The Passion of James Valliant's Criticism

[Chris Grieb]

Neil; In regard to your last post. Peikoff and company really are turning Objectivism into a cult.

Am I to understand that Valliant considers "The Ayn Rand Cult" a serious work about Ayn Rand and Objectivism?

[Robert Campbell]

In other words: Peikoff is even more essential to Objectivism than Rand.

Well, Leonard Peikoff's works do get the first (and longest) section in the Ayn Rand Bookstore catalog.

Maybe they should change its name to the Leonard Peikoff Bookstore...

Robert Campbell

[Neil Parille]

Chris,

Valliant has a generally unfavorable view of Walker's The Ayn Rand Cult. However, when it contains a version of events that is (allegedly) different from Barbara Branden's, it magically becomes more credible.

[Brant Gaede]

In other words: Peikoff is even more essential to Objectivism than Rand.

Well, Leonard Peikoff's works do get the first (and longest) section in the Ayn Rand Bookstore catalog.

Maybe they should change its name to the Leonard Peikoff Bookstore...

Robert Campbell

How about "Atlas Shrugged," by Leonard Peikoff with an afterword by Ayn Rand?

--Brant

[John Dailey]

~ I usually try to avoid weighing in on this stuff, but, gotta say, that evaluation by Casey Fahey is (searches for dippy-lomatic words)...NOT something that Rand would have agreed with. --- Indeed, I believe she somewhere commented on the necessary intellectual acuity (not RAINMAN 'smarts') she thought needed to understand h-e-r philosophy, and considered pretty well most readers of English capable...without some DIMwit's idea of proper 'official' course-taking being 'necessary' before discussion could ensue. Cripes!

~ Whoever admires Rand and/or her writings to any degree would find this attitude uselessly 'intellectually' snobbish, socially boorish, artificially elitist, and something that only one who wasn't worth discussing anything with could or would say.

LLAP

J:D

PS: Sounds like the same attitude LP took re 'vote my way or admit you're a philosophical moron.'

Edited August 3, 2007 by John Dailey

[Dragonfly]

I think another recent performance by Casey Fahy is just as telling.

In his role as SOLOP's resident expert on Objectivist philosophy, Mr. Fahy treats Stephen Boydstun to the following lecture:

Are you aware of the Objectivist position on the primacy of existence?

If you haven't taken the extended courses on these issues by Peikoff I can understand that there could be misunderstandings about these issues.

The courses on these issues are a revelation one can not, on the other hand, ever turn back the clock on in terms of understanding sense perception and logic's lock-step relationship with truth, and the difference between the metaphysical and the man-made, the perceptual and the conceptual. I really don't regard anyone as being an objectivist even lower case if they haven't taken these courses. They are essential. The rest is just "I read her novel and loved it."

Yes, isn't it wonderful! This clown really believes what he's saying... He's a Jehova's witness, he only has exchanged Peikoff for Jehova. His choice of words is telling: Peikoff's courses are a revelation, it's pure religion! If only Stephen would listen to those wonderful lectures, he'd no longer say such stupid things. He would then be aware of the Objectivist position on the primacy of existence and the scales would fall from his eyes. Yes, mr Fahy can tell him a thing or two about philosophy, thanks to Peikoff's revelations!

Hilarious that Perigo gets stuck with this kind of ally...

[Daniel Barnes]

This is my favourite Fahy quote from that thread:

Submitted by Casey Fahy on Sun, 2007-07-22 19:51.

"The concept of universe is not "knowledge." It's a bucket for putting knowledge into. The concept of 'universe' philosophically speaking does not tell us anything about the universe -- it merely provides a folder in which everything can be filed. It's the equivalent of a library that excludes nothing and includes everything. It's not physics, it's philosophy"

So, we have it definitively: concepts are not knowledge. What are they, then, I wonder? Surely this claim causes severe difficulties for a so called "Conceptual Theory of Knowledge" for anyone but the most determined hair-splitter. Fortunately it appears Casey is up to the job.

We also learn: The concept "universe" does not tell us anything about the universe. The same, we can presume, for all other concepts.

They merely provide a mental "folder" or "bucket" for filing purposes.

Apparently this amazing epistemological insight stands in complete contrast with the philosophical tradition known as nominalism, in which words are mere mental "labels" for filing purposes.

"Folders" or "buckets" vs "labels". "Labels" vs "buckets" or "folders." Clearly the epochal innovation of this theory of knowledge becomes apparent only to those who have completed Peikoff's extended philosophy courses! You'll never be able to "turn the clock back" to mere "labels" again...

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

I wish you would provide a link. It is very hard to locate Fahy's post over there the way you presented it.

(EDIT: Here is the link.)

I do want to mention something about moral perfection that I see being debated on the thread with Neil. Because of the plagiarism clean-up, I reread "Fact and Value" by Peikoff again. This led to one hell of an integration, which proves to me that the concept of "moral perfection" needs to be chucked out the window in Objectivism. (Or, more specifically, spoken of only within the context of rejecting the Christian view.) There are two points that became very clear to me:

1. Double standard. If, as Peikoff maintains, every fact conceptualized comes with a built-in value judgment, then there is no such thing as knowledge without a moral judgment involved. The proponents of the moral perfection idea (including Peikoff) claim that making an error of knowledge is not the same as making a moral error. But here's the rub. If all knowledge is moral by nature (i.e., contains value judgments), this means that there is no "error of knowledge" without such being a "moral error." How is it that knowledge contains morality for bashing Kelley in "Fact and Value" but does not contain morality for "moral perfection? How's that for a big honking double standard?

2. Original sin. All the moral perfection business amounts to, anyway, is recycling the original sin myth. The main component of morality is volition. According to the moral perfection proponents, we can only become morally perfect by choosing to be so. This means that we are born morally imperfect. According to Objectivism, then, we are literally born in sin.

Salvation, anyone? All we need to do is crucify someone and call him the Son of Rand. Volunteers?

btw - I already covered some of this over a year ago here: Moral Perfection.

Michael

[Roger Bissell]

This is my favourite Fahy quote from that thread:

Submitted by Casey Fahy on Sun, 2007-07-22 19:51.

"The concept of universe is not "knowledge." It's a bucket for putting knowledge into. The concept of 'universe' philosophically speaking does not tell us anything about the universe -- it merely provides a folder in which everything can be filed. It's the equivalent of a library that excludes nothing and includes everything. It's not physics, it's philosophy"

So, we have it definitively: concepts are not knowledge. What are they, then, I wonder? Surely this claim causes severe difficulties for a so called "Conceptual Theory of Knowledge" for anyone but the most determined hair-splitter. Fortunately it appears Casey is up to the job.

We also learn: The concept "universe" does not tell us anything about the universe. The same, we can presume, for all other concepts.

They merely provide a mental "folder" or "bucket" for filing purposes.

Apparently this amazing epistemological insight stands in complete contrast with the philosophical tradition known as nominalism, in which words are mere mental "labels" for filing purposes.

"Folders" or "buckets" vs "labels". "Labels" vs "buckets" or "folders." Clearly the epochal innovation of this theory of knowledge becomes apparent only to those who have completed Peikoff's extended philosophy courses! You'll never be able to "turn the clock back" to mere "labels" again...

Actually (and much as I cringe at the thought of defending the guy), Fahy is essentially correct.

As Rand said in her Epistemology Workshops, "[W]e can't ascribe space or time or a lot of other things to the universe as a whole." Apart from what we learn through scientific discovery, Rand said, there is very little we can ascribe to the universe as such.

The concept of existence or universe is extremely general. Its units are all the things that exist, but as a sum total of those things, you can only ascribe to it the very most general facts, such as its possessing identity and being finite. It includes that, and only that, knowledge; it contains no specific knowledge about the world. That is all Fahy was sloppily trying to say, as I interpret him (with the maximum charity I can muster).

In any case, it is not accurate or just to denigrate Leonard Peikoff's excellent lectures, or the Objectivist theory of concepts, just because of the verbal ineptitude of one of its zealous supporters.

REB

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Roger,

We do agree that "the concept of universe is knowledge" don't we? That's quite an initial allegation Fahy made, claiming that a concept is not knowledge.

I would be most interested in seeing a list of which concepts are not knowledge. According to Rand, all concepts have "a specific definition" (see ITOE, Chapter Two).

How can something have a definition and not be knowledge (in Objectivism)?

Dayaamm!

EDIT: Here is an excellent quote from ITOE (2nd Exp. Ed., Chapter 8, p. 81):

All knowledge is processed knowledge—whether on the sensory, perceptual or conceptual level. An "unprocessed" knowledge would be a knowledge acquired without means of cognition.

So, according to this, in Fahy's view, "the concept of universe" is not processed by a human being on any level at all—sensory, perceptual or conceptual.

The only other knowledge Rand mentions is "implicit knowledge." That's kinda where all hell breaks loose in my own thinking, but still, I can't imagine "universe" being "implicit knowledge" unless it is a synonym for "existence."

Going the other way (micro-level), here is a quote from ITOE, p. 296, which I find extremely pertinent:

And you know what else is crucially important? When you talk about discovering the ultimate constituents of the universe, remember that in order to discover them, no matter by what calculations or by what machinery, you had to bring them to your perceptual level. You would have to say "this particle" is that which acts in such and such a way on subatomic particles, which act in such and such a way on atoms, which act in such and such a way on molecules, and all of that results in a material object such as this glass as distinguished from other material objects such as this ashtray. Unless you bring it back to the perceptual level, it's not knowledge. That is what has to be kept in mind always in speculating about ultimate causes, which have to be discovered by some, at present, unknown means. You still always have to bring it back to your sensory-perceptual level, otherwise it's not knowledge.

This works by boiling discoveries down from the macro level to the perceptual level, also.

And just for the record, here is a more complete quote of the one you gave (ITOE, p. 274):

Prof. B: I would be completely satisfied on this if you could clarify one more thing for me, which is: why call the universe an entity, rather than simply a collection, since it doesn't act as a whole?

AR: Well, you can't really call it an entity in that sense. I don't think the term applies. The universe is really the sum of everything that exists. It isn't an entity in the sense in which you call a table, a chair, or a man an entity.

Actually, do you know what we can ascribe to the universe as such, apart from scientific discovery? Only those fundamentals that we can grasp about existence. Not in the sense of switching contexts and ascribing particular characteristics to the universe, but we can say: since everything possesses identity, the universe possesses identity. Since everything is finite, the universe is finite. But we can't ascribe space or time or a lot of other things to the universe as a whole.

The only way I can understand the meaning of "finite" in this quote by saying "to have identity," i.e., "to be conceivable." In such a definition, it is then possible for space to extend indefinitely and for time to exist for an infinite duration.

As one last thought, I looked up "finite" (ITOE, PP. 195-196)

Prof. E: Every measurement is made within certain specifiable limits of accuracy. There is no such thing as infinity in precision, because you are using some measuring instrument which is calibrated with certain smallest subdivisions. So therefore there is always a plus or minus, within the limits of accuracy of the instrument. And that's inherent in the fact that everything that exists has identity. Now if that's so, you can measure up to any specifiable degree of precision by an appropriately calibrated measuring rod.

If exactness in measurement is defined in such a way that you have to get the last decimal of an infinite series, by that definition no measurement can be exact. The concept of "exact measurement" as such becomes unknowable and meaningless, and therefore what would it mean to say a measurement is inexact? Exactness has to be specified in a human context, involving certain limits of accuracy. Is that valid?

AR: Yes, in a general way. But more than that, isn't there a very simple solution to the problem of accuracy? Which is this: let us say that you cannot go into infinity, but in the finite you can always be absolutely precise simply by saying, for instance: "Its length is no less than one millimeter and no more than two millimeters."

I understand this to mean that it is always possible to measure the finite. I do not understand this to mean the same thing as what Peikoff said in OPAR, p. 31:

Every entity, accordingly, is finite; it is limited in the number of its qualities and in their extent; this applies to the universe as well.

One of the reasons is the word "any." Rand states in ITOE, p.11:

The principle is: the relevant measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity.

Doesn't "any quantity" mean an infinite number of quantities?

(Sorry for the hijack. Back to PARC.)

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

To get back on topic, I did come up with a concept that is not knowledge: PARC.

It is infinite in its awfulness, too.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

Prof. B: I would be completely satisfied on this if you could clarify one more thing for me, which is: why call the universe an entity, rather than simply a collection, since it doesn't act as a whole?

AR: Well, you can't really call it an entity in that sense. I don't think the term applies. The universe is really the sum of everything that exists. It isn't an entity in the sense in which you call a table, a chair, or a man an entity.

Actually, do you know what we can ascribe to the universe as such, apart from scientific discovery? Only those fundamentals that we can grasp about existence. Not in the sense of switching contexts and ascribing particular characteristics to the universe, but we can say: since everything possesses identity, the universe possesses identity. Since everything is finite, the universe is finite.

Huh? Why can't there be infinitely many finite things? A star is a finite thing. How does that imply that there can't be infinitely many stars? Is this Objectivist logic?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

I have trouble with that one, too. A person would have to be omniscient to be able to state that as a concrete fact. That's why I looked for other meanings above.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

I guess the issue for me is:

1) Are concepts knowledge or not? Yes or no? If yes, why should "universe" be any different?

2) If yes, then Casey has got Peikoff wrong - after all his courses and everything. Does anyone have Peikoff saying any different?

[John Dailey]

~ I have to ask: IF it is 'objectively' meaningful to speak of an empirically infinite quantity of stars, then it is so for any existent we have a 'concept' of, no? Like...squirrels, marbles, rabbits, cars, bacteria, and maybe even concepts? I mean, we may know (without certainty about some, of course...like rabbits) that such may be false, now, but, such empirically (metaphysically?) can one day occur, by this reasoning, no?

~ If atoms/quarks or stars are applicable here as meaningully quantifiable in terms of an empirical infinity, then so is everything else.

~ I really don't want to think about an infinite amount of politicians showing up one day in the future.

LLAP

J:D

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

John,

I can think of two objectively meaningful reasons, and both have to do with measurement omission.

The first is metaphysical: it is simply to accept the fact that we don't know what we don't know and that whatever is out there is out there. Our only means of validating what we do know is by direct observation and there is no way to directly validate something like a finite number of stars.

The second is epistemological: we accept the concept of infinity so can construct a concept. If the principle is "the relevant measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity," why would that measurement omission principle not pertain to the number of stars?

Is infinity merely a cognitive game we use for convenience, the way logical positivists claim that words are, or is infinity present in our minds as a cognitive tool because it actually exists and the concept corresponds to reality?

From what I have read so far, Rand and Peikoff are claiming the first for the concept of "universe," but the second for everything else. I claim the second for everything.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Oh my God Oh my God Oh my God Oh my God Oh my God Oh my God!!!!!

LOLOLOLOLOL...

I had forgotten.

Look at Jon Letendre's post here. But for the benefit of those who do not want to click on links, let's rewind to October 5, 2005 on SoloHQ.

Post 31 - October 5, 2005

Casey,

I would be much obliged if you would make a post saying that you are morally perfect. ‘My name is Casey Fahy, and I have attained absolute moral perfection,’ would do. I am embarrassed a little at making this request as I can’t explain very well why I would like to see it, except that in post 21 you note that “Absolute moral perfection is EASY to human beings […]” and it occurs to me that I have never seen one who advocates for this come out and say it of themselves. Would you do that for me?

Post 34 - October 5, 2005

... YUP. ...

Post 38 - October 5, 2005

I can confirm Casey's testimony. He is morally perfect -- and then some!

Dayaamm!

Houston, we have a problem...

Michael

[Robert Campbell]

Roger,

I think you are going way too easy on Mr. Fahy.

The concept of existence or universe is extremely general. Its units are all the things that exist, but as a sum total of those things, you can only ascribe to it the very most general facts, such as its possessing identity and being finite. It includes that, and only that, knowledge; it contains no specific knowledge about the world. That is all Fahy was sloppily trying to say, as I interpret him (with the maximum charity I can muster).

First of all, on that same thread Mr. Fahy failed to distinguish between our universe-concept and its referent or referents. (By the way, how many units does our universe-concept have? Since there is just one sum total of everything that exists, how can 'universe' even qualify as a concept under Rand's theory? Can a concept have just one unit?)

Second, he claimed that our universe-concept does not constitute knowledge of anything. In Rand and Peikoff's view, that is equivalent to saying that our axiomatic concept of 'existence' does not constitute knowledge of anything!

I have a further difficulty with what Dr. Peikoff actually said, as opposed to Mr. Fahy's incompetent rendering of it.

If it is up to physics and not philosophy to specify nearly all of the properties of the universe, why didn't Ayn Rand make a parallel move with the concept of "mind" or "consciousness"? Why didn't she say that philosophy can tell us very little about consciousness (except that it exists, it has an identity, it perceives existence, it doesn't make existence happen all by itself...) and everything else will have to be supplied by psychology?

Robert Campbell

PS. Messrs. Valliant and Fahy continue to make their incredible assertions about moral perfection over at SOLOP, while dodging Neil's questions. Among other things, they seem to have forgotten that in her article on "Extremism," Ayn Rand claimed that every "anti-concept" was hatched deliberately, and that in OPAR, Dr. Peikoff insinuates that every arbitrary assertion is intentionally perpetrated (making it the product of conscious evil). They have also forgotten the, um, er, expansive view of breaches of morality taken in a little essay titled "Fact and Value."

[Brant Gaede]

I wonder why Casey keeps referring to Rand when you can't understand Objectivism just by reference to her according to him.

--Brant

[Roger Bissell]

Robert, I concede your point about Fahy. Nuff said.

As for the concept of "the universe" or "Existence," I agree that the standard Randian treatment is not adequate. And I confess that I completely glossed over the problem in my comments, and I would now like to take the opportunity to share some thoughts I have developed over the past 10 years.

It is standard in epistemology (and not just by Objectivists) to claim that we can only form concepts of universals, such as man or red or rationality -- and not of particulars, such as Ayn Rand or Mars or the color of my automobile.

Since particulars include not only individual particulars such as Ayn Rand, but also collectives of particulars, such as the U.S. Congress or Existence (the universe), this would mean that there cannot be a concept of Existence or the universe.

Rand claims that the units of Existence are all the things that ever existed, do now exist, and will exist in the future. This is not correct.

Existence or the universe is a "sum total," a collective, comprising all those things as individuals. Not as units, but as members of the sum total.

Rand was apparently confusing "Existence" with "existent." The units of "existent" are all those things she said were units of "Existence."

There ~is~ a way we can treat speak intelligibly of the units of "Existence," but only if we first figure out a way to get beyond this sum total of particulars and identify a ~group~ of such sum totals.

We can do this by expanding the idea of what a concept is to include not only universals, but also particulars. In other words, metaphorically, we acknowledge that our "file folder" for Ayn Rand at time 1, time 2, time 3, etc. works very much like a conceptual file folder -- enough so that the concept of "Ayn Rand" makes sense, at least by analogy. The units of the concept "Ayn Rand" would, of course, be Ayn Rand at time 1, time 2, time 3, etc.

Similarly, we can look at the universe or Existence with the aid of a file folder. Following Rand, we can see that Existence always (i.e., at any point in time) has a past, present, and future. It is ~partititioned~ into three temporal parts. And that partitition contains different particular individuals in each of the three sections at each point in time. Which gives us a way to treat the universe at each of these different points of time as units of the concept "the universe" or "Existence."

But ~only~ if we can treat individual particulars and collectives (sum totals) of particulars in this way can we toss around the concept of "Existence" or "the universe." If "Ayn Rand" is not a concept, then neither is "the universe" or "Existence." (Though "existent", which is a universal not a particular, is still a concept. And Rand's chapter on axiomatic concepts should be re-written or at least re-read with that in mind.)

REB

[Daniel Barnes]

Robert:

I think (Roger is) going way too easy on Mr. Fahy..

I agree.

ISince there is just one sum total of everything that exists, how can 'universe' even qualify as a concept under Rand's theory? Can a concept have just one unit?

Rand's theory that you need "two-or-more" units to form a concept is a fundamental absurdity in her system. Further, I believe it is even an empirically testable claim, and would almost certainly fail such a test. (Amusingly, a few years back when I offered a couple of possible experiments which would test Rand's theory, I was told by one Soloist that I was being a "rationalist"...;-))

Second, he claimed that our universe-concept does not constitute knowledge of anything. In Rand and Peikoff's view, that is equivalent to saying that our axiomatic concept of 'existence' does not constitute knowledge of anything!

I have a further difficulty with what Dr. Peikoff actually said, as opposed to Mr. Fahy's incompetent rendering of it.

If it is up to physics and not philosophy to specify nearly all of the properties of the universe, why didn't Ayn Rand make a parallel move with the concept of "mind" or "consciousness"? Why didn't she say that philosophy can tell us very little about consciousness (except that it exists, it has an identity, it perceives existence, it doesn't make existence happen all by itself...) and everything else will have to be supplied by psychology?

I agree with everything you are saying here Robert, and woudl extend it. Fahy's claim that concepts are not knowledge destroys Rand's theory utterly. Because if he's right, and philosophy can tell us nothing about consciousness other than it exists and has identity, then it can't tell us anything about men, or stars, or plants, or atoms, or bubblegum either, other than they exist, and haveidentity. Everything else will be supplied by anthropology, astronomy, biology, physics, and chemistry respectively.

All that's left for philosophy to do is restate the Law of Identity over and over again. How useful this role is is debatable, but at any rate we can hardly call the LOI Ayn Rand's invention. (Incidentally, this problem may be deeply rooted. I have already analysed Rand's theory of the initial stages of concept formation from the ITOE. It turns out that her theory violates the LOI; and where it doesn't violate it, merely restates it)

PS. Messrs. Valliant and Fahy continue to make their incredible assertions about moral perfection over at SOLOP, while dodging Neil's questions.

The key point they have to dodge is as follows: if Casey Fahy is morally perfect, then logically he is the moral equal of Ayn Rand herself. Because, of course, one cannot be better than perfect. But then how can Rand be the millenial moral exemplar they wish to install at the apex of the Objectivist system if she is morally no better than Casey Fahy? She cannot be.

Therefore I predict Fahy will never answer Neil's question...;-)

Edited August 6, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Brant Gaede]

The key point they have to dodge is as follows: if Casey Fahy is morally perfect, then logically he is the moral equal of Ayn Rand herself. Because, of course, one cannot be better than perfect. But then how can Rand be the millenial moral exemplar they wish to install at the apex of the Objectivist system if she is morally no better than Casey Fahy? She cannot be.

Well, there is more to morality than this. Ayn Rand gets big points for writing Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead. She gets big points for a stunningly heroic life. That George Washington may have chopped down a cherry tree doesn't match up too well against "Father of the Country." If he did, though, he wasn't "morally perfect." Hence, the inherent stupidity in the concept which denies human dynamism, achievement, fallibility in place of a static, frozen view of humanity and oneself. That is kowtowing to appearances and is secondhandism or social metaphysicianism--posing as Ayn Rand (or whomever) instead of being Ayn Rand (or whomever). I want also to point out that if "moral perfection" is "easy" then being morally perfect is hardly heroic. Hence Casey says "Yup" to the question of whether he is. This denigrates Ayn Rand to the core.

These people are hung up on "moral perfection" out of stupidity, hubris, ignorance and lack of individuation as people from Ayn Rand and her philosophy. Since Rand herself was also apparently hung up on it too to some extent, these folks are her logical heirs. But to be a true heir of Ayn Rand means being an individual and living a life of integrity--growing up and growing out.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The key point they have to dodge is as follows: if Casey Fahy is morally perfect, then logically he is the moral equal of Ayn Rand herself.

Daniel,

I fear this is not accurate, at least according to Valliant. According to him, Rand is only morally perfect, but Fahy is... er... ahem... he... that is... Fahy... (tears of laughter are starting to stream down)... he is... he is... he is...

"He is morally perfect -- and then some!"

That makes him equal to Rand, "and then some!"

(Sorry to correct you. Normative abstractions and all that... )

Michael

[Neil Parille]

Dan,

Rand's theory that you need "two-or-more" units to form a concept is a fundamental absurdity in her system. Further, I believe it is even an empirically testable claim, and would almost certainly fail such a test.

Rand is quite emphatic about this. On page 148 of ITOE, she says the concept of a monotheistic God is "invalid" because by definition you couldn't have the requisite 2 gods to to serve as "concretes."

Edited August 6, 2007 by Neil Parille

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

>(Sorry to correct you. Normative abstractions and all that... )

Yes, all true Objectivists are morally perfect, but some are more perfecterer than others...