Science and philosophy? Or philosophy and science?

[John Dailey]

Mike:

~ I'm having a problem understanding the idea of a description (we're talking 'empirical' here, right?) especially a personally experiential one, being considered 'tautological', much less merely a 'concept' of that type. Indeed, if the description is a mere 'concept'...are we still talking 'Qualia'?

~ I really don't see THAT 'definition' as all that...'perceptive.' Indeed, it seems arbitrarily tautological in itself.

~ Apart from that, the def leaves ignored as to whether a 'toothache' would be a type of 'Qualia'...if the metaphorical 'awl-stabbing' feeling wasn't added as part of the description.

~ I mean, the whole def lacks, big time.

LLAP

J:D

Edited September 7, 2007 by John Dailey

[Roger Bissell]

Mike:

~ I'm having a problem understanding the idea of a description (we're talking 'empirical' here, right?) especially a personally experiential one, being considered 'tautological', much less merely a 'concept' of that type. Indeed, if the description is a mere 'concept'...are we still talking 'Qualia'?

~ I really don't see THAT 'definition' as all that...'perceptive.' Indeed, it seems arbitrarily tautological in itself.

~ Apart from that, the def leaves ignored as to whether a 'toothache' would be a type of 'Qualia'...if the metaphorical 'awl-stabbing' feeling wasn't added as part of the description.

~ I mean, the whole def lacks, big time.

LLAP

J:D

I have a somewhat different definition of "qualia" than the one(s) offered so far.

I think there are two important points to make about qualia. First, qualia are dual-aspect phenomena of our awareness of reality; they reflect both the form of awareness of reality and some aspect of reality of which we are aware. Second, we have both physical qualia and mental qualia, and the proper understading of them takes you a long way toward properly understanding the solution to the mind-body problem.

Physical qualia are (1) the form in which we are perceptually aware of some aspect of an entity, whether a red apple or our own throbbing tooth, and (2) some aspect of an entity (e.g., apple or tooth) as we are perceptually aware of it.

Mental qualia are (1) the form in which we are introspectively aware of some aspect of our brain (or nervous system) functioning, and (2) our brain (or nervous system) as we are introspectively aware of it.

Just as redness or pain is not some spiritual entity distinct from the apple or diseased tooth, neither is mind (as we experience it) some spiritual entity distinct from our brain (nervous system). They are all just the form in which we are aware of certain entities -- and they are those entities as we are aware of them.

Perhaps this still seems a bit tautological, but I think that when you reduce a problem about consciousness to the fact that the relationship between consciousness and existence has two poles -- the entity in reality and one's form of awareness of it -- one has pretty much reached the limit of explanation. (This dual-aspect of the objective, by the way, is the subject of an essay that is "in press" for the next issue of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies.)

REB

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

John,

LOL...

You fell into a trap (but it wasn't set on purpose for tripping people). That definition was tongue-in-cheek. If you had clicked on the link, you would have discovered a wickedly funny site called Mezmer's Dictionary of Bad Psychology. Maybe the definition of consciousness will be a little more edifying.

Consciousness: A thing in itself, or besides itself, the sum of all qualia, or perhaps a channel on the Matrix. Consciousness can be raised, lowered, embodied, or if it means to, float out of this room. It is everywhere, perhaps nowhere, but most certainly is here with you, reading this dumb definition, and is well, self-conscious about it.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

I’m hopeful that my soon-to-be-completed essay “Understanding Imaginaries Through Hidden Numbers”—an early draft of which is currently “for sale” on Lulu.com at an impossible price—will be seen as relevant to the parts of this discussion concerning the priority of philosophy and science. (My short answer is: The special sciences, a telling formulation used by AR, and philosophy are all equally sciences; man’s task is to integrate all science. And by the way, consider what science tells you that.)

You don't say? One of the distinguishing characteristics of a science is that its conclusions (predictions) are empirically testable. To what extent are philosophical systems empirically testable. Are the parts of philosophical systems that talk about the world testable? Or are philosophical systems really meta systems that talk about systems that talk about the world?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[John Dailey]

Mike:

~ Ah-h-h, cute. :baby: No wonder it lacked sense: didn't intend to have it. :drool: Got me on that one.

LLAP

J:D

[Guyau]

Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

Volume 1104

May 2007

Reward and Decision Making in Corticobasal Ganglia Networks

Edited by: Bernard Balleine, Kenji Doya , John O'Doherty, and Masamichi Sakagami

"The neural bases of decision-making processes are currently generating considerable experimental and theoretical interest. Several recent developments in neuroscience, psychology, and economics have helped to focus thinking on this issue: the computational description of cortico-striatal networks in terms of reinforcement learning models, recognition that midbrain dopaminergic activity could reflect an error correction learning signal, improvements in imaging technology, the recognition that multiple controllers of actions and of values contribute to the development of adaptive behavior, and the recognition that theories of value derived from economics can provide a principled means of incorporating intangible factors such as risk, uncertainty, and temporal discounting into computational models of neural system.

"The contributions to this volume are forward-looking assessments of the current and future issues likely to be faced by researchers in this area. Four current issues are specifically addressed:

• the degree to which distinct behavioral and psychological capacities map onto discrete neural systems;

• the relationship between midbrain dopamine activity and reward in terms of phasic and tonic activity, prefrontal and striatal targets, and whether and what limits exist in terms of learning;

• whether there are multiple prediction error signals distinguishing between, for example, reward and punishment, instrumental versus Pavlovian conditioning, goals and habits, learning with different discount factors, real versus fictive learning; and

• the relationship between economics and neuroscience, which has recently emerged in a marriage to form the new field of neuroeconomics. Will this marriage be productive for the long term or swiftly head for divorce?"

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

One of the articles listed in the Table of Contents for this issue (http://www.blackwell-synergy.com:80/toc/nyas/1104/1) is available without charge for a limited time.

Edited March 8, 2008 by Stephen Boydstun

[Daniel Barnes]

You don't say? One of the distinguishing characteristics of a science is that its conclusions (predictions) are empirically testable. To what extent are philosophical systems empirically testable. Are the parts of philosophical systems that talk about the world testable? Or are philosophical systems really meta systems that talk about systems that talk about the world?

The role of philosophy in Objectivism is basically twofold.

1) To inform us that what exists exists, and that what does not exist, does not exist.

2) To explain the true meanings of words.

That pretty much wraps it up. Are either of these tasks empirically testable? Not that I can see. Do Objectivists aim at testable theories? Not if they can possibly help it.

Edited March 9, 2008 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

I'll hazard a theory of my own that may be testable.

If Rand is right about her own theories - that they are the basis of true intellectual independence and the highest level of human creativity - Objectivism will produce lots of skyscrapers, and hardly any discussion groups.

If I'm right about Rand's theories - that they are basically verbalist illusions that are in fact counterproductive to human creativity - Objectivism will produce lots of discussion groups, and hardly any skyscrapers.

Edited March 9, 2008 by Daniel Barnes

[Mike11]

I'll hazard a theory of my own that may be testable.

If Rand is right about her own theories - that they based on intellectual independence and the highest level of human creativity - Objectivism will produce lots of skyscrapers, and hardly any discussion groups.

If I'm right about Rand's theories - that they are basically verbalist illusions that are in fact counterproductive to human creativity - Objectivism will produce lots of discussion groups, and hardly any skyscrapers.

Not entirely. There is the definition of "Objectivism" being used, the way in which the ARI LULZ factory keeps the drama threads growing and worthy to partake in, as well as Libertarian overlap.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The role of philosophy in Objectivism is basically twofold.

1) To inform us that what exists exists, and that what does not exist, does not exist.

2) To explain the true meanings of words.

That pretty much wraps it up.

Daniel,

I suggest you rethink this. It is wrong on so many points I don't know where to begin. I do have to compliment you on the richness of your brevity, however. With two statements, you managed to be wrong on about 20 issues, at the very least.

Here is a starter. One of the roles of philosophy in Objectivism is not to explain "the true meanings of words"—as one of the Big Fundamental Two you provide. (There are more than two fundamentals.) The fundamental role of epistemology is to explain how concepts work, i.e., how knowledge is formed.

Michael

[Mike11]

The role of philosophy in Objectivism is basically twofold.

1) To inform us that what exists exists, and that what does not exist, does not exist.

2) To explain the true meanings of words.

That pretty much wraps it up.

Daniel,

I suggest you rethink this. It is wrong on so many points I don't know where to begin. I do have to compliment you on the richness of your brevity, however. With two statements, you managed to be wrong on about 20 issues, at the very least.

Here is a starter. One of the roles of philosophy in Objectivism is not to explain "the true meanings of words"—as one of the Big Fundamental Two you provide. (There are more than two fundamentals.) The fundamental role of epistemology is to explain how concepts work, i.e., how knowledge is formed.

Michael

Some on the outside, well me at least, can relate to the meanings argument. Often debating Objectivists, and always those of the ARI stripe, is such an excruciating word game that you just wish Lenny was dead. One of these days I'll make millions on a Rand to English dictionary.

[Daniel Barnes]

I suggest you rethink this. It is wrong on so many points I don't know where to begin. I do have to compliment you on the richness of your brevity, however. With two statements, you managed to be wrong on about 20 issues, at the very least.

Well, as I say, my theory makes some predictions in reality. Let's see how it shakes out, shall we?

Here is a starter. One of the roles of philosophy in Objectivism is not to explain "the true meanings of words"—as one of the Big Fundamental Two you provide. (There are more than two fundamentals.) The fundamental role of epistemology is to explain how concepts work, i.e., how knowledge is formed.

It amounts to the same thing, only my version is shorter. ;)

[Daniel Barnes]

One of these days I'll make millions on a Rand to English dictionary.

Well there's the Lexicon online now.

[Mike11]

One of these days I'll make millions on a Rand to English dictionary.

Well there's the Lexicon online now.

Yah, I mean those hard core roids though who argue ceaselessly about "Good Luck" or "Helping people is good." Example.

Edited March 9, 2008 by Mike11

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Here is a starter. One of the roles of philosophy in Objectivism is not to explain "the true meanings of words"—as one of the Big Fundamental Two you provide. (There are more than two fundamentals.) The fundamental role of epistemology is to explain how concepts work, i.e., how knowledge is formed.

It amounts to the same thing, only my version is shorter. ;)

Daniel,

My God! You really don't understand what a fundamental is...

(scratching head)

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Yah, I mean those hard core roids though who argue ceaselessly about "Good Luck" or "Helping people is good."

Well, you know the problem is that Rand wrote conflicting things herself about such issues. This allows the hardcore roids you mention to take up opposite positions on an issue, and still be true to Ayn Rand. Which is the main thing as far as they are concerned. No doubt this is entertaining if you have a lot of time on your hands, but shouldn't they be out building skyscrapers?

The verbalist method is pretty straightforward. You hear a lot of Objectivist claims about how Rand solved various problems of philosophy. I've even debated a few of them around here myself at considerable length. You soon see the "solution" consists of merely moving the problem back a step into some specialized Objectivist meaning of an ordinary word, like "logic". The original problem then can be safely buried in lengthy, insoluble debates over who's got the "true" meaning of such a term. Objectivists like to call this arguing over the meanings of words debating "fundamentals." Which leads back to the second of my two original points.

For example, some claim that Objectivism contains the solution to the well-known logical problem of induction. You ask them exactly how they've solved it, and they say oh, you can't use ordinary logic to do it. You have to use a special Objectivist logic. Of course this is like claiming to have solved Goldbach's conjecture, but by using a special Objectivist version of math. ;)

That's roughly how it seems to work at any rate.

Edited March 9, 2008 by Daniel Barnes

[Mike11]

That's roughly how it seems to work at any rate.

"Roughly"?

"Roughly" is a term used to designate the texture of matter, I refer you to your copy of Leonard Peikoff's insightful treatise "Table and Supper" for definition. If you have an alternate definition please state it in full here and explain why you feel the Objectivist definition is inferior or incomplete.

Also, your use of the word "seems" implies a lack of certainty on an essential aspect of Objectivism, one I personally value greatly. Do you believe knowledge of this sort is forever doomed to the mysticism of uncertainty and materialism?

Lastly, I would like to say that "Rates" are not the subjective whims of second handers like yourself, nor are they arbitrary laws from some creator but the objective price determined by the producers of values. They are not an "any" but an objective and non negotiable fact of Reality.

/BurgessLaughlin

Well, I should leave the thread before it goes too off topic now....

Edited March 9, 2008 by Mike11

[Daniel Barnes]

That's roughly how it seems to work at any rate.

"Roughly"?

"Roughly" is a term used to designate the texture of matter, I refer you to your copy of Leonard Peikoff's insightful treatise "Table and Supper" for definition. If you have an alternate definition please state it in full here and explain why you feel the Objectivist definition is inferior or incomplete.

Also, your use of the word "seems" implies a lack of certainty on an essential aspect of Objectivism, one I personally value greatly. Do you believe knowledge of this sort is forever doomed to the mysticism of uncertainty and materialism? If so, why are you here?

/BurgessLaughlin

Well, I should leave the thread before it goes to off topic now....

LOL, MIke11

[Mike11]

4 years arguing with ARI people; I can Roid at a Binswanger level I think.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

4 years arguing with ARI people; I can Roid at a Binswanger level I think.

Mike11,

That's something to be proud of?

Michael

[Mike11]

4 years arguing with ARI people; I can Roid at a Binswanger level I think.

Mike11,

That's something to be proud of?

Michael

MSK gets up every morning at the crack of dawn, grabbing some coffee he reads the paper with false enthusiasm. Bored he hits his site and sees Mike11 has posted something new. "Ah! The newb, I'll own him for a bit then tell my friends of the lulz."

[Guyau]

Following on #83

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...amp;#entry16102

I should mention this work:

Representation Reconsidered

William M. Ramsey

http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/cata...9875&ss=toc

[Guyau]

Intersection of Memory and Imagination

In “Imagination and Cognition”

http://objectivity-archive.com/volume1_number3.html#57

Merlin Jetton noted a number of thinkers, over the centuries, who closely connected memory and imagination.

Many of the same brain regions used to recall memories are engaged during the imagination of future events: http://www.sciencenews.org/view/feature/id...future_memories

[BaalChatzaf]

Intersection of Memory and Imagination

In “Imagination and Cognition”

http://objectivity-archive.com/volume1_number3.html#57

Merlin Jetton noted a number of thinkers, over the centuries, who closely connected memory and imagination.

Many of the same brain regions used to recall memories are engaged during the imagination of future events: http://www.sciencenews.org/view/feature/id...future_memories

imagination is remembering the future.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Guyau]

Explaining the Brain

Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience

Carl F. Craver

Oxford 2007

Table of Contents

1. Starting with Neuroscience

2. Explanation and Causal Relevance

3. Causal Relevance and Manipulation

4. The Norms of Mechanistic Explanation

5. A Field-Guide to Levels

6. Nonfundamental Explanation

7. The Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience

Summary of Chapter 5

Explanations in neuroscience typically span multiple levels. The term level, however, is multiply ambiguous. I develop a taxonomy of different kinds of levels, and I show why one must be careful to keep these different kinds distinct. Using an example from contemporary neuroscience—the multilevel mechanisms of spatial memory—I argue the “levels of mechanisms” captures the central explanatory sense in which explanations in neuroscience (and elsewhere in the special sciences) span multiple levels. The multilevel structure of neuroscientific explanations is a consequence of the mechanistic structure of neuroscientific explanations. I emphasize the importance of levels of mechanisms by showing how other common notions of levels (such as levels of science, levels of theories, levels of control, levels of entities, levels of aggregativity, and mereological levels) fail to describe the explanatory levels appearing in the explanation for spatial memory.

http://www.amazon.com/Explaining-Brain-Car...3787&sr=8-1