A Speculation about the Roots of Brandens Demonizing

[Barbara Branden]

Mike Hardy and John: Oops! Thanks for the correction.

Barbara

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I had a silly thought, but it won't leave me alone, so maybe posting it will help. The noun version of excommunicate would make a very good title for a science-fiction series:

The X Communicants

Michael

[DavidMcK]

Would their nemisis be the 'Y' Communicants?

David

[Robert Campbell]

Jenna,

Great quotes from Feynman and Gould.

Once when I taught Infant and Child Development, I got back a written comment on one of my students' evaluations. It went, "The professor talks too much about ignorant psychologists and not enough about babies and children."

Could be that I overdid it that semester, but I always try to emphasize how much psychologists still don't know about human development. I always present at least two major unresolved controversies in the field (such as whether newborn babies imitate facial expressions or not).

Even if they have no interest in becoming researchers, students need to realize that they are learning the results of ongoing inquiry, some of which is really difficult to conduct, and involves researchers in genuinely contentious issues. They can't just read an article or a newspaper account and get the final answers handed to them on a plate.

In my recent exchanges on SOLOPassion, I've really wondered whether some of the people who have been taking vehement exception to what I'm saying would be even mildly comfortable with ongoing inquiry. At best they seem to want an upfront guarantee that the range of acceptable results will be tightly bounded and contain no surprises--otherwise they won't get involved in any kind of research.

I thought Objectivism put a high value on firsthand knowledge, a high value on competence, and an even higher value on creativity. Surely all of those involve being able to cope with unexpected results. What have I missed?

Robert

[Mike Hardy]

I had a silly thought, but it won't leave me alone, so maybe posting it will help. The noun version of excommunicate would make a very good title for a science-fiction series:

The X Communicants

Michael

Well, a "communicant" of a church is one who normally receives communion there.

Let's see, following up on my usage note from yesterday:

"The jury will deliberAYT tomorrow."

"The crime was quite deliberIT."

"He alternAYTes between believing in free will and ..."

"There are 12 jurors and one alternIT."

I think a couple of dozen words follow this pattern. Things like this make you realize what a hodge-podge of a language English is. -- Mike Hardy

[Ellen Stuttle]

A mischievous interjection.

Robert recalls:

Once when I taught Infant and Child Development, I got back a written comment on one of my students' evaluations.  It went, "The professor talks too much about ignorant psychologists and not enough about babies and children."

I'm reminded of a story. Larry and I were sitting with a philosophy professor friend of ours in an auditorium at Trinity prior to a talk by Patricia Churchland -- a "setting" detail which has no relevance to the story; it's just that I tend to remember the ambient circumstances of when a remark is made...

The friend was commenting on differences between scientists' and philosophers' approaches to lecturing. He said he'd recently attended a talk given by a philosopher about someone who had proposed the phlogisten theory (I've forgotten who the theorist was; I tend not to remember names). One of the science types in attendance was heard to comment afterward: "Is that how they give talks in philosophy? He didn't use any transparencies [this was in the days before PowerPoint presentations became near-ubiquitous], and he spent a whole hour talking about someone who got it wrong."

I don't know what the moral of that tale is. ;-)

Ellen

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[Mike Hardy]

Ellen mischievously interjected:

The friend was commenting on differences between scientists' and philosophers' approaches to lecturing.  He said he'd recently attended a talk given by a philosopher about someone who had proposed the phlogisten theory (I've forgotten who the theorist was; I tend not to remember names).  One of the science types in attendance was heard to comment afterward:  "Is that how they give talks in philosophy?  He didn't use any transparencies [this was in the days before PowerPoint presentations became near-ubiquitous], and he spent a whole hour talking about someone who got it wrong."

I don't know what the moral of that tale is. ;-)

Ellen

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Once upon a time a philosophy professor gave a talk to a statistics colloquium at NCSU when my wife was a graduate student there. A UNC math professor who attended commented afterwards (and I concur) that philosophers talk extremely fast in such lectures, in contrast with mathematicians, who are far more leisurely. In philosophy talks they read their talks verbatim from prepared scripts. Mathematicians sometimes write on blackboards, sometimes have transparencies, sometimes use PowerPoint or the like, but hardly ever have verbatim scripts. Apparently biologists use slides instead of transparencies. Mathematicians using transparencies often call them "slides".

OK, Ellen, since you claimed to be entertained by my account of how I first became aware of Stephen Pinker when he and I both attended the MIT applied math colloquium, here's another one: A month or two ago I attended a "public lecture" (one of those talks for a broad public outside of one's field) in Minneapolis by a mathematician, on the use of mathematics to detect art forgeries and such. During the question period I notice that Garrison Keillor was in the audience (not that I'd never seen him on campus before, but he was the speaker on the other occasions). -- Mike Hardy

[JennaW]

I first became aware of Stephen Pinker when he and I both attended the MIT applied math colloquium

I'm reading Steve Pinker's book How the Mind Works. Very fun! (and funny too). I'd like to meet him one day.

[Ellen Stuttle]

I'm reading Steve Pinker's book How the Mind Works. Very fun! (and funny too). I'd like to meet him one day.

Agreed, and same here. There have been times when I was reading one of his books while eating at a restaurant and I've burst out into public giggles at one of his (many) comic flights.

Ellen

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[Robert Campbell]

Ellen and Mike,

Just last Friday I was giving my Experimental Psych students some tips on how to present the results of their studies (giving a 10-minute talk in class is one of the assignments).

I told them how psychologists usually speak extemporaneously while using PowerPoints, and how philosophers usually read their papers word for word. (In fact, philosophers will often say that what they did at the conference was... read a paper.) I warned them that most audiences would find reading deadly dull, but also explained how they could write their presentations out and still deliver them with some degree of spontaneity.

Jenna,

Steven Pinker is genuinely hilarious. IMHO, though, he is guilty of some degree of overreach in How the Mind Works. I hope you will tell us your impressions here after you finish the book.

Robert

[Ellen Stuttle]

Robert:

I told [my Experimental Psych class] how psychologists usually speak extemporaneously while using PowerPoints, and how philosophers usually read their papers word for word.  (In fact, philosophers will often say that what they did at the conference was... read a paper.)  I warned them that most audiences would find reading deadly dull....

In defense of the philosopher method of presentation: A lot of philosophy pertains to the very precise meanings of words; getting one word wrong can mess up an argument. (Scientists and mathematicians, on the other hand, are supposed to get their math, their data, and their interpretations right. The verbal details aren't of overriding concern.) Also, it's customary at philosophy conferences to send copies of the paper in advance to those registered for a session. Thus the reading of the paper is to refresh everyone's memory of it in preparation for critique (generally from a formal commentator, whose comments have been prepared in advance) and questions. It's a different mindset.

Ellen

PS: Now if someone would just reconnect the thread to its topic.... Ta, ta, back to preparing for my meetings.

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[Roger Bissell]

If/when anyone might be interested in reading it, here is the link to my review of Pinker's How the Mind Works, which was published in 1998 in issue #23 of Reason Papers, back when Tibor Machan was still publishing it.

http://members.aol.com/REBissell/indexmm11.html

Feedback, comments, etc., are welcome.

REB

[Mike Hardy]

In defense of the philosopher method of presentation:  A lot of philosophy pertains to the very precise meanings of words; getting one word wrong can mess up an argument.  (Scientists and mathematicians, on the other hand, are supposed to get their math, their data, and their interpretations right.  The verbal details aren't of overriding concern.)  Also, it's customary at philosophy conferences to send copies of the paper in advance to those registered for a session.  Thus the reading of the paper is to refresh everyone's memory of it in preparation for critique (generally from a formal commentator, whose comments have been prepared in advance) and questions.  It's a different mindset.

Ellen

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Well, a lot of math seminars and math colloquia depend heavily on very precise definitions of words, and yet mathematicians rarely read papers verbatim in such talks. Style appropriate for reading and style appropriate for speaking are often (not always) completely different. Philosophers read papers at million words per hour. I've attended maybe fifteen philosophy colloquia, and hundreds of seminars and colloquia in math. My impression is that philsophers talk too fast. (But what do I know?) -- Mike Hardy

[Dragonfly]

Ellen:

A lot of philosophy pertains to the very precise meanings of words; getting one word wrong can mess up an argument.

The problem is that philosophers seldom agree on those precise meanings. See the amusing story by Feynman between the philosophers in this post. What's so funny in that story is that those philosophers weren't even aware that they all used different definitions!

[Charles R. Anderson]

Paul,

Thanks for your comment on 9 April. I am simply and profoundly pleased that you found something worth noting in my comments.

Things are moving quickly here and it is hard to keep up!

[Ellen Stuttle]

Ellen:  

A lot of philosophy pertains to the very precise meanings of words; getting one word wrong can mess up an argument.

The problem is that philosophers seldom agree on those precise meanings. See the amusing story by Feynman between the philosophers in this post. What's so funny in that story is that those philosophers weren't even aware that they all used different definitions!

Two questions (both tweakingly asked):

(1) You have a sufficient sample to generalize from one story to the statement that philosophers "seldom" agree on precise meanings?

(2) And what of the meaning of "information" in the so-called "information sciences"?

Re-tying (sort of) to the purported subject of this thread: The mathematicians and scientists put down the philosophers; the philosophers, I'd imagine, have comparable compliments they can pay in reverse.... And so it goes: how can one have a group without having an out group?

Cheers.

Ellen

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[Dragonfly]

Ellen:

(1) You have a sufficient sample to generalize from one story to the statement that philosophers "seldom" agree on precise meanings?

This is merely a typical example, but it confirms my own experience with philosophers. Some Objectivist examples: Rand's definition of causality. This is so vague that it can be interpreted in different ways, as I've shown elsewhere. I still haven't got any definite answer to my questions on that subject. Further I hear a lot of talk about "entities" and "actions", but I haven't seen any clear definition of these concepts. Not to mention such things as "reality", "truth", "objectivity". Even Objectivists don't seem to agree on the definitions of those terms.

2) And what of the meaning of "information" in the so-called "information sciences"?

In algorithmic information theory or in communication theory there is no ambiguity about the definition of information. You should only not confuse such information with the everyday use of the term, which is of course more difficult to determine, as that implies that it must have some meaning to us, which makes it difficult to quantify.