Critique of Objectivist ethics theory

[Brant Gaede]

Not when it comes to politics. If you believe that the primary if not sole function of government is the protection of individual rights, then you take over government and make that so. This leaves the citizens with no choice in the matter unless they want to violate rights if they think they can get away with it. Rights are protected or violated by force. If the anarchist says "I didn't consent to this government," so what? So what is his beef? He's not free to violate rights?

Brant,

You haven't eliminated the rights-violator's power of choice in regard to his/her acceptance of your code. You're merely saying that in the case of a rights violation, you'll meet force with force. Rights are enforceable moral claims, unlike other moral claims. This still doesn't say that the putative (or actual) rights violator has to accept your reasoning. (Re what "the anarchist" says, the anarchists on the lists you and I are both members of accept the idea of rights; I think you've caricatured those anarchists.)

Ellen

___

That's right. I have no ability to eliminate that power of choice. Btw, I wasn't referring to all anarchists or those to whom you allude.

--Brant

[Daniel Barnes]

Ellen:

>I disagree with your first sentence, that "Rand has solved Hume's 'is-ought' problem by restating it in a form that can be solved." Again, she's very brief in what she says, but as I read her, she hasn't restated, she's swept aside.

Hi Ellen,

Forgive me for being boring, but I would like to say I am in complete agreement again. (see my last to replies to Darrell).

Also many thanks for your lengthy, thorough, and I believe accurate posting. I think I and many other readers, even if they disagree with you, very much appreciate the effort you've taken here.

[Dragonfly]

Ellen:

Forgive me for being boring, but I would like to say I am in complete agreement again. (see my last to replies to Darrell).

Also many thanks for your lengthy, thorough, and I believe accurate posting. I think I and many other readers, even if they disagree with you, very much appreciate the effort you've taken here.

I'll second that, it was an excellent post. But also my compliments to Daniel and Brendan, you guys can formulate it all better than I can do, so I'll take a break now as I don't know how I could explain it better than I've done already.

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

>Let’s get to the meat. I have pointed out the two different aspects of values---objective and subjective. If we approach ethics as entirely subjective—you won the debate!

I have never said anywhere in this debate ethics were "entirely subjective." Quite the opposite: I have claimed that objective facts are always involved with decisions, standards, norms etc. Again:They are just not logically derivable from them. Victor, with things like this and my alleged 'religious' undertones I must say I get the impression you are not arguing with me, but with someone else entirely!

>But a rational, objective and scientific ethics is possible (and this is to be discovered, not invented or contrived) and LIFE—the life of a volitional being—is the standard.

>To exist or not to exist, that is the question.

Men cannot really choose not to physically exist. It mighte be better if you put it that man can choose to die. Is that what you mean? If so obviously this flies in the face of "life" (or "survival") as an ethical standard, for obviously it can be ethical to choose commit suicide for example. Rand I think realised at some level there was this and related objections to this initial claim, so she equivocates in her "Ethics" essay between life as mere survival at the beginning of her argument, and life as "man qua man" which she introduces later. Of course, "man qua man" is so vague it allows her to introduce any actions she wants to, including suicide, but the price of this equivocation is that it entirely neutralises her argument.

>Ethics, in this case, is like the "laws" of physics.

Well, I will take the widest possible interpretation of this claim in order to find some point of agreement with you, in that I do not doubt that sociological "laws" (i.e. ethical standards or norms), might have some relation to scientific endeavour, in that the social sciences may learn a great deal from the scientific method of critical testing. That much I could agree with. However, saying that ethics are "like" physics to any greater degree than the foregoing can only be sheer hyperbole, as quite obviously I may choose to not act in accordance with the ethic of "love thy neighbour", but I must act in accordance with the law of gravity.

Edited March 17, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Victor Pross]

Ellen quotes Darrell:

"The answer is that we ought to take life as a rational being as our standard of value because that is the only standard that is fully compatible with the nature of a rational being." [Darrell]

Ellen wrote: “And there I again disagree -- and think you've gone straight back to foundering the argument on the Humean "is/ought" problem because you've left out the conditional, the "if" a person cares whether or not his/her life is "fully compatible with the nature of a rational being." Assuming the person does care, and assuming that your ethical code is the only possible code compatible with that nature, then, yes, the person ought to live by your code. But that's where the ball stops bouncing, IMO….”

And then concludes: You require the person's being motivated before the person is going to accept your "ought."

For the life of me I do not see how her conclusion follows her prior statements. But reading further down her post, I was struck by this:

“My belief is that the vast majority of humans do want to live an emotionally satisfying -- a fulfilled, and a happy -- existence, and that if one can present a way of living which they believe is going to work to that end, there will be a lot of takers. That some people would remain holdouts doesn't trouble me. It's always been so, no matter what ethical code has been devised. But I think that with an ethical code which truly did work to produce emotional fulfillment, there would be fewer holdouts than has historically been the case.”

I am unable to see her bafflement. The simple fact is that people have free-will and are not programmed to automatically act in ways that are beneficial to him. That he does or does not is not a validation or invalidation of any ethical system, so I don’t follow the logical chain—a chain that only Ellen can see. She states: I think that with an ethical code which truly did work to produce emotional fulfillment, there would be fewer holdouts than has historically been the case.” Volition means that man is the initiator of thought and action, that he has the capability to generate and sustain a thought process and a physical movement, but this does not mean he will chose any given ethical system—including a rational one. It comes down to choice, that’s the nature of volition. Man is free to choose his actions, because he is not programmed to act in any a given manner---any given manner. Man’s volitional nature necessitates that he chose to think and act in order to survive. That some men chose the wrong actions or chose not to live—does not invalidate this.

-Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

That he does or does not is not a validation or invalidation of any ethical system, so I don’t follow the logical chain—a chain that only Ellen can see.

Victor,

I see it too. I am sure many other see it also. (I will write about this later. Gotta run right now.)

Ellen,

Post 299 was one hell of a post. Thank you. I have some issues I want to address later. (I don't think you and Darrell are all that far from each other.)

Michael

[Victor Pross]

That he does or does not is not a validation or invalidation of any ethical system, so I don’t follow the logical chain—a chain that only Ellen can see.

Victor,

I see it too. I am sure many other see it also. (I will write about this later. Gotta run right now.)

Ellen,

Post 299 was one hell of a post. Thank you. I have some issues I want to address later. (I don't think you and Darrell are all that far from each other.)

Michael

Michael,

You see it? Good, then spell it out when you run back here. Thanks. B)

Victor

Edited March 17, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Darrell Hougen]

You are confusing two separate issues here. Without getting too technical, you are trying to establish a normative principle by appealing to a metaethical theory.

Hi Brendan,

Being an engineer/scientist and not a philosopher, I have no idea what you are talking about above.

Premise: Man is a rational being

Premise: His life as a rational being is his highest good

Conclusion: Therefore, he ought to adopt that life as his standard of value.

There are two main problems with this argument. First, the conclusion is a non-sequitur, since the imperative of adopting x is not deducible from the mere fact that x is the case.

Second, in order for the argument to work, it must appeal to an unexpressed premise to the effect that one ought to strive to achieve one’s highest good. But in that case, the premises of the argument contain an ‘ought’, hence the is-ought gap remains unbridged.

You're still trying to use deduction to state Rand's argument. But, it cannot be stated deductively, e.g., as a syllogism. I'm almost tempted to drop the whole, "is-ought," terminology because it tends to imply the use of instrumental or deductive reasoning.

Darrell

[Victor Pross]

Daniel,

I’ll take your word for it that you are not a very religious man, but I was wondering if you at all fall into one of the two paradigms I illustrated before.

Emotivism: ethics is a matter of emotional expressions and therefore lacks cognitive content.

Subjectivism: ethics is merely a report of one’s personal, subjective preference and it is therefore not prescriptive in a universal sense to pertain to all human beings.

If neither of the above describes your philosophical orientation that is wonderful. We are perhaps not entirely on philosophical opposite sides—maybe. But it was this sentence (below) that raised an eye-brow.

You wrote: "The dualism between facts and decisions, or (or facts/values or norms, or "is/ought") is like that between a natural law (eg: a law of physics, like the law of gravitation) and man-madelaw (or "norm", like "love thy neighbor"). For of course a law of nature describes an unalterable situation, one that we must accept, like it or not. Now, the man-made law does not have to be this way - men can obviously change it if we choose."

So I asked for clarification: Do you see ethics as necessarily “man-made?” The above gave a hint that you do see ethics as "rule based"--as man-made based. So you change your tune? I also asked you this: And does the issue of man’s volition give credence—or ‘truth’, as you would have it, to the is-ought issue?

It is very difficult to discuss the many implications entailed by the distinction between teleological and deontological ethics. But I will say that it is the normative judgment of deontological ethics—where an “ought” is prescribed without reference to a goal, that cannot be grounded in facts. “One ought to do X.” Why? “Because it is morally required, and one ought to do it.” [love thy neighbor perhaps]. This type of approach of deontological ethics WILL FOREVER server values from facts and will fuel the is-ought dichotomy. A rational, scientific ethics will not. Do you think that there is a "rational and scientific" case to be made for ethics? IF so, what is the standard of such an ethics? Life? Something else? What? Let's talk. Let's communicate here.

-Victor

Edited March 17, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Darrell Hougen]

Darrell

>It's not rational to choose to be irrational. That's why you can't back up any further.

Actually there are two well-known problems with what you're saying here that you may not be aware of:

1) The least important, but still decisive one is that you can in fact back up further. For the problem with saying what you're saying here ie:"I should be rational, because that is the rational choice" is that it inherently presupposes that the decider is rational in the first place and is thus circular. So your argument is not valid.

I'm not assuming that the decider is rational, but if the decider is rational, he must make the rational choice. That is, one cannot misuse logic and then claim to be logical.

2) The more important objection is that "rational" is a very vague word, (especially in Objectivism) and attempts to formulate "rational" ethical systems very quickly degenerate into mere verbalism, or arguments over the meaning of "rational" (for words are, entirely contra Rand, themselves norms or conventions, and thus logically undecidable for the reasons we have already agreed upon).

To be rational, in this context, means to be logical with regard to statements about ethics or morality.

But don't just take my word for it: let us try it in practice. Even if we take an entirely unobjectionable definition of "rational" (such as:"the attitude of being willing to accept logical argument and factual experience") we find this brings us back to the start: for we know from logic that decisions/norms/values cannot be derived from facts, and we know from experience that people can choose to do any number of things when confronted by a fact

As Michael has pointed out, the fact that we can choose to do any number of things only means that we have choices. Also, you cannot assume that values cannot be derived from facts, a priori, because that is what the whole discussion is about. Decisions require choices and are not equivalent to values. One can always choose to be irrational, but then one is irrational.

Darrell

[Daniel Barnes]

>I was wondering if you at all fall into one of the two paradigms I illustrated before.

Neither. I am a Popperian, a fan of Karl Popper as I have said before. This has nothing whatever to do with these supposed paradigms.

>So I asked for clarification: Do you see ethics as necessarily “man-made?”

Yes, obviously, I have only said so about a hundred times....;-)

>The above gave a hint that you do see ethics as "rule based"--as man-made based. So you change your tune?

From what??? I've never said anything different. Ethics is based on man-made rules. But this of course does not mean facts are not involved - they are always involved.

>I also asked you this: And does the issue of man’s volition give credence—or ‘truth’, as you would have it, to the is-ought issue?

If I understand you correctly,

>It is very difficult to discuss the many implications entailed by the distinction between teleological and deontological ethics.

This distinction is not relevant to this discussion as far as I can see, because the adoption of both "ends" and "duties" require man-made decisions, which I must boringly state again, are not derivable from facts. I cannot see what bringing up these two different types of ethics adds to the discussion, as Hume's point applies to all ethics.

>But I will say that it is the normative judgment of deontological ethics—where an “ought” is prescribed without reference to a goal, that cannot be grounded in facts. “One ought to do X.” Why? “Because it morally required, and one ought to do it.” [love they neighbor perhaps]. This type of approach of deontological ethics WILL FOREVER server values from facts and will fuel the is-ought dichotomy.

But so what? All this "severing values for facts fuelling the is-ought dichotomy" is melodrama, not argument. As I suggested earlier, the is/ought problem may in fact be a feature, not a bug.

>Do you think that there is a "rational and scientific" case to be made for ethics?

My remarks in the previous post sum up my position ie: our social sciences, such as the study of ethics, may indeed be greatly improved by adopting the physical sciences approach of conjecture and critical testing, as despite their modern veneer much of it is still stuck in the Middle Ages, and Aristotelian scholasticism. But that is as far as I would go.

>IF so, what is the standard of such an ethics. Life?

I think you have to realise that saying "life" is the standard of ethics is not saying much at all, as it leads to a boring, scholastic debate about the meaning of the word that can logically never be resolved.

[Victor Pross]

Victor: So I asked for clarification: Do you see ethics as necessarily “man-made?”

Daniel: Yes, obviously, I have only said so about a hundred times....;-)

Daniel,

And we get to the root of our disagreement. So long as we approach ethics from our two different stand-points—there will never be an agreement or understanding regarding the is-ought issue. We are at an impasse. Maybe not.

You wrote: This distinction is not relevant to this discussion as far as I can see, because the adoption of both "ends" and "duties" require man-made decisions, which I must boringly state again, are not derivable from facts. I cannot see what bringing up these two different types of ethics adds to the discussion, as Hume's point applies to all ethics.

I heard you, I heard you. I don't agree. In time, I will answer to this.

I asked you: Do you think that there is a "rational and scientific" case to be made for ethics?

You answered: My remarks in the previous post sum up my position ie: our social sciences, such as the study of ethics, may indeed be greatly improved by adopting the physical sciences approach of conjecture and critical testing, as despite their modern veneer much of it is still stuck in the Middle Ages, and Aristotelian scholasticism. But that is as far as I would go.

Well I did ask you a lot earlier if ethics is a legitimate field of study? And if so, what is the purpose of the study -- and the purpose of the subject being studied--namely, ethics. What purpose does ethics serve? (If any).

-Victor

Edited March 17, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Daniel Barnes]

Darrell:

>I'm not assuming that the decider is rational, but if the decider is rational, he must make the rational choice. That is, one cannot misuse logic and then claim to be logical.

But Darrell, how does the decider get to be rational in the first place then? Luck? Genetics? In which case, you can hardly rationally choose to be rational then!

I'm sorry, but I still consider this argument to be circular, and thus invalid.

>To be rational, in this context, means to be logical with regard to statements about ethics or morality.

And as I point out, this definition of 'rationality' begs the very point at issue, which is whether one can logically derive statements about ethics or morality from statements about facts! So I cannot see how your reply overcomes this.

> Also, you cannot assume that values cannot be derived from facts, a priori, because that is what the whole discussion is about.

I am not 'assuming' this, the logical argument for this is quite straightforward. But I cannot see how either of your points above threaten this argument; in fact they seem to both be errors, for the reasons I've stated.

>Decisions require choices and are not equivalent to values. One can always choose to be irrational, but then one is irrational.

Once again, this seems to be a fallacy. See the above comments on 'rational'. If you still don't see my point, which is pretty standard AFAICS, perhaps we should agree to disagree.

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

>And we get to the root of our disagreement. So long as we approach ethics from our two different stand-points—there will never be an agreement or understanding regarding the is-ought issue. We are at an impasse. Maybe not.

I am not persuaded in the least by the oft heard belief that having two different stand-points implies inevitable impasse. If that were the case, no-one would ever agree with anyone else because in fact everyone has a different standpoint in terms of their knowledge and experience. (This fallacy is related to the common philosophical fallacy that one must find a "true" starting point before one can properly look for truth)

This fact necessitated the development of mutually agreed standards of debate and criticism, by which people can decide which viewpoint is right and which is wrong. One such important standard is the adoption of the rules of logic, which as Objectivist and non Objectivist alike, we both agree to use, right? So: I put forward Hume's logical argument regarding is/ought. You may not like his conclusion, but at least we can both potentially test whether Hume's argument is sound according to our mutually agreed system. And if you should provide a more logically compelling argument to counter Hume, you can expect I will have to agree with you, even if I do not like it! However, currently I, among others, are not at all persuaded you (or Rand, or Darrell) have done so. You are welcome of course to take your arguments to a perhaps a expert logic forum to see if they hold up against Hume better than Ellen, me and others are saying they do, as i am sure we do not regard ourselves as expert logicians in any way. However, the issues seem quite basic. So we can at least say we have some level of agreement or understanding at least on some of the fundamental principles of discussion, even if not on this particular issue. So all is not lost. All debate is helpful..;-)

[Victor Pross]

Daniel,

You wrote: "I think you have to realise that saying "life" is the standard of ethics is not saying much at all, as it leads to a boring, scholastic debate about the meaning of the word that can logically never be resolved."

Huh? Life can’t be defined? There is no logical way to resolve what? I think this is all slippery talk because I suspect the very crux of ethics rests on life, human life—and you know it. This is a breezy way of fudging the discussion---just when we are getting to the meat of it. (But I could be wrong). :flowers:

[insert—“I could be wrong" statement with smiley face; I don’t want MSK on my ass about being an Ortho.]

-Victor

edit: I read your above post. I still would like an answer to this question: is ethics a legitimate field of study? And if so, what is the purpose of the study -- and the purpose of the subject being studied--namely, ethics. What purpose does ethics serve? (If any).

Edited March 17, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Darrell Hougen]

Hi Ellen,

Thank you for your response. I'm sorry to hear that you have a neuro-muscular problem, but I appreciate you taking time to respond to my post. Still, I must disagree.

I don't think you're quite right -- though I think you're partially right -- in the way you're presenting the issue. The Humean problem is one of deduction -- and even in physics, yes, we deduce from certain principles that certain occurrences will happen, though we don't arrive at the principles by deduction and we continue to test the principles by seeing if the anticipated results indeed occur. But the Humean point, if I understand it correctly -- bear in mind that it's been a number of years since I last read Hume -- is that statements of an "ought" form cannot be syllogistically deduced from statements of an "is" form (in the way that "Socrates is mortal" can be deduced from the premises "All men and mortal" and "Socrates is a man"). I disagree with you as to Rand's claim in Galt's Speech. She's terribly sketchy there, but I think she is saying that an "is" entails an "ought."

If that is Hume's question, then it is the wrong question. I tend to take Hume's question in the broadest possible sense: Is there a factual basis for claiming that one choice of ultimate value is better than another? It doesn't matter whether the claim is supported by deductive logic or by any other non-contradictory means of identifying the facts of reality. In my view, the purpose of the question is to determine whether there is any means at all of determining whether one ethical system is superior to another.

My claim, and I think it is consistent with Rand's claim in the broadest possible sense, is that there is only one choice of ultimate value that is consistent with man's nature as a rational being, that is life as a rational being. Any other choice leads to irrationality and is, therefore, irrational.

If your choice of standard of value is ultimately rooted in desire, then the choice cannot be defended by the use of reason.

The problem in understanding the metaphysical basis of values is that one cannot exclude the reasoning process itself from questions of values. Any conclusion that a person reaches is dependent not only on the rules of logic, but on the values possessed by that person. Therefore, a correct conclusion can only be (purposefully) reached by a person that values logical conclusions more highly than any value that the person is reasoning about.

Even if the is-ought gap cannot be successfully bridged, it is still clear that the weak form of Rand's answer, the form that depends upon the choice of the valuer to live, goes an enormous distance towards closing the gap. Even if the choice to live is arbitrary, or depends upon one's desires, once the choice has been made, all other goals or ends become instrumental to that end.

BTW, Rand stated that happiness is man's highest purpose, but she also stated that happiness is the "psychological concomitant" of life. That is, happiness is the psychological equivalent of the the metaphysical goal of life, but being psychological, rather than metaphysical, the concept of happiness is subordinate to the concept of life. Thus, the goal of happiness is consistent with the goal of life (as a rational being).

Darrell

[Victor Pross]

Darrell,

You wrote: “If that is Hume's question, then it is the wrong question. I tend to take Hume's question in the broadest possible sense: Is there a factual basis for claiming that one choice of ultimate value is better than another? It doesn't matter whether the claim is supported by deductive logic or by any other non-contradictory means of identifying the facts of reality. In my view, the purpose of the question is to determine whether there is any means at all of determining whether one ethical system is superior to another.” [Emphasis mine].

Bingo. :turned:

-Victor

[Barbara Branden]

Rand, in my opinion, was an angry venemous narcissist who did a good job of convincing her avid followers that this behaviour was justified and indirectly (or perhaps even directly) admirable qualities. To me, she's like an intelligent angry teenager that never grew up. For someone who does not have a well developed personality and who is angry and discontented there is a danger in finding justification in being this way (angry, narcissistic, condescending) and developing further anti-social behaviours.

Bob

I don't know how anyone else feels, but I am extremely offended by this characterization of Rand. I have certainly criticized her, but I have always given my reasons in detail, as have most others on this Forum. To throw off this kind of abuse without reasons, without grounds, and when much of your stated disagreement with Rand appears to be based on a complete failure to undertand her ideas, is a disgraceful smear.

Barbara

[Darrell Hougen]

Darrell:

>I'm not assuming that the decider is rational, but if the decider is rational, he must make the rational choice. That is, one cannot misuse logic and then claim to be logical.

But Darrell, how does the decider get to be rational in the first place then? Luck? Genetics? In which case, you can hardly rationally choose to be rational then!

I'm sorry, but I still consider this argument to be circular, and thus invalid.

Are you assuming that people can never choose to be irrational? That the logical processes of the brain can never be corrupted? That people are not capable of evading responsibility for the content of their thoughts? If people can choose to be irrational, then they can choose to be rational. It may be difficult for a person possessing a lot of unwarranted conclusions and undefended premises to suddenly become rational, but does that make it impossible?

Actually, it is probably easier for children to achieve rationality than for adults that are already carrying a lot of intellectual baggage. If they have been using their rational faculty honestly from the time that they were little kids, then it may be easier for them to make the right choice.

As Michael stated in an earlier post, children value life, not as a matter of choice, but as a matter of their nature. That is, they act to preserve their lives because, just like animals, that is the standard of value with which they are born. Similarly, they attempt to reason logically, because that is the way they are made (so to speak). But, that is because they don't yet have a fully volitional consciousness. They haven't fully realized that they can subvert logic and kill themselves. That comes later. That is when they can choose to be rational or irrational.

For most people, it is natural to continue to value rationality and to value their lives. For one thing, their emotions have been self programmed from an early age to protect the integrity of their minds and their desire to live. Successful living makes them happy, so they pursue it, often without being completely conscious of what they are doing. It is only the philosophers that have managed to screw up people's natural mechanisms for living a rational, happy life by asserting that there is no rational choice of values.

This reminds me of the story of the centipede. One day a centipede was walking along the side of the road when he met a worm. The worm asked him, "How do you coordinate the activity of so many legs?" The centipede sat down and started to contemplate the question. Pretty soon he realized that he didn't know how it was possible and that he couldn't figure it out. Then, he got up and started trying to walk, but he was so confused that he was no longer able to do it. So, there he sat by the side of the road, incapable of moving.

Most people are naturally rational and moral because that is the natural state of their existence. Their emotions have already encoded the correct responses, the responses they learned at an early age. It is only the philosophers that have given the question too much thought and are now incapable of moving forward because they can't remember what they already knew.

>To be rational, in this context, means to be logical with regard to statements about ethics or morality.

And as I point out, this definition of 'rationality' begs the very point at issue, which is whether one can logically derive statements about ethics or morality from statements about facts! So I cannot see how your reply overcomes this.

I don't understand how that definition begs the question.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

I don't know how anyone else feels, but I am extremely offended by this characterization of Rand.

Hi Barbara,

Welcome to the discussion. I completely agree. That characterization was offensive. I guess we mostly ignored it and moved on. Anyway, welcome.

Darrell

[Victor Pross]

I don't know how anyone else feels, but I am extremely offended by this characterization of Rand.

Hi Barbara,

Welcome to the discussion. I completely agree. That characterization was offensive. I guess we mostly ignored it and moved on. Anyway, welcome.

Darrell

Damn, I wish Barbara would contribute to the conversation at hand. (hint-hint)

[Barbara Branden]

I don't know how anyone else feels, but I am extremely offended by this characterization of Rand.

Hi Barbara,

Welcome to the discussion. I completely agree. That characterization was offensive. I guess we mostly ignored it and moved on. Anyway, welcome.

Thanks for the welcome, Darrell. I've had to be mostly away from OL for a while, but I've been back for the last few days and I expect to post regularly.

I want to say that I think it's a mistake to ignore the kind of thing I objected to. This is, after all, a forum for Objectivists and people sincerely interested in Objectivism. Although no one is required to agree, we have a right to demand that our ideas and the woman who is the source of many of those ideas be treated with respect. If we do not demand it, we become like so many other forums, where unjustified accusations are hurled with abandon -- which is precisely what many of us came here to escape.

Barbara

[Brant Gaede]

Rand, in my opinion, was an angry venemous narcissist who did a good job of convincing her avid followers that this behaviour was justified and indirectly (or perhaps even directly) admirable qualities. To me, she's like an intelligent angry teenager that never grew up. For someone who does not have a well developed personality and who is angry and discontented there is a danger in finding justification in being this way (angry, narcissistic, condescending) and developing further anti-social behaviours.

Bob

I don't know how anyone else feels, but I am extremely offended by this characterization of Rand. I have certainly criticized her, but I have always given my reasons in detail, as have most others on this Forum. To throw off this kind of abuse without reasons, without grounds, and when much of your stated disagreement with Rand appears to be based on a complete failure to undertand her ideas, is a disgraceful smear.

Barbara

I missed this one. I agree with Barbara because I had direct experience of Ayn Rand and she was not like that.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I know I let this slide because I have been working on persuading Bob. You should have read him before!

This was a backslide. He has been becoming much more amenable and has actually been considering the ideas (which he did not do before, at least in his posts). But the point about respect is well-taken. It is possible to disagree with Rand's ideas and lifestyle without playing armchair psychologist and simply calling her names, not making even any pretense at trying to objectively discuss anything.

Michael

[Laure]

Rand, in my opinion, was an angry venemous narcissist who did a good job of convincing her avid followers that this behaviour was justified and indirectly (or perhaps even directly) admirable qualities. To me, she's like an intelligent angry teenager that never grew up. For someone who does not have a well developed personality and who is angry and discontented there is a danger in finding justification in being this way (angry, narcissistic, condescending) and developing further anti-social behaviours.

Bob

I don't know how anyone else feels, but I am extremely offended by this characterization of Rand. I have certainly criticized her, but I have always given my reasons in detail, as have most others on this Forum. To throw off this kind of abuse without reasons, without grounds, and when much of your stated disagreement with Rand appears to be based on a complete failure to undertand her ideas, is a disgraceful smear.

Barbara

Barbara, I was offended as well, and I'm glad you took the time to post about this. I felt uncomfortable responding directly for fear of being dismissed as a Rand-worshipper; there are a lot of very negative comments about Rand on this site, and I was starting to think that was the direction the site was evolving. You've probably given the site a nice little corrective kick, and I thank you.

(And if Rand was an intelligent angry teenager who never grew up, well thank God for that; we need more of them!!)