Questions on Objectivist metaphysics

[heusdens]

I have a couple of fundamental questions about the Objectivist metaphysics.

1. Axiom: Existence exists

There is existence, undoubtly. There is no real/rational person that can doubt that.

But what does it add to that fact to state that "existence exists" (which is tautological) and what does it tell us as to what and how things/the world exist?

2. Primacy of Existence

The main question in Philosopy is to what is to be considered primary: matter or mind.

Objectivism considers that there are basically only two candidates, which are 1. existence or 2. consciousness.

However (as in question 1) exactly what is to be considered the base ingredient of existence, that what must necessarily exist primary? What is there that exists on which everything else is dependent upon, and which itself has no ground for it's existence other then itself?

In some explenations it is said that existence is as well considered the material world (all material existence forms) and also thought or mind (ie. consciousness) itself. But in that case how can existence be primary to consciousness, if existence itself also has consciousness as an ingredient?

If existence is to be considered primary to consciousness, then this would mean that only the ingredient of existence which is not consciousness can be considered the primary component of which the world is made, since it would be rather senseless to state that consciousness is primary to consciousness.

So the only candidate ingredient of existence which rightfully can be termed primary is the form of existence which exists outside, apart and independend of consciousness.

This ingredient is also termed: matter.

3. Law of Identity

The proposition A=A is to be considered some hight truth. But what does this tell us about the real world?

The law of identity is - in all for what it is worth - to be considered some absolute truth, which truth is not dependend on time, place or circumstances.

Now how does that apply to the real world?

An apple, the one I just put in from of me, then certainly is equal to itself. Which truth must also be the case the next instant I observe the apple, and for the same reason must be true at all later instances.

Has anyone left behind an apple for some weeks without noticing, and has remarked wether the law of identity still holds? Is the apple you left behind still equal to the apple you found back, some weeks later?

Alternatively, is there any other object (any object at all) to which the law of identity holds?

Or is the law of identity only valid in the context of objects that do not change, that is, for objects that do not exist in time?

4. Consciousness

Despite the fact that Objectivism regards itself not to be in the camp of Idealism, Objectivist regard consciousness to be also a primary ("consciousness is an irreducable primary").

The acknowledgment of Primacy of existence in this regard means that one does need to have existence and an outer world to be consciouss of something.

However, to regard consciousness despite this as a primary (that is non-reducable feature, which can not be explaind in other terms) asks for an explenation. If the world is to be regarded in existence before there was even human consciousness and any form of life (as the primacy of existence is supposed to mean and is in accordance with scientific knowledge) then this begs the question: where did consciousness come from?

The materialistic / naturalist explenation is that consciousness (consciouss awareness) developed together with the development of life itself in higher organisms.

Since Objectivism rejects supernatural causes, this then is unexplained. Also it neglects the scientific evidence (rational thought!) for the material bases of consciousness and the scientific evidence for evolution which in fact precisely point to the fact that human consciousness is a material development.

Which shows at leat that the Objectivist metaphysics is incomplete (inexhausted) and contradictionary.

5. Law of Causalility and Identity

According to Objectivism:

"The Law of Causality is a formulation of the axiomatic observation that there are no disembodied events: Every event is an action of an entity, and an entity can only act according to its specific nature. Objectivist philosophy affirms the Law of Causality as a corollary of the Law of Identity."

The problem with this position is this: how does one explain the motion of objects in free fall due to a gravity field? It is not the identity (ie properties of the body itself) that determine the motion of the object, but instead it is the local geometry, the gravity field itself, that determines this motion.

How does Objectivism explain that? Is it considered that this is due to the identity of the gravity field itself?

But the gravity field is not a (local) object, but instead is to be seen as the property of the distribution of all mass in the universe.

A different and perhaps even more serious problem arises in the light of quantum mechanics. QM definately proves that we can not account for certain phenomena (entangled pairs of photons for example) based on LOCAL properties of objects. An entangled pair, that can even be seperated lightyears from each other, demonstrate that the observed property of one photon and that of the other, correlate, and can not be reduced to the property of each individual photon. No local hidden variable theory can explain this phenomena.

Conclusions

Objectivism tries to understand the world without contradiction. In doing so, and just by avoiding contradiction, it falls into it, and creates a major contradiction with the real world. For rational though, which does not stand in opposition to the world but which becomes part of it and tries to understand it, tries to understand the world on its own terms and premises, is able to overcome these contradiction just by understanding that contradictions do in reality exist and reality is in fact full of it. One can not understand the living, changing world of motion without understanding contradiction and how it naturally arises in it and resolves itself.

The identity of the world is not just identity but also and at the same time opposition, and that in every object at every time and every place. The thought that proceeds and looks at the world as without contradiction can not ever grasp a world in which something is itself somewhat, that is is equal to itself but also in opposition with itself at the same time, which is just the natural cause for something to change into another something. A thought that proceeds from the rather static and motionless proposition that the world is self-equal and only identical to itself at all time, is in major contradiction with the world itself. It can in fact not even grasp the world but only turn into circles of abstract thought, without ever reaching out to the real world.

Wether one things about how and what an atom is, or even an electron, or a planet, a star, an animal or a human being, in everything we find both identity and opposition. You are yourself and at the same time you oppose yourself, which is the reason for why you change.

A cloud of hydrogen gas is at the same time itself and at the same time not itself, that is, it is in the process of becoming a star which is formed because of the gravitational interaction, and this motion/force at the same time it is opposing to, which causes the compacting gas cloud to built up pressure and heat, thus at the same time enabling to ingnite the fusion process which acts against the further compatification and gravitational collapse, but in doing so exhausts in the long run it's own fuel that is enabling the counterforce pressure against it's own self-collapse, which in the end it can not continue any longer causing the outer shell to explode and the remains to collapse further into a brown dwarf, neutron star or black hole., etc.

The cloud of atomic hydrogen has in this proces changed it's identity many times, causing new identities to come into existence, of which yet new identities can be formed, and also this new identies oppose themselves and give rise to new varieties of phenomena and material relations.

As another example, the self-interacting field potential, standing at the beginning of formation of a new universe is building up it's potential at some point which it can only escape from by rolling itself from the height of the potential and by doing this, by it's self-action and opposition against this motion, goes into an exponential expansion overtaking major parts of space, and drives this process further and further and by that creating new expanding regions, untill the initital expanding region finally reaches it's minimum, where it releases it's frozen energy and reheats the newly formed universe, causing condensation forms of energy in a various soup of hot and dense subatomic particles on a spacetimebackground in which quantum fluctuations have frozen in, and in which the major repulsive gravitational force now turns into the attractive force of mass-interacting particles, and which in time form up into protons, neutrons, electrons, into atomic nuclei and finally into atoms, that in their initial configuration by slight frozen-in inhomogeneities form into clouds of atomic matter and compactifying itself into proto-galaxies, quasars and locally into huge stars, etc.

All this just describes the material and eternal ongoing processes in which some material formation, while being itself somewhat, at the same time opposes itself and changes into another, which yet again opposes itself and goes into yet other different material forms, etc. etc.

Never ever does matter exist in a total self-identifying or self-equal form, for then, no motion change or whatever would arise, the world thought as only in self-equal form is a world without change, without motion, or would be, stated differently, inexistent. The nature of all existent entities is that they are themselves and not themselves at the same time.

The mind which has not yet grasped this fact of reality, stands in major opposition with reality.

In the light of both general relativity and quantum mechanics, the idea that interactions and motion of objects could be reduced to the identity of objects is provably wrong.

Edited March 2, 2007 by heusdens

[Darrell Hougen]

I have a couple of fundamental questions about the Objectivist metaphysics.

At this point I don't know whether you really have questions or whether you are actually on a crusade to try to discredit Objectivism, but I will take you at your word and attempt to answer your questions one at a time.

1. Axiom: Existence exists

There is existence, undoubtly. There is no real/rational person that can doubt that.

But what does it add to that fact to state that "existence exists" (which is tautological) and what does it tell us as to what and how things/the world exist?

The short answer is nothing. But the form of your question is something like: everyone knows that man is an animal and that he has a rational faculty; what does it add to that to say that man is a rational animal? That is, you've started out by stating the meaning of the words, "existence exists," and then you ask what the statement, "existence exists," adds to that. Of course the answer to that question is nothing, but the question is poorly stated.

The real question is whether, "existence exists," is tautological and therefore devoid of meaning. But some philosophers like George Berkeley and other solipsists have argued that: existence is merely an illusion. If that phrase has any meaning, then so does the statement that existence exists as it is the opposite of the foregoing. That is, Objectivism rejects the notion that existence is an illusion. If that assertion seems trivial to you, fine. But that is an issue in philosophy.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

2. Primacy of Existence

The main question in Philosopy is to what is to be considered primary: matter or mind.

Objectivism considers that there are basically only two candidates, which are 1. existence or 2. consciousness.

However (as in question 1) exactly what is to be considered the base ingredient of existence, that what must necessarily exist primary? What is there that exists on which everything else is dependent upon, and which itself has no ground for it's existence other then itself?

In some explenations it is said that existence is as well considered the material world (all material existence forms) and also thought or mind (ie. consciousness) itself. But in that case how can existence be primary to consciousness, if existence itself also has consciousness as an ingredient?

If existence is to be considered primary to consciousness, then this would mean that only the ingredient of existence which is not consciousness can be considered the primary component of which the world is made, since it would be rather senseless to state that consciousness is primary to consciousness.

So the only candidate ingredient of existence which rightfully can be termed primary is the form of existence which exists outside, apart and independend of consciousness.

This ingredient is also termed: matter.

I'm not sure I understand what you think the problem is here, although it appears to be tied to point number 4 about consciousness.

4. Consciousness

Despite the fact that Objectivism regards itself not to be in the camp of Idealism, Objectivist regard consciousness to be also a primary ("consciousness is an irreducable primary").

The acknowledgment of Primacy of existence in this regard means that one does need to have existence and an outer world to be consciouss of something.

However, to regard consciousness despite this as a primary (that is non-reducable feature, which can not be explaind in other terms) asks for an explenation. If the world is to be regarded in existence before there was even human consciousness and any form of life (as the primacy of existence is supposed to mean and is in accordance with scientific knowledge) then this begs the question: where did consciousness come from?

The materialistic / naturalist explenation is that consciousness (consciouss awareness) developed together with the development of life itself in higher organisms.

Since Objectivism rejects supernatural causes, this then is unexplained. Also it neglects the scientific evidence (rational thought!) for the material bases of consciousness and the scientific evidence for evolution which in fact precisely point to the fact that human consciousness is a material development.

Which shows at leat that the Objectivist metaphysics is incomplete (inexhausted) and contradictionary.

The main problem here appears to be the statement that, "consciousness is an irreducable primary." I would like to know who said that and in what context. Did Rand herself say that, or is that Piekoff's interpretation of Rand?

The statement in question could be considered an error, depending upon how it is taken. However, it is possible to give a positive interpretation of the statement. In my view, the relationship of consciousness (or the mind) to the brain is similar to the relationship of software to a computer.

Software has no existence outside of a computer or storage device. It is not a material object. It has no length, width, or height, nor any weight or charge or any other physical property. Yet it exists. Moreover, a piece of software cannot be explained by reference to a computer. The same computer can be programmed to track financial transactions, fly an airplane, or drive a vehicle across country. The only difference between the computers is the software that resides on them.

A computer program specifies the state of some region of computer memory, the program memory. Other state information is used to track the progression of the program or to hold the data upon which the program operates. As such, it is a description of the state of a machine. Similarly, the contents of your mind, in some sense specifies the state of your brain. And, just as a piece of software, written in a modern programming language, is a high level description of a program, so, the state of your mind is a high level description of the state of your brain. Therefore, the mapping from your mental states to your physiological states is not obvious. In fact, there may be more than one possible mapping.

Therefore, I don't think it is entirely incorrect to state that consciousness is irreducible. The state of your mind doesn't correspond to any obvious physiological state. It is an epiphenomenal description of the state of your brain. Therefore, it makes little sense to try to reduce it to some sort of low level description of brain function.

However, I do not like the term, "irreducible primary," as it seems to imply that the mind has some sort of non-physical existence, though it is obvious that the existence of the mind is equivalent to the existence of the brain. If the brain ceases to exist, so does the mind (which is just a high level description of the state and behavior of the brain).

Perhaps that is a point on which to criticize certain Objectivists, perhaps Rand herself, though I am not aware of her saying that. I certainly do not believe that she thought that the mind exists independent of the brain. She certainly repudiated the notion of any sort of mind-body dichotomy on numerous occasions.

Darrell

[Paul Mawdsley]

One can see consciousness as epistemologically primary but not metaphysically primary. Percepts are the primary elements of Objectivist epistemology. Consciousness and the objects of consciousness are implicit categories of the perceptual field and are thus epistemologically primaries. The job of consciousness is the non-contradictory integration of the objects of consciousness.

From the implicit categories of the perceptual field, we not only find the primary elements of Objectivist epistemology, we also find the basic axioms of Objectivist metaphysics: the primacy of existence, the Law of Identity and the irreducible nature of consciousness. However, our metaphysics---our understanding or models of the nature of existence---does not begin or end with the implicit categories of the perceptual field as an abstract whole. It begins with the identification, integration and generalization of specific patterns observed within that field and fits within the form of the basic metaphysical axioms.

As Dragonfly has stated, and Rob is echoing, Objectivism's three primary axioms are largely empty of content without further identification, integration and generalization of the evidence contained in the perceptual field. They are merely general categories waiting to be filled by a process of observation and reason that can take three primary forms: scientific (using mathematical reasoning to manipulate quantitative symbols and associated experiential images), philosophical (using linguistic or predicate reasoning to manipulate qualitative symbols and associated experiential images), and intuitive (using causal reasoning to manipulate experiential images directly in the imagination). All of these should be used in the exploration and identification of objective, rather than simply observed (as is currently the fashion in modern physics), existence. In fact, each approach can produce different insights that can be used to feed insights in the other approaches. Using one to the exclusion of the others reduces our means of approaching objectivity.

What exactly is the basic ingredient or ingredients of existence is open to scientific, philosophical and intuitive scrutiny. No informed person today would suggest that matter is the basic ingredient of existence. If we assume we can only have knowledge to the point of what can be observed, then there are definite physical limits to knowledge. If we can build a model of reality from hypothetical fundamental particles up to the observable universe without breaking the conditions of the metaphysical axioms or the identified, integrated and generalized patterns observed within the perceptual field, then I think we can claim to have a viable theory about the inner workings of reality, even if we cannot observe it directly.

The Law of Identity does not imply things do not change. It does imply the fundamental constituents of things do not change. If matter and consciousness are emergent properties of a the dynamic interaction of a more fundamental substance, then change can be seen as a consequence of the changing patterns or dynamics of unchanging things. Also, if there is only one type of substance, no metaphysical dualities arise.

I fully agree that Objectivism's view of causality does not account for Einstein's view of causality. Einstein suggested that the actions of entities are partly affected by their general field and that entities inherently have both a particulate and a wave (or field) character. This is contrary to Rand's very atomistic conception of causation that shapes her view of human nature, social dynamics, ethics, and politics. General Relativity and QM do not fit Rand's view of causality as identifying the relationship between what a thing is and its local actions and interactions. Causality must also contain a reciprocal node-to-field concept of causation whereby entities are also considered parts of a whole network of relationships and hierarchies of networks of relationships. As parts of a whole system, an entity's actions are shaped by the degrees of freedom made available by the form of the whole system. At the same time, the entities particular actions participate in shaping the form of the whole system. I think this way of conceiving causality, integrated with a more particulate view of causation, can lead to an intuitive account of General Relativity and QM without contradicting Objectivism's basic axioms.

Paul

[heusdens]

I have a couple of fundamental questions about the Objectivist metaphysics.

At this point I don't know whether you really have questions or whether you are actually on a crusade to try to discredit Objectivism, but I will take you at your word and attempt to answer your questions one at a time.

1. Axiom: Existence exists

There is existence, undoubtly. There is no real/rational person that can doubt that.

But what does it add to that fact to state that "existence exists" (which is tautological) and what does it tell us as to what and how things/the world exist?

The short answer is nothing. But the form of your question is something like: everyone knows that man is an animal and that he has a rational faculty; what does it add to that to say that man is a rational animal? That is, you've started out by stating the meaning of the words, "existence exists," and then you ask what the statement, "existence exists," adds to that. Of course the answer to that question is nothing, but the question is poorly stated.

The real question is whether, "existence exists," is tautological and therefore devoid of meaning. But some philosophers like George Berkeley and other solipsists have argued that: existence is merely an illusion. If that phrase has any meaning, then so does the statement that existence exists as it is the opposite of the foregoing. That is, Objectivism rejects the notion that existence is an illusion. If that assertion seems trivial to you, fine. But that is an issue in philosophy.

Darrell

Thanks Darrell

I should have raised the question perhaps more precisely.

Objectivism states two things: existence exists and existence is primary.

But somewhere (I don't remember where exactly) it is stated that existence consists of both physical/material reality and the mind. If this is somehow not in accordance with Objectivism, then perhaps that is the source of the confusion.

The primacy of existence is somewhat confusing because existence is already partly overlapping with consciousness, and in that sence the primacy of existence is less meaning full then stating that the material (that what exists outside, apart and independent of the mind) has primacy (like Materialism does) or stating that consciousness has primacy (like Idealism does).

Objectivism (a more recent Philosophy) somehow does not fit in between these two, since Objectivism has a dualistic approach to this. In one way Objectivism sees existence as primary, but then, on the other hand Objectivism states that Consciousness is an irreducable primary too.

Objectivism has in common with Idealism that it sees consciousness as irreducable primary.

While Objectivism also states that existence is primary over consciousness, and at the same time reflects on existence as consisting of both the material (objective reality) and consciousness (the mind) itself, we can ask: what component of existence then has primacy?

Is it matter that has primacy over consciousness, or consciousness that has primacy over the material?

If matter is primary, then consciousness can not be a at the same time a primary too.

If stated that consciousness is primary, then the next question is: why is there consciousness?

In what did it originate? Was it (like matter) always in existence? Where was consciousness then, before living organisms started populating earth? Some 'world spirit' perhaps? The mind of God?

This is of course not the position one should attribute to Objectivism, because explicitly all reference to the supernatural are rejected. But then Objectivism would need to conclude that consciousness is not realy a primary, but is in fact conditioned by and dependent on material entities and must have had it's origin in the material, that is the only way it can make sense.

At the same time it is clear that an approach which denies the various aspects of the material organisation forms that give rise to the phenomena of consciousness, is not a clever approach. Consciousness and how it relates to the material urges for many levels or layers of abstractions, and these layers of abstraction have seperate meaning (although they do depent on and originate from deeper levels of material reality).

Edited March 6, 2007 by heusdens

[heusdens]

2. Primacy of Existence

The main question in Philosopy is to what is to be considered primary: matter or mind.

Objectivism considers that there are basically only two candidates, which are 1. existence or 2. consciousness.

However (as in question 1) exactly what is to be considered the base ingredient of existence, that what must necessarily exist primary? What is there that exists on which everything else is dependent upon, and which itself has no ground for it's existence other then itself?

In some explenations it is said that existence is as well considered the material world (all material existence forms) and also thought or mind (ie. consciousness) itself. But in that case how can existence be primary to consciousness, if existence itself also has consciousness as an ingredient?

If existence is to be considered primary to consciousness, then this would mean that only the ingredient of existence which is not consciousness can be considered the primary component of which the world is made, since it would be rather senseless to state that consciousness is primary to consciousness.

So the only candidate ingredient of existence which rightfully can be termed primary is the form of existence which exists outside, apart and independend of consciousness.

This ingredient is also termed: matter.

I'm not sure I understand what you think the problem is here, although it appears to be tied to point number 4 about consciousness.

4. Consciousness

Despite the fact that Objectivism regards itself not to be in the camp of Idealism, Objectivist regard consciousness to be also a primary ("consciousness is an irreducable primary").

The acknowledgment of Primacy of existence in this regard means that one does need to have existence and an outer world to be consciouss of something.

However, to regard consciousness despite this as a primary (that is non-reducable feature, which can not be explaind in other terms) asks for an explenation. If the world is to be regarded in existence before there was even human consciousness and any form of life (as the primacy of existence is supposed to mean and is in accordance with scientific knowledge) then this begs the question: where did consciousness come from?

The materialistic / naturalist explenation is that consciousness (consciouss awareness) developed together with the development of life itself in higher organisms.

Since Objectivism rejects supernatural causes, this then is unexplained. Also it neglects the scientific evidence (rational thought!) for the material bases of consciousness and the scientific evidence for evolution which in fact precisely point to the fact that human consciousness is a material development.

Which shows at leat that the Objectivist metaphysics is incomplete (inexhausted) and contradictionary.

The main problem here appears to be the statement that, "consciousness is an irreducable primary." I would like to know who said that and in what context. Did Rand herself say that, or is that Piekoff's interpretation of Rand?

The statement in question could be considered an error, depending upon how it is taken. However, it is possible to give a positive interpretation of the statement. In my view, the relationship of consciousness (or the mind) to the brain is similar to the relationship of software to a computer.

Software has no existence outside of a computer or storage device. It is not a material object. It has no length, width, or height, nor any weight or charge or any other physical property. Yet it exists. Moreover, a piece of software cannot be explained by reference to a computer. The same computer can be programmed to track financial transactions, fly an airplane, or drive a vehicle across country. The only difference between the computers is the software that resides on them.

A computer program specifies the state of some region of computer memory, the program memory. Other state information is used to track the progression of the program or to hold the data upon which the program operates. As such, it is a description of the state of a machine. Similarly, the contents of your mind, in some sense specifies the state of your brain. And, just as a piece of software, written in a modern programming language, is a high level description of a program, so, the state of your mind is a high level description of the state of your brain. Therefore, the mapping from your mental states to your physiological states is not obvious. In fact, there may be more than one possible mapping.

Therefore, I don't think it is entirely incorrect to state that consciousness is irreducible. The state of your mind doesn't correspond to any obvious physiological state. It is an epiphenomenal description of the state of your brain. Therefore, it makes little sense to try to reduce it to some sort of low level description of brain function.

However, I do not like the term, "irreducible primary," as it seems to imply that the mind has some sort of non-physical existence, though it is obvious that the existence of the mind is equivalent to the existence of the brain. If the brain ceases to exist, so does the mind (which is just a high level description of the state and behavior of the brain).

Perhaps that is a point on which to criticize certain Objectivists, perhaps Rand herself, though I am not aware of her saying that. I certainly do not believe that she thought that the mind exists independent of the brain. She certainly repudiated the notion of any sort of mind-body dichotomy on numerous occasions.

Darrell

Thanks for the comments.

I should perhaps have not made the statements without backing them up with citations of who and in what context said that where and when, since now we are mere guessing of who to attribute them too. I know I have read them (and I guess they can be attributed to Peikoff).

I will do my best in providing an accurate quotation first, so that we can more properly discuss it.

Just one remark, I think that such issues could be avoided by explaining what we mean. I hold on to the idea for instance that everything there is, can be explained at the basis of material reality. But such does not mean that for instance social structures (for example take an education institute) can be reduced to the atoms of school buildings, tables, pencils, books and persons. On the other hand, it is clear a school system neither goes without that low level part of physical reality.

Such a reduction is obviously an absurd one. We need for different material realities different and suitable levels of abstractions to describe them.

Even in the case of chemistry, while it can in principle be satisfactory reduced to quantum physics, no chemist will do that in practice, since it is a too low level of an abstraction.

In the same way we reflect on communication in computer networks on different layers of abstraction. For instance using the OSI model, which distinguishes the different levels of communication:

application , representation , session, transport, network , data link , physical

In the ultimate sense all communication that goes on is physical, and for sure no communication could go on without the physical. Yet we do not reduce anything that goes on inside computer networks in terms of physical interactions, since that would be an inadequate abstraction.

In a similar way I think consciousness can be explained, as various levels of abstraction.

It has thefefore meaning to talk about some phenomena at some level of abstraction, without being bothered too much about what goes on on deeper levels of abstraction. Like they have independent existence and/or stand on their own without even needing the underlying layers, although they do not realy and must be based ultimately on physical reality.

Edited March 6, 2007 by heusdens

[Darrell Hougen]

3. Law of Identity

The proposition A=A is to be considered some hight truth. But what does this tell us about the real world?

The law of identity is - in all for what it is worth - to be considered some absolute truth, which truth is not dependend on time, place or circumstances.

Now how does that apply to the real world?

An apple, the one I just put in from of me, then certainly is equal to itself. Which truth must also be the case the next instant I observe the apple, and for the same reason must be true at all later instances.

Has anyone left behind an apple for some weeks without noticing, and has remarked wether the law of identity still holds? Is the apple you left behind still equal to the apple you found back, some weeks later?

Alternatively, is there any other object (any object at all) to which the law of identity holds?

Or is the law of identity only valid in the context of objects that do not change, that is, for objects that do not exist in time?

This is a complete misinterpretation of the law of identity. The law of identity states that everything is something. That is, a thing has a particular nature. It does not state that things cannot change over time.

Again, you may think that the law of identity is trivial, but if you look at the history of religion and philosophy, you will find a history rife with examples in which the law of identity is violated. Any miracle demands such a violation.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

5. Law of Causalility and Identity

According to Objectivism:

"The Law of Causality is a formulation of the axiomatic observation that there are no disembodied events: Every event is an action of an entity, and an entity can only act according to its specific nature. Objectivist philosophy affirms the Law of Causality as a corollary of the Law of Identity."

The problem with this position is this: how does one explain the motion of objects in free fall due to a gravity field? It is not the identity (ie properties of the body itself) that determine the motion of the object, but instead it is the local geometry, the gravity field itself, that determines this motion.

How does Objectivism explain that? Is it considered that this is due to the identity of the gravity field itself?

But the gravity field is not a (local) object, but instead is to be seen as the property of the distribution of all mass in the universe.

You seem to be assuming that the entity model of causation implies that entities must act under their own internal power or motivation. But, that is not at all what Objectivism is saying. It is simply saying that an apple in a gravitational field must behave like an apple in a gravitational field, i.e., fall to earth. The apple cannot act like a bird and fly away; again, a trivial point to the modern scientific mind, but again violated time and again throughout the history of religion and philosophy.

A different and perhaps even more serious problem arises in the light of quantum mechanics. QM definately proves that we can not account for certain phenomena (entangled pairs of photons for example) based on LOCAL properties of objects. An entangled pair, that can even be seperated lightyears from each other, demonstrate that the observed property of one photon and that of the other, correlate, and can not be reduced to the property of each individual photon. No local hidden variable theory can explain this phenomena.

This is no problem for Objectivism. It would be like stating that Objectivism cannot understand the behavior of two tether balls connected by a rope because it must view the balls as separate entities. But, this is simply false and absurd. The notion that two entities are connected is perfectly comprehensible within the framework of Objectivism. In this case, the two entities are parts of a larger entity, the composite system.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

Conclusions

Objectivism tries to understand the world without contradiction. In doing so, and just by avoiding contradiction, it falls into it, and creates a major contradiction with the real world. For rational though, which does not stand in opposition to the world but which becomes part of it and tries to understand it, tries to understand the world on its own terms and premises, is able to overcome these contradiction just by understanding that contradictions do in reality exist and reality is in fact full of it. One can not understand the living, changing world of motion without understanding contradiction and how it naturally arises in it and resolves itself.

Reality does not contain contradictions. It simply is what it is. If your mental state is filled with contradictions, then comprehension and understanding of reality is impossible.

Darrell

[Dragonfly]

This is a complete misinterpretation of the law of identity. The law of identity states that everything is something. That is, a thing has a particular nature. It does not state that things cannot change over time.

Again, you may think that the law of identity is trivial, but if you look at the history of religion and philosophy, you will find a history rife with examples in which the law of identity is violated. Any miracle demands such a violation.

Why should it? A miracle is an event that goes against all our expectations, but our expectations may be wrong. We thought that a thing had a particular nature, but it turns out that this nature is not quite what we thought it was, after all we're not omniscient. If miracles would exist, they would be fully compatible with the law of identity, the identity is only not what we thought it was, it turned out to have surprising aspects. Now we may have good reasons to reject the reality of specific miracles, as they would go against our scientific knowledge (for example that water can suddenly change into wine, or that the amount of food can "miraculously" increase) but it is also possible that something may seem miraculous, without it being so (for example as Arthur C. Clarke once said: "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic"). Only scientific knowledge may tell us the difference, but not the law of identity. We can only use that afterwards when we "finally know" (or think we know) what the particular nature of a thing is, but then it comes too late in the day to be of any use. That's inherent in its trivial character.

[Dragonfly]

Just one remark, I think that such issues could be avoided by explaining what we mean. I hold on to the idea for instance that everything there is, can be explained at the basis of material reality. But such does not mean that for instance social structures (for example take an education institute) can be reduced to the atoms of school buildings, tables, pencils, books and persons. On the other hand, it is clear a school system neither goes without that low level part of physical reality.

Such a reduction is obviously an absurd one. We need for different material realities different and suitable levels of abstractions to describe them.

Even in the case of chemistry, while it can in principle be satisfactory reduced to quantum physics, no chemist will do that in practice, since it is a too low level of an abstraction.

That is what Dennett calls the difference between "reductionism" and "greedy reductionism". BTW, your example of chemistry is not quite right, as there certainly is a thriving field quantum chemistry that uses QM in chemical applications.

[Darrell Hougen]

Why should it? A miracle is an event that goes against all our expectations, but our expectations may be wrong. We thought that a thing had a particular nature, but it turns out that this nature is not quite what we thought it was, after all we're not omniscient. If miracles would exist, they would be fully compatible with the law of identity, the identity is only not what we thought it was, it turned out to have surprising aspects.

Perhaps the following quote from Easton's 1897 Bible dictionary will help to clarify things:

Miracle ... an occurrence at once above nature and above man. It shows the intervention of a power that is not limited by the laws either of matter or of mind, a power interrupting the fixed laws which govern their movements, a supernatural power.

From: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/miracle

A miracle defies the law of identity by definition. There is no natural, scientific, or logical explanation of a miracle by definition. No religious person would ever accept the notion that there might be a scientific explanation for some apparent miracle because that would undermine his belief in the supernatural.

Don't give the enemies of reason the benefit of the doubt. They don't deserve it. They are willfully evasive of the facts of reality because facts don't suit their need to believe in the supernatural. They would rather reject logic than to question their superstitions.

I was reading a book a few years ago called, "Flim Flam," by James Randi. In it, he describes a case in which physicists undertook to study psychic phenomena at (I believe) Washington University in St. Louis. Among other things, they were trying to determine whether telekinesis --- moving objects with the mind --- is possible.

In order to study the phenomenon, they placed a delicately balanced, rotating wheel under a bell jar and asked the participants to attempt to move it using their minds. I'm not sure I can remember exactly what the apparatus looked like, but the mental picture I have is something similar to a Crooke's radiometer. At any rate, most of the participants were unable to cause the wheel to move, but one day, a man was able, by placing his hands on the sides of the bell jar and (apparently) focusing his mind, to cause the wheel to move. He wasn't always able to move the wheel, but he did move it on several different occasions and the physicists were convinced that the effect was real.

The problem is, that the effect wasn't real. The physicists had been hoodwinked. The experimental subject had slightly lifted up the edge of the bell jar and had blown underneath the edge so imperceptibly that the scientists watching him hadn't noticed. How did James Randi know? He had paid the man that fooled the scientists.

I told that story because I think it illustrates an important point. We scientists are often naive about people's motivations. We tend to assume that everyone is being honest and are often ill-prepared to deal with flim flam, with people's attempts to hoodwink us. But part of Rand's genius was in understanding people's motivations. She knew that religious people weren't interested at finding the truth but in obscuring it.

The anti-concept of miracle is an attempt to obscure the truth, plain and simple. There is no way to sugar coat it to make it acceptable to the rational scientific mind, because the purpose of the concept is to destroy the possibility of obtaining real knowledge. Don't allow yourself be duped by epistemological charlatans.

Darrell

[Victor Pross]

A miracle is an event that goes against all our expectations, but our expectations may be wrong. We thought that a thing had a particular nature, but it turns out that this nature is not quite what we thought it was, after all we're not omniscient. If miracles would exist, they would be fully compatible with the law of identity, the identity is only not what we thought it was, it turned out to have surprising aspects.

Dragonfly,

"If miracles would exist, they would be fully compatible with the law of identity, the identity is only not what we thought it was, it turned out to have surprising aspects." What? Sometimes you can be so damn cleaver, and yet on other occasions you can be so wrong that I have to turn away from the computer screen and shake my head and laugh in wonderment. Don’t take this as an insult. I laugh in wonderment, but I wonder how a man of your intellect can make the kind of remarks you do, as in the above case. If it were almost anybody else, I would simply ignore it and move on.

I agree with Darrell's post addressing you.

A miracle, as it is covered in religion, is not an epistemological concept, but rather a metaphysical one: it is the intervention of “natural laws” at the behest of a supernatural being who is able to revert, cancel or suspend that which He set in motion to run along a natural course. A miracle may be defined as an event so extraordinary that it can be explained only with reference to a supernatural power.

-Victor

Edited March 9, 2007 by Victor Pross

[heusdens]

That is what Dennett calls the difference between "reductionism" and "greedy reductionism". BTW, your example of chemistry is not quite right, as there certainly is a thriving field quantum chemistry that uses QM in chemical applications.

You are right about that, in some parts of chemistry one can use quantum mechanics to predict outcomes, but I merely added to that that chemistry is still a usefull abstraction and we can not merely get rid of it and use quantum mechanics instead.

In theory all chemical reactions can be explained at the basis of quantum mechanics. In practice that is far too complicated in the general case.

Edited March 9, 2007 by heusdens

[heusdens]

One can see consciousness as epistemologically primary but not metaphysically primary. Percepts are the primary elements of Objectivist epistemology. Consciousness and the objects of consciousness are implicit categories of the perceptual field and are thus epistemologically primaries. The job of consciousness is the non-contradictory integration of the objects of consciousness.

I agree on this point. In the metaphysical sense there is just one substance.

From the implicit categories of the perceptual field, we not only find the primary elements of Objectivist epistemology, we also find the basic axioms of Objectivist metaphysics: the primacy of existence, the Law of Identity and the irreducible nature of consciousness. However, our metaphysics---our understanding or models of the nature of existence---does not begin or end with the implicit categories of the perceptual field as an abstract whole. It begins with the identification, integration and generalization of specific patterns observed within that field and fits within the form of the basic metaphysical axioms.

Ok.

As Dragonfly has stated, and Rob is echoing, Objectivism's three primary axioms are largely empty of content without further identification, integration and generalization of the evidence contained in the perceptual field. They are merely general categories waiting to be filled by a process of observation and reason that can take three primary forms: scientific (using mathematical reasoning to manipulate quantitative symbols and associated experiential images), philosophical (using linguistic or predicate reasoning to manipulate qualitative symbols and associated experiential images), and intuitive (using causal reasoning to manipulate experiential images directly in the imagination). All of these should be used in the exploration and identification of objective, rather than simply observed (as is currently the fashion in modern physics), existence. In fact, each approach can produce different insights that can be used to feed insights in the other approaches. Using one to the exclusion of the others reduces our means of approaching objectivity.

What exactly is the basic ingredient or ingredients of existence is open to scientific, philosophical and intuitive scrutiny. No informed person today would suggest that matter is the basic ingredient of existence. If we assume we can only have knowledge to the point of what can be observed, then there are definite physical limits to knowledge. If we can build a model of reality from hypothetical fundamental particles up to the observable universe without breaking the conditions of the metaphysical axioms or the identified, integrated and generalized patterns observed within the perceptual field, then I think we can claim to have a viable theory about the inner workings of reality, even if we cannot observe it directly.

Here - on the point of matter as the basic ingredient of existence - I would disagree. Science has not eliminated matter, but merely has extended it's model about what matter is. The 'old' perception of matter as point like particles has been replaced by more sophisticated models of matter which better reflect their properties (fields, waves, quantum mechanics, etc.). Still, in any case we speak about matter as something that is in motion and exists in space and time (space and time are merely the modes of existence of matter).

This is still valid for for example quantum field theory.

We did not get rid of matter, on the contrary!

Note however that for physics the term 'matter' stands for matter in baryonic form, while the philosophical meaning of the term 'matter' includes all physical forms (baryonic, radiation, quantum mechanical stuff, fields , etc.).

For physics it is quite correct to say that matter (mass) can be converted into enery and vice versa, but then in the philosphical meaning of the term matter, this just means a transformation, not destruction or creation of matter.

The Law of Identity does not imply things do not change. It does imply the fundamental constituents of things do not change. If matter and consciousness are emergent properties of a the dynamic interaction of a more fundamental substance, then change can be seen as a consequence of the changing patterns or dynamics of unchanging things. Also, if there is only one type of substance, no metaphysical dualities arise.

The point of no metaphysical dualities (since there is basically just one substance) is correct.

But about change, we merely ought to conclude that change is everywhere and anytime. It only looks like somethings do not change, because it does not happen in our perception of it. Still, there is change on every scale.

So things do have an 'Identity' but that is only a partial aspect of it, since also 'Identity' is subject to change.

If we would say that the identity of a fish for example, does not change (a fish is only a fish and only begets a fish) this would contradict evolution, since a fish changes over long geological time scales into other organisms. And not just due to the identity of the fish, but due to the interaction with the environment.

As evolution sees it, change in environment drives the change of species.

So in the light of modern science, we can not give credit to some 'fixed' identity. Note however that this does not claim that 'identity' is something without meaning, since still at any given point in time, things have some identity. The only point is that such an identity itself is also subject to change.

I fully agree that Objectivism's view of causality does not account for Einstein's view of causality. Einstein suggested that the actions of entities are partly affected by their general field and that entities inherently have both a particulate and a wave (or field) character. This is contrary to Rand's very atomistic conception of causation that shapes her view of human nature, social dynamics, ethics, and politics. General Relativity and QM do not fit Rand's view of causality as identifying the relationship between what a thing is and its local actions and interactions. Causality must also contain a reciprocal node-to-field concept of causation whereby entities are also considered parts of a whole network of relationships and hierarchies of networks of relationships. As parts of a whole system, an entity's actions are shaped by the degrees of freedom made available by the form of the whole system. At the same time, the entities particular actions participate in shaping the form of the whole system. I think this way of conceiving causality, integrated with a more particulate view of causation, can lead to an intuitive account of General Relativity and QM without contradicting Objectivism's basic axioms.

Paul

Yes, these are some important points in which I think Objectivism clings onto ideas (like the fixed nature of identity) which can not be held valid in the light of modern science. In this respect the ideas of Objectivism look pretty ancient (more or less a Newtonian outlook on reality).

I do not yet understand how this can be fixed.

[heusdens]

The real question is whether, "existence exists," is tautological and therefore devoid of meaning. But some philosophers like George Berkeley and other solipsists have argued that: existence is merely an illusion. If that phrase has any meaning, then so does the statement that existence exists as it is the opposite of the foregoing. That is, Objectivism rejects the notion that existence is an illusion. If that assertion seems trivial to you, fine. But that is an issue in philosophy.

Darrell

I would think that even Berkeley would agree on "existence exists", just that in the view of Berkeley that refers only to the mental states (mind), not the material world as such.

The philosphical issue is not wether there is existence, but what existence is in the meta-physical sense: the material world (independent and outside of the mind) or consciousness.

[Darrell Hougen]

So things do have an 'Identity' but that is only a partial aspect of it, since also 'Identity' is subject to change.

If we would say that the identity of a fish for example, does not change (a fish is only a fish and only begets a fish) this would contradict evolution, since a fish changes over long geological time scales into other organisms. And not just due to the identity of the fish, but due to the interaction with the environment.

As evolution sees it, change in environment drives the change of species.

So in the light of modern science, we can not give credit to some 'fixed' identity. Note however that this does not claim that 'identity' is something without meaning, since still at any given point in time, things have some identity. The only point is that such an identity itself is also subject to change.

Yes, these are some important points in which I think Objectivism clings onto ideas (like the fixed nature of identity) which can not be held valid in the light of modern science. In this respect the ideas of Objectivism look pretty ancient (more or less a Newtonian outlook on reality).

I do not yet understand how this can be fixed.

I really do not understand why you think that Objectivism holds the view that things have a "fixed" identity, i.e., an identity that doesn't change over time. I have read a large percentage of Rand's works and have have never found anything to suggest such a belief on her part. For example, I'm sure Rand was acutely aware of the fact that a person is born as a baby, grows into a child and then into an adult, gets old and dies. Yet, at any moment in time, a person, in Rand's view (and in fact), has an identity. Indeed, her view is entirely consistent with what you said in the first quoted paragraph above.

In the, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Rand discusses the manner in which we know the identity of an object, namely, by measuring it --- by determining the quantity of each quality. In the above example of a person, the obvious measurements of height an weight (and every other quality) change throughout life. Therefore, the identity of a person, not who a person is, but his precise nature, changes over time. The only restriction is that the change be causal. The change is not arbitrary but is in accordance with his nature.

I find the notion that Rand was unaware of such facts and the notion that her concept of identity was somehow inconsistent with such facts preposterous, at best.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

I would think that even Berkeley would agree on "existence exists", just that in the view of Berkeley that refers only to the mental states (mind), not the material world as such.

The philosphical issue is not wether there is existence, but what existence is in the meta-physical sense: the material world (independent and outside of the mind) or consciousness.

The phrase, "existence exists," is shorthand for the statement that, "the material world, independent and outside of the mind or consciousness, exists."

Darrell

[heusdens]

I would think that even Berkeley would agree on "existence exists", just that in the view of Berkeley that refers only to the mental states (mind), not the material world as such.

The philosphical issue is not wether there is existence, but what existence is in the meta-physical sense: the material world (independent and outside of the mind) or consciousness.

The phrase, "existence exists," is shorthand for the statement that, "the material world, independent and outside of the mind or consciousness, exists."

Darrell

Ok. No problem with that

It would have been much clearer if Objectivism would have stated it in such a manner.

But then Objectivism would only restate what already was stated by Materialism, it would be an (almost) identical philosophical position.

Maybe Objectivism is Materialism in disguise?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The phrase, "existence exists," is shorthand for the statement that, "the material world, independent and outside of the mind or consciousness, exists."

Ok. No problem with that

It would have been much clearer if Objectivism would have stated it in such a manner.

But then Objectivism would only restate what already was stated by Materialism, it would be an (almost) identical philosophical position.

Maybe Objectivism is Materialism in disguise?

I think there is a small misunderstanding here. The mind and consciousness also exist and they are part of existence. They may not be material in themselves, but they reside in material supports or are products of material.

I would rephrase the expanded version to say, "the material world, independent and outside of the mind or consciousness, and the mind or consciousness, all exist." I would also make it clear that the material world can exist without consciousness, but consciousness cannot exist without the material world.

Michael

[Darrell Hougen]

Thanks, Michael, for providing a clear and comprehensive statement.

Darrell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Thanks, Michael, for providing a clear and comprehensive statement.

Darrell,

Based on your other posts, I wanted to say, "I believe you meant to say..." but that sounded presumptuous. I am pleased to see that we are completely on the same wavelength conceptually.

Incidentally, some of your posts are some of the clearest explanations of metaphysical/epistemological fundamentals from an Objectivist orientation I have ever read.

Michael

[heusdens]

The phrase, "existence exists," is shorthand for the statement that, "the material world, independent and outside of the mind or consciousness, exists."

Ok. No problem with that

It would have been much clearer if Objectivism would have stated it in such a manner.

But then Objectivism would only restate what already was stated by Materialism, it would be an (almost) identical philosophical position.

Maybe Objectivism is Materialism in disguise?

I think there is a small misunderstanding here. The mind and consciousness also exist and they are part of existence. They may not be material in themselves, but they reside in material supports or are products of material.

I would rephrase the expanded version to say, "the material world, independent and outside of the mind or consciousness, and the mind or consciousness, all exist." I would also make it clear that the material world can exist without consciousness, but consciousness cannot exist without the material world.

Michael

Michael,

Yes, well, obviously there is also consciousness, but consciousness is there only in the epistemelogical sense.

I don't think that in the meta-physical sense one can state that there is matter and there is consciousness, or can one? In the meta-physical sense, there is just matter. In the epistemelogical sense, also consciousness exists, but the material is primary over consciousness.

(In the same fashion, when we state there are atoms and molecules made from atoms, we don't need to add that Hydrogen exist)

In fact that is the point on which Objectivism to me is unclear (or my understanding of it), since if one states that existence consists of both the material and consciousness, what does it mean to say then that "existence is primary over conscioussness"?

This would only be meaningfull when existence means only the material.

Consciousness can't exist apart or outside or independent from the material world, that is quite clear.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Consciousness can't exist apart or outside or independent from the material world, that is quite clear.

heusdens,

This is a long discussion and it is a bit more complex than it seems. Your statement above is correct, but this does not mean that consciousness can boil down simply to the interaction of properties of subatomic particles.

Actually, as a metaphysical state added to inanimate existents, life comes before consciousness. There is a great deal of difference between a carcass and a living being. Regardless of the reductionist view that death only entails a system breakdown and nothing more, there is a unique something that goes out of existence that is more than a mere system. Even using the word "system" points to a top-down organization in addition to a bottom-up one from the subatomic realm.

Exactly what this unique something is has not really been answered by science to satisfaction. We only know that it is and that it has a temporary nature—with birth, growth, maturity, aging, and death as essential parts of it. Also, it feeds on itself in order to support the material part. Consciousness is merely an organ of highly developed life forms.

Life is a metaphysical form of existence.

Also, be careful with axiomatic concepts (existence, identity and consciousness). They are not exclusive to each other. They are merely facets of the same thing. Existence cannot be divorced from identity. It can be divorced from consciousness, but not if you want to talk about it. There has to be consciousness in order to do that.

In this sense, there is no epistemological anything without the metaphysical and vice-versa, since claiming metaphysics means talking about it. They are facets of the same thing (consciousness with a specific nature existing within a universe of life and inanimate existents).

Michael

[Darrell Hougen]

Hi Michael,

Thank you for the compliment above. I don't believe that something is truly understood until it is possible to give a clear and concise explanation of it. Actually, I don't really believe that something is truly understood until one has constructed (or can construct) an object, machine or device that implements the principles involved, but the first step in that direction is a clear and concise description.

I am also happy that we are on the same page with respect to the issue of the existence of the material world and of consciousness. However, based on your comments, quoted below, I'm not sure we're in exact agreement with respect to the nature of consciousness (or of life).

Actually, as a metaphysical state added to inanimate existents, life comes before consciousness. There is a great deal of difference between a carcass and a living being. Regardless of the reductionist view that death only entails a system breakdown and nothing more, there is a unique something that goes out of existence that is more than a mere system. Even using the word "system" points to a top-down organization in addition to a bottom-up one from the subatomic realm.

Here, I disagree, to some extent. I do believe that life is a property of the system that is related to the organization and ongoing activity of the system. In some sense, this is a reductionist point of view in the sense that each subprocess of the overall system process can be explained in terms of the ordinary laws of physics and chemistry. The possibility of such a reduction is a requirement of the fact that the body of a living organism is a physical object that exists in the physical world. It is ultimately governed by the laws of physics.

There is, however, a sense in which life exists that cannot be trivialized. Once the activity of a living organism has been sufficiently disrupted, there is no way to restore it. The life of any person alive today was passed down in an unbroken line through eons of time to the present day. Once that spark of life, which represents the proper organization of the cell or system of cells, has been snuffed out, it is gone forever. That branch of the tree has been cut off and cannot be restored.

Life is a metaphysical form of existence.

Agreed.

Consciousness is also a metaphysical form of existence.

Anything that exists, exists metaphysically.

Just as life represents a certain state and process of matter, consciousness represents a certain state and process of the brain. Consciousness bears a similar relationship to the brain as software bears to a computer. Heusdens, I would ask you to reread my response in post #3 on this thread so I don't have to repeat everything that I said there.

Darrell