Science and philosophy? Or philosophy and science?

[Selene]

Ba'al:

Reminds me of Bill Cosby's story of going to Ray Charles hotel room and finding the door open he walks in and asks, "Hey Ray, where are you?"

A voice comes out of the other room which is pitch black, "I'm shaving."

And as Cosby says, you know how sometimes as you say something, your mind goes NOOOOO!, well Bill says that he yells out "Ray! What are you crazy ...

How the hell can you shave in the dark................!"

Adam

[Guyau]

Neurobiologists Chasing Animal Consciousness

Anybody Home?

Susan Gaidos

Science News (12/19/09)

D.B. Edelman and A.K. Seth (2009)

[anonrobt]

Self-Awareness Deficit and Autistic Brain

Aha! That gives me a clue to why I have so much trouble with introspection.

Ba'al Chatzaf

You really don't see yourself?

What, then, do you see?

Do you ask a blind man what he sees? I am an Aspergarian. I am mostly mind blind. I do not read other people and their intentions very well and I am unable to dig very far into myself either. What is see is what I get.

Ba'al Chatzaf

No - you do not say you do not see, only that you do not see yourself - so, what then do you see instead? as you do infer you have a self, so then you see something...

[BaalChatzaf]

No - you do not say you do not see, only that you do not see yourself - so, what then do you see instead? as you do infer you have a self, so then you see something...

I have nowhere the sense of myself that you Normals have. My grasp of me is rather superficial. I am much more focused on what is going on outside my skin, than what is going on inside.

Even though I am mind-blind I have developed by empirical and inductive means a set of rules which enables me to navigate among the Normals so as to make life easier for both me and them. I am married to a Normal and most of my children are Normals so it behooves me to grasp as much as I can of their ways, even if it is not by "natural" intuitive means. By the time I was twenty five, I would do as much interpretation, by empirical and inductive means, that a five or six year old could do intuitively. I am in my mid seventies so I now know enough to "pass" for human without too much difficulty. Every now and again I stumble over my literal-mindedness, but that is a minor inconvenience.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[merjet]

Neurobiologists Chasing Animal Consciousness

Anybody Home?

Susan Gaidos

Science News (12/19/09)

D.B. Edelman and A.K. Seth (2009)

David Edelman is the son of Gerald Edelman.

I have read only a little of the article so far, but it is very interesting. Thanks for the alert.

[BaalChatzaf]

Self-Awareness Deficit and Autistic Brain

Bingo! The story of my life. Fortunately I am a high function autistic, (that is how Aspies are classified) so I can get along by substituting an empirical processing of externalities for introspection which I rarely do and when I do it, it is kind of shallow and superficial. Deep down there is nothing much to see. My existence is largely defined by interaction with entities and processes external to me.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[jeffrey smith]

Self-Awareness Deficit and Autistic Brain

Bingo! The story of my life. Fortunately I am a high function autistic, (that is how Aspies are classified) so I can get along by substituting an empirical processing of externalities for introspection which I rarely do and when I do it, it is kind of shallow and superficial. Deep down there is nothing much to see. My existence is largely defined by interaction with entities and processes external to me.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Whereas for me, being a fifty year old autistic, introspection is my default state; to process external reality requires a willed decision to do so and to keep on doing so, and even in doing so, I am aware that I am perceiving and am aware of the effect those perceptions have on me.

This is one example of why autism is a spectrum syndrome: not every autistic demonstrates the same characteristics.

There is a bundle of symptoms which most autistics have, but most do not have the full complement.

Jeffrey S.

[BaalChatzaf]

MSK: Spammer.

Life is not a self sustained process. It requires an external energy source. A self sustained process would violate the first and second laws of thermodynamics. That is wy us living critters have to eat.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

We need a philosophy to guide us in living life. There is no other reason to develop a philosophy. With no knowledge of the science of life, we cannot develop and test the ideas that are supposed to answer that need. Therefore, we cannot understand philosophy without science.

The ancient Greeks developed some of the best ethical theories ever conceived, yet their knowledge of the "science of life" (I assume this refers to the biological sciences) was rudimentary at best.

One does not need knowledge of science to understand philosophy. The sciences (in the modern sense) depend on specialized observations, whereas philosophy appeals to common experience. This is not to say that the conclusions of science are necessarily irrelevant to philosophy, but when scientists extrapolate from their fields of expertise and make grand pronouncements, they are sometimes doing bad philosophy, not good science.

Ghs

[Dragonfly]

One does not need knowledge of science to understand philosophy. The sciences (in the modern sense) depend on specialized observations, whereas philosophy appeals to common experience. This is not to say that the conclusions of science are necessarily irrelevant to philosophy, but when scientists extrapolate from their fields of expertise and make grand pronouncements, they are sometimes doing bad philosophy, not good science.

Science has shown that "common experience" can lead to completely wrong ideas about reality. Philosophers without a scientific background just don't understand how the results of modern physics have fundamentally destroyed the "common sense" ideas about reality, they fight a rearguard action, they're hopelessly out of date. Fortunately there are still knowledgeable philosophers, like Bernard d'Espagnat. His On Physics and Philosophy is a must-read for any philosopher who wants to understand what "reality" means.

From the foreword:

Unfortunately, the split that presently exists between scientists and philosophers means that many of the latter tend to simply ignore recent scientific advances, which makes them miss the point that, by blocking some traditional perspectives, such findings may well open promising new ones. For example, some philosophers do still make unrestricted use of classical notions of quite a general nature, such as locality, distinguishability, etc., taken to be obvious ever since Galileo's and Newton's times. Most of them do so without realizing that the domains of validity of such notions are known, nowadays, to be severely limited. Ironically, some even condemn - as "unduly exploiting scientific data" - any use made of the findings of such great twentieth-century physicists as Louis de Broglie, Dirac, Feynman and Heisenberg. They thereby overlook the fact that the said findings are the very ones that invalidate unrestricted use of the classical notions in question and thereby open bright new fields for philosophical thinking.

and

Maybe this is, even now, the attitude of mind that a few epistemologists entertain toward present-day physics. However, if this is the case I claim that these searchers are in the wrong. To me it seems quite clear that whoever expresses himself, even on matters as general as those epistemology deals with, tacitly refers to a world view, be it only to draw from it the concepts his or her statements will bind together. Now, during the twentieth century, science - mainly though one of its branches, physics - brought about such momentous changes in the possible representations of the world, it so drastically ruled out notions hitherto considered obvious, that reasoning on epistemological matters without taking such developments into account has become inconsistent.

[George H. Smith]

One does not need knowledge of science to understand philosophy. The sciences (in the modern sense) depend on specialized observations, whereas philosophy appeals to common experience. This is not to say that the conclusions of science are necessarily irrelevant to philosophy, but when scientists extrapolate from their fields of expertise and make grand pronouncements, they are sometimes doing bad philosophy, not good science.

Science has shown that "common experience" can lead to completely wrong ideas about reality. Philosophers without a scientific background just don't understand how the results of modern physics have fundamentally destroyed the "common sense" ideas about reality, they fight a rearguard action, they're hopelessly out of date. Fortunately there are still knowledgeable philosophers, like Bernard d'Espagnat. His On Physics and Philosophy is a must-read for any philosopher who wants to understand what "reality" means.

I don't have any trouble understanding what reality "means" without reading d'Espagnat. Do you?

In fact, if I did't already understand a lot of reality prior to reading d'Espagnat, his words would appear to me as nothing more than random marks without meaning. A future scientist has already incorporated a good deal of common experience, such as language, before he takes his first high school science class.

As for "completely wrong ideas about reality," both philosophy and science have produced these.

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

I don't have any trouble understanding what reality "means" without reading d'Espagnat. Do you?

In fact, if I did't already understand a lot of reality prior to reading d'Espagnat, his words would appear to me as nothing more than random marks without meaning. A future scientist has already incorporated a good deal of common experience, such as language, before he takes his first high school science class.

As for "completely wrong ideas about reality," both philosophy and science have produced these.

Ghs

Your common sense experience in the world at man-size scales does not tell you that every thing is made up of atoms and the atoms consist of yet smaller pieces. Your common sense experience tells you that velocities add (Galilean transform). In fact this is wrong. Your common sense notions of simultaneity are equally wrong. Common sense tells you the sun moves around the earth which does not move at all. And so on and so on.

A physicist has to unlearn a great deal of common sense in order to do physics right.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited May 19, 2010 by BaalChatzaf

[Dragonfly]

I don't have any trouble understanding what reality "means" without reading d'Espagnat. Do you?

Yes, I do, even after reading d'Espagnat. The question is far from trivial. Now I knew of course already a lot of what d'Espagnat writes, but the book gave me also much additional information. I just browsed it a bit, and I can't wait to reread it, it's so much richer and more interesting than the trivial Randian theories.

In fact, if I did't already understand a lot of reality prior to reading d'Espagnat, his words would appear to me as nothing more than random marks without meaning. A future scientist has already incorporated a good deal of common experience, such as language, before he takes his first high school science class.

Of course you must have some basis to start from, but it's unavoidable that that basis which is formed by our experiences in a macroscopic world with low velocities, contains serious errors, that must be unlearned at a later stage, as the new world view cannot be experienced intuitively but has to be learned through hard labor.

As for "completely wrong ideas about reality," both philosophy and science have produced these.

No doubt, but it is science that can give us the answers as that is the only discipline where the ideas are tested.

[9thdoctor]

William Parkar and Barry Bert are spammers, that's pretty obvious. Best to ignore them but above all, not include their posts in a reply.

[George H. Smith]

I don't have any trouble understanding what reality "means" without reading d'Espagnat. Do you?

In fact, if I didn't already understand a lot of reality prior to reading d'Espagnat, his words would appear to me as nothing more than random marks without meaning. A future scientist has already incorporated a good deal of common experience, such as language, before he takes his first high school science class.

As for "completely wrong ideas about reality," both philosophy and science have produced these.

Ghs

Your common sense experience in the world at man-size scales does not tell you that every thing is made up of atoms and the atoms consist of yet smaller pieces. Your common sense experience tells you that velocities add (Galilean transform). In fact this is wrong. Your common sense notions of simultaneity are equally wrong. Common sense tells you the sun moves around the earth which does not move at all. And so on and so on.

A physicist has to unlearn a great deal of common sense in order to do physics right.

Ba'al Chatzaf

First, I spoke of "common experience," not "common sense." Philosophy, unlike science, does not rely on specialized observations. That's why there are no authorities in philosophy, whereas, when we are unable to replicate the observations (or calculations) of scientists, we have no choice but to appeal to authorities in science.

Second, it is not within the province of philosophy to tell us what the ultimate constituents of existence are or to discover astronomical truths. Such knowledge falls solely within the province of science. Philosophy becomes relevant only when philosophical conclusions are drawn from scientific research.

For example, when a "high-powered" Princeton mathematician tell us that subatomic particles have "free will" and that a "particle has a choice" about how it will move, his credentials do not exempt him from philosophers pointing out that he has drawn an unwarranted (and rather silly) conclusion. See:

http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S23/69/84A24/index.xml?section=announcements

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

For example, when a "high-powered" Princeton mathematician tell us that subatomic particles have "free will" and that a "particle has a choice" about how it will move, his credentials do not exempt him from philosophers pointing out that he has drawn an unwarranted (and rather silly) conclusion. See:

http://www.princeton...n=announcements

Ghs

First of all they are high power mathematicians. Conway is probably the greatest mathematical genius since Ramanujin. Second of all the "Free Will Theorem" is a mathematical theorem, somewhat fancifully named. You took it literally. That was a mistake.

Did you bother reading the paper? Maybe if you did you would know what they were talking about. The spin of a subatomic particle is not determined by any data available to those doing the spin measurement nor is it determined by any measurable property possessed by the particle. That is why the authors Kochen and Conway chose to use the fanciful name "free will" for the theorem. The proof they give does not prove free will exists in the sense that philosophers mean the phrase.

Read the paper. Then decide if it is nonsense.

Here is the URL: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0604/0604079v1.pdf

Also related to the question of whether quantum states are determined is the work of J.S.Bell (no deceased). He was able to show that if there were deterministic causative factors for certain quantum states a set of inequalities would hold correlating the behavior of two entangle particles. By experimental means, it has been shown these inequalities do not hold which implies that the quantum states of the particles are not determined. They happen when measured. Bottom line: there are no local hidden variables, which is the technical term for the unobserved factors the could "cause" quantum states. There is a genuine indeterminism at work.

See : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

For example, when a "high-powered" Princeton mathematician tell us that subatomic particles have "free will" and that a "particle has a choice" about how it will move, his credentials do not exempt him from philosophers pointing out that he has drawn an unwarranted (and rather silly) conclusion. See:

http://www.princeton...n=announcements

Ghs

First of all they are high power mathematicians. Conway is probably the greatest mathematical genius since Ramanujin. Second of all the "Free Will Theorem" is a mathematical theorem, somewhat fancifully named. You took it literally. That was a mistake.

When Conway says that a "particle has a choice," is it also a mistake to take this literally? Is Conway capable of speaking in anything other than fanciful metaphors?

The article characterizes Conway's position as follows: "The gist of it is this: They say they have proved that if humans have free will, then elementary particles -- like atoms and electrons -- possess free will as well."

This sounds like much more than a "mathematical theorem" to me; it sounds like a muddled philosophical conclusion based on a mathematical theorem. And I don't care how great of a mathematician Conway is; this is nonsense, pure and simple. Mathematicians and scientists are as capable of speaking philosophical gibberish as anyone else.

Ghs

[Dragonfly]

When Conway says that a "particle has a choice," is it also a mistake to take this literally? Is Conway capable of speaking in anything other than fanciful metaphors?

The article characterizes Conway's position as follows: "The gist of it is this: They say they have proved that if humans have free will, then elementary particles -- like atoms and electrons -- possess free will as well."

This sounds like much more than a "mathematical theorem" to me; it sounds like a muddled philosophical conclusion based on a mathematical theorem. And I don't care how great of a mathematician Conway is; this is nonsense, pure and simple. Mathematicians and scientists are as capable of speaking philosophical gibberish as anyone else.

Did you read the article? Speaking about particles that possess free will is no more nonsense than speaking about "the virtue of selfishness" or "the benevolent universe". But Rand is always excused when she uses her own ideosyncratic definitions, the argument being that as long as she gives a clear definition of her own terms, there's nothing wrong with it. So why not apply that same principle when mathematicians and physicists use their jargon with its typical definitions? If you can tell us why the conclusions in that article are wrong, using the definitions given in that article, then I'd like to hear that. When scientists talk about "no free lunch theorems", "cosmic censorship", "God playing or not playing dice", or "color", "flavor", "charm" when talking about quarks, you shouldn't interpret them literally in the everyday sense either.

[BaalChatzaf]

When Conway says that a "particle has a choice," is it also a mistake to take this literally? Is Conway capable of speaking in anything other than fanciful metaphors?

The article characterizes Conway's position as follows: "The gist of it is this: They say they have proved that if humans have free will, then elementary particles -- like atoms and electrons -- possess free will as well."

This sounds like much more than a "mathematical theorem" to me; it sounds like a muddled philosophical conclusion based on a mathematical theorem. And I don't care how great of a mathematician Conway is; this is nonsense, pure and simple. Mathematicians and scientists are as capable of speaking philosophical gibberish as anyone else.

Ghs

Read the f***ing paper in arxivx!

It is sufficiently well annotated that you don't need to grasp all of the mathematical formalism. In the context of the paper he defines his terms quite clearly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

When Conway says that a "particle has a choice," is it also a mistake to take this literally? Is Conway capable of speaking in anything other than fanciful metaphors?

The article characterizes Conway's position as follows: "The gist of it is this: They say they have proved that if humans have free will, then elementary particles -- like atoms and electrons -- possess free will as well."

This sounds like much more than a "mathematical theorem" to me; it sounds like a muddled philosophical conclusion based on a mathematical theorem. And I don't care how great of a mathematician Conway is; this is nonsense, pure and simple. Mathematicians and scientists are as capable of speaking philosophical gibberish as anyone else.

Ghs

Read the f***ing paper in arxivx!

It is sufficiently well annotated that you don't need to grasp all of the mathematical formalism. In the context of the paper he defines his terms quite clearly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I did read the article, though I had to skim the technical parts.

Two things are clear. First, when Conway speaks of particles making free decisions, he isn't just using a fanciful metaphor, as you claimed.

Second, Conway's philosophical reasoning is a mess. Every key point he wants to make could have been made more clearly without dragging in the notion of "free will" at all.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

When Conway says that a "particle has a choice," is it also a mistake to take this literally? Is Conway capable of speaking in anything other than fanciful metaphors?

The article characterizes Conway's position as follows: "The gist of it is this: They say they have proved that if humans have free will, then elementary particles -- like atoms and electrons -- possess free will as well."

This sounds like much more than a "mathematical theorem" to me; it sounds like a muddled philosophical conclusion based on a mathematical theorem. And I don't care how great of a mathematician Conway is; this is nonsense, pure and simple. Mathematicians and scientists are as capable of speaking philosophical gibberish as anyone else.

Did you read the article? Speaking about particles that possess free will is no more nonsense than speaking about "the virtue of selfishness" or "the benevolent universe". But Rand is always excused when she uses her own ideosyncratic definitions, the argument being that as long as she gives a clear definition of her own terms, there's nothing wrong with it. So why not apply that same principle when mathematicians and physicists use their jargon with its typical definitions? If you can tell us why the conclusions in that article are wrong, using the definitions given in that article, then I'd like to hear that. When scientists talk about "no free lunch theorems", "cosmic censorship", "God playing or not playing dice", or "color", "flavor", "charm" when talking about quarks, you shouldn't interpret them literally in the everyday sense either.

Yes, I read the article. Have you?

If you think I have been unfair to Conway, then state what you think is his basic argument (regarding his use of terms like "free will"), and I will respond.

As for Rand supposedly being excused for using idiosyncratic definitions, do you excuse her? Have others on OL excused her? On the contrary, she has often been criticized for this practice, and I have been among the critics.

So why do you give Conway a pass? Because you are impressed by his mathematical abilities? Why should that exempt him from criticism of his sloppy use of philosophical terms?

Conway's use of "free will" is nothing new; Arthur Eddington made similar statements, though his were not as silly as Conway's.

In the final analysis, Conway is defending indeterminism, and he doesn't understand that this is not the same thing as free will.

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

When Conway says that a "particle has a choice," is it also a mistake to take this literally? Is Conway capable of speaking in anything other than fanciful metaphors?

The article characterizes Conway's position as follows: "The gist of it is this: They say they have proved that if humans have free will, then elementary particles -- like atoms and electrons -- possess free will as well."

This sounds like much more than a "mathematical theorem" to me; it sounds like a muddled philosophical conclusion based on a mathematical theorem. And I don't care how great of a mathematician Conway is; this is nonsense, pure and simple. Mathematicians and scientists are as capable of speaking philosophical gibberish as anyone else.

Did you read the article? Speaking about particles that possess free will is no more nonsense than speaking about "the virtue of selfishness" or "the benevolent universe". But Rand is always excused when she uses her own ideosyncratic definitions, the argument being that as long as she gives a clear definition of her own terms, there's nothing wrong with it. So why not apply that same principle when mathematicians and physicists use their jargon with its typical definitions? If you can tell us why the conclusions in that article are wrong, using the definitions given in that article, then I'd like to hear that. When scientists talk about "no free lunch theorems", "cosmic censorship", "God playing or not playing dice", or "color", "flavor", "charm" when talking about quarks, you shouldn't interpret them literally in the everyday sense either.

Yes, I read the article. Have you?

If you think I have been unfair to Conway, then state what you think is his basic argument (regarding his use of terms like "free will"), and I will respond.

As for Rand supposedly being excused for using idiosyncratic definitions, do you excuse her? Have others on OL excused her? On the contrary, she has often been criticized for this practice, and I have been among the critics.

So why do you give Conway a pass? Because you are impressed by his mathematical abilities? Why should that exempt him from criticism of his sloppy use of philosophical terms?

Conway's use of "free will" is nothing new; Arthur Eddington made similar statements, though his were not as silly as Conway's.

In the final analysis, Conway is defending indeterminism, and he doesn't understand that this is not the same thing as free will.

Ghs

Forget the article. Did you read the Conway-Kochen paper which was the subject of the article? Did you? Did you? You are taking a second hand account as though it were a primary. Shame on you! I provide you with the URL to arxiv. Now why don't you read the paper and see what Conway and Kochen had to say. By the way, Conway is well known (by those who read mathematical papers) as a very playful character, so he is inclined to use terms metaphorically to spice up otherwise daunting technical material. Ditto for Kochen who is famous for a "no go" theorem.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

For those who have not read the Conway/Kochen article, "The Free Will Theorem," the following is an excerpt from their "closing remarks":

"The world it presents us with is a fascinating one, in which fundamental particles are continually making their own decisions. No theory can predict exactly what these particles will do in the future for the very good reason that they may not yet have decided what this will be! Most of their decisions, of course, will not greatly affect things — we can describe them as mere ineffectual flutterings, which on a large scale almost cancel each other out, and so can be ignored." (My italics.)

Two quick observations:

First, Conway and Kochen don't merely speak of the indeterminism of fundamental particles; rather, they expressly attribute this indeterminism to "decisions" by these particles.

Second, Conway and Kochen place their discussion in the context of traditional debates over free will versus determinism. They defend free will in experimenters and give the following as one of their reasons:

"It is hard to take science seriously in a universe that in fact controls all the choices experimenters think they make. Nature could be in an insidious conspiracy to “confirm” laws by denying us the freedom to make the tests that would refute them. Physical induction, the primary tool of science, disappears if we are denied access to random samples. It is also hard to take seriously the arguments of those who according to their own beliefs are deterministic automata!"

This is actually a good point, one that resembles NB's "contradiction of determinism" argument (which is also found in Kant and various other philosophers), and it makes clear that the authors are not using "free will" in some fanciful sense. The problem arises when they attempt to transfer this free will to particles in a manner summarized in the Introduction:

"Do we really have free will, or, as a few determined folk maintain, is it all an illusion? We don’t know, but will prove in this paper that if indeed there exist any experimenters with a modicum of free will, then elementary particles must have their own share of this valuable commodity."

When Conway and Kochen attribute free will to humans (more as a hypothesis than a proven fact), they don't mean this in some eccentric, fanciful sense. Thus if, when attributing free will to fundamental particles, they suddenly shift to a dramatically different meaning, then the above claim (a key theme of their paper) has virtually no meaning. They might as well say, "If there exist experimenters with a modicum of free will, then elementary particles must be colored red."

As I said before, the philosophical aspects of this paper are a mess.

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

For those who have not read the Conway/Kochen article, "The Free Will Theorem," the following is an excerpt from their "closing remarks":

"The world it presents us with is a fascinating one, in which fundamental particles are continually making their own decisions. No theory can predict exactly what these particles will do in the future for the very good reason that they may not yet have decided what this will be! Most of their decisions, of course, will not greatly affect things — we can describe them as mere ineffectual flutterings, which on a large scale almost cancel each other out, and so can be ignored." (My italics.)

Two quick observations:

First, Conway and Kochen don't merely speak of the indeterminism of fundamental particles; rather, they expressly attribute this indeterminism to "decisions" by these particles.

Second, Conway and Kochen place their discussion in the context of traditional debates over free will versus determinism. They defend free will in experimenters and give the following as one of their reasons:

"It is hard to take science seriously in a universe that in fact controls all the choices experimenters think they make. Nature could be in an insidious conspiracy to “confirm” laws by denying us the freedom to make the tests that would refute them. Physical induction, the primary tool of science, disappears if we are denied access to random samples. It is also hard to take seriously the arguments of those who according to their own beliefs are deterministic automata!"

This is actually a good point, one that resembles NB's "contradiction of determinism" argument (which is also found in Kant and various other philosophers), and it makes clear that the authors are not using "free will" in some fanciful sense. The problem arises when they attempt to transfer this free will to particles in a manner summarized in the Introduction:

"Do we really have free will, or, as a few determined folk maintain, is it all an illusion? We don’t know, but will prove in this paper that if indeed there exist any experimenters with a modicum of free will, then elementary particles must have their own share of this valuable commodity."

When Conway and Kochen attribute free will to humans (more as a hypothesis than a proven fact), they don't mean this in some eccentric, fanciful sense. Thus if, when attributing free will to fundamental particles, they suddenly shift to a dramatically different meaning, then the above claim (a key theme of their paper) has virtually no meaning. They might as well say, "If there exist experimenters with a modicum of free will, then elementary particles must be colored red."

As I said before, the philosophical aspects of this paper are a mess.

Ghs

It was a paper on a mathematical and theoretical physics subject, not a paper on philosophy. You didn't read the paper, did you?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

Yes, I read the article. Have you?

If you think I have been unfair to Conway, then state what you think is his basic argument (regarding his use of terms like "free will"), and I will respond.

As for Rand supposedly being excused for using idiosyncratic definitions, do you excuse her? Have others on OL excused her? On the contrary, she has often been criticized for this practice, and I have been among the critics.

So why do you give Conway a pass? Because you are impressed by his mathematical abilities? Why should that exempt him from criticism of his sloppy use of philosophical terms?

Conway's use of "free will" is nothing new; Arthur Eddington made similar statements, though his were not as silly as Conway's.

In the final analysis, Conway is defending indeterminism, and he doesn't understand that this is not the same thing as free will.

Ghs

Forget the article. Did you read the Conway-Kochen paper which was the subject of the article? Did you? Did you? You are taking a second hand account as though it were a primary. Shame on you! I provide you with the URL to arxiv. Now why don't you read the paper and see what Conway and Kochen had to say. By the way, Conway is well known (by those who read mathematical papers) as a very playful character, so he is inclined to use terms metaphorically to spice up otherwise daunting technical material. Ditto for Kochen who is famous for a "no go" theorem.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Yes, I read their article, and I expressly said so -- twice. So stop your goddamned lecturing.

If you want to defend the absurd philosophical arguments in that paper, then be my guest. Unlike you, I am not disposed to view mathematicians as infallible. Nor am I disposed to excuse a key argument in a published paper as metaphorical, especially when the authors never indicate that they are speaking metaphorically.

I know you admire these guys, but you need to grow a spine.

Ghs