The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy

[Kat]

There seems to have been a bit of a misunderstanding of OL's position on Dragonfly's critique of Peikoff's work. I personally have not spent a lot of time studying the technicalities of metaphysics and epistemology and do not generally debate such issues. My silence is neither a condemnation nor an endorsement of what is being said on either end. I simply have not explored the topic deeply enough to speak about it intelligently.

I do realize, however, that some of Dragonfly's personal views conflict with Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology. He has proven himself time and time again to be a knowledgable and intellectually honest person and a worthy opponent to debate such topics with. He has certainly earned my respect and admiration. I know the discussions have helped me in my own understanding. To paraphrase Voltaire, I may not agree with everything you say, but I will defend your right to say it on OL. I also wish to commend Michael, Roger, Paul, Jenna, Phil, Marsha, Ellen, Dragonfly and many others for their good sportmanslike conduct in the more technical discussions. Roger gets the first hug ((hug))

When we opened up Objectivist Living, I wanted to be sure that an outline of Objectivist philosphy was posted clearly so that people would be familiar with the Objectivist perspective. We have a section of OL called Objectivist Philosophy where The Objectivist Center has graciously let us reproduce their summaries of the philosophy. All of us here are either consider ourselves Objectivists or are in agreement with many Objectivist ideas, although we each have our own unique point of view and speak for ourselves as individuals. We are a group of rational thinking individuals not a group-think-tank. (In answer to the unasked question... Michael and I both consider ourselves to be Objectivists.)

Chewing on Ideas is a section of OL where ideas that fall outside the realm of traditional Objectivism may be presented and discussed. I personally think it is one of the cool places in OL. We encourage a free and open exchange of ideas and perspectives. We push the limits of rational thought. It is a place for checking our premises and expanding our understanding and exploration of other ideas.

IMHO If Objectivism is so fragile that it cannot stand up to valid criticism or opposing viewpoints, we need to take a look and try to address the issues in a constructive manner.

Kat

[Dragonfly]

I found the post on the So-Low Bashin' forum (as Roger calls it elsewhere) rather amusing. Take the title: "OL Writer Explicitly Embraces Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy", as if some terrible sin is committed here, OL must be really a cesspool that they allow such blasphemy! For every Objectivist should know that when Peikoff hath spoken, the last word has been said about this topic.

I do think that Cal erroneously presents himself as well-schooled in the field of epistemology.

Interesting, how does he know how well-schooled I am in the field of epistemology? Now I won't pretend that I'm well-schooled in the field of epistemology, but I know a lousy argument when I see one, even if it's made by - gasp! - Peikoff himself. I've heard now from several people that they can easily refute my critique. Well, what stops them? I'm waiting breathlessly. The attempts so far I've found hardly impressive, to put it mildly.

[Kat]

Dayaammm Dragonfly, I thought you got squished in the last round!

You seem to be saying that you want to go a few more rounds in this discussion. You don't wear down as easily as your opponents, do you? Bill stomped you, Roger kicks your ass practically every day and still you refuse to give up. You just keep buzzing about. You'll never win against Objectivists! NEVER!

Any more takers? Bring it on! :D/

Kat

[dan_edge]

One must keep in mind that Peikoff's Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy (A-S-D) is entirely based on ideas presented in Intro to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE). A thourough, technical understanding of ITOE is critical in understanding Peikoff's essay. A-S-D is completely consistent with ITOE, and a critique of the former implies a critique of the latter. I consider this matter so important because Cal's essay was not just an attack on Peikoff, but an attack on Rand and the foundation of Objectivist principle.

Cal writes:

>>This [the open ended nature of concepts] is indeed a crucial part of his argument, as there otherwise would be always room for doubt, which is incompatible with an analytic deduction.

This is the most important part of Cal's essay, the source of his misinterpretation of Objectivist Epistemology. A clearer presentation of the nature of truth and doubt is in order. Contrary to popular misconception, Objectivism does not accept the correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theory states that proposition 'X' is true if it is always true, regardless of context. I call this the "omniscient standard" of truth. If one accepts this standard, then truth and certainty are impossible to attain, because man's knowledge is always contextual.

Rand's revolutionary idea is that one can define truth in absolute terms within a specified context of knowledge. Truth is the recognition of a relationship between perceptions and concepts within one's context of knowledge. This is why the open-ended nature of concepts is so critical.

For example, Newton's Law of Motion were true when he discovered them, and will always be true, given his context of knowledge. Einstein did not contradict Newton, he merely added to the body of knowledge subsumed under the same concepts. Understanding Einsteinian Physics would be impossible without first grasping Newtonian Physics. Now, imagine if we did not preserve an open-ended method of using concepts. Einstein could not have assumed that Newton's Laws dealt with the same category of referents that he was dealing with hundreds of years later. Einstein would have had to start over from the beginning.

Concepts refer to the same category of referents no matter how much we know about the nature of those referents. This allows for an ever-expanding body of knowledge with regard to a specific set of entities.

Now, to state that concepts refer to all characteristics of an entity, including those not yet discovered, does not imply an omniscient standard of truth. Whenever we make a statement about an entity, the ever-present preamble remains: "Within the context of my knowledge, 'X' is true."

Using concepts as open-ended, we attach all sorts of ideas and knowledge to any given concept. Not all of this information will be included in the definition, because the function of definitions is not to present all the known information about a concept. A definition only states the epistemologically essential characteristics of a concept that separate it from other concepts. It is a handy organizational tool for those with a limited capacity for focal awareness. (To be clear, Peikoff never wrote nor implied, as Cal suggests, that a concept is interchangeable with its definition.)

So, we have: 1) a concept which refers to a specified set of entities (or characteristics of entities, actions of entities, etc.), 2) a definition for this concept which distinguishes it from other concepts, and 3) a body of knowledge related to that concept. None of these things should be confused or equated with the other.

Now, let us return to the "ice" example. The fact that ice floats in water is not contained in the definition of "ice," but it is factual, evidence-based information about ice related to the concept. Before I read Cal's essay, I did not know that there were forms of solid water that didn't float, and I had no evidence contradicting the statement "ice floats in water." Therefore, I would be justified in making the statement: "Within the context of my knowledge, ice floats in water." Were I to assert otherwise, I would be contradicting my current understanding of the concept "ice."

Now, since Cal has educated me further about ice, and has informed me that not all ice floats, I must integrate this information with the rest of my knowledge. The additional evidence with which Cal has provided me does not contradict my former statement "Within my context of knowledge, ice floats" because my context was narrower at that time. If I refused to integrate this new information into my understanding of ice, then I would be contradicting myself, but not before.

Also, note that I have maintained an open-ended perspective on the nature of concepts. Just because I have learned that some ice sinks does not mean that I was not subsuming sinking ice in my previous usage of the concept "ice". My use of the concept did include that form of ice, I was simply unaware of some characteristic of it. I can and will still apply everything else I know about ice to sinking ice, excluding the fact that it sinks. For instance, I can still assume that it is made up of water, H2O, it would nourish my body, etc. (Though, to some degree I would need to investigate the reason why this form of ice floats before I could confidently apply all the other things I know about ice to this new form.)

One more note about definitions: they can not be formed arbitrarily, as Cal states. Again, a definition describes the epistemologically essential characteristics of a concept that separate it from all other concepts. We would not define "man" as the "blue's playing animal," even though men are the only entities that play the blues. The fact that man plays the blues does not give us clear, concise, essential information about man that separates him from other animals. If we formed concepts this way, we could never keep our shit straight for the long term. Read the "definitions" chapter in ITOE for more information.

In fact, Cal, I *highly* recommend that you read ITOE (or re-read it) with a special focus on the nature of definitions and the open-ended nature of concepts. I think you will find that each trip through the ITOE is a fruitful one, especially if you are focused on something specific.

Thanks for reading,

--Dan Edge

[JennaW]

Your article is receiving attention elsewhere.

I replied on that. I said if he disagree with DF/Cal, he should directly disagree. And I notice that he did, so, good! I'm just not too keen on the act of posting on another forum to complain about someone else on this forum (or any other forums). I will leave it up to others to understand why I would say that. I prefer to directly disagree, and notice-- within myself-- the difference between intellectual disagreement and emotional reaction. I would also caution on knowing the difference between one's own thoughts and regurgitation.

As for me personally, I just think if you can learn something from someone's disagreement about a particular matter, such as ice, I'm all the more happy for it. It's not going to personally bother me if Oist epistemology is challenged. I'm too secure in myself for that. In fact, I like being challenged-- it is painful-- but the rewards are great. For me to validly consider picking up Oism or any other guideline, in my eyes it should-- it must-- be challenged to the utmost extent to see how strong it is. If I had done that with the Bible, I would never have had those wretched 9 months.

However, I disagree with any attempts for anyone to state that their context of knowledge should also be mine. My context of knowledge of art is different, as is my context of knowledge of the brain, mind, consciousness, cognition, perception, conceptualization process, etc. As I said on SOLO, I don't expect anyone to already know this; however I do expect a certain respect for expertise, even if the person listening doesn't agree. If they disagree, I expect them to have done *some* intellectually honest, reality-based research on it so that the conversation doesn't become yet another creationist/evolution "debate".

It's just personal responsibility for one's self and mind, I think.

[JennaW]

Any more takers?  Bring it on!

Well that's why I was happy to see DF here. He's a challenger, and not afraid to stand up for it. My emotional life is not contingent on whether Rand or Peikoff is proven wrong or right; I have plenty of resources outside of that to integrate into my life to make my life my own. I find this discussion fun, educational, exciting, and what one's mind should *really* do-- think, be challenged, and think some more. I think things gain strength from being challenged. Why shouldn't it be true of a philosophy?

[JennaW]

The fact that man plays the blues does not give us clear, concise, essential information about man that separates him from other animals. If we formed concepts this way, we could never keep our shit straight for the long term. Read the "definitions" chapter in ITOE for more information.

Per post-Rand research in cognition, the formation of concepts includes a "similarity" (simple similarity-based pattern recognition) approach as well.

This info is from The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, ed. by Holyoak and Morrison.

And also per other research, humans are not born tabula rasa. I doubt the majority of people still thinks this though, but it comes up in nature/nurture debates (and I also doubt that anyone really thinks it's either nature or nurture anymore in this day and age).

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dan,

I'm going to get into the meat of this by rereading everything first. I'm just taking a little time out right now to welcome you to my home. I'm glad to see you here.

I have read your posts on Solo and Jenna's interpretation of my intention is correct. I probably wasn't as clear as I could have been.

You are free to ask me anything you may doubt about my posts. (Incredibly, sometimes I write in haste and am unclear - and even more incredibly, sometimes I am even wrong. Now sit down for this one. Most incredibly of all, sometimes I am still grappling with an issue and don't have all the answers. Dayaamm! Ain't life a bitch? Life used to be simpler back when I knew everything.)

I'm pretty sure we will be able to come an understanding as you appear to be coming in a spirit of reason and goodwill. I'll get back later on all this.

Michael

PS - I really don't want to do epistemology right now (my "sob stories" and an essay on the Brandens call), but I'll at least lay down some of my basic thoughts a little clearer for you.

PPS - Thanks a lot for looking correctly at my thoughts, Jenna. On reading over some of your posts, it is clear that you are developing quite a healthy anti-cult mentality. That a REALLY GOOD thing.

[JennaW]

A thourough, technical understanding of ITOE is critical in understanding Peikoff's essay.  A-S-D is completely consistent with ITOE, and a critique of the former implies a critique of the latter.

Only if you think of ITOE ---> A-S-D as a linear procession. For those who not only think linearly, but also are able to dimensionalize comprehension and conceptualization, in comparison with reality, a critique of one is *not* a critique of the other. Reality is too complex and dynamic for the all-or-none mentality; hence, the existence of different perspectives.

I consider this matter so important because Cal's essay was not just an attack on Peikoff, but an attack on Rand and the foundation of Objectivist principle.

A critique is not an attack.

I agree that a concept should be open-ended, and I also agree that any epistemology (or other parts) should be critiqued from particular all the way up to complex. The only people who fear critique are the ones who have something to lose, and that situation is an entirely different story.

As for science, if it can be critiqued by philosophers, then by golly why not have scientists critique philosophy? Judge and be judged.

[JennaW]

Thanks a lot for looking correctly at my thoughts, Jenna. On reading over some of your posts, it is clear that you are developing quite a healthy anti-cult mentality. That a REALLY GOOD thing.

I'm glad I was correct in my interpretation. In my head I was thinking, "Well, if I'm wrong, I'm wrong. That'll be cool, and it'll help me understand MSK's writing style better."

Cult: I know for sure that I'm explicitly against cults-- *any* cult, *any* cultish behavior, *any* cultish thought, *any* behavior that shuns or shuts off the critically thinking person. I don't usually take extremist paths, nor consider the entirety of my life by ONLY extreme absolutes, but one of those absolutes is that I hate any hint of thought control, in any form. I'm so utterly a freethinker that it might be funny. I may not be vocal about it, but I certainly don't like the "memorize-checkBible-regurgitate" method of thinking. I can elucidate on it, but I think I might save it for an article I am highly aware of my bias, and my behavior, and my reactions to cultish behavior. I know I may be too sensitive to it, so thus I temper myself with caveats (context!). But most of this is internal and quite automatic by now... as with most things, thought takes practice and honing.

[Jody Gomez]

Dan-

I haven't even followed this thread closely, but I just caught wind of what went on over at SoloP, and here, and I'm glad you decided to come here to debate the issue, rather than bash. Your posts have always seemed well reasoned to me, and I hope you'll hang out and maybe discuss some other issues with us. We're truly not trying to secretly destroy objectivism over here, we're trying to live it. I've been wrong on certain issues, I heard MSK was wrong one time ;) , Barbara...even Rand. What though, is to be made of a world of despicable intolerance that would not allow us the freedom to think for ourselves, and all of the mistakes that will follow with that freedom? Good to see you here, and you have to admit, we must be doing something over here, given the rampant voyeurism people are practicing and spouting off about regarding this site.

[L W HALL]

JennaW said:

And also per other research, humans are not born tabula rasa. I doubt the majority of people still thinks this though, but it comes up in nature/nurture debates (and I also doubt that anyone really thinks it's either nature or nurture anymore in this day and age).

I do not wish to hi-jack this thread in any way, but the argument for and against tabula rasa has always been an interesting one to me. Since you are on the cutting edge of new discoveries in these fields I would find it interesting if sometime in the future you could start a separate thread setting forth your beliefs on why you do not hold with the pro tabula rasa crowd.

L W

[Roger Bissell]

I should say a little more about my comments above in re this discussion, especially since there has been some overlap between this discussion group and another one.

1. In stating my disagreement with Dragonfly over the issues of axioms and the Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy, I am simply doing what I should have done to start with, but neglected to do until Dan's suggestion hit home with me. No one is manipulating me, and I am not importing a suggestion made in another group to the detriment of this group. My statement was good for me, and it's good for O-L to know that this is where I stand.

2. I am not espousing a Randian Loyalist/Dogmatist position about these issues. I simply call them as I see them. I think most O-L members know this already. Let me give two contrasting examples. First, the Objectivist theory of free will has NEVER made complete sense to me, and Bill Dwyer's critique of Nathaniel Branden's version in The Personalist back in the early 1970s made perfect sense to me, and I have been a Compatibilist ever since. (Bill has written more recently on this in a review of Tibor Machan's free will book in the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies.) I understand that many Objectivists would take this as decisive in my not qualifying as a bona fide Objectivist. (Though I have been amazed, in listening to Peikoff's 1983 lectures on Understanding Objectivism, to hear him referring to Rationalist Objectivists, Empiricist Objectivists, etc. -- and I wonder why there couldn't be a similar category for Determinist Objectivists or Compatibilist Objectivists.) However, my position on free will/determinism flows from my understanding and acceptance of the Objectivist axioms as applied to the causality of human action. Although Dragonfly is also a Compatibilist, I would assume that he is one for different reasons, perhaps more along the lines of Daniel Dennett's arguments in Elbow Room and later books. Second, by way of contrast, the Objectivist theory of axioms and Peikoff's essay on the A-S-D have both always made perfect sense to me, and I have seen a lot of challenges to them crash and burn. I have also seen any number of attempts by some Objectivists to try to legislate the positive content of physical theories and psychological theories by performing various contortions with the axioms, and I am not surprised to hear that Dragonfly has been mistreated by some of them in discussions. The most authoritative stand on the relation of axioms to science is that they serve as part of the cognitive framework for what ideas are not acceptable, because they are contradictory. In other words, as Peikoff has said, the Law of Identity (and its corollaries) has "negative veto power." It can't say what a scientific theory MUST contain, but it can say what a scientific theory MUST NOT contain (namely, contradictions). Since David Harriman is currently working on two books relating philosophy (and axioms) to science, it won't be much longer before we find out if the "official Objectivists" have gotten it right -- or whether they are mired in dogmatic confusion, as Dragonfly suspects. As for the A-S-D, I am going to have to let Bill Dwyer or someone else carry the ball; though I am still waiting for a report about whether Peikoff's doctoral thesis contained any kind of acknowledgement of Quine's priority on the A-S-D. (That latter question raises the issue of intellectual honesty, not just at the time Peikoff penned the essay in the mid-60s, but to this day. Which is fair enough, considering that the Brandens are still being scourged for dishonesties supposedly committed in the 60s that they have not yet acknowledged.)

3. In drawing back from the debate, I am not signalling some kind of disapproval of Dragonfly as a person or of his challenging Objectivism in regard to certain issues. As I noted above, I challenge some of its tenets, too, and I don't think there is anything wrong with doing so respectfully and rationally. Nor do I think there is any excuse for the mistreatment that he and I and others have received from the Loyalists. (One rather authoritarian, Argument-from-Intimidation brandisher referred to Compatibilism as "beyond stupid." Nice.) I just don't have the time and energy to adequately engage Dragonfly on these issues, and I don't want my silence to suggest that I agree with his challenges to Objectivism on these issues. If there were several more of me, I could jump in on all the issues that I disagree with or think need clarifying. But since there's just one of me, I have to choose my issues and let the others go -- but with some kind of notice registering my disagreement. So, if I have come across to anyone as being condescending or aloof, be assured that I don't consider myself too good for any discussion, just too busy. <sigh>

Best to all,

REB

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dan,

I finally reread Dragonfly's article and read your post, but I did not yet reread Peikoff's essay. I came to the conclusion that we are all talking about the same thing, but using different words - or slightly different meanings for words. Here are some initial thoughts (slightly modified) that I included in an email to Roger just now.

Dragonfly wrote this for example:

We can only derive conclusions from a concept that subsumes all the current knowledge about the subject.

You write about concepts being contextual.

You are both saying the same thing here, but you use a different nuance for the word "concept."

As I read it, you refer to "concept" as meaning some kind of plastic and flexible intellectual container that will exist for all time (so long as there are human beings and knowledge has not been destroyed), being able to be added to and changed by empirical evidence.

Dragonfly refers to "concept" as meaning its current contextual form, and that once it is changed by empirical evidence, it becomes a slightly different concept.

You would say that the concept was added to and that the context changed. Dragonfly would say that both the concept and the context changed.

They both mean the same thing and all this is boiling down to is semantics.

All Dragonfly wants to do is stress the need for hands-on experiments, not just armchair deductions. Deducting things from principles is a good way to set goals and postulate strong probabilities. I don't think Dragonfly disagrees with this. But then actual verification in reality also has to occur for this to become solid knowledge. I don't think you disagree with that. (Am I wrong about your thoughts?) If knowledge cannot bear up to the reality test, it is mere conjecture. That is pretty obvious to me.

I will get to Peikoff at another time.

Going to the phrase you had trouble with in my post, I stated clearly that concepts are open-ended. The part after the "but" meant that in one respect, the basic structure of a concept will remain the same with an alteration (even a drastic one that changes part of its basic structure). However, its form in a particular context does not include unknown knowledge. At that stage it only includes the possibility of knowledge being added to it - not the actual knowledge since that knowledge does not yet exist in human minds. The reality to be learned is still out there, but it is not knowldege yet. (However, we agree that a concept does include all referents with the same defining characteristics - with "all" meaning minus measurements as this is a fundamental part of a concept.)

We should actually use two different terms for these things. Maybe "concept" (for the mental container only, being that it can change - even drastically - over time) and "knowledge" (for the container plus verification) or something like that.

Some concepts have become so different over the years, though, that it is hard for us to imagine them in their primitive form. Lightening before the discovery of electricity would be a good example. Electricity became added and the gods were eliminated from the concept. The phenomenon didn't change, yet I would say that the concept of what it is suffered a drastic change over the centuries.

Once you agree on what words you wish to use for "concept" and its nuances (like context and empirical verification) - and make the meaning of those words explicit, then it will be much easier to look at terms like analytic and synthetic and agree about them.

That's all I have time for right now. I hope that made some of my own thinking clearer to you.

Michael

[JennaW]

I do not wish to hi-jack this thread in any way, but the argument for and against tabula rasa has always been an interesting one to me. Since you are on the cutting edge of new discoveries in these fields I would find it interesting if sometime in the future you could start a separate thread setting forth your beliefs on why you do not hold with the pro tabula rasa crowd.

Cutting edge? *grin* I feel like I'm in the middle of the Pacific, at night, no moon, and I'm naked and I don't know how to swim. Oh yeah, no land in sight. If that's what cutting edge feels like... I guess I'm there.

As for blank slate: I don't know who still holds this idea. I've asked non-science folks and most have come to their own conclusion that it's an interaction between nature and nurture.

Here's a site of a father writing about his child's developmental process.

This article is research done where humans are suggested to be "hard-wired" not for speech, but for "detecting aspects of patterns for language".

Interesting in that language can be dissected into "phonemes" (speech sounds), intonation, morphology, syntax, etc. and that some parts of this is related to how music is also as universal in humanity as language, and how we are born to pick up differences/similarities in sounds/intonation. Language has a connection to music this way too (sounds, tones---> music); I've heard plenty enough that Mandarin sounds like singing or like birds. To bring this type of study to the brain's physical function is within the realm of Neurolinguistics.

[Eudaimonist]

As for blank slate: I don't know who still holds this idea. I've asked non-science folks and most have come to their own conclusion that it's an interaction between nature and nurture.

Perhaps this discussion should have a topic of its own, but doesn't the idea of tabula rasa really mean that we are born without conceptual knowledge (based on the view that all concepts must be formed through a process of thought), not a lack of "hard-wiring" that allows one to learn languages, for instance. Our natural ability to quickly pick up languages when we are young isn't a form of conceptual knowledge -- it's a "first nature" ability, where the language is something we acquire "second nature". Conceptual knowledge is also something acquired "second nature".

[Dragonfly]

Dan:

This is the most important part of Cal's essay, the source of his misinterpretation of Objectivist Epistemology. A clearer presentation of the nature of truth and doubt is in order. Contrary to popular misconception, Objectivism does not accept the correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theory states that proposition 'X' is true if it is always true, regardless of context. I call this the "omniscient standard" of truth. If one accepts this standard, then truth and certainty are impossible to attain, because man's knowledge is always contextual.

Such a truth that depends on the context is now what we call a 'synthetic truth'. It corresponds to our best knowledge that we have about the concept, but we don't know whether it will be always true. However, there exist also statements that do not depend on the context, like 2 + 2 = 4. Such statements will be always true, as the negation of the statement will lead to a contradiction. And that is what we call an 'analytical truth'.

Rand's revolutionary idea is that one can define truth in absolute terms within a specified context of knowledge. Truth is the recognition of a relationship between perceptions and concepts within one's context of knowledge. This is why the open-ended nature of concepts is so critical.

I don't see what's so revolutionary about that. Scientists do the same when they make statements about the world. That knowledge is 'contextual' is saying no more that all knowledge about the real world is tentative, which no scientist will deny.

For example, Newton's Law of Motion were true when he discovered them, and will always be true, given his context of knowledge. Einstein did not contradict Newton, he merely added to the body of knowledge subsumed under the same concepts.

But Einstein did contradict Newton; for example Newton's assumption that gravitation works by instantaneous action was shown to be wrong, as was his notion of an absolute time. That doesn't mean that Newton's theory won't work in practice, as long as we consider speeds that are very small compared to the speed of light and gravitational fields that are relatively weak, but we know now that Newton's equations are an approximation of Einstein's equations, which may work well in some circumstances, but which give the wrong answers in other circumstances.

Concepts refer to the same category of referents no matter how much we know about the nature of those referents. This allows for an ever-expanding body of knowledge with regard to a specific set of entities.  

Now, to state that concepts refer to all characteristics of an entity, including those not yet discovered, does not imply an omniscient standard of truth. Whenever we make a statement about an entity, the ever-present preamble remains: "Within the context of my knowledge, 'X' is true."

Then it would be far easier to define a concept as referring to all the current knowledge we have. Then instead of a static, but in principle unknowable concept you have a dynamic and knowable concept, that will evolve in time: it will grow, be adapted and it may even disappear as a valid concept (e.g. phlogiston, N-rays, polywater, orgone). What Peikoff wants to do, however, is to obliterate the distinction between analytical truths and synthetic truths. To that end he tries to show that all truths are analytical truths. He can't do that with the dynamic definition of a concept, as any truth derived from such a concept would be "contextual", i.e. amenable to correction, and therefore certainly not an analytic truth. He therefore tries to circumvent this by saying that a concept not only refers to the current knowledge, but also to all knowledge still to be discovered, implying that by including all future knowledge no corrections will be needed, the truth of statement will follow automatically from the concept. But this is of course an empty statement: we're not omniscient, we have no access to knowledge that is still undiscovered, so we can never say that the truth we derive from our knowledge of a concept will necessarily be true, we can only say that it is within the context of our knowledge true, we can't escape that fact. And that is where Peikoff's argument fails, the distinction between an analytical truth like "2 + 2 = 4" and a synthetic truth like "ice doesn't sink in water" is as sharp as ever.

One more note about definitions: they can not be formed arbitrarily, as Cal states.

I don't know what passage you refer to, but this will no doubt have been a qualified statement, I'm not saying that any definition will do, only that there is nearly always some wriggle room in forming a definition. Look at all the different definitions of "truth", "consciousness", "altruism". Is there always only one possible definition? Even for something simple as water there is not one single correct definition: for example, is heavy water water?

In fact, Cal, I *highly* recommend that you read ITOE (or re-read it) with a special focus on the nature of definitions and the open-ended nature of concepts.

There's no need to do that, I've read those texts often enough and I know what the writers mean and also what's wrong with it.

[dan_edge]

Cal,

RE Newton's Laws: I wrote that Newton's Laws will always be true provided his context of knowledge when he discovered them. Einstein did not contradict the statement "within Newton's context of knowledge, his Laws always hold true." Remember, Objectivism holds that *all* statements made by a human being imply the preamble "within my context of knowledge." Einstein had access to and a comprehension of higher mathematics and better technology. He had a broader context.

RE Concepts: Concepts do not refer to *knowledge* of entities, they refer to the entities themselves. I think this point is critical to our disagreement, but I can't tink of a good way to explain it right now. Maybe later.

RE (2+2=4): I propose a thought exercise. What are the definition and referents of the concept "two?" What are the definition of referents of the concept "equals?" To what *precisely* do these concepts refer to in reality? In answering these questions, one must conclude that these concepts, like all others, are based on an individual's contextual understanding of the world, because all concepts are formed and understood contextually.

--Dan Edge

[Dragonfly]

Dan:

RE Newton's Laws: I wrote that Newton's Laws will always be true provided his context of knowledge when he discovered them. Einstein did not contradict the statement "within Newton's context of knowledge, his Laws always hold true." Remember, Objectivism holds that *all* statements made by a human being imply the preamble "within my context of knowledge." Einstein had access to and a comprehension of higher mathematics and better technology. He had a broader context.

By that criterion you could as well say that the statement that the Earth is flat will always be true within the context of knowledge of the time when this was deemed to be true. I wonder if that is really the Objectivist position.

RE Concepts: Concepts do not refer to *knowledge* of entities, they refer to the entities themselves.

Well, Peikoff writes: "The meaning of a concept consists of the units - the existents - which it integrates, including all the characteristics of these units

If we make statements about a concept it is the knowledge of those characteristics that enables us to assess the veracity of those statements. To borrow an example from Peikoff: we can only say that the statement: "man has two eyes" is true if we know that the characteristic "has two eyes" is part of the concept "man". As the argument in the ASD is about the truth of such statements, the knowledge about the characteristics of a concept is in this case essential.

RE (2+2=4): I propose a thought exercise. What are the definition and referents of the concept "two?" What are the definition of referents of the concept "equals?" To what *precisely* do these concepts refer to in reality? In answering these questions, one must conclude that these concepts, like all others, are based on an individual's contextual understanding of the world, because all concepts are formed and understood contextually.

The point is that the truth of that statement can be validated independently of experience. It can be derived from Peano's axioms (see for example http://www.groupsrv.com/science/viewtopic.php?p=265734). Now the statement may be applied to entities in the real world but it doesn't depend on those entities and it can't be disproved by some empirical finding, it simply follows from the definition of natural numbers and it's therefore an example of an analytical truth.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Following Roger's urging, I reread "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy" by Lenard Peikoff after decades of not looking at it. I see that I will want to do an in-depth report on some implications that I discerned (and verify that my impressions are correct), but for now, here are a few observations.

This essay, in addition to being included in ITOE, but not the first versions, if I remember correctly from my copy with the green stripe on the cover, was first published in The Objectivist, May-September, 1967. That being the case, I wonder what made Rand include it after ITOE was originally published separately from The Objectivist. It was available at the time of the first printing. At any rate, it is to be considered as having had Rand's full sanction, even before it was included in ITOE.

I had forgotten how much bombast there was. The rhetoric is thick as gravy.

Rand drew up a breakdown of the philosophical schools of thought on concepts (from the "Forward to the First Edition" of ITOE):

1. The "extreme realists" or Platonists, who hold that abstractions exist as real entities or archetypes in another dimension of reality and that the concretes we perceive are merely their imperfect reflections, but the concretes evoke the abstractions in our mind. (According to Plato, they do so by evoking the memory of the archetypes which we had known, before birth, in that other dimension.)

2. The "moderate realists," whose ancestor (unfortunately) is Aristotle, who hold that abstractions exist in reality, but they exist only in concretes, in the form of metaphysical essences, and that our concepts refer to these essences.

3. The "nominalists," who hold that all our ideas are only images of concretes, and that abstractions are merely "names" which we give to arbitrary groupings of concretes on the basis of vague resemblances.

4. The "conceptualists," who share the nominalists' view that abstractions have no actual basis in reality, but who hold that concepts exist in our minds as some sort of ideas, not as images.

(There is also the extreme nominalist position, the modern one, which consists of declaring that the problem is a meaningless issue, that "reality" is a meaningless term, that we can never know whether our concepts correspond to anything or not, that our knowledge consists of words—and that words are an arbitrary social convention.)

If you read carefully, you see that Peikoff runs the analytic-synthetic dichotomy through all four (including extreme nominalist, with "conceptualists" obviously being Objectivists), but he only deals with "moderate realists" in passing. (I suspect this was because the ancestor was Artistotle.) He doesn't use Rand's terms, "moderate realists," "extreme realists," "extreme nominalists" and "conceptualists" though.

The thing that bothered me the most was the mix-up between the syntax of logic and statements of fact. An analytic truth seems to be one that follows syntax. A synthetic truth is one where empirical observations vary the concept. I get the feeling that Peikoff dismisses syntax as a parameter outright from philosophical thought. He claims, for example, that since a definition is based on empirical observation and includes much more than the distinguishing characteristics, this invalidates the concept of analytic truth.

But if analytic truth is merely the syntax of logic and not some evil "plague," as Peikoff bombastically claimed, he has set up an enormous strawman. I agree with him that concepts are based on integrating sensory experience (with a qualification about some innate mental propensities I have discussed elsewhere). I do not agree that he properly understood what other philosophers were saying. I need to read some of them, maybe, but Peikoff didn't provide hardly any sources for checking.

Anyway, let's look at definition. Once we agree that a definition is based on distinguishing characteristics (sensory in nature), then claim that the definition of a concept cannot negate those distinguishing characteristics, we have not made a metaphysical statement about the entity the concept refers to (noncontradiction). We did that when we defined the concept. We are merely making a statement regarding the syntax of the logic we use, essentially saying that we cannot define a concept according to essential characteristics and then eliminate or alter those essential characteristics and call that the same definition.

This has nothing to do with knowledge that must be checked by experience (synthetic). And it does not mean that someone is positing that a concept and a definition are the same thing. It merely apples the law of identity (noncontradiction) to the act of defining instead of the entity.

Here is a quote from Peikoff's essay where, apparently, he categorically dismisses the idea of even considering that syntax might be the issue (ITOE, Expanded Second Edition, p. 108):

(Contemporary philosophers prefer to talk about propositions or statements, rather than about facts; they rarely say that facts are contingent, attributing contingency instead to statements about facts. There is nothing to justify this mode of speech, and I shall not adhere to it in discussing their views.)

As I understand it, a fact would be the metaphysical reality irrespective of the form of awareness of it, and the statement about it would be both the metaphysical reality and our epistemological apparatus (thus it would include syntax).

I have to do some thinking about this.

Where Peikoff ruffled Dragonfly's feathers (ahem... do bugs have feathers and can this be proved synthetically? ), is in his absolutely snooty and sarcastic manner of presenting the idea that a concept includes more than the distinguishing characteristics (the definition). He uses the ice floating on water example (pp. 115-116):

Those who attempt to distinguish the "logically" possible and the "empirically" possible commonly maintain that the "logically" impossible is unimaginable or inconceivable, whereas the merely "empirically" impossible is at least imaginable or conceivable, and that this difference supports the distinction. For instance, "ice which is not solid" (a "logical" impossibility) is inconceivable; but "ice which sinks in water" (a merely "empirical" impossibility) is at least conceivable, they claim, even though it does not exist; one need merely visualize a block of ice floating on water, and suddenly plummeting straight to the bottom.

This argument confuses Walt Disney with metaphysics. That a man can project an image or draw an animated cartoon at variance with the facts of reality, does not alter the facts; it does not alter the nature or the potentialities of the entities which exist. An image of ice sinking in water does not alter the nature of ice; it does not constitute evidence that it is possible for ice to sink in water. It is evidence only of man's capacity to engage in fantasy. Fantasy is not a form of cognition.

Further: the fact that man possesses the capacity to fantasize does not mean that the opposite of demonstrated truths is "imaginable" or "conceivable." In a serious, epistemological sense of the word, a man cannot conceive the opposite of a proposition he knows to be true (as apart from propositions dealing with man-made facts). If a proposition asserting a metaphysical fact has been demonstrated to be true, this means that that fact has been demonstrated to be inherent in the identities of the entities in question, and that any alternative to it would require the existence of a contradiction. Only ignorance or evasion can enable a man to attempt to project such an alternative. If a man does not know that a certain fact has been demonstrated, he will not know that its denial involves a contradiction. If a man does know it, but evades his knowledge and drops his full cognitive context, there is no limit to what he can pretend to conceive. But what one can project by means of ignorance or evasion, is philosophically irrelevant. It does not constitute a basis for instituting two separate categories of possibility.

Well, Dragonfly came up with some forms of ice that sink in water. So that is not exactly "Walt Disney," "fantasy," "cartoon," or especially this gem: "Only ignorance or evasion can enable a man to attempt to project such an alternative."

That particular alternative - the one Peikoff was ridiculing with so much gusto - happened to be reality as discovered by scientists (who apparently were "ignorant or evasive").

As I said, I have to do some thinking on all this, but for now, I am very thankful that scientists are not guided by mental straitjackets and that they know enough not to question their logical syntax, but to question everything else.

They know enough about the difference between theory (analytic) and practice (synthetic) to test their theories.

Nothing I said here should be construed to mean my final thoughts on this. There's still a lot of thinking to do.

Michael

[JennaW]

They [scientists] know enough about the difference between theory (analytic) and practice (synthetic) to test their theories.

I think most scientists would know this. I'd find it hard to continue in science and not know the value of each. As I was mentioning to a friend yesterday, philosophers' perspectives on brain, mind, consciousness, and cognition --without empirical evidence-- are mostly, if not all, theoretical.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Regarding the open-endedness of concepts, there is a part in the second edition of ITOE (p. 147) that gives the idea clearly.

Prof. A: Concepts are open-ended in the sense that every new concrete of the same type is to be subsumed under the concept. Can you say anything about the process by which a child moves from a limited group from which he forms the concept to making it open-ended? How does he get beyond the concretes from which he starts?

AR: In order to grasp a concept he has to grasp that it applies to all entities of that particular kind. If he doesn't, he's merely repeating a word. If you ever watch how a child learns to speak, he may first grasp only that "nose" applies to his own nose and, let's say, his mother's. But he hasn't grasped the concept until he can point to any face and say "nose." And that is what children usually do; that is exactly how they learn words. First they have to grasp the word as standing for a particular concrete, then they begin to apply it to other concretes of that kind. Until they have done that, they haven't got it yet. But once they begin to apply the word to new concretes of the same kind, they've made it open-ended.

Prof. A: So to make the classification open-ended is part of the integration itself?

AR: Yes.

Prof. A: To see that there is a kind of thing.

AR: Yes.

To address the addition of unknown knowledge issue, it is clear that my analogy of a concept to a plastic and flexible mental container to put observations into is a valid one. However, where scientists break open new ground is when they discover something that shows that the perceived entity is actually not correctly perceived. At that moment a concept is altered in its essence, not merely added to (further filled out).

Also, the more I think about the syntax issue, the more I think it is the correct manner of understanding what "analytic" means.

Michael

[Roger Bissell]

Mike, you wrote:

To address the addition of unknown knowledge issue, it is clear that my analogy of a concept to a plastic and flexible mental container to put observations into is a valid one. However, where scientists break open new ground is when they discover something that shows that the perceived entity is actually not correctly perceived. At that moment a concept is altered in its essence, not merely added to (further filled out).

Mike, that is way too vague. Could you concretize with at least two examples of what you mean by a "perceived entity" actually not being "correctly perceived"? I'm wracking my brain for examples, and I will have to ask you to help me out.

REB

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Roger,

That's not so hard. I will give one example right off the top of my head, but let me say first that I don't know the history of mineralogical discovery, so I cannot vouch for the concept in terms of mankind's general knowledge, only in the knowledge of individuals as they learn about things. The name of the stuff says it all:

1. Fool's gold - pyrite (and a couple of other minerals at times).

I imagine that there had to been a first time for mankind when this was thought of as gold, but there are many accounts I am aware of where early prospectors did not know about pyrite, thinking that they had found gold, only to discover that another similar mineral existed. At that point, their concept of gold changed. The definition changed in the differentia department and the "entity" perceived and referred to was seen to sometimes be something that was not gold.

The all-inclusive concept became changed to one that had to share its space with another. As its nature was no longer all-inclusive, the concept itself suffered a change. Fool's gold would actually be a warning against indiscriminately including all "unknown knowledge" in the concept of gold.

2. I mentioned earlier the concept of lightning. This is a bit trickier but it is just as valid in terms of the concept itself changing. In order to see the change, it is necessary to try to imagine how nature was perceived in ancient times, when the heavens were the home of the gods. Although the gods were not "perceived" in the modern day sense, manifestations of nature like lightning were seen as the working of them. Lightning was not just a phenomenon. It was the result of an activity of the gods. (Call it a species, in ITOE language). I would say that the genus of the term "lightning" was being incorrectly perceived.

Once the existence of the gods was no longer accepted, phenomena of nature started to become seen as part of "existence" only, with its own laws based on elements and causality. As it became studied, the actual concept changed because the genus defining it changed.

Did that do it?

Michael

[Gregory Browne]

Michael,

Regarding your comment about Fool's Gold

1. Fool's gold - pyrite (and a couple of other minerals at times).

I imagine that there had to been a first time for mankind when this was thought of as gold, but there are many accounts I am aware of where early prospectors did not know about pyrite, thinking that they had found gold, only to discover that another similar mineral existed. At that point, their concept of gold changed. The definition changed in the differentia department and the "entity" perceived and referred to was seen to sometimes be something that was not gold.

The all-inclusive concept became changed to one that had to share its space with another. As its nature was no longer all-inclusive, the concept itself suffered a change. Fool's gold would actually be a warning against indiscriminately including all "unknown knowledge" in the concept of gold.

this example in fact supports Peikoff's position that unknown attributes are part of the concept of gold, since iron pyrite's lack of various properties that gold has but which were once wholly unknown and still are unknown to lay people (or undetectable by them without scientific apparatus), such as gold's atomic number entails that it is not true gold. This very example is used to argue for this point by philosopher Hilary Putnam. He argues against the contrary position, held by John Locke and the Logical Positivists, that only a few superficial attributes which we learn when learn the meaning of the word are essential and necessary: Locke, if I remember right, listed being a metal, yellowness, malleability, and a couple other attributes as the only essential attributes of gold. Well iron pyrite has those attributes, but it is not real gold. To switch an example even closer to everyday life, consider Putnam on water. He asked us to imagine a planet, Twin Earth, very much like Earth, which had on it a material that appeared to be water: it was liquid, it quenched thirst, was tasteless, colorless and odorless, etc. (in the literature it is called "twater). We started to call it "water". But later we did chemical analysis and discovered that it was not H20. So was twater a kind of water? Putnam says "no", and so would Peikoff, Rand, Aristotle and I, whereas the position of Locke and the Logical Positivists (and I would add Hume and Descartes) entails that twater is a kind of water.

Iron pyrite, gold, and water, as well as most chemical and biological kinds, are what I call "Deep Kinds" (Putnam and others call them "natural kinds"). They differ from what I call "Shallow Kinds" (such as those in logic and math, and, I would add, parts of physics and the social sciences) in that there is more to their essence than just what we happened to learn about when we learned how to use the term, more than what we may happen to know at any given time, more than we can put in a short definition (such as Locke's definition of gold). In contrast, in Shallow Kinds (such as triangles and bachelors) there is no more to their essence than that.