Critique of Objectivist ethics theory

[Dragonfly]

Human social parasites feed off of the productive efforts of other human beings. They can exist perfectly within a society. But they would not survive using the parasite system if stranded alone on a desert island. There they would have to use reason to produce food, shelter, etc., or they would die.

That is not relevant. How many parasites are stranded alone on a desert island? Why should they take that as a criterion? Apart from that, why shouldn't they be able to use reason to produce food or shelter when the necessity arises? They may be very good at using reason to realize their goals. You shouldn't believe Rand's fairy tales that such people can't do anything, some of them might be much more practical in surviving under adverse circumstances than some Objectivists who know their Rand from A-Z. But why should they bother if such imaginary scenarios are not relevant?

[Victor Pross]

The parasite is entirely dependent upon those who do live by a rational code of ethics. It is a correct system. Of course it is—because the parasite is thriving on it! Here’s what it boils down to: in your own way, you are saying that a lot of people live the life of a parasite, and they are doing very well, thank you. But Rand’s philosophy is fraught with problems and it is basically incorrect—and yet the parasite survives on the men and women who live by Rand’s code. This is a contradiction.

There is no contradiction at all. The parasite is not against people leading a productive life, not at all! The only difference with Rand is that he doesn't think that everyone should lead such a life, he is all for such a rational and sensible notion as the division of labor: some people should work hard and produce and others should profit from it!

Dragonfly,

I think my point is clear. I never said that the parasite objects to the hosts--from whom he exploits and robs—living the life of productive and rational beings. Where did I say that? And why would the parasite object? He is dependent upon the host(s) for his survival.

You have not addressed my point, and I suspect you are cleverly (as you see it) eluding my actual point—a point that is clear. My point was simply this: if Rand’s ethics (a rational ethical system) is so fraught with errors and problems—and is fundamentally “wrong” (factually or/and normatively) then how is it able to maintain the life of both the host and the parasite? That was—and is—my point. Your contradictory stance is blazingly evident. Rand’s pro-productive rational ethical system is factually wrong, but that shouldn’t stop the parasite from living off those who have instigated it. Yeah, sure.

I suspect that even a fly can see it by now.

Victor

Edited March 12, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Daniel Barnes]

Darrell:

>Michael Huemer's piece is fraught with rather obvious errors. He does not properly identify her premises or conclusions and his objections rely on rather obvious misinterpretations of what Rand meant.

Hi Darrell,

Could you give some examples of the "obvious errors" in Huemer's piece?

>Rand may have been somewhat careless in her use of language from time to time, but I think it is unreasonable to require a writer to put every possible qualification on every statement at every point in a derivation.

This is not what I meant at all. What I meant is that she has a consistent pattern throughout her work of using confused and confusing terminology. A typical oxymoron is, for example, her phrase "contextual absolute" - because, obviously, an 'absolute' is something that doesn't change, no matter what the context! For example, an absolute law of physics is something that is true in every time and place in the universe ie: every possible context. Words have meanings, after all! Such a construction is really no better than saying something is free, except you have to pay for it. That kind of thing. It's not profound, it's simply playing with words in a highly misleading fashion, IMHO.

Edited March 12, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Human social parasites feed off of the productive efforts of other human beings. They can exist perfectly within a society. But they would not survive using the parasite system if stranded alone on a desert island. There they would have to use reason to produce food, shelter, etc., or they would die.

That is not relevant. How many parasites are stranded alone on a desert island? Why should they take that as a criterion?

It depends on the context. Of course it is relevant if you are discussing the nature of a being's survival mechanisms. A lion in captivity has claws and strong muscles for running. Just because he is in captivity does not mean that noticing that these features developed for life on the open plains is irrelevant to studying lions in captivity, or to caring for them. The same kind of reasoning applies to human beings.

It is irrelevant, of course, if you are not interested at all in the nature of man...

Apart from that, why shouldn't they be able to use reason to produce food or shelter when the necessity arises?

Excuse me. I though I was clear. I thought I said "they [the human parasites] would not survive using the parasite system if stranded alone on a desert island" instead of "they are unable to use reason to produce food or shelter." Hmmm... Yes. As a matter of fact, I did say that. Yep. It's right there in my post. I find it strange that you missed it. Was that difficult to understand? Could I have written it clearer?

(suddenly afflicted)

Talk to me, Dragonfly! Talk to me!

You shouldn't believe Rand's fairy tales that such people can't do anything, some of them might be much more practical in surviving under adverse circumstances than some Objectivists who know their Rand from A-Z.

Thank you for enlightening me. As I never believed in that fairy tale to begin with, having you straighten me out on it makes doubly sure I won't believe in it.

Michael

[Victor Pross]

Victor:

>where do you stand with Rand’s ethical system?

I think it is almost certainly false for the most part, though of course it might contain elements of truth. Michael Huemer's piece above is a brief but thorough refutation. The most obvious problem is of course her equivocation over man's "life", which early in the "Ethics" essay she uses in the sense of "survival", but then later shifts to mean "man qua man" - that is to say, just about anything she pleases! That in itself is enough to render her theory useless. The other obvious problem is the "is/ought" issue, which she obviously doesn't solve as studiodekadent points out below - whoops, I mean above! - (what she/he calls the "narrow sense" of the problem is the only important sense in my opinion). There are also her usual problems of fudge words and oxymorons etc etc that bedevil the rest of her work, but aren't specific to this theory.

(I don't agree with the rest of what studiodekadent says, BTW. The problem with Rand's ethics has nothing to do with any definitions of Objectivity - and even less to do with Logical Positivism - but quite simple matters of verbal equivocation and valid logic. Once again, see Huemer's essay Dragonfly posted above)

Daniel,

I don’t see how studiodekadent has demonstrated how the is/ought dichotomy still stands, and that Rand did not provide a solution. I regard studiodekadent’s post—no insult intended—as convoluted amidst the borage of multi-Slavic philosophic verbiage, and that is intended to convey (or demonstrate) something problematic, but which does not. The meaning is lost to me, and I have read it many times. However, I’ll wait for someone (like MSK perhaps) to address that particular post to see what is decipherable from it. We’ll see.

Meanwhile, for those who don’t have the time to read the lengthy argument that Dragonfly linked, why don’t you condense the Is/Ought dichotomy and argue as to how Rand failed to solve this age old problem that has vexed previous philosophers. What is the IS/OUGHT dichotomy as you understand it? How did Rand fail to solve it, as is purported? Let’s take that as a single focus for now.

I’m prepared—for the purpose of interest and economy—to squire-off with this central question in philosophic inquiry. Are you game?

-Victor

Edited March 12, 2007 by Victor Pross

[studiodekadent]

A typical oxymoron is, for example, her phrase "contextual absolute" - because, obviously, an 'absolute' is something that doesn't change, no matter what the context! For example, an absolute law of physics is something that is true in every time and place in the universe ie: every possible context. Words have meanings, after all! Such a construction is really no better than saying something is free, except you have to pay for it. That kind of thing. It's not profound, it's simply playing with words in a highly misleading fashion, IMHO.

This is precisely why I pointed out that the Anti-Rand side are using different definitions than the Pro-Rand side. The Anti-Randians are obviously using the analytic philosophy definition of objective, which is, to the Pro-Rand side, Intrinsicism.

And laws of physics do have a context: this universe. There could (yes, this is speculation, but the example is valid) be multiple universes with different laws of physics. And in the end all human knowlege is within the context of human experience so all knowlege is contextual. That does not mean our knowlege is worthless, it simply means that if it isn't an axiom, its subject to revision, criticism, modification, etc.

As for the blog post at the start of this article:

Premise 2 seems to be false. If I knew that I was inevitably going to get a million dollars tomorrow--there's no way I can avoid it--would that mean that the money will have no value?

ERROR: Conflation of economic value with moral value.

First, it is not true that non-living things can't be destroyed. I once saw a house destroyed by flames, for example.

ERROR: Misinterpretation of Rand. "Matter is indestructible, it changes forms (including changes to energy, such as being burnt) but it cannot cease to exist" (brackets mine) and "Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies; its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of existence." (The Objectivist Ethics). Hence, Rand was referring to the existence of life, not existence as matter.

[studiodekadent]

Daniel,

I don’t see how studiodekadent has demonstrated how the is/ought dichotomy still stands, and that Rand did not provide a solution. I regard studiodekadent’s post—no insult intended—as convoluted amidst the borage of multi-Slavic philosophic verbiage, and that is intended to convey (or demonstrate) something problematic, but which does not.

No insult taken. But I did not attempt to point out a problem. Im an Objectivist too, remember? I simply wanted to point out how there are different ways of interpreting the is/ought problem and to which interpretation is solved by Rand.

The meaning is lost to me, and I have read it many times. However, I’ll wait for someone (like MSK perhaps) to address that particular post to see what is decipherable from it. We’ll see.

Ive had some training in philosophy at university, so I learned the conventional framework. Im simply trying to show where Rand fits in it. Sorry if I confused you... I tried to provide definitions in my post.

[Darrell Hougen]

The point is that this probability of success is not the same for everyone. For some people it will be a bad choice, for others not.

You can't measure the probability of success after the fact. With 20/20 hindsight, everyone knows whether he or she made the right choice or the best choice, but are the odds ever really in your favor going in? If I win the lottery, I can say that I made the right choice in buying a lottery ticket, but was it really the right choice before hand?

Bank robbers and the average burglar are certainly not the most succesful exponents of the parasitic lifestyle. But they form only a small minority among the parasites. Much more important and also more succesful is for example the con man and in general white-collar criminality. Especially when there are indications that only a very small part of these are ever brought to justice.

Here, you're just speculating. Some white collar criminals may be very successful, but that doesn't imply that the odds were in their favor going in.

For the same reason that a slave cannot live a life proper for a rational being, a moocher doesn't either. In the first case, the slave is not allowed to use his mind in the sense that he can never test his conclusions and therefore gives up thinking because it is useless. In the second, the moocher doesn't bother to test his conclusions and therefore gives up thinking.

This is pure speculation. How do you know that the moocher gives up thinking? Maybe he has thought out his situation very well and has he come to the conclusion that this is the lifestyle for him. That you would arrive at a different conclusion for yourself doesn't prove anything, you cannot think for him.

I'm not trying to think for him. He may have thought out his situation very well in the beginning, but now that he is hooked up to the gravy train (the welfare check or his relative's handouts) he doesn't need to think any more and he doesn't. If he did, if he came up with a great way to make money and implemented it while he was sitting around receiving his welfare check, he wouldn't need welfare anymore because he would be rich (or at least reasonably well off). So moochers (not thieves) are people who, by definition, sit around year after year not doing much and receiving payments from other people.

So, the moocher, in effect, wastes his life. He may have the capacity to use his mind, but he doesn't. He doesn't understand as much as the person that works and isn't as knowledgeable.

Of course, the moocher could sit at home and read books, but there is a limit to the amount that can be learned from books. It is often difficult to understand something if you don't do it yourself. It is necessary for the mind to connect abstract concepts to perceptual concretes and explore the effects of actions on those things that are observed. You may think you understand a computer programming book, but until you have actually written computer programs, debugged them, made them work and made them do something useful, you don't really understand how to program.

Now, a moocher might actually implement something that he reads in a book in his basement and, being the genius that he is, might discover some new physical theory. But, once the theory becomes known, he is no longer a moocher, but a benefactor of humanity. His only choice, if he really wants to be a moocher, is to take his brilliant new theory to his grave with him. But, would that be rational? Isn't it likely that he would profit much more by making it known?

So, I just don't see how a person can be a moocher and live a life proper to a rational being, that is, use his mind to engage in rational thought.

Darrell

[Victor Pross]

studiodekadent,

When you read Rand speaking of “contextual absolutes” she is using the phrase in terms of making an ethical elaboration—this is not a metaphysical observation. In metaphysics, absolute is used with concepts such as completness, totality, all-inclusiveness and that which is unchanging and universal.

But Rand speaks of "ethical contextual absolutes" (not using those words, mind you). That’s the context. If you wish to prove otherwise then please furnish us with a paragraph that proves otherwise.

Rand's illustrations in ethics is the context. For example, to refer to a previous point I made, take the fact of the sun’s immense heat. We need its warmth so I must afford myself contact to the sun--under certain conditions and for certain reasons. However, prolonged exposure can be damaging to my skin—even my life. Therefore, sometimes I seek its heat and other times I need to avoid it. I must take the relevant context into consideration. That's two different "oughts" from the same metaphysical "is". Is the sun good or bad? It can be both—absolutely, depending on the context.

-Victor

edit: Sorry, studiodekadent, our posts crossed. You are an Objectivist? Well, maybe my post should have been addressed to Danial. :turned:

Edited March 12, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Darrell Hougen]

As long as such a society doesn't exist (if it ever can exist), the parasite's behavior is quite rational. The Objectivist's error is to think that "rational behavior" is a synonym for "desirable behavior".

I should add that I agree with you here. Whether mooching is rational or not depends upon the context of a person's existence. It bears a similar relationship to reality as honesty. Honesty is the best policy only when a person is dealing with generally honest or good people. U.S. intelligence told lies to the Germans during WWII because that was the rational way to win the war. Mooching may be rational given the sanction of the victim.

Darrell

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

>I don’t see how studiodekadent has demonstrated how the is/ought dichotomy still stands, and that Rand did not provide a solution.

Hi Victor,

Do you know about the basic rule of a valid logical inference? That the truth of the conclusion cannot exceed the truth of the premises? That is the problem here (and one of the problems of induction BTW)

>Meanwhile, for those who don’t have the time to read the lengthy argument that Dragonfly linked, why don’t you condense the Is/Ought dichotomy and argue as to how Rand failed to solve this age old problem that has vexed previous philosophers.

I attempted to do that in my first post. Obviously not well enough....;-) Have a quick look at that and come back to me with anything seems unclear. (sorry to be brief but I am travelling)

[Victor Pross]

'Daniel,

Yes, you are right. Sorry about that.

Your arguement:

But let's just leave these aside for a moment and focus on the single issue of whether Rand really has solved Hume's famous "is/ought" problem. She certainly seems to think she has, but I am not sure she actually understands it.

The "is/ought" dualism can be simply grasped as the distinction between facts and decisions - "here is a fact, what ought I do?" (This can also be understood as the difference between descriptive statements and prescriptive statements) The problem is this: that a decision cannot be validly derived from a fact, or any number of facts. From the fact it is sunny outside as I type, I may make any number of decisions - to stay inside or go outside, to go surfing or to visit my mother, to stop writing and make coffee or to finish my post to O-living despite the glare on my computer screen. All these things are perfectly possible and reasonable choices, but I would never dream of claiming that any of them can be logically determined in the same way that we can validly determine "Socrates is mortal" in the classic syllogism - for of course we have no choice but to come to this conclusion. Now it does not matter what type of decisions we're talking about, ethical or otherwise, or what type of facts, natural or man-made. The problem remains the same. So it turns out the fact that a living entity "is" does not and cannot validly determine which of a vast range of decisions it "ought" to make. Thus there can be no sound "validation" of value judgements by the facts of reality - a situation which, interestingly, returns us the other great Humean problem, the problem of induction. (At least Rand plainly admits she has not solved that one - p303/4, ITOE - although once again it is not clear she fully understands it) So much for Rand's solution to the problem of the logical relationship between "is" and "ought."

I will give it a careful read and due consideration. So later on this, thanks. :turned:

-Victor

[Daniel Barnes]

studio dekadent

>This is precisely why I pointed out that the Anti-Rand side are using different definitions than the Pro-Rand side. The Anti-Randians are obviously using the analytic philosophy definition of objective, which is, to the Pro-Rand side, Intrinsicism.

Actually, the Anti-Rand side - well, those on this forum at least - are using plain English anyone can understand, and not relying on dodgy selfcontradictory jargon...;-)

[Darrell Hougen]

>Michael Huemer's piece is fraught with rather obvious errors. He does not properly identify her premises or conclusions and his objections rely on rather obvious misinterpretations of what Rand meant.

Could you give some examples of the "obvious errors" in Huemer's piece?

Hi Daniel,

Here is an example:

2. Something is valuable to an entity, only if the entity faces alternatives.

...

Premise 2 seems to be false. If I knew that I was inevitably going to get a million dollars tomorrow--there's no way I can avoid it--would that mean that the money will have no value? Again, Rand offers no defense of this assertion.

If I was going to receive a million dollars tomorrow, that would not convert me into a being that is not faced with alternatives. If I receive a million dollars, I must still decide how to use it. If I'm involved in a car crash over which I have no control, I must still figure out how to pick up the pieces and go on.

Huemer's argument is just silly, in this case. It is based on a shallow and obvious misinterpretation of Objectivism. I haven't read the whole thing, but if you think he makes a good point somewhere, we can debate that.

Darrell

[studiodekadent]

Actually, the Anti-Rand side - well, those on this forum at least - are using plain English anyone can understand, and not relying on dodgy selfcontradictory jargon...;-)

Just because Objectivism has a different conceptual framework to analytic philosophy does not mean it is 'selfcontradictory jargon.' We frequently explain our definitions, and we frequently point out we do not use the term "Objective" in the sense that the analytic philosophers use the term. This discussion thread unfortunately did not sufficiently specify that and as such you are attacking Objectivism for not being intrinsic.

And Victor, no problems with the crossing post. Yes, I am an Objectivist, I have posted a bit on these forums before.

[Judith]

I believe that what Rand would say to the above is that the moocher's own mind will not allow him to live happily and function well under these circumstances.

How could she know? This is a typical example of wishful thinking and armchair psychologizing of the worst kind.

Accordingly, the "revenge" that reality and his own psyche take on him for his "sins" is that he lives in a state of chronic anxiety.

Again armchair psychologizing of people you even don't know, without any evidence.

I am assuming (and it's a big assumption, I admit) that Rand was relying on introspection as well as observation here. Armchair psychologizing? Perhaps. But there are certain universals regarding the human mind and consciousness. We're not infinitely different from one another; if we were, we wouldn't be able to communicate as much as you and I are doing right now. We rely on introspection to some extent every time we communicate. If you're in a debate and trying to win points from an opponent, you can stubbornly refuse to admit points from introspection, but if you're in a non-adversarial discussion among friends, you can appeal to introspection as a form of evidence with each other and ask each other if it rings true.

That's the theory. Whether you find it convincing is up to you. I personally have known enough people out of touch with reality who were also filled with chronic anxiety, and have also noticed from introspection that my level of fearlessness corresponds pretty directly to my willingness to face reality, that I'm willing to buy it.

Well, if you want more anecdotal evidence, what about Rand herself, was she happy with her severe depression that lasted for years, doing virtually nothing but playing patience and crying? Or the bitterness of her later years? By this kind of reasoning she should have been the most radiantly happy person on earth.

You're assuming that non-mooching is the only condition necessary for radiant happiness. It may be a necessary condition, but it's not the only condition.

Judith

[Daniel Barnes]

Darrell offered the following as an example of an "obvious error" in Huemer's piece:

"2. Something is valuable to an entity, only if the entity faces alternatives."

Huemer wrote:

"Premise 2 seems to be false. If I knew that I was inevitably going to get a million dollars tomorrow--there's no way I can avoid it--would that mean that the money will have no value? Again, Rand offers no defense of this assertion."

Darrell criticised Huemer as follows:

>If I was going to receive a million dollars tomorrow, that would not convert me into a being that is not faced with alternatives. If I receive a million dollars, I must still decide how to use it.

Hi Darrell,

I'm sorry, but this does not seem to be an error - or at least not an obvious one. If anything, I might politely suggest you have mistaken Huemer's point. First of all, we should note Huemer is rather tenative about this criticism - he talks about what Rand "seems" to be saying and it's certainly not one of the errors he calls "egregious". Secondly, the prima facie point is is about whether or not the enforced $1m will have value to you - not whether it will "convert" you "into a being not faced with alternatives". Whether the enforced money will still have value to you is the initial point at issue. That, in the first instance, I am sure most people would say "yes" to. Now, of course we may take the next step and expand to a secondary point as you suggest - but Huemer raises a question mark as to whether this is what Rand actually meant, because it seems Rand herself did not offer this defense. (Huemer may be wrong; however I can think of anywhere she did offhand. Do you know where Rand defends it? If you do then this might show Huemer up as not having done his homework, which is always handy)

If you don't, you are of course welcome to speculate what you think Rand might have said in reply, but then this would hardly make Huemer's questioning an "obvious misinterpretation."

So I don't think Huemer's argument is "silly" - or at least there is no rebuttal of it in Rand's work.

>I haven't read the whole thing, but if you think he makes a good point somewhere, we can debate that.

OK, well his "5. Man qua man and fudge words" seems both powerful and accurate to me, and well-supported by the text. Have a look and let us know what you think.

[Victor Pross]

The idea that we cannot derive “Ought from Is” is worse than worthless, it is a self-contradictory philosophical fiction. In fact, all of us make Is-Ought derivations every day in the normal course of our lives.

Such derivations are inescapable and examples are innumerable. Every time you act from a volitional choice---you have expressed (at least implicitly) the conclusion, "I ought to take this action." And that the normative conclusion is always based on your observations of what you ARE, and of what the conditions of your environment ARE.

Objectivism is a philosophy for living on earth. All life is subsumed by ought conditions and if those conditions are not met, the living creature dies—and this is a constant observable fact that is substantiated time and again. To attempt to establish guidelines that ignores those conditions (to think about Oughts not derived from Is) is suicidal. The fact that what reality IS determines how one OUGHT to deal with it—and this seems so simple to grasp that it’s no wonder it eludes modern academics. Any assertion to the contrary implies that reality is not objective but necessarily subjective in its fundamental nature. The only people who can take such nonsense seriously are those who believe that philosophy is merely a word game, having no practical application to real life. People who take ideas seriously and have a genuine concern for learning philosophical principles to help successful living, will simply reject "word game" philosophy and ignore it for the nonsense it is.

Let's move on.

There seems to be a difference between descriptive statements (about what is) and prescriptive statements (about what ought to be) and so we have the questions as to how can you derive an "ought" from an "is"? This dichotomy attempts to erect an impenetrable barricade between an entity and its behavior, between what a thing IS and what it OUGHT to do. This problem alone has become one of the central issues of ethical theory. But is it a problem?

Let’s take the field of medicine as an example: would you ask this question: "How can one possibly draw from knowledge of what is good or bad for man's physical well-being by studying man and the world in which he lives?" I don't think so because the answer is so patently obvious.

The assumption underlying the critic's question is that "ought" judgments are obtained from a "voice of authority” which one can see as the underlining implication to those who hold to the Is/ought dichotomy. Of course, Objectivism maintains that there is only one ultimate authority: the facts of reality (that which "is"--and when reality is consulted, it clearly informs us that an object's identity determines its behavior.

The fact that “action results from identity” is universally accepted and used in the fields of physics, chemistry, and the other realms of science. (Maybe in this case, we can get something intelligible from Dragonfly to confirm this).

It is observed be true not only of inanimate objects but also of living things. It is seen in the field of biology where a thing's behavior is determined by internal as well as external influences. One would not attempt to grow a food harvest as though it were a cell phone, because harvest’s identity is different from that of a cell phone, and therefore its behavior is different.

Let’s move up the ladder: if we observe living objects and then observe entities possessed of consciousness, we still see the same precept in action. Conscious entities are faced with alternatives. In those creatures whose consciousness functions automatically, that automatic functioning determines the creature's behavior in the face of its alternatives.

Now take a further step up: if we observe creatures whose consciousness is not automatic but volitional, we see the same principle in action: the creature's identity (its particular kind of consciousness) will determine

its behavior. Because our power of choice is not automatic (but volitional) we allocate its expression--its outcome--not as "will be" but as "ought to be."

The concept "ought" arises from the difference between an automatic form of consciousness and a volitional form of consciousness. "Ought" refers to behavior--but a certain kind of behavior: that which is life-conducive as opposed to that which is life-detractive. The cognitive function of the word "ought" is to designate preferable actions, those which promote the goals of the acting being--a volitional being.

The volitional nature of our consciousness is part of what we ARE. It enables us to select (to a great extent) the significance of our behavior. What a thing IS, determines what it CAN do, what it WILL do---and if the thing is possessed of volitional choice, what it OUGHT to do.

The concept "ought" presumes the possibility of a certain kind of behavior---a deliberate selection among alternatives. "Ought" has meaning only with reference to a conscious entity that has the capability to make such a selection. "Ought" assumes that there IS such an entity, and that the entity IS faced with an environment that IS containing alternatives. If any of these "IS" conditions are removed from consideration, then the "ought" is deprived of any meaning. It becomes a Stolen Concept. So, therefore, "ought" is based on "is." You cannot conceptually have "ought" without a proceeding "is." It is the possession of volitional consciousness that gives rise to the whole field of normative propositions.

The fact that a human being IS a being of volitional consciousness is the direct source of all normative behavior; moral instruction is necessary because human beings do not live by instinct as animals do. Our consciousness is not hardwired to know automatically and infallibly what is good for us and what is bad for us. Yet in order to survive we MUST choose between these things. This is the fact of human nature that makes morality possible---and the reason we need the science of morality.

There are a mass of references "bridging the Is-Ought gap" but that "gap" can never be bridged-- because no such gap exists. It is merely a philosophical fantasy. The attempt to split "ought" from "is"--the attempt to sever normative propositions from cognitive propositions--is merely a cheap shot to separate morality from the real world.

-Victor

Edited March 12, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Daniel Barnes]

studiodekadent:

>Just because Objectivism has a different conceptual framework to analytic philosophy does not mean it is 'selfcontradictory jargon.' We frequently explain our definitions, and we frequently point out we do not use the term "Objective" in the sense that the analytic philosophers use the term. This discussion thread unfortunately did not sufficiently specify that and as such you are attacking Objectivism for not being intrinsic.

studiodekadent, may I politely ask what's up with the "analytic philosophy" biz? Who is arguing here from an 'analytic' point of view? The term usually refers to conceptual or linguistic analysis-type philosophies, or Logical Positivism some such, and I believe those philosophies to be in serious error too - and even share to some serious errors with Objectivism. I'm not interested in attacking Objectivism for not being "intrinsic" etc. Nothing could be more tiresome IMHO.I'm interested in basic logical and factual errors in Rand's arguments, and the "fudge" words and jargon that concealed them from her readers, and especially, I believe, Rand herself.

For Rand often did not realise she had not solved the problem she thought she had. The "is/ought" example is a typical one. The other one that is amazingly obvious - so much so that people who have a lot of confidence in Rand's claims can scarcely believe it is true - is that Rand did not in fact refute Hume's famous "problem of induction" - the basis of all modern skepticism. Not only did she not refute it, she had not even done any work on it. For this, you do not need to rely on my say-so. She admits this with crystal clarity in her own words in the ITOE. Let's review this remarkable passage in full: (ITOE p304/5)

Professor M asks - admittedly not very clearly - how one can verify scientifcally that Newton's theory of gravitation is correct.

Rand replies:

"After it has been verified by a great many observations, not merely the verification of one prediction, then at a certain time one can accept it as fact. But taking your example as an illustration of what you are asking, if the sole validation for Newton's principle was that it predicted that orbits will be elliptical, that wouldn't be sufficient proof. Epistemologically, it wouldn't be enough. You would have to have other observations, from different aspects of the same issue, which all support this hypothesis. (Historically Newton validated his theory by means of a great many observations of widely differing phenomena)"

Prof M:"The question is: where does one stop? When does one decide that enough confirming evidence exists? (emphasis DB) Is that the province of the issue of induction?"

Now we will pause briefly here, as anyone even faintly familiar with Hume's famous philosophical problem will recognise this question as the induction problem in a nutshell. Of course, Hume's answer to this question is simply: Never! For no matter how many observations you make, you can never positively establish the truth of a universal law. The logical inference is always going to be invalid, as the universal truth of the conclusion will always exceed the truth of the premises (or observations), which will always be limited to some extent. Further, appeals to some kind of "inductive validity" as opposed to purely logical validity also fail, because it is circular. So it is a mother of a problem alright - as Rand then acknowledges.

AR: "Yes. That's the big question of induction. Which I couldn't even begin to discuss - because a) I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it, (emphasis DB) and b) it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process in that field"

That's right - just read that passage again. The problem of induction, Hume's big Kahuna that informs his other skepticisms, such as causality, and kicked off modern skepticism, not to mention Immanuel Kant - and she hasn't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate an answer to it! (Her appeal to some "scientist" to come along and explain it only indicates that she doesn't realise the nature of the problem; for the problem of induction is a logical one, not an empirical one). Knowing this, it becomes extremely difficult to take the oft-made claims that Rand refuted Hume's skepticism seriously. In her own words, she has barely even thought about the subject!

[Victor Pross]

Daniel,

How do you argue that Rand’s not sufficiently dealing with Hume's famous "problem of induction" as a monumental case—a positive case--for an is/ought dichotomy? What is the connection?

-Victor

edit: Yes, the Is/ought dichotomy was introduced by David Hume in his "Treatise of Human Nature" and then it was “modernized” in 1903 by the Cambridge philosopher George Edward Moore in his "Principia Ethica," where he claims that normative propositions (the Ought) cannot possibly be derived from cognitive propositions (the Is).

The dichotomy is comparable to Vitalism (a discarded artifact from the history of biology). Vitalism was a doctrine that ascribed the functions of living organisms to a vital principle distinct from chemical and physical forces, endeavoring to set up an impassable barrier between life and non-life.

From Wiki: Vitalism, as defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary, is:

[1] a doctrine that the functions of a living organism are due to a vital principle distinct from physicochemical forces

[2] a doctrine that the processes of life are not explicable by the laws of physics and chemistry alone and that life is in some part self-determining

Vitalism was devised by Georg Stahl about 1700 and was demolished by Friedrich Wohler in 1828, Pierre Berthelot in 1860 and completed by Stanley Miller. Happily for the field of biology, the disproof of Vitalism has been acknowledged and accepted. Unfortunately for the field of philosophy, the Is-Ought dichotomy is still feverishly cuddled. :turned:

Edited March 12, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

>How do you argue that Rand’s not sufficiently dealing with Hume's famous "problem of induction" as a monumental case—a positive case--for an is/ought dichotomy? What is the connection?

It's intended as merely another example - both clear cut, and powerful - that Rand often did not solve the problems she (and others) claimed she did.

Why do you think the debunking of an antique idea like vitalism as a doctrine is related to the "is/ought" problem? One is a discarded biological theory. The other is a basic problem of valid logical inference, as I have already explained. It's like trying to say the law of the excluded middle should be discarded, because scientists don't believe in phlostigon. There is no relationship between the two, let alone any 'cuddling'...;-)

[Victor Pross]

The fact that the is-ought dichotomy (and all the other subjectivist junk) cannot be accepted and practiced consistently without resulting in eventual death (or serious erosion to the life process in the very least) is what leads to the separation of philosophical principle from real life behavior. Ultimately, what the advocates accomplish is not the separation of "is" from "ought" but the separation of their "philosophy" from the reality of human life. (Of course, they are hypocrites; of course they make ought-judgments by observing what is.

I recall the Peikoff story of the Logical Positivist who gave a lecture on why the word "God" is meaningless, then asked for directions to the nearest synagogue so he could say his prayers. "What has philosophy got to do with living?" he asked indignantly. And so it is with the advocates of the Is/ought dichotomy advocates: What has morality do do with a human life?

Consider this remark from philosopher Bertrand Russell:

"This [idea] is patently absurd; but whoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened by absurdities."

If you want to know whether or not Objectivism is consistent, don't ask a philosopher or those who have overdosed on romanticized philosophies---test it by putting it into practice in the real world. There's your validation. :rofl:

-Victor

Edited March 12, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I have been doing a bit of reading on vitalism because of the constant claims that it has been discredited. As I understand the discredit, it cannot be falsified as a theory, therefore it cannot be true (for a very Popperian manner of thinking). But when I read further, I keep coming up against some very interesting phrases: "emergent properties" and "emergent processes." What intrigues me about these phrases is that they are treated as absolute fact (and as the correct substitute for vitalism to explain life), but when you push the concept up against the wall, trying to find out how "emergence" actually occurs, you get a big fat "we don't know yet."

Hmmmmm...

Something about all this doesn't satisfy me too much.

Still reading, though...

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

>Objectivism is a philosophy for living on earth. All life is subsumed by ought conditions and if those conditions are not met, the living creature dies—and this is a constant observable fact that is substantiated time and again. To attempt to establish guidelines that ignores those conditions (to think about Oughts not derived from Is) is suicidal. The fact that what reality IS determines how one OUGHT to deal with it—and this seems so simple to grasp that it’s no wonder it eludes modern academics.

Hi Victor

All this sounds very stirring, but...how does this solve the problem of valid logical inference from "is" to "ought"? This is what you have to keep coming back to I'm afraid. Fine words butter no parsnips in logic. This is a serious issue, and unfortunately will not be drowned out by arias, no matter how boldly sung...;-)

[Victor Pross]

Victor:

>Objectivism is a philosophy for living on earth. All life is subsumed by ought conditions and if those conditions are not met, the living creature dies—and this is a constant observable fact that is substantiated time and again. To attempt to establish guidelines that ignores those conditions (to think about Oughts not derived from Is) is suicidal. The fact that what reality IS determines how one OUGHT to deal with it—and this seems so simple to grasp that it’s no wonder it eludes modern academics.

Hi Victor

All this sounds very stirring, but...how does this solve the problem of valid logical inference from "is" to "ought"? This is what you have to keep coming back to I'm afraid. Fine words butter no parsnips in logic. This is a serious issue, and unfortunately will not be drowned out by arias, no matter how boldly sung...;-)

You act as if that's all I said. Save the "selectivity" for art, and address my central point, cherry-picker. I made my case, not that you'll really deal with it though. :turned: