Critique of Objectivist ethics theory

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Richard,

You mean Michael.

I sent you an email.

You have no idea how pleased I am to hear from you. (I do not remember meeting you, but your father was a dear friend for several years.)

Michael

[Guyau]

2002

"Is Benevolent Egoism Coherent?" by Michael Huemer. In The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies V3N2.

This essay received a serious rebuttal in "Egoism and Prudent Predation" by Michael Young,

which was in JARS V5N2 (2004).

A debate on Rand's ethics was recently held between Michael Huemer and Onkar Ghate.

http://dianahsieh.com/blog/2009/03/audio-o...ds-ethics.shtml

Edited March 6, 2009 by Stephen Boydstun

[Neil Parille]

Stephen,

This debate was quite good. There appears to be a new openness in ARI circles. To my mind, Dr. Ghate was unable to give adequate responses to Huemer's claim that an egoist should respect other's rights and be charitable (saving a drowning child).

-NEIL

[BaalChatzaf]

On Daniel Barnes' blog I found a link to an interesting article by Michael Huemer about Objectivist ethics. It discusses some of the big holes in the theory I've mentioned in earlier posts. Something for our Michael to chew on.

Step 12 is questionable and step 13 does not follow from step 12

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I have gone over Huemer's critique before, but it reminded me of a music composition by Charles Ives. He often portrayed two different marching bands approaching then passing each other, with each band playing a different composition at the same time.

Huemer consistently insists on imposing his meanings on words Rand meant in a different manner, then proceeds to argue against his own meanings while ignoring hers. Here is one such gem (from Item 12 in his Critique of "The Objectivist Ethics"):

Rand has given no argument for thinking that life is good; not even that it is good for the living thing.

Rand defined "good" as life being the standard of good. In her normative thinking, good is a measurement of impact on health (whether physical or mental, with integration of both being the highest standard). She rarely used the word "health" and preferred "an existent's nature" instead for this context. But the meaning is essentially the same in this context.

Huemer is using "good" to mean something or some quality divorced from life—and presuming that this is the meaning Rand used—for that objection to make any sense. His objection is tantamount to saying: "Rand has given no argument for thinking that an inch is length; not even that length applies to an inch."

The whole critique is shot full of things like that. I don't think it is worth a detailed rebuttal if the gross of the rebuttal is going to consist of "Rand's meaning for Word X was "A," but Huemer attributed her as meaning "B," then he argued against that incorrectly attributed meaning."

Michael

[Xray]

This is not what I meant at all. What I meant is that she has a consistent pattern throughout her work of using confused and confusing terminology. A typical oxymoron is, for example, her phrase "contextual absolute" - because, obviously, an 'absolute' is something that doesn't change, no matter what the context! For example, an absolute law of physics is something that is true in every time and place in the universe ie: every possible context. Words have meanings, after all! Such a construction is really no better than saying something is free, except you have to pay for it. That kind of thing. It's not profound, it's simply playing with words in a highly misleading fashion, IMHO.

"Contextual absolute" is a contradiction in terms indeed, since the very meaning of "absolute" implies precisely the opposite: indepedent of context.

[Xray]

In examining "man's nature" it might be helpful to refer to the definition of man as "the rational animal." If he is "rational" one can make a chain of reasoning with that ending up, in one case, with productive work, which is not parasitism or tyranny.

I disagree. Why can't a parasite be rational? As I said in an earlier post, rationality does not refer to what your goal is, but to how you try to realize that goal. If his goal is comfortable survival as a parasite he may very well succeed in reaching that goal, and there is nothing irrational in that. That is one of the bad points of Rand's legacy: to designate every behavior she didn't approve of as irrational. It can also lead to underestimating your opponents, as they may be much more rational in the usual sense than you might think on the basis of their so-called "irrationality". In Atlas Shrugged the bad guys may all crumble when they are confronted with their own irrationality, in real life things are rather different, evil isn't as impotent as Rand may suggest.

Good points, Dragonfly.

When one takes some of Rand's so-called "cardinal values and virtues", for example "productivity" and "pride", these floating abstractions would apply to a five-year-old in the sandbox being "proud" of his many mudcakes, a well as to a serial killer being "proud"of the number of his victims.

Edited July 8, 2009 by Xray

[Xray]

Huemer's critique of Rand's objectivist ethics is very interesting especially since it is detailed enough to offer the reader something to hang one's hat on when analyzing it.

He lists one of Rand's premise:

Huemer: 2. Something is valuable to an entity, only if the entity faces alternatives. premise 15,6 [= TVOS, page 15, 6th paragraph)

http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/rand5.htm#N_2_

This refers to Rand's statement:

Rand:

"The concept "value" is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the

question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of

acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative

exists, no goals and no values are possible." (end quote)

Huemer's comment: "Premise 2 seems to be false. If I knew that I was inevitably going to get a million dollars tomorrow--there's no way I can avoid it--would that mean that the money will have no value? Again, Rand offers no defense of this assertion." (end quote)

But imo Rand's original comment quoted above is one of the few times where her premises were correct.

Huemer's argument to refute it is not convincing since one can still choose to consider the money as a non-value even if one can't refuse to accept it.

For example, there exist rich people to whom their money is of no value, in some extreme cases to a point where they give it all away. Leo Tolstoj for example did this.

Edited July 11, 2009 by Xray

[Guyau]

Normativity (Cf. #92)

Judith Jarvis Thomson

(Open Court 2008)

Professor Thomson argues:

Normative thought is not restricted to moral thought. Normative judgments divide into two sub-kinds, the evaluative and the directive; but the sub-kinds are larger than is commonly appreciated. Evaluative judgments include the judgments that such and such is a good umbrella, that Alfred is a witty comedian, and that Bert answered Carol's question correctly, as well as the judgment that David is a good human being. Directive judgments include the judgment that a toaster should toast evenly, that Edward ought to get a haircut, and that Frances must move her rook, as well as the judgment that George ought to be kind to his little brother. In Normativity Thomson describes how judgments of these two sub-kinds interconnect and what makes them true when they are true.

Thomson shows that given the extensiveness of the two sub-kinds of normative judgment, our everyday thinking is rich in normativity, and moreover, that there is no gap between normative and factual thought—our everyday thinking is rich not only in normativity, but in judgments that are factual as well as normative. The widespread suspicion of the normative is therefore in large measure due to nothing deeper than an excessively narrow conception of what counts as a normative judgment.

This book will be the topic of an Author-Meets-Critics session at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA on the April 2, 9:00 a.m.–Noon. The commentators will be Gilbert Harman, Thomas Scanlon, and R. Jay Wallace.

The Pacific Meeting will be at the St. Francis Hotel in San Francisco. The session for the Ayn Rand Society will be on April 3, 6:00–9:00 p.m. It will be an Author-Meets-Critics session on Essays on Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, Robert Mayhew, editor.Contributing authors Onkar Ghate, Allan Gotthelf, and Gregory Salmieri will respond to commentaries delivered by Christine Swanton, Lester Hunt, and William Glod.

[Philip Coates]

> Huemer consistently insists on imposing his meanings on words Rand meant in a different manner, then proceeds to argue against his own meanings while ignoring hers. [MSK]

That's exactly what he does, Michael.

Plus, I've seen it elsewhere. He was involved in an argument in "Cato Unbound" with Rasmussen, Roderick Long, and Neera Badwhar and within several paragraphs he showed that he didn't understand Rand's concepts. It was as if he hadn't read much beyond the fiction. As soon as I realized this I lost all interest . . . skimmed it to see if it got better.

Repeatedly, critics who pop up arguing the Objectivist ethics or politics or epistemology is false haven't actually taken the time to grasp it. They're refuting a straw man.

And, as you perceptively point out, it's often the 'terminology barrier' that's a problem.

Edited February 7, 2010 by Philip Coates

[Philip Coates]

> Why can't a parasite be rational? [DF]

In a somewhat altererd form, this is actually the false alternative of survival vs. flourishing once again:

A parasite can be rational if he is an insect or lower animal, because that is his nature, that is how he evolved. But if he is man, his nature is such that if he survives that way (merely physically...or without productive thought or without fairness or justice in some deep way), he does not actually flourish. Here is my sentence (if you flesh it out, and if you understand the non-literal sense in which I mean it - the same sense as Consciousness is Identification)which resolves the great S vs. F debate in Oist academic circles:

"SURVIVAL IS FLOURISHING."

Even if they tell you how blissfully happy and serene they are in their parasitical lifestyle when you interview the heroin pusher or the dishonest Used Car salesmen who roll back the odometer or the white collar criminals or the salvation now hucksters who rake in millions and have a nice estate in Arkansas . . . or the inmates of cellblock D.

Can I prove this to you in a philosophical syllogism. Nope. The evidence is psychological. Often introspective. Ask yourself (assuming you are healthy and mature and accurate to begin with), would I be happy doing each of the above, even if it made me rich? What about being a contract killer for hire?

Or if I had the ring of Gyges (as Plato said)?

Edited February 7, 2010 by Philip Coates

[Brant Gaede]

A Jew in Germany trying to flee with his family in 1937 might have rationally engaged in parasitical behavior to get up enough money to finance the trip. Context counts for a lot. If you were born into and grew up in a Viking tribe 1000 years ago, it might be perfectly rational for you to join your fellows and invade and loot Britain. In an essentially individualistic/capitalistic country the rational thing overall is to engage in productive behavior and honor your contracts. Particular scruples are not part of the human DNA. Scruples generally are in that we are hardwired for them. The psychology of a tribal mob destroying another tribe can encompass looting, kidnapping, rape and murder as part of a celebratory frenzy. To be a part of such a primitive tribe and say "No!--that's irrational!" is the road to self-banishment and effective suicide. That's rational? Now if individualistic me is suddenly thrust into such a context I'll do everything to get out of it. I will not rape and kill for that would be murder to my developed psychology. Believe it or not, individualism has its own tribe with conforming behavior and psychology.

--Brant

Edited February 7, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Christopher]

Perhaps there are some gems in this article. I only made it to objection 6 before I gave up looking.

Brant, I like your example. Perhaps it does speak of a better point from the article (I didn't look hard enough?). Rand was really interesting in that she argued in an unethical society (e.g. Soviet Russia), there can be no morality. I disagree.

A morality that is based on objectivity is based on the proper functioning of one's mind. In the context of an immoral society, certain actions may need to be taken to survive that seem immoral (lying, stealing, etc.). But there are also actions that, by virtue of being a human organism, cause psychological harm. Murder and rape, for example.

I don't know Rand's detailed position on ethics in an unethical society, so it may be that she wrote about restrictions on human action to some extent. Whatever the case, morality and ethics to me is not based on a social system, it is based on the psychology of the individual system (in a social context).

[Dragonfly]

A parasite can be rational if he is an insect or lower animal, because that is his nature, that is how he evolved. But if he is man, his nature is such that if he survives that way (merely physically...or without productive thought or without fairness or justice in some deep way), he does not actually flourish.

You don't know that.

Even if they tell you how blissfully happy and serene they are in their parasitical lifestyle when you interview the heroin pusher or the dishonest Used Car salesmen who roll back the odometer or the white collar criminals or the salvation now hucksters who rake in millions and have a nice estate in Arkansas . . . or the inmates of cellblock D.

Can I prove this to you in a philosophical syllogism. Nope. The evidence is psychological. Often introspective. Ask yourself (assuming you are healthy and mature and accurate to begin with), would I be happy doing each of the above, even if it made me rich? What about being a contract killer for hire?

This is the big fallacy in your reasoning: "If I cannot be happy doing those things, nobody can." The psychology of different people is so varied that you cannot conclude that they can find happiness in only one kind of behavior. A simple example: actions that make a heterosexual person happy (in loving his partner) will not be the same actions that a homosexual person make happy and vice versa. Eating a nice juicy steak would be a punishment for a strict vegetarian. There are many examples of things that can make some people very happy and are abhorrent to others. Introspection is worthless as an indicator what people will make happy in general. That people on this list in general will agree with you that a non-parasitical way of life is to be preferred, is no surprise. That is a question of self-selection, parasites are unlikely to frequent objectivist sites. You are like that man who always travels by train and who concludes that railroad barriers are always down: always when he passes a railroad crossing by train the barriers are down, so he concludes that those barriers are always down (and thinks that this is a rational conclusion).

[Selene]

DF:

Very well reasoned.

I have always had a problem with the "O"ist inability to keep those avenues open.

Adam

[Philip Coates]

> "If I cannot be happy doing those things, nobody can."

Dragonfly, did I say that that was all there was to my reasoning - or did I include it as one clue or aspect?

> The psychology of different people is so varied that you cannot conclude that they can find happiness in only one kind of behavior.

Ah, so Socrates was wrong, and there are no general principles for mental and emotional health or fulfillment just like there are for physical success?

> A simple example: actions that make a heterosexual person happy (in loving his partner) will not be the same actions that a homosexual person make happy and vice versa. Eating a nice juicy steak would be a punishment for a strict vegetarian.

You can't reason by analogy like this.

> Introspection is worthless as an indicator what people will make happy in general.

Why? Just because you say so?

> You are like that man who always travels by train and who concludes that railroad barriers are always down

Your entire post is an attempt to argue from analogy.

Edited February 8, 2010 by Philip Coates

[jriggenbach]

> A simple example: actions that make a heterosexual person happy (in loving his partner) will not be the same actions that a homosexual person make happy and vice versa. Eating a nice juicy steak would be a punishment for a strict vegetarian.

You can't reason by analogy like this.

(1) Of course he can reason by analogy if he wants to do so. Why can't he?

(2) He is not reasoning by analogy in the sentence you responded to. He's doing exactly what he said he was doing - offering a couple of examples of his (rather elementary) point.

JR

[jriggenbach]

Even if they tell you how blissfully happy and serene they are in their parasitical lifestyle when you interview the heroin pusher or the dishonest Used Car salesmen who roll back the odometer or the white collar criminals or the salvation now hucksters who rake in millions and have a nice estate in Arkansas . . . or the inmates of cellblock D.

Tell me: how exactly is "the heroin pusher" (that is someone who sells a drug the State has banned from the market to customers willing to buy it at his prices) a "parasite"? I'd call him a businessman - specifically, an unlicensed pharmacist.

JR

[Brant Gaede]

> A simple example: actions that make a heterosexual person happy (in loving his partner) will not be the same actions that a homosexual person make happy and vice versa. Eating a nice juicy steak would be a punishment for a strict vegetarian.

You can't reason by analogy like this.

(1) Of course he can reason by analogy if he wants to do so. Why can't he?

(2) He is not reasoning by analogy in the sentence you responded to. He's doing exactly what he said he was doing - offering a couple of examples of his (rather elementary) point.

JR

Phil would be taken a lot more seriously if he would learn to use the quote function so we could click back on what he is referring to without spending 5-10 minutes trying to find out where he got the stuff from. Really! I don't have time to read 20% of what is being posted here on OL which means it's terribly hard to find time for Phil, Phil! So I don't, except for the piss-me-off parts.

--Brant

[Xray]

Tell me: how exactly is "the heroin pusher" (that is someone who sells a drug the State has banned from the market to customers willing to buy it at his prices) a "parasite"? I'd call him a businessman - specifically, an unlicensed pharmacist.

"Unlicensed pharmacist" - good one!

The state's decision to declare certain drugs as legal while banning others is indeed compeletely arbitrary.

Philip Coates (to DF):

You can't reason by analogy like this.

JR (to Philip C.):

(1) Of course he can reason by analogy if he wants to do so. Why can't he?

(2) He is not reasoning by analogy in the sentence you responded to. He's doing exactly what he said he was doing - offering a couple of examples of his (rather elementary) point.

Correct. DF's sentence which Phil quoted in # 366 was no example of reasoning by analogy. It was an example to illustrate the subjectivity of values.

Reasoning by analogy was DF's excellent comparison with the railroad barriers down:

DF: You are like that man who always travels by train and who concludes that railroad barriers are always down: always when he passes a railroad crossing by train the barriers are down, so he concludes that those barriers are always down (and thinks that this is a rational conclusion).

DF: A simple example: actions that make a heterosexual person happy (in loving his partner) will not be the same actions that a homosexual person make happy and vice versa. Eating a nice juicy steak would be a punishment for a strict vegetarian.

Illustrative examples of values being subjective.

No values can exist "out there" independently of a valuer attributing value. Actually something only becomes "a value" after being chosen as such by an individual having the mental capacity to attribute value.

Life goes with lifestyle and ongoing choices.

So what is Rand's "ought to" if not presuming to make choices for someone else?

Edited February 12, 2010 by Xray

[Selene]

The state's decision to declare certain drugs as legal while banning others is indeed compeletely arbitrary.

Almost as arbitrary as arresting home schcooling parents, or putting their children in mental institutions

Illustrative examples of values being subjective.

No values can exist "out there" independently of a valuer attributing value. Actually something only becomes "a value" after being chosen as such by an individual having the mental capacity to attribute value.

Life goes with lifestyle and ongoing choices.

So what is Rand's "ought to" if not presuming to make choices for someone else?

.

A question, Ms. Xray, are there contradictions in these two quotes?

As with the smoking issue, Rand tried to carry over her personal fantasies (of "romantic love", with the correesponding heroes) into real life. Since those fantasies had non basis in reality, it had to end in disaster.

If subjective values choices lead to "disaster", would there therefore, be values that ought to be chosen that would be the opposite of disaster or successful living?

Adam

[Xray]

Xray: The state's decision to declare certain drugs as legal while banning others is indeed compeletely arbitrary.

Selene: Almost as arbitrary as arresting home schcooling parents, or putting their children in mental institutions

Xray: Illustrative examples of values being subjective.

No values can exist "out there" independently of a valuer attributing value. Actually something only becomes "a value" after being chosen as such by an individual having the mental capacity to attribute value.

Life goes with lifestyle and ongoing choices.

So what is Rand's "ought to" if not presuming to make choices for someone else?

.

A question, Ms. Xray, are there contradictions in these two quotes?

I can't see any contradictons. If you think there are, feel free to point them out and explain why.

Xray: As with the smoking issue, Rand tried to carry over her personal fantasies (of "romantic love", with the correesponding heroes) into real life. Since those fantasies had non basis in reality, it had to end in disaster.

Selene: If subjective values choices lead to "disaster", would there therefore, be values that ought to be chosen that would be the opposite of disaster or successful living?

Please read more carefully. I did not write that subjective value choices lead to disaster. I wrote that Rand's trying to carry over into real life her personal fantasies having no basis in reality had to end in disaster.

Edited February 12, 2010 by Xray

[tjohnson]

Adam and Xray are doing nothing but arguing about terms. Xray keeps saying there is no such thing as objective values and Adam says there is. What Xray means is that people are free to value whatever they want and I hardly think Adam would disagree with that. Adam means that there are real consequences that accompany your choice of what you value and I don't think Xray would disagree with that. Just stop using the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' and it will all work out.

[Xray]

Adam and Xray are doing nothing but arguing about terms. Xray keeps saying there is no such thing as objective values and Adam says there is. What Xray means is that people are free to value whatever they want and I hardly think Adam would disagree with that. Adam means that there are real consequences that accompany your choice of what you value and I don't think Xray would disagree with that. Just stop using the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' and it will all work out.

GS,

While this will work out fine for me, it won't work out for an Objectivist since the claim that "objective values" exist is the root premise on which the whole philosophy rests. Every belief in "objective value" naturally leads to all other values being devalued as "non-objective".

If that root premise is refuted, it reduces Rand's "objective value" claim to a personal set of values and beliefs held.

But something can only become "a value" if a volitional entity attributes value to it. Which is why there can't exist any values "out there" awaiting objective discovery.

Do you believe that objective values exist? If my memory is correct, your position is that values can't be anything but subjective.

Whereas Rand verbatim wrote that e. g. plants "seek values". No kidding. Source: AR, "The Virtue of Selfishness", page 19 pb.

You said you have not read much of Rand, but studying the primary source would serve as an eye-opener.

[Selene]

Well GS:

There goes that special United Nations envoy position to settle the Arab Israeli dispute, or is it the Muslim Israeli dispute.

Hmm, I wonder if Egyptian Coptic Arabic folks want Israel wiped off the face of the Earth.

At any rate, I would have been perfectly willing to give up the use of objective for the purpose of argument, but you see how these global

subjectivist fanatics are.

Until all persons who claim that values are objective are wiped off the face of the Earth, she will keep coming.

Adam

Closing the open gate, taking in the welcome mat and dousing the candle of hope as he hears the subjective snarls from the deadly dark forest that pulses with malevolence. Makes sure the clip is full and the night sight is on. Pours a beverage and waits.