Paul Mawdsley's view of causality in re Objectivism

[Dragonfly]

Michael:

Why the hostility to them? Of course the law of identity is not a magic wand, but then nobody ever claimed it was. Well, you just did. The jargon calls that a strawman (and I REALLY don't like standard Objectivist jargon - the words and phrases get in the way of understanding the concepts behind them).

Well, my experience at least is that it is widely used as a magic wand. In almost any discussion with an Objectivist about some philosophic of scientific issue the latter comes up with the law of identity. First, it is useless as an argument, as you can't prove anything with it. Second, it suggests that the other party somehow denies or violates that law of identity. Perhaps that may be true for some crazy pomo philosopher or some other weirdo, but with such people any discussion is useless and it's rather insulting to suggest that your discussion partner is such an idiot that he denies the law of identity. So, in effect it is a completely useless and even insulting argument, and that's why you may perhaps perceive sometimes a tiny amount of frustration when it's used.

(The following is not asked aggressively - I am genuinely curious) When you write something like "(a thing behaves like it behaves, duh)," what is the reason to belittle that axiom? It is obvious, I'll grant you that, but is it a mere detail?

I think you're missing my point. I was discussing Rand's definition of causality, which is terribly vague. Some people claim that it implies a deterministic world view (although I've shown that this doesn't follow from the definition she gives), which leads to a contradiction with her denial of compatibilism. Others seem to think that her definition sometimes leads to determinism (e.g. for inanimate matter) and sometimes not, (for human beings). But then the definition is circular (a thing acts according to its nature - how do we know what its nature is? By observing what it does!) and the whole "law of causality" becomes meaningless; an axiom may be obvious, but not empty of meaning.

Anyway, I find discussions by Objectivists about causality always terribly vague, they're talking about "entities" and "actions", but how are these defined? Is a photon for example an entity? Or is it an action? What is exactly the meaning of "according to its nature"? I find it all so enormously unfocused. Perhaps one of these days I'll try to disentangle this mess and bring some order in it. The funny thing is that I've never been interested in philosophy, for me it was too much talk about angels dancing on the head of a pin. But I've seen in discussions with Objectivists so many bad arguments that I can't resist in pointing out the errors, so now I'm drawn into it myself...

Now that reminds me of a story by Feynman... ("Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!"): Once Feynman attended a philosophy seminar, just out of curiosity. The subject was about the book Process and Reality by Whitehead. The discussion seemed to be about the notion of "essential object", but Feynman didn't really understand what it meant, so he kept quiet. Until a professor asked him: "Mr. Feynman, would you say an electron is an 'essential object'?". Feynman admitted that he didn't understand that notion, and tried to get the meaning by asking the professor whether a brick is an 'essential object'. It turned out that every participant of the seminar came up with a different definition, there was complete disagreement! To quote Feynman: "..I tell you, I have never heard such ingenious different ways of looking at a brick before. And, just like it should in all stories about philosophers, it ended up in complete chaos. In all their previous discussions they hadn't even asked themselves whether such a simple object as a brick, much less an electron, is an 'essential object'."

If things have no identity, how can they be known since the validity of reason-based knowledge rests on the axiom of identity?

Is anyone claiming that things have no identity? If not, why bring up such a trivial statement?

The reason I see Rand so bombastic is that she was arguing against people who claimed that these starting points (axioms) do not exist or are not valid. Her main dragon to slay was faith - not the Rich Engle type of quest to add to his reason-based mental experience. The faith she railed against claimed superiority over reason to do the things reason was supposed to do. It claimed the power to make miracles.

That may perhaps explain her attitude at the time, although I seriously doubt that any of her serious opponents really denied the obvious. Do you think that in discussions between scientists anyone ever comes up with the law of identity in an argument? His colleagues would think that he'd become crazy to mention such a triviality. He could as well have used "2 + 2 = 4" as an argument.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

I don't think you got my meaning yet, since you keep going back to a "scientific" view. Science studies specific entities. Philosophy studies generalities. Science focuses on the unit (unit by unit) and derives it principles from that. Philosophy focuses on the "framework" or "background" that holds units and draws up principles for that.

Also, axioms exist solely for the benefit of the mind so that logical thinking can start. Nothing more.

Blaming an axiom for not being able to explain the nature of a photon is a misuse of the concept. An axiom like Identity doesn't cover just a photon, but a photon, all photons and everything else that exists.

Being all-inclusive, axioms are not devoid of meaning, as you claim. The are just so general that they are not specific.

//;-))

You are correct (in general) that no scientist would cite fundamental axioms in his/her experiments and reports, much less contradict them, but philosophers do. That's because studying the general stuff is what they do. So blaming a philosopher for not being a scientist and vice-versa is a an exercise in futility.

Both rely on each other, but they come at a problem from different angles. In the oversimplified version, philosophy is based on induction and science is based on deduction. Rand stated somewhere (in Q&A, I think) that the greatest gap that was still incomplete in Objectivism was its theory of induction.

We have to get this part precise and agreed on before focusing on determinism, free will and all that other stuff. If not, we will always talk past each other.

What's worse, we are the intelligent ones, so we get along. But we (and others like us) are observed by people with hardening of the categories and not much independent thinking. If we talk past each other, pseudo-Rands will go on seeing subjectivism/intrinsicism/mysticism under every rock with those who mix axioms with proof, and the close-minded scientifically-oriented will go on seeing nothing but mentally lazy fruitcakes.

Bashing then ensues on both sides (and both are wrong).

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Dragonfly,

First, sorry that I didn't get back to you at all yesterday. You might have noticed from something I posted in the Branden Corner that I became sidetracked by a heavy memory-lane trip. This PARC business, and all that keeps coming up because of that, has been throwing the proverbial "monkey wrench" in my ability to stay on track with subjects I'd rather be thinking about.

You wrote:

My impression is that you think that when I use the term "levels of abstraction" that it refers to something the system that I describe is doing itself. That is not the case, however. It refers to the the way an observer of that system describes the system.

All right, yes, that's pretty accurate to how I've been "reading" you. It does seems as if often you're including what the system itself is doing -- though I'm aware that isn't what your mean if you're talking about what non-cognitive systems are doing. But, if it's the observers who are describing in "levels of abstraction," I'm still not clear on how the observers acquire the ability to do that.

I think I followed what you wrote about the computer analogy, up to here:

Nevertheless, we have at this level of abstraction still too many trees to see the wood, so we can move to a still higher level of abstraction, by combining and finding the patterns in all those logic gates and their content to derive a program. The description of the program itself can be done at different levels of abstraction: machine instructions, low-level subroutines, higher-level programming languages.

Where is the existence of a program coming in - from the computer's perspective? A program is instructions that are put into the computer by us, though I'm aware that then we get computers which can self-program, but again the program is from our perspective. The computer isn't cognizant of goals, intentions, a task to be accomplished. However, if you analogize this to us, we are aware of having goals, intentions, some idea or sense of results we want to achieve. And this is from our internal perspective, not describing us from an outside observer perspective. I'm not clear on how supposedly this internal directing is arising with the computer analogy. Maybe I could put it this way: How does "the intentional stance" become internally-experienced intentions? This remains a feature of his views which I think Dennett just skips. I keep feeling reading him, but wait, there, you've stepped right past the question; you have a step in here where "Then a miracle occurs." (I expect you've seen the Harris cartoon I'm referring to, but if you haven't, ask and I'll describe it.)

Re your evolution "sidetrack," you wrote:

(Sorry, now I got sidetracked, but I found this parallel fascinating; that's the result of "thinking aloud", which I often do with these posts.)

Don't be sorry. The sidetrack was useful to me, indeed it gives a bit of a glimmer of an answer to my own question above. (BTW, I still haven't even cracked open The Intentional Stance, which I'd expected to have finished by now. The PARC detour.)

Ellen

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[Dragonfly]

Michael:

Blaming an axiom for not being able to explain the nature of a photon is a misuse of the concept. An axiom like Identity doesn't cover just a photon, but a photon, all photons and everything else that exists.

But where do I ask that your axiom explains the nature of a photon? I merely point out that I haven't seen any satisfactory definitions of "entity" and "action", and I think that a discussion about such things is rather meaningless if you have no clear definition of them. I merely asked whether a photon is an entity or an action; if even that question can't be answered, what's the use then of any further discussion? I find the parallel with Feynman's story striking: he asked the simple question whether a brick is an "essential object", and they couldn't give him an unambiguous answer while it only then turned out that they didn't agree at all on the definition of an "essential object", which they'd been talking about all the time! You're quite right that I blame them for that!

Now I hasten to say that not all philosophers do have that kind of pretensions. A good example is Dennett, one of the great thinkers of our time. Not that he eschews scientific discussions, far from it, but at least he knows what he's talking about and he uses valid scientific arguments and not some vague philosophical ideas. He doesn't pretend to know more than he does as an amateur scientist, but he has repeatedly pointed out flaws in the arguments of some scientists. Believe me, his arguments are quite different from those of Objectivists who meddle with science.

You are correct (in general) that no scientist would cite fundamental axioms in his/her experiments and reports, much less contradict them, but philosophers do. That's because studying the general stuff is what they do. So blaming a philosopher for not being a scientist and vice-versa is a an exercise in futility.

Now wait a moment... I've no problem when philosophers use this kind of argument when they're discussing among themselves. But the point is that Objectivists pretend to know what scientific theories are good or bad, they're in fact telling scientists what these should do. I find that enormously pretentious, especially if they come up with such gems like the law of identity and their foggy law of causality to "prove" their points (like the notion that there hasn't been a Big Bang for example). Those cobblers should stick to their lasts!

Both rely on each other, but they come at a problem from different angles. In the oversimplified version, philosophy is based on induction and science is based on deduction.

Science is as much based on deduction as on induction, to which I would add abduction as the essential element of science.

We have to get this part precise and agreed on before focusing on determinism, free will and all that other stuff. If not, we will always talk past each other.

What part must we get precise? If you read my posts (for example about free will and determinism), you'll see that I always try to give precise definitions and arguments. Vague generalities won't help us any further and if they're the only counterarguments the discussion is futile and I'd better move on to other things...

But we (and others like us) are observed by people with hardening of the categories and not much independent thinking. If we talk past each other, pseudo-Rands will go on seeing subjectivism/intrinsicism/mysticism under every rock with those who mix axioms with proof

Oh, they'll do that anyway, I've no illusions about that. But, as Feynman said: "what do you care what other people think?" (I've no idea what you mean by mixing axioms with proof).

[Roger Bissell]

Michael, something you wrote didn't sound right to me. It sounded like you got the labels turned around for philosophers and scientists. You wrote:

You are correct (in general) that no scientist would cite fundamental axioms in his/her experiments and reports, much less contradict them, but philosophers do. That's because studying the general stuff is what they do. So blaming a philosopher for not being a scientist and vice-versa is a an exercise in futility.  

Both rely on each other, but they come at a problem from different angles. In the oversimplified version, philosophy is based on induction and science is based on deduction. Rand stated somewhere (in Q&A, I think) that the greatest gap that was still incomplete in Objectivism was its theory of induction.

By my understanding, it is scientists who predominantly operate according to the inductive method, generalizing from observed facts, and philosophers who primarily speak from the armchair, apply their acquired generalizations to more specific issues and facts, in a deductive manner. Peikoff's central mission in the fast 25 years or so has been to try to nudge Objectivists more in the direction of understanding ideas and principles in an inductive manner and away from deductive rationalism as a primary method of doing philosophy.

If you simply misspoke yourself above, you can make the correction in your post and delete this post of mine, if you like. If you said what you meant to say, then I am here going on record as disagreeing with you!

REB

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Roger,

My context for philosophy was in terms of axioms. You don't arrive at axioms deductively. After enough of them are in place, then the deducting starts.

Also, I was thinking in terms of the scientific method of trial and error. Experiments are not set up inductively. They normally start with a hypothesis that one sets out to test or prove. That hypothesis is normally arrived at deductively (but sometimes inductively). Because of that origin, the interpretation of the results are not completely inductive.

Also, I didn't mean to imply that either discipline was exclusively induction or deduction. Both need all the reason they can get.

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

Dragonfly,

I have some questions:

I'm curious. Aside from the opportunity to torment Objectivists, what do you get out of Ayn Rand's and Nathaniel Branden's work, and these forums? It can be easy to find oneself pointing out the negative. And I will agree there is negative to be pointed out. But what is the positive you find here?

Do you think it is possible to accomplish anything of value, such as a the development of new integrations, through the mutual exchange of ideas and perspectives on a forum such as this? I think your answer would be yes, but I would like to know if my assessment of you is correct.

On a personal level, would you say you are striving to put together your own personal theory of everything?

Paul Mawdsley

Always trying to understand.

[Dragonfly]

Paul:

I'm curious. Aside from the opportunity to torment Objectivists, what do you get out of Ayn Rand's and Nathaniel Branden's work, and these forums? It can be easy to find oneself pointing out the negative. And I will agree there is negative to be pointed out. But what is the positive you find here?

You think that I'm tormenting Objectivists? I'm just making critical remarks about some of their arguments, and I think they should be glad about that. To quote myself from an earlier post:

Why should you be concerned at all? Either the theory is good enough to withstand criticisms, and in that case these can only lead to a better understanding (instead of just uncritically accepting ideas while they're held by "authorities"), or the theory is not good enough, and in that case we wouldn't want to evade that fact, would we? Shouldn't we rock the boat?

I think that post will answer many of your questions, it can be found in this thread: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...hp?showtopic=53

Do you think it is possible to accomplish anything of value, such as a the development of new integrations, through the mutual exchange of ideas and perspectives on a forum such as this? I think your answer would be yes, but I would like to know if my assessment of you is correct.

At least I hope that it is possible! I think we should focus on the good points, but we should not be afraid to discard the bad reasoning and the quasi-proofs. I think a less pretentious theory that doesn't try to claim to be able to deduce all the answers from a few axioms will have a better chance to get accepted and have real effect in the world. But I realize that probably many people on this forum will think this is a bridge too far, but who knows, perhaps someday they'll see the light! //;-))

On a personal level, would you say you are striving to put together your own personal theory of everything?

More or less à contrecoeur... As I've said before, I'm not really interested in all that philosophizing, but when I see bad arguments I can't resist the temptation to try to come up with better ones, and now I find myself thinking up all kinds of theories. Time to write a book about them...

[Paul Mawdsley]

Dragonfly,

Would you mind if I addressed you by your first name. I am having trouble reprogramming the name of the category in my head that represents you. I think it might be a software glitch.

Paul Mawdsley

[Dragonfly]

No problem... Are you sure it isn't a hardware fault?

[Roger Bissell]

Dragonfly wrote:

I think we should focus on the good points, but we should not be afraid to discard the bad reasoning and the quasi-proofs. I think a less pretentious theory that doesn't try to claim to be able to deduce all the answers from a few axioms will have a better chance to get accepted and have real effect in the world.

If you're still speaking of theories of cosmology, physics, or other sciences -- I'm not aware of (official) Objectivism trying to "deduce all the answers from a few axioms."

It's true that Peikoff and others do bend a little elbow grease trying to spinout the implications of identity and causality in regard to our methodology of using reason and logic, and in bolting down the idea of Primacy of Existence. These arguments (deductions, if you like, though there is a lot of Reaffirmation through Denial involved in the validations) are foundational and methodological, and they do not prescribe specific content of people's minds or theories. They merely elaborate on the basic principle that anything that is -- whatever it is -- must be what it is and cannot be contradictory.

However, all I ever thought the Objectivist metaphysics (identity, causality) did in regard to the sciences was to bar certain answers or kinds of answers, due to their conflict with the axioms. The Objectivist metaphysics merely says: look at the facts and draw your generalizations, but don't utter nonsense about them. Facts aren't (and can't be) contradictory, so don't describe them as if they were.

So, two questions:

1. Do you find this perspective objectionable? If so, why?

2. Do you find this perspective (on what Objectivists have tried to do, in your experience) inaccurate? If so, please give an example of two.

REB

[Paul Mawdsley]

Peter,

You asked:

Are you sure it isn't a hardware fault?

I was being optimistic. The hardware is getting a little older and I don't think I can get parts.

Paul

[Dragonfly]

It's true that Peikoff and others do bend a little elbow grease trying to spinout the implications of identity and causality in regard to our methodology of using reason and logic, and in bolting down the idea of Primacy of Existence. These arguments (deductions, if you like, though there is a lot of Reaffirmation through Denial involved in the validations) are foundational and methodological, and they do not prescribe specific content of people's minds or theories. They merely elaborate on the basic principle that anything that is -- whatever it is -- must be what it is and cannot be contradictory.

Then this quote from a post on the Branden forum may perhaps interest you:

Peter,

I think your interpretation of Peikoff's quote is accurate.

As to whether he has changed his views, all I know is what I heard

when I went to Ford Hall Forum last year. Peikoff was discussing the

book he is working on. As I remember, someone asked if he thought

the Big Bang theory was incorrect, and Peikoff said he did, but that

he was still studying physics so he can refute it.

So Peikoff knows in advance what the result must be, apparently by philosophizing in his armchair (a priori knowledge?), and now he's taking physics lessons to be able to prove what he "knows"! And that is supposed to be representative for a rational philosophy of science? Do you really expect me to take that seriously?

However, all I ever thought the Objectivist metaphysics (identity, causality) did in regard to the sciences was to bar certain answers or kinds of answers, due to their conflict with the axioms. The Objectivist metaphysics merely says: look at the facts and draw your generalizations, but don't utter nonsense about them. Facts aren't (and can't be) contradictory, so don't describe them as if they were.

So, two questions:

1. Do you find this perspective objectionable? If so, why?

As stated, this is not objectionable. What I object to is what they call "nonsense", the enormous hubris they show by telling scientists that they're wrong, only on the basis of their armchair philosophizing.

2. Do you find this perspective (on what Objectivists have tried to do, in your experience) inaccurate? If so, please give an example of two.

See the Peikoff example above, what could be more ridiculous than that? And how many times haven't I heard Objectivists telling that QM is contradictory or irrational? I've never heard why, however, only vague references to the law of identity (why would QM violate that law?) or the law of causality (the Objectivist version, which is either false or devoid of meaning, as I've shown in earlier posts). I'm still waiting for a concrete example of such a "refutation" by an Objectivist (and not some arbitrary assertions), as I've asked before in this forum.

[Roger Bissell]

My own understanding about possible objections to Big Bang theory is that since you can't get something from nothing, any theory that posits a point prior to which nothing existed is ruled out. Some versions of Big Bang theory allow that something existed prior to the explosion, and these would not be ruled out.

Also, any version of Big Bang theory that said that there was a point in time prior to which there was any kind of process or motion would be ruled out.

I've also heard Objectivists argue convincingly that the universe is eternal, that there can't have been a time prior to which anything existed. They also argue that there can't be a place outside of which anything exists. This sounds like they are saying the universe is infinite, but it also sounds like the idea from cosmology that the universe is finite but unbounded. (Whatever that means.)

If Peikoff is arguing anything beyond these ideas -- which are basically logical limitations on what a theory describing facts can legitimately claim -- I'd have to look at those arguments case by case, to see if he was overstepping himself as you suggest.

REB

[Paul Mawdsley]

Peter,

I was not impressed with Peikoff. In the same course that I had to read Atlas Shrugged, I also had to read Ominous Parallels. Rand sparked my passion, Peikoff put me to sleep.

I don’t know what Peikoff has to say about the Big Bang theory and I have no reason to care. However, we should not discount the value of intuition in general. As you know, Einstein valued his intuition– what could be called his biased interpretation of existence– a great deal. He claimed “his little finger” would tell him the direction his investigations should pursue. He was generally wise enough to not open his mouth until he was ready to substantiate his claims– a lesson you taught me well the first time we met.

I too have intuitive issues about the Big Bang theory. In particular, the concept of singularities messes with my bias that existence is fundamentally physical, not mathematical. This is just my intuition. It is not an argument. But it does lead the direction of my further investigations. If entities are fundamentally physical– ie. have extension in space and duration in time– then its not the laws of physics that break down at the point of singularities, but our mathematical descriptions that break down.

Again, this is not meant as an argument against the Big Bang singularity or singularities in general. It is simply what the bias at the root of my intuition tells me, what my “little finger” tells me.

To mount an attack on the Big Bang, I would have to focus on all the weak points of its arguments, as you are doing with Objectivism, and I would want to consider an alternative perspective that better fits with philosophical principles and observation.

I would choose to focus on the interpretations of data that gave rise to the theory. The data the theory has grown from is the observed red-shift of distant galaxies that increases with measured distance. The interpretation is that the red-shift is caused by a Doppler effect in light frequencies. Some have questioned the accuracy of the method that measures the distance of the galaxies. Personally, I have no cause to question these measurements.

Some have questioned our understanding of the nature of light, suggesting that the increase in wavelength of light from more distant galaxies could be due to an intrinsic property in the nature of light of which we are, as yet, unaware. Now this thought has caught my attention. My bias regarding existence being fundamentally physical, rather than mathematical or supernatural, sends my spidy-senses tingling. Can our observations of light be interpreted in a fundamentally physical way (ie. Without a dual nature)? It hasn’t yet. This would certainly require a causal explanation of quantum physics. But if light were interpreted in a fundamentally physical way, would there be another explanation for light losing energy over large distances?

Another point the Big Bang theory rests on is the microwave background radiation. The measure of this radiation is considered a verification of the predictions from the Big Bang theory, even though the temperatures originally predicted were considerably higher than what was measured. The theory has since been adjusted to better fit the measurements. What if there is another explanation for the microwave background radiation? Some have been suggested. I have my own pet idea but I do not have the mathematical knowhow to determine if the idea should be raised to the level of theory. But my pet ideas are not the point. If these three ideas– the interpretation of the mathematical description of singularities, the identification of the nature of light with its implications for interpretations of the red-shift, and the interpretation of the microwave background radiation– can be brought into question, then the Big Bang theory may not be the best fit for the facts.

At the root of any questions about the Big Bang theory is the question: what is the nature of identity and causality? Peter, you are right, the most important answers to this question are not found a priori. They are abstracted from experience. Rand and N. Branden’s work, I would suggest, contain more complex answers than their metaphysical axioms suggest. Their views of human nature, in particular, contain an implicit understanding of the natures of identity and causality that is a posteriori, quite sophisticated, and extremely profound. It’s not quite accurate to suggest this understanding was “smuggled in” just because they did not identify their own internal processes completely. I do think identifying the implicit view of identity and causality in Rand and Branden’s work is an important task, even for a physicist. Maybe, just maybe, the concepts of identity and causality, at the heart of their work, does hold the key to a new interpretation of physics. I hope these discussions might lead us in that direction.

Paul Mawdsley

[Dragonfly]

Roger:

My own understanding about possible objections to Big Bang theory is that since you can't get something from nothing,

Why not?

I've also heard Objectivists argue convincingly that the universe is eternal, that there can't have been a time prior to which anything existed.

The fact that there can't have been a time prior to which anything existed does not imply that the universe is eternal, it's perfectly consistent with a finite-time universe. Now the Big Bang theory describes the situation after the first 10^-35 sec. What happened in that first period we don't know, neither do we know if there was a "before" the Big Bang or not; all theories about that are still speculations. But the Big Bang theory for times after the first 10^-35 can be tested, and if you want to reject it, you'll have to come up with scientific arguments and not with philosophical speculation. There is a parallel with the theory of evolution: this can be tested without having a theory about abiogenesis. The latter may be an extension of the theory of evolution, but it's not necessary to prove the validity of that theory.

[Ellen Stuttle]

I've been biting my lips on the subject of Objectivism and physics, since it's a subject the history of which I know a certain amount about; but I haven't time to try to write a detailed history. I'll give a few highlights.

My "window" on what was going on dates back to late '69. Larry was starting his graduate work at Brooklyn Poly, taking occasional courses while supporting himself working as the programmer for the Registrar's Office. Leonard Peikoff was at that time teaching at Brooklyn Poly. Leonard and Larry became "comrades in arms" during what came to be called "the Putsch at Poly." This was a series of incidents in which students tried to take over university offices, etc., incidents similar to those at other colleges in those years. (It was due to Larry's involvement "on the barricades" with Leonard that he was then permitted to join the epistemology seminar, which had already started a few sessions before he joined.)

Larry and Leonard several times had lunch together. Two or three of those times, I also lunched with them (I was helping out by typing materials for the anti-Putsch campaign).

Leonard -- I'm putting this in my words; this isn't anything Leonard said, it's my description of his attitude -- was trying to find a way to pin intellectual corruption on modern physics. You see, modern physics has to be corrupt, since it's an "axiom" of Objectivism that the whole of modern thought is corrupt, and that the source of the corruption is Kant.

But a problem was that no one in the Inner or near-Inner Circle knew enough about physics to do an adequate job of pinpointing corruption. Harry Binswanger had some physics background, but not enough. So Leonard was asking various questions of Larry, and not getting too far (since Larry wasn't convinced that modern physics is corrupt). Even with my non-extensive knowledge of physics (I know more now than I did then), I could sense that Leonard didn't have "a head for physics." He had trouble understanding various physics theories, e.g., relativity (whether special or general; he just didn't "get it").

A few years later, a person named Lewis Little began to seem a good hope for the desire to put physics on trial. I'm not sure just when Lew got to know Harry. But at any rate by the mid-'70s, Lew Little was giving some talks about flawed concepts at the base of physics. I'm sorry, I can't provide details of his views, since I didn't pay a whole lot of attention. Meanwhile Lew was developing a theory which he called TEW (I hope I have the acronym right), the Theory of Elementary Waves. Again, I don't know the details. Larry looked over some preliminary stuff, and saw problems with it. I believe that later Lew gave some presentations to professional physics groups, who weren't enthused. (Someone else here might know more about the history of that: Roger?)

I haven't heard much of anything about Lew Little in recent years. But meanwhile, a person came along who seems to be just the person who was desired, a physics major named David Harriman. David Harriman has become Leonard's physics teacher. Harriman has this view that physics should go back to Newton -- and he has an interpretation of Newton which isn't even entirely correct. Harriman and Peikoff are working on a book...

[....]

Ellen

PS: Dragonfly, I hope you saw my post responding about "levels of abstraction." No reply needed, since basically what I said is that I'm not "getting the picture" about a certain step -- the development of true intention -- in what Dennett proposes. I might yet "see" it, or I might conclude that there really is a missing step. Time will tell. Anyway, I just wanted to be sure you know I responded

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[Dragonfly]

PS: Dragonfly, I hope you saw my post responding about "levels of abstraction." No reply needed, since basically what I said is that I'm not "getting the picture" about a certain step -- the development of true intention -- in what Dennett proposes. I might yet "see" it, or I might conclude that there really is a missing step. Time will tell. Anyway, I just wanted to be sure you know I responded

Good that you mention it, because I had missed your post! Perhaps I'll reply later.

[Dragonfly]

I dread seeing that book completed, because if it is, Larry will be asked to review it, and will probably accept the request, and life will be difficult around here.

Now you've made me curious, how should I read that?

[Ellen Stuttle]

[This is in the category "closing the barn door after the horses have escaped," but the thought occurred while I was out eating dinner that the walls have ears in listland and I was making the mistake of forgetting that fact. I should have replied off-list.]

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[Ellen Stuttle]

In a Steady State theory, which is the major alternate theory type to Big Bang theory, something does come from nothing, constantly (or so I believe the theory requires -- is that your understanding also, Dragonfly?).

Ellen

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[Dragonfly]

Does that explain?

Yes, thanks. I was just wondering whether you meant that Larry and you would have quite different opinions on that book, or that he didn't want to be too negative and you wouldn't agree with that - now that would life make difficult.

[Dragonfly]

In a Steady State theory, which is the major alternate theory type to Big Bang theory, something does come from nothing, constantly (or so I believe the theory requires -- is that your understanding also, Dragonfly?).

Yes.

[Paul Mawdsley]

Peter,

Have you ever considered what biases have been smuggled into theoretical physics? With an understanding of Special Relativity it was realized that Classical Physics had carried with it a bias in its interpretations about the nature of existence. Classical Physics was biased towards an interpretation of observed events from a perspective of absolute space and time. The evidence remained the same, it was the interpretation that changed.

Einstein’s perspective changed how we interpret the evidence but he did not challenge the concept of causality that was implicit in the bias of the Classical view. In fact, it was struggling to hold onto the notion of causality implicit in Classical Physics that ultimately caused him to draw away from the direction physics was heading after Quantum Theory started to take shape. He viewed the “Copenhagen Interpretation” as being mistaken because it required that physics abandon Classical causality at the foundation of reality.

Quantum theory actually introduces two new solutions to understanding the behaviour of entities. Firstly, there is the idea that there is a reciprocal causation between the particle and the quantum field. The particle affects the behaviour of the field as a whole, and the field as a whole affects the behaviour of the particle. Secondly, the Uncertainty Principle has lead to the interpretation that quantum events are ultimately the result of random occurrences that are uncaused. Einstein was able to accept the first but not the second.

What I would suggest is that the, as yet, unidentified biases in theoretical physics, which have their roots in Newton’s Three Laws of Motion, were the cause of Einstein’s dilemma. Physics is now governed by the bias of three implicit concepts of causation. Einstein wanted to get rid of one. I, for one, would be happier if we could find one concept of causality that can account for all existence.

It has been shown that bias has entered the understanding of existence painted by theoretical physics before. Why should we assume no bias exists now? If we identify the concept of causality that is contained in Newton’s Three Laws of Motion, and we identify the concept of causality contained in Rand and Branden’s work, we might be able to see things a little more clearly. I don’t think either is complete but identifying them would bring us a lot closer to the truth. I think the Aristotle/Rand/Branden view of causality, particularly what is found in their views of human nature, is where we will find the beginnings of a concept of causality that can integrate the other existing notions.

Peter, would you be willing to discuss such an idea?

(The invitation for discussion is open to anyone interested.)

Thanks,

Paul Mawdsley

[Ellen Stuttle]

What I would suggest is that the, as yet, unidentified biases in theoretical physics, which have their roots in Newton’s Three Laws of Motion, were the cause of Einstein’s dilemma. Physics is now governed by the bias of three implicit concepts of causation. Einstein wanted to get rid of one. [....]

Paul, to clarify what you're asking, could you state what you think are the "three implicit concepts of causation" which currently govern physics? I don't think you mean Newton's Three Laws of Motion, but from the above paragraph it might seem that that's what you mean.

Ellen

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