Generosity and Self-Interest

[Dragonfly]

You realize, I hope, that you advocate the imposition of duties where there is no prior contract creating these duties. One has the duty to honor a contract that he has willing assented to. I don't know of any contract requiring us to guard the lives of strangers. We have a legal contract not to endanger the lives of others, but that is an entirely different thing. What you propose is making an -act of omission- in a non-contractual situation actionable. Is that what you really, really want?

Where I live we have a legal contract to help people in an emergency if it is in our power to do so. This does not imply that it is our duty to help everyone everywhere. A slippery slope argument is no argument. As Rand said:

The principle that one should help men in an emergency cannot be extended to regard all human suffering as an emergency and to turn the misfortune of some into a first mortgage on the lives of others.

[Dragonfly]

edit: where would it end? Not only where one's path crosses those in distress; how would one prove that one's path DIDN'T cross that of the one in distress? Imagine having the burden of proof that one didn't take a particular route down a particular road, or one "didn't see" an accident by the roadside because it hadn't happened at the time one was passing by? What a nightmare! It wouldn't be safe to leave the house for fear of being accused of not rescuing people!

That is nonsense. I think that even in America you're presumed innocent until proven guilty. With this kind of reasoning you can ridicule any penal law.

[Daniel Barnes]

Hey Dragonfly,

Here's the key graf from Rand on the subject:

“To illustrate this on the altruist’s favourite example: the issue of saving a drowning person. If the person is a stranger, it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one’s own life is minimal; when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it; only a lack of self esteem could permit one to value one’s own life no higher than that of a random stranger.” - "The Ethics of Emergencies", VOS.

This, I think, clearly summarises Rand's contribution to this ethical question: that is, if you risk your life to save a stranger, you're immoral, and if you don't, this is morally exemplary. Now, let’s try to imagine just such a situation, but in a world where almost everyone has adopted Rand’s moral code. A lone young girl is swept out to sea on a dangerous surf beach. The crowd stands by, doing nothing, as they have too much self-esteem to risk their own life for the young girl, who is after all a ‘random stranger.’ A man plunges in after her. Both nearly drown in the attempted rescue, but eventually after a great struggle he brings the both of them into shore alive. They both lie exhausted, gasping on the beach. Eventually he lifts his head only to be greeted by grim faces and contemptuous stares from the surrounding crowd. One woman eventually speaks, voice brimming with emotion: “That was the most immoral thing I’ve ever seen. You ought to be ashamed of yourself.” The crowd nod fiercely, and turn away in frank disgust.

Or alternately: as the girl is swept out to sea, a man walks to the edge of the churning surf. As she cries for help, he stands there, assessing the situation. Then, having decided it’s just too dangerous, he steps back, and returns to his towel by the shore. A wave of spontaneous applause breaks out among the beachgoers, in appreciation of a truly moral act; a woman says to her young son, “Look at that man just did. I hope you grow up to be just like him.”

Absurd as this seems, this is just what Rand is advocating.

Edited April 17, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Victor Pross]

I don’t think most followers of the philosophy, let alone Rand, would agree with Daniel's characterization. If you follow the presentation in Rand's essay “The ethics of Emergencies” she advices that it is totally appropriate to help others (in an emergency situation) if it is in one’s power, but not if it meant certain peril for one’s self. (And it was also put forth else where that one does not save the drowning children of a stranger ignoring one’s own).

In helping others in an emergency situation, Rand uses the example of shipwrecked people, as I recall, but a drowning person also serves the point. The point is that one does not spend the rest of their life searching for shipwrecked victims or drowning strangers so that they may achieve “morality” –a prospect that is truly ridiculous.

I also think that if one is happy and truly values their own life, they have a greater capacity to relieve suffering--they feel empathy-- when they come across it, but not from a sense of duty or because their life is secondary to everybody who is not "them"--which is everybody. This is where we get back to the anti-self at the core of altruism.

-Victor

Edited April 17, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I don’t think most followers of the philosophy, let alone Rand, would agree with Daniel's characterization.

Victor,

Do you mean "agree with" or "like"? If you mean "agree with," please explain where he was wrong in making an incorrect logical extension from Rand's words. The only thing I found was added, not contradicted, and that was the approval given by witnesses.

(That doesn't mean I like it, either. I don't.)

Michael

[Victor Pross]

I don’t think most followers of the philosophy, let alone Rand, would agree with Daniel's characterization.

Victor,

Do you mean "agree with" or "like"? If you mean "agree with," please explain where he was wrong in making an incorrect logical extension from Rand's words. The only thing I found was added, not contradicted, and that was the approval given by witnesses.

(That doesn't mean I like it, either. I don't.)

Michael

Michael,

I mean “agree with.” Briefly, this is the problem I have with Dan’s presentation: the excerpt is stripped from a wider context with crucial points preceding and succeeding this excerpt. (But there is no point to introduce it here, we have all read it).

But let’s look at Dan’s hypnotically scenario. It is hardly realistic. First of all, there would be no such thing as a purely 'homogenized Objectivist society' (or any other philosophy) largely comprised of Ortho-Objectivists who would, with lightening speed, condemn the man who saved the drowning girl without knowing anything other that a girl was saved! That is, how would they know the relationship of the people involved? Is this girl the man’s wife or daughter or somebody else extremely important to him? This is an emergency situation, and nobody knows the total facts within minutes! How could anybody make any assessment (let lone moral) under a highly stressed situation that is an emergency? So, as I said, it is not realistic. And so, stripping away all these factors, Dan’s argument is not, I think, genuine. (I grant him the smarts to know that his own argument lies on thin ice given what I just pointed out).

But let’s alter Dan’s little morality play and return it from an “Objectivist society” [silly notion that is on its own] to the present: two young girls are swept out to sea on a dangerous surf beach. The crowd stands by, doing nothing. A man plunges in after her. They all nearly drown in the attempted rescue, but eventually after a great struggle he brings back only one of them alive. The other dies. A crowd gathers around the man and at some point later, after the commotion has settled, our hero is asked: ‘Why didn’t you save the other girl?” The reply: “Hmm, I could have, but...Well, that was my daughter and I wanted to be perceived as a hero, but how small I would look if I saved my daughter and have charges of selfishness flung at me, you know? I’m truly heroic as the news reports confirm, because they said ‘I had no regard for my own life’ and that my act was truly unselfish."

-Victor

Edit: (Anyway, my denigration of Ortho-Objectivists is not really fair--as only a supreme asshole fool would ream-out a man who saved a drowning person, and would be considered so almost under any philosophy).

Edited April 18, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Judith]

Here's the key graf from Rand on the subject:

“To illustrate this on the altruist’s favourite example: the issue of saving a drowning person. If the person is a stranger, it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one’s own life is minimal; when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it; only a lack of self esteem could permit one to value one’s own life no higher than that of a random stranger.” - "The Ethics of Emergencies", VOS.

This, I think, clearly summarises Rand's contribution to this ethical question

It is terribly, terribly, terribly important to distinguish between what is moral if freely chosen and what should be legally required. I think that Rand would consider it monstrous beyond conception to have a legal requirement of rescue.

That is my entire point in raising this issue. We all have a desire to rescue those in distress. I'm not for a moment saying that there's anything wrong with that.

What I *AM* objecting to is anyone saying that I must do so, whether I want to or not. And I'm certainly objecting to someone saying, after I've done so, "Oh, you were only doing your duty."

I've purposely drawn the issue in the starkest possible terms to illustrate the point: a drowning child in a puddle in which there's no possible risk or even inconvenience to yourself in the rescue. When is such a situation ever likely to arise?

Let's try some other, more likely situations:

You're on your way to the airport for a flight to an interview for a job you want desperately. Your future career depends on it. On your way to the airport, you drive by an accident. There's no other traffic on the road, and you have no cell phone. Do you stop to help?

You're a physician who's just been sued unjustly for malpractice. You see an accident by the roadside. You're in a state where there's no law protecting physicians from malpractice should they happen to do something incorrect in such a situation. You happen to be a dermatologist, and you know you aren't an expert in such injuries. Do you stop to help?

You're driving your kid to the hospital with a high fever when you witness an accident. Your kid is probably all right, but you don't know. Do you stop to help?

See what I mean?

Judith

Edited April 18, 2007 by Judith

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Victor,

I think the whole point Daniel was making is precisely what you said, that it was not realistic.

Yet logically it holds if you take the morality as stated. (It can be changed easily enough to include knowledge of the relationship.)

I find another angle that Rand did not deal with because she denied the existence of instincts: the emotional hijack. There are many documented cases to ignore of perfect strangers jumping in to save someone drowning and not even remembering later having made that decision. I believe you can't make a hard-and-fast-rule of what constitutes good and evil for an emergency. Human nature as it exists must be a factor, especially since values in extreme situations are being dealt with.

However, as a rule of thumb, I have no problem with Rand's formulation. (There we go with scope once again.)

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael K

>The only thing I found was added, not contradicted, and that was the approval given by witnesses.

Hey Michael

I based that reaction on Rand's frequent insistence on the absolute necessity of passing moral judgement when confronted with moral or immoral acts (eg "The Cult of Moral Grayness"). If rescuing a drowning stranger at a risk to yourself is immoral, the reaction follows.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I based that reaction on Rand's frequent insistence on the absolute necessity of passing moral judgement when confronted with moral or immoral acts (eg "The Cult of Moral Grayness"). If rescuing a drowning stranger at a risk to yourself is immoral, the reaction follows.

Daniel,

LOL...

I stand corrected.

Michael

[Victor Pross]

Victor,

I think the whole point Daniel was making is precisely what you said, that it was not realistic.

Yet logically it holds if you take the morality as stated. (It can be changed easily enough to include knowledge of the relationship.)

I find another angle that Rand did not deal with because she denied the existence of instincts: the emotional hijack. There are many documented cases to ignore of perfect strangers jumping in to save someone drowning and not even remembering later having made that decision. I believe you can't make a hard-and-fast-rule of what constitutes good and evil for an emergency. Human nature as it exists must be a factor, especially since values in extreme situations are being dealt with.

However, as a rule of thumb, I have no problem with Rand's formulation. (There we go with scope once again.)

Michael

Michael,

I agree with you. And Rand certainly didn’t condemn “human nature”--if indeed that is what is playing a part here, in the sense that the sudden act--the "emotional hijack"--to save a drowning person was one of a knee jerk -re-action, similar to when a doctor hits your knee to test your reflexes. The knee-jerk is neither moral nor immoral (although ‘good’ or ‘bad’ could come from the action—that is, all are saved or both the would-be hero and drowning person dies). So these saving acts sound as if it were morally neutral. Does that logically follow?

What Rand objected to is the philosophic doctrine of altruism.

“The basic principle of altruism is that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only justification of his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest moral duty, virtue and value."

This is the Objectivist view of “altruism” and it is soundly condemned on ethical grounds. But it’s not just an “Objectivist view” of what altruism is: it is also the view of the philosopher, Aususte Comte, who coined the term:

"He coined the word 'altruism' to refer to what he believed to be a moral obligation of individuals to serve others and place their interests above one's own. He opposed the idea of individual rights, maintaining that they were not consistent with this supposed ethical obligation. (Catechisme Positiviste)."

-Victor

Edited April 18, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Daniel Barnes]

Ruth:

>We all have a desire to rescue those in distress. I'm not for a moment saying that there's anything wrong with that.

No, of course not. But Ayn Rand is arguing that there is something wrong with that desire, at least where there is a potential threat to your life. Further, she stops well short of saying assisting people in a more general sense, such as you outline below, is morally good. In fact she says quite openly that one should help strangers only in an emergency. But she is not very clear herself about this point; for on the very next page she says that illness and poverty are not emergencies, but one "may" help an ill and impoverished neighbour! In which case there is not much to distinguish this in practice from conventional morality.

It does not make much sense, but there you are.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ruth:

>We all have a desire to rescue those in distress. I'm not for a moment saying that there's anything wrong with that.

Daniel,

Ruth?

Michael

[Dragonfly]

Daniel,

Ruth?

Michael

Daniel, Ruth, Judith, Michael... too many biblical names, that's the problem, it gets confusing, I wouldn't know the difference between Judith and Ruth either... Some of you even made it to a bible book.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

Ah ha!

I thought I detected a Judeo-Christian train of thought somewhere...

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Ruth:

>We all have a desire to rescue those in distress. I'm not for a moment saying that there's anything wrong with that.

Daniel,

Ruth?

Sorry, Judith! (slaps forehead) Doh, stupid brain.

[Judith]

>We all have a desire to rescue those in distress. I'm not for a moment saying that there's anything wrong with that.

No, of course not. But Ayn Rand is arguing that there is something wrong with that desire, at least where there is a potential threat to your life. Further, she stops well short of saying assisting people in a more general sense, such as you outline below, is morally good. In fact she says quite openly that one should help strangers only in an emergency. But she is not very clear herself about this point; for on the very next page she says that illness and poverty are not emergencies, but one "may" help an ill and impoverished neighbour! In which case there is not much to distinguish this in practice from conventional morality.

It does not make much sense, but there you are.

I think it's quite clear from the above that we can and should help people WHEN WE WANT TO. Even strangers can mean something to us because, as Rand pointed out in another one of her essays, we recognize that they are like us, we want to see life succeed, etc.

Rand's entire point was that WE DON'T HAVE TO. When we DON'T want to, we SHOULDN'T. When we see a stranger, to whom we owe no obligation whatsoever, in trouble, and we feel no desire whatsoever to help, we shouldn't help. To do otherwise is altruism.

We may not feel like helping for many reasons: our own problems may supersede those of others, we may have helped so many others already that we just can't help any others, we may be obnoxious antisocial bastards -- whatever. It doesn't matter. Rand would argue that we shouldn't decide on a whim, however; we should make the decision based on our own rational self-interest.

Judith

Edited April 18, 2007 by Judith

[Victor Pross]

Judith, you really hit the nail on the head.

Objectivism is not against charity or “helping people” either in an emergency or otherwise. Politically speaking, Objectivists endorses voluntary action. Gifts (including charity) and mutual trade are both types of voluntary action, as freely chosen by the individual, and consequently are not unacceptable. From an ethical point of view, it is an advantageous for us to have a flourishing society, and there is no reason to reject charity as a valid means to realize this. However, giving to charity is neither a moral merit nor a duty: anyone can give to a charity—IF they freely chose to--but productivity, an immensely more effective means to “help society", [as David Kelley argues for in his essay] is what’s much more crucial. Before you can speak of “distribution” you must have production.

You know, it’s the whole concept of freedom and voluntarism that rubs certain people the wrong way, I think, and so it comes as no surprise that Objectivism would rub them the wrong way. They are core concepts within the ethics of Objectivism.

-Victor

Edited April 19, 2007 by Victor Pross

[BaalChatzaf]

You know, it’s the whole concept of freedom and voluntarism that rubs certain people the wrong way, I think, and so it comes as no surprise that Objectivism would rub them the wrong way. They are core concepts within the ethics of Objectivism.

-Victor

Say a person gives to a cause or another person because that cause or other person instantiates his values. In a sense the generous person is giving to his own cause and for his own ends. Generally there is an -impulse- of generosity that goes with this, it is not entirely calculated.

People who detest this sort of charity fault it on the grounds that the giver did not give out of Duty, but out of impulse and inclination. This criticism sounds rather Kantian, don't you think? Kant not only got science and mathematics wrong, he also misunderstood human motivation. The only thing that runs on Duty is a machine that makes fertilizer.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[BaalChatzaf]

Generosity and Self-Interest

by David Kelley

From the December 2004/January 2005 issue of the Fraser Forum.

People do generous things. They give directions to strangers, contribute to charities, volunteer in hospitals, send food and supplies to earthquake victims. Actions like these are usually described as altruistic, in contrast to the pursuit of self-interest. In a free society, most of our interactions with people involve trade: we provide values to others only on terms that benefit ourselves. Generosity, however, means providing someone with a value that is not part of a definite trade, without the expectation of a definite return.

Read the rest of the article at TOC...

Here is an opportunity to discuss my motives for giving. And I am not doing this to solicit admiration, but to explain why a rationally selfish person like myself should give at all.

I do two things: I give blood regularly at the Red Cross and I help prepare books for the blind and dyslexic at Reading for the Blind and Dyslexic of New Jersey (RFBDNJ), part of a nation-wide organization.

Why do I do it?

Partly out of generosity and sympathy. My contract permits to have four decent impulses a year (that is a joke). And partly out of superstition. What! you say? Its a Karma thing. If I expect blood to be in the pipe line when I need it, it behooves me to put some of my own into the pipeline. Think of at as a kind of diffuse Trader Principle. Likewise, if I should become blind (heaven forfend!) I would want recorded books to be available for me. But it seems ungraceful to expect this service without either contributing to the effort monetarily or contributing labor. All good things must be paid for, somehow.

Besides, the process of preparing recorded books (of high quality and accuracy) is rather exacting. It requires focus, concentration and attention to details. While it is not Rocket Science, it cannot be done half-ass either. So it is a challenge.

And that is why I do it. Altruism has nothing to do with it all. I do it because of what I expect and what I owe to my own best interests.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Daniel Barnes]

Judith:

>I think it's quite clear from the above that we can and should help people WHEN WE WANT TO. Even strangers can mean something to us because, as Rand pointed out in another one of her essays, we recognize that they are like us, we want to see life succeed, etc.

>Rand's entire point was that WE DON'T HAVE TO.

Oh, sure. You can do all kinds of things if you want to. But leave the issue of whether you're forced to or not to one side. My point is if you do want to, is this immoral? Rand is saying it is; that it is immoral to help people where there may be a cost to oneself. Like saving the drowning girl in my example. Rand says this act is immoral. (She also says pretty clearly that it is immoral to help people in non-emergency situations, tho, not unusually, she contradicts herself later)

Do you agree with either of these positions?

Edited April 20, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Brant Gaede]

There's a lot of Rand this and Rand that on this thread. I wish there were more quotes.

--Brant

[Daniel Barnes]

There's a lot of Rand this and Rand that on this thread. I wish there were more quotes.

I've provided the key ones. Go back and read them.

[Judith]

Say a person gives to a cause or another person because that cause or other person instantiates his values. In a sense the generous person is giving to his own cause and for his own ends. Generally there is an -impulse- of generosity that goes with this, it is not entirely calculated.

People who detest this sort of charity fault it on the grounds that the giver did not give out of Duty, but out of impulse and inclination. This criticism sounds rather Kantian, don't you think? Kant not only got science and mathematics wrong, he also misunderstood human motivation. The only thing that runs on Duty is a machine that makes fertilizer.

Bingo! Gods, what motivates the petty self-righteousness behind people who make those kinds of criticism? What are their lives like?

Judith

[Judith]

Oh, sure. You can do all kinds of things if you want to. But leave the issue of whether you're forced to or not to one side. My point is if you do want to, is this immoral? Rand is saying it is; that it is immoral to help people where there may be a cost to oneself. Like saving the drowning girl in my example. Rand says this act is immoral. (She also says pretty clearly that it is immoral to help people in non-emergency situations, tho, not unusually, she contradicts herself later)

Do you agree with either of these positions?

I don't agree with those positions, and I don't think Rand would either. She may have made isolated statements that sound that way, and you might be able to quote "Randian Scripture" at me to support that position, but taking her entire work as a whole, I don't believe that she herself would approve of it.

Interpreted literally, life among other people would be impossible if one tried to live up to such a standard of never helping others outside of strict emergencies. One would have to analyze one's own actions constantly to see if one were inadvertently helping other people. One would never gain the cooperation of other people if one had the reputation of being an antisocial bastard. And one would turn one's self into such a stingy, miserable person that one wouldn't want to live with one's self.

I'm the kind of person who would probably get myself killed trying to rescue other people out of a lack of prudence. In view of the recent shooting at Virginia Tech, I keep running scenarios through my head: what if a deranged student came in here and started shooting people? What would I do? Etc.? And I would very likely try to help instead of sensibly just getting the hell out of there. And later, if I were crippled for life, I'd probably cuss myself for it. But on the other hand, if I ran and dozens of people were killed, I'd have it on myself for the rest of my life that maybe I could have saved at least some of them. What would Rand say? She'd probably say that it would be proper to help only at minimal risk to myself. That's what all the training courses say. But in the adrenaline of the moment, cool reason goes out the window, and you have to decide in the moment what to do, and whatever you decide, you'll have hindsight for the rest of your life to torment you or praise you, depending on how it went.

Judith