objects do in fact fall. He was just using colorful, anthropomorphic language.

Ghs

Aristotle said heavy things fall (assume a lower position) because that is their end purpose. Newton said things fall because the earth exerts a force on them. Einstein said things fall because they travel the shortest distance in a curved space-time manifold.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Human volition is a manifestation of neurons a-popping. I certainly do not deny that. Human conscious is a physical process which we do not understand all that well.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Thanks for clarifying. So basically you just deny that there is consciousness apart from physical reality--that the former reduces to the latter. Right? Yet you embrace free will over determinism. It strikes me that you may have modified your views somewhat since the discussions we used to have on RoR. Fascinating P-O-V...

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Anthropomorphism is an "intuition pump" to use Dennett's term. As long as the technical points made by the paper are not confused or distorted by anthropomorphic terminology, there is no harm done.

Bob K,

Your citation of Daniel Dennett is not a confidence builder.

A philosopher of mind should know better than to liken all possible genomes to a library.

There are other instances where his points have been confused or distorted by his use of anthropomorphic technology.

Robert C

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Your citation of Daniel Dennett is not a confidence builder.

Ah Dennett, at last a sensible philosopher.

A philosopher of mind should know better than to liken all possible genomes to a library.

Anyone who has read Dennett knows that his metaphor of the library of Mendel is inspired on Borges' library of Babel, an abstract multidimensional space that nobody will confuse with a real library. It is isomorph with Dawkins' genetic space. Or are those poor philosophers also confused by the use of the word "space" for more than 3 dimensions or even infinite dimensions?

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Ah Dennett, at last a sensible philosopher.

I dig Daniel Dennett the same way I dig David Hume. They both make so much sense.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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  • 9 months later...

Stephen,

That looks like a very good book.

I am still struggling with the first one, but what I have been able to take from it has been useful to my overall understanding of the brain and the mind. I have no doubt when I'm done with the first one, this one will be much easier (obviously I'm interested).

Still, it's like chipping at a boulder with a claw hammer. I'll get through eventually.

Meanwhile, chip... chip... chip...

:)

Michael

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  • 2 months later...

.

Seems to weigh against first paragraph of Boydstun #89:

Predictions in the Brain

Moshe Bar, editor

(Oxford 2011)

I will suppress my urge to buy this book now and wait until I can get it used.

Stephen, you have nearly busted my piggy-bank with your book recommendations.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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  • 2 months later...
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