Signs Your Objectivist Friend is Calling for Help

[HERTLE]

Signs Your Objectivist Friend is Calling for Help.

Are there signs that have meaning to others that others may

respond to?

Ralph Hertle

[Peter]

2 hours ago, HERTLE said:

Signs Your Objectivist Friend is Calling for Help.

Are there signs that have meaning to others that others may

respond to?

Ralph Hertle

I would drop the word Objectivist from your post and suggest you seek out friends without qualifiers. I remember in my younger days, fresh out of the Army, I was looking for a female objectivist who was also looking for someone like me. It did not turn out well. After a few months I was only looking for women I hit it off with . . . and who liked me. By calling for help from persons with strong rational self interest who are not your friend seems pointless.  

[Peter]

I searched for a thread with Ralph Hertle.

From: Michael Hardy To: atlantis@  Subject: ATL: Re: Pi Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2001 13:02:48 -0400 (EDT)

Anthony Cook wrote: >I learned in Calculus that pi can be expressed as an infinite series derived from the infinite series for arctan(x).

     ... and what follows was some standard stuff.....

 > I'm not sure what the convergence of this series is,

I'm not sure what this means.  The series does converge, and what it converges to is pi.  It converges very slowly, so as a means of computing pi it is very inefficient.

 > but doesn't this seem to indicate that the digits of pi are not random

The answer would seem to turn on the question of what "random" means.

>(unless the question is whether, given all the digits of pi, 1s are likely to be as plentiful as 3s and 9s)?

That they are -likely- to be as plentiful is not what the conjecture on normality says; it says they -are- as plentiful, and similarly any sequence of digits occurs as frequently as other of the same length. The definition of "irrational number" given in the posting that started this thread is one that is frequently seen, and is demonstrably equivalent to the one mathematicians take as standard, but it is NOT the definition that mathematicians take as standard.  That definition says a number is irrational if it cannot be written as m/n, where m and n are integers.  For example 22/7 approximates pi, and 355/113 is a closer approximation, but no such fraction can be exactly pi.

Why not??? I'm amazed that so many people don't ask that question when they post things like what I'm replying to.  Ancient Greeks proved that the square root of 5 and many similar numbers are irrational, but to prove that pi is irrational is subtle enough that it was not done until the middle of the 18th century. Mike Hardy

From: Ralph Hertle <ralph.hertle@verizon.net> To: ATL <atlantis@wetheliving.com> Subject: ATL: Pi vs Existence? Date: Mon, 06 Aug 2001 10:22:02 -0400

Morganis: In what concept of number do you wish the ratio for PI to be expressed, e.g., base n, x^-n, x^n,...? A mathematician friend suggested that the number system of base 37 could work well.

I ask, "Why must PI be expressed in arithmetical terms?" Why shouldn't it be expressed in mathematical terms? I suggest that the ratio of P:C, the logical relationship of the ratio of the Perimeter to the Diameter of a circle, is the most accurate expression of PI that is possible. If a mathematical expression of the relationship is needed, then, the ratio may be expressed as a fraction, P/C. Period.

I believe that the concept of PI is most accurately, rather, is absolutely, expressed as a size ratio relationship of the Perimeter of a circle to the Diameter of the circle. Carrying out the arithmetic calculation of an algorithm to some billions of places of arithmetic decimal digits is akin to the problem of calculating infinity in that one is always required to add, or subtract, or multiply or divide, some standard amount from the extension of the number of the concept that one is dealing with. The infinity advocates strive compulsively for an endless numerical calculation as if they are searching for a reduction to science solution rather than a reduction to existence solution.

Infinity is a phony concept, and it doesn't seem to work in mathematics at all. The purpose of mathematics is to measure existents, their properties, and the relationships between same. Infinity measures nothing at all in the universe. I suggest that the concept of a continuum replace infinity in logic and mathematics. A concept of a continuum actually identifies all Objective existents, and as such, it may be converted in certain contexts to its equivalent terms in mathematics. The concept appears to be needed in Quantum Mechanics, for example.

A continuum refers to the continuity of the existence of, or the properties of, an entity or an existent. The concept of a continuum is a corollary to the Existence and Identity axioms. For example, if you have a geometrical concept of a circle, a radius, and its diameter the properties of those existents exist continually.

The problem with the concept of infinity is that it exists having a limit to its properties, a limit to which one may add or subtract a standard unit thus creating a new limit. Infinity is proclaimed to have no property of a limit, and, in fact, without same it has no properties at all. The property that the advocates of infinity will then claim is that of a continuum of properties, e.g., that one will be able to continue adding or subtracting to the finite length or concept of number that is the original selected length or number. The fall back argument of the infinity advocates is that existents exist having a continuity of properties. But, isn't that the Aristotelian, Euclidean, and Objectivist position on the Existence and Identity Axioms in metaphysics that underlies all true geometry and mathematics!

Existence is continuous, rather than infinite. The symbol I suggest for a continuum is the following design:

     A circle with a single radius line that starts from

     the center of the circle, and which extends horizontally

     to the right to touch the perimeter line of the circle.

     The overall shape resembles a letter "c".

The two concepts, infinity, and continuum, require definitions. The definitions may then be proved or not proved.

A Platonist will say, "But a continuum cannot be given number", and an Aristotelian will say that the, "universe cannot be measured". Rand is right -- that "existence is existing." Ralph Hertle

LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL

Morganis Chamlo wrote: >Has anyone worked on *calculating* Pi in non-decimal system terms? >Addendum: Has anyone CALCULATED Pi in non-decimal system terms?

From: Michael Hardy To: atlantis CC: ralph.hertle@verizon.net Subject: ATL: Re: Pi vs Existence Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2001 13:27:57 -0400 (EDT) Ralph Hertle <ralph.hertle@verizon.net> wrote: >Infinity is a phony concept, and it doesn't seem to work in mathematics at all.

In mathematics a variety of different concepts can be referred to by the words "infinity" and "infinite", and many of them work very well.  -Some- of them are presented in high school: There are sums of infinite series, e.g.:

   1 - (1/2) + (1/4) - (1/8) + (1/16) - (1/32) + ......  = 2/3.

Others everyone sees in freshman calculus, and these include not only limits as things approach infinity, but also limits generally, including the limit as something approaches zero that is used in the definition of the derivative.  Some are cardinalities of infinite sets, and I posted something on that to this forum on July 14th, which is in the archive at <http://objectivism.cx/~atlantis/mailing-list/msg22235.html>.

Others are much less well known among educated non-mathematicians, even though they require much less in the way of effort and prerequisite learning than does anything in calculus.  The best of these is Euclid's famous proof that the set of all prime numbers is infinite.  That argument is short and pretty and can be understood by anyone who knows some very basic arithmetic.  Yet another concept of infinity in mathematics is the infinity associated with Dirac's delta function, which is used routinely and very profitably by all engineers and physicists.  That kind of infinity differs from the ones you learned in calculus and the ones dealt with in my posting cited above, and the one Euclid dealt with, in that it admits being multiplied by a finite real number such as pi, the product being a -different- infinity.

>Infinity measures nothing at all in the universe.

How would you apply that proposition to understanding the status of Euclid's proof of the infinitude of primes?

>I suggest that the concept of a continuum replace infinity in logic and mathematics.

The finite cardinal numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ..... form an infinite set, but not a continuum.  How will you deal with that fact?  The concept of continuum has long been well-known to all mathematicians, all of whom have thoroughly studied it in graduate school, on which numerous treatises have been written, and yet it has failed to replace the concept of infinity.  You need to be specific about how you will do the replacing.  Specifically how will you re-write the theory of Fourier series (just one example) without the concept of infinity? I don't expect you to give details of such a revised theory -here- on this list, but maybe you could say something in which the answer would at least be implicit. Mike Hardy

From: Michael Hardy  To: atlantis Subject: ATL: algorithms Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2001 15:32:55 -0400 (EDT) Nick Glover wrote: >algorithms, or sequences of actions, which are essentially equivalent to the causal laws that we normally think of things following.

Are you saying all causal laws are algorithms?  And that "we normally think" of them that way? The "Church-Turing thesis" is a philosophically problematic proposition that says the conventional definition of "algorithm" is the right one.  The conventional definition can be summarized as saying that an algorithm is that which "computers as we know them" do. And "computers as we know them" have not changed since 1936 (in the sense that is relevant here).  There are numerous seemingly different ways of defining "algorithm," and all of them have been shown, via some fairly laborious arguments, to be equivalent.  In some ways, the Church-Turing thesis can be thought of as saying computers don't do very much.

Now this other proposition, that all causal laws are algorithms, goes light-years beyond where the Church-Turing thesis leaves off, and adds to the statement that computers don't do much, the additional statement: Neither does anything else. The fact that your field is computer science causes a suspicion in my mind:  You came by your belief that human minds do no more than what computer do, by studying only computers and not human minds or human brains. Mike Hardy

From: Nick Glover To: atlantis Subject: Re: ATL: algorithms Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2001 17:09:33 -0400 Mike Hardy wrote: >Are you saying all causal laws are algorithms?  And that "we normally think" of them that way?

No, I meant we normally think of things as following causal laws.  I asserted that these are equivalent to algorithms.  I did not attempt to argue this position, only explain it.  I argued it back on July 9th (subject "Argument for Strong AI" ).

Mike Hardy: >The "Church-Turing thesis" is a philosophically problematic proposition that says the conventional definition of "algorithm" is the right one.  The conventional definition can be summarized as saying that an algorithm is that which "computers as we know them" do.

I would just like to clarify for anyone else who is following this that the definition of an algorithm is not based any specific archaic computer.  It is based on the theoretical analysis of what types of things can be done that fit an intuitive notion of what we consider possible to calculate.  Also, an algorithm is originally a  athematical notion.  It just deals with the sequence of actions for completing some task (mathematically, this is some sort of calculation ).  These actions could be done by a human or a computer.

Mike Hardy: >And "computers as we know them" have not changed since 1936 (in the sense that is relevant here).  There are numerous seemingly different ways of defining "algorithm," and all of them have been shown, via some fairly laborious arguments, to be equivalent.  In some ways, the Church-Turing thesis can be thought of as saying computers don't do very much.

>Now this other proposition, that all causal laws are algorithms, goes light-years beyond where the Church-Turing thesis leaves off,  and adds to the statement that computers don't do much, the additional statement: Neither does anything else.

I suppose this depends on what you consider "not doing much", but I don't agree.  The only things that it has been shown that algorithms cannot do are things dealing with infinities.  They cannot deal with "straight-forward" infinities such as a real number, which can have an infinite string of numbers after the decimal point ( like Pi, which is 3.14159.... ).  And, algorithms cannot deal with infinities of self-reference or recursion ( consider Godel's Theorem or the Halting problem; sorry I can't think of an example of this that everyone on Atlantis will understand ).  Now, if you happen to agree with Bill Dwyer and I that there are no existing infinities in reality, then it seems quite reasonable to suppose all of reality is essentially algorithmic especially with an Objectivist notion of causality.

 Mike Hardy: > > Nick Glover

>The fact that your field is computer science causes a suspicion in my mind:  You came by your belief that human minds do no more than what computer do, by studying only computers and not human minds or human brains.

That is an incorrect suspicion.  I have read the following relevant books if this convinces you of anything: Reisberg, Daniel. _Cognition: Exploring the Science of the Mind_. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York 1997. Miyake, Akira and Shah Priti., _Models of Working Memory: Mechanisms of Active Maintenance and Executive Control_. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999. Hofstadter, Douglas R. _Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid_. Vintage Books, New York 1979. Damasio, Antonio R. _Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brian_. Avon Books, New York 1994. Chalmers, David J. _The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory_. Oxford University Press, New York 1996. Sperry, Roger. _Science and Moral Priority: Merging Mind, Brain, and Human Values_. Columbia University Press, New York, 1983.

I also have read portions of books or essays by others such as John Searle, Nagel, and Paul M. Churchland.

I don't claim my knowledge is in any way complete on the subject, but my view is certainly not the result of only studying computer science. And, for those who want an introduction to a lot of these issues with algorithms, the limits of algorithms, and various other theoretical and practical computer science topics, I believe _The New Turing Omnibus_ by A.K. Dewdney is a good choice.  I'll just list a few of the more interesting chapter titles: "Genetic Algorithms", "Neural Network that Learn", "Cellular Automata", "Detecting Primes", "Computer Vision", "Computer Viruses", "Public Key Cryptography", "The Halting Problem", "Noncomputable Functions".  This book can be found on most online bookstores. Nick Glover

From: Michael Hardy To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Nick Glover's syllogism Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2001 15:02:54 -0400 (EDT) Nick Glover's syllogism, if he were capable of articulating it (but it seems he lacks the ability to see one of the premises) would look like this:

(1) All of reality can be implemented by a discrete algorithm.

(2) Any discrete algorithm can be implemented by a computer program (in any of the conventional programming languages).

(3) THEREFORE, All of reality can be implemented by a computer program (in any of the conventional programming languages).

Premise (2) is the celebrated "Church-Turing thesis," widely believed because of the failure of decades of Herculean efforts to find any counterexamples --- in other words, inductively inferred.

Nick Glover leaps from (2) to (3) without mentioning the crucial premise (1).  Premise (1) is what needs to be defended if this argument is to be saved.  Premise (1) is really the heart of the matter.  Nick Glover seems unable to see that, since he keeps repeating the inference from (2) to (3) as if it were the whole argument.        Mike Hardy

From: Nick Glover To: atlantis Subject: Re: ATL: Re: We're all computers? Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2001 15:53:36 -0400 Mike Hardy wrote: >Your July 9th posting was grossly illogical.  It said:> > > So, as long as we accept the Church-Turing Thesis, we can see that reality can be implemented by a computer program. > The Church-Turing thesis says that anything that can be done by a discrete algorithm (the word "discrete" is redundant, but in *this* case an urgently needed redundancy) can be done within the conventionally known programming languages.  That's *ALL* it says!  The Church-Turing thesis is one premise in your tacit syllogism.  The other premise is missing!  Why are you blind to that obvious fact?  Your other premise would have to be that reality can be implemented by some discrete algorithm.  Even if you regard that bizarrely powerful statement as self-evident, you should still state it explicitly.  That statement  -- that all of reality can be implemented by a discrete algorithm -- is the center of this controversy, and you are unwilling to state it; >you just act as if everyone has already agreed on it and then you go on from there.

I really have no idea what you are talking about.  Did you notice the word "So" at the beginning of your quote from my July 9th post?  The implication is that there was a preceding argument for that statement, and that implication is correct.  My argument for causal laws being computational comes before that.  This starts from the second paragraph of the post with the sentence "The Objectivist notion of causality is a key to my argument for strong AI" and ends a couple paragraphs later with "So all of reality can be defined by algorithm".

When I posted "Argument for Strong AI" initially, Mike Hardy challenged this argument on the basis that reality is not necessarily discrete.  I responded with an argument based on Zeno's Dichotomy paradox which got me in arguments with numerous people on the list over this.  Fortunately, one of these people was the admirably stubborn and rational Bill Dwyer who eventually convinced me that my use of Zeno's paradox to show that reality is discrete was incorrect.   However, from all the arguing about Zeno's paradox, to me, the way to argue that reality is discrete is quite evident ( and I believe Bill Dwyer agreed ). But, I have never posted defending discrete reality without Zeno's paradox because Mike Hardy had lost interest by then, and I didn't feel like bringing it up again at the time.

Right now I do not have the time to argue this issue in depth, so for now we can just leave at the fact that my argument for Strong AI ( and also humans being computers ) depends on discrete reality, but I have not clearly defended discrete reality yet ( because you would have to weed through arguments that I admit are incorrect ). Nick Glover

From: "Gayle Dean To: "Atlantis" Subject: ATL: Determinism/adaptation Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2001 08:33:46 -0500  >Keyser replied in part: >Incidentally, hasn't Gayle's friend borrowed the notion of "infinity" from time and imposed it on all finite existents? The measurement systems time (duration), and space (h,w, and l) possess "indefiniteness, lack of boundary." But it doesn't translate that the matter upon which those measurements depend is also indefinite or boundless. If something exists, it is definite and bounded,  regardless of its duration in relation to any other existent or action. Right?

____________________________________________

I posed Keyser's question to my friend and following is his reply.

See how complicated things are:-)

___________________________________________

I don't think I'm borrowing the infinity of time and applying it to space.  Nevertheless, I'm not being completely precise, and there is theoretical work to be done on these subjects.  Still, the main point is that the predetermination of events has no fatalistic significance of how to treat consciousness -- there's always a mixture of things that can be changed and things that cannot.  As I understand chaos theory, they treat physics classically as involving infinitely divisible space, continuous measurements in real numbers.  The simplest model for a chaotic process is shifting a transcendental number like Pi to the left and truncating it, playing out over time the digits of an infinitely non-repeating series.  Most real numbers measuring position are of this infinite-information variety. Something like that shifting happens in non-linear interactions, described as chaotic processes.   In these, no matter how many decimal places are carried in a predictive computation, there is something in the remaining places which is not randomly canceling out over time (as they do in linear systems), but accumulating into unpredictable effects.  We can say that the past contains the whole future, but hides the exact content of the future from any process smaller than the entire universe, and also that the past contains an inherent disorder in what the future will be, some random dispersions of events -- the fact this is all contained in the past doesn't change its consequences.  There is a mixture of order and chaos to things.  Thermodynamics involves a kind of preservation of disorder in systems.  Randomness can be defined in terms of whether subsets of the past data can predict the rest of the data, whether it is ordered or not, or can be captured with a compression algorithm, has a recognizable pattern.  Quantum mechanics has a different view of some intrinsic probability and chance created moment by moment, in a world with only finitely defined, discontinuous, quantified measurements.  There could be a mathematical equivalence between these cases, and if not exactly, at least that there might not be much difference to anything whether randomness is a chaotic process playing back an infinity of hidden information in the past or is an intrinsic uncertainty in each moment.  There is a similar state in which no subset of the universe can predict everything that will happen and there is dispersion in what happens, gases remaining dispersed etc. Freedom of will is definitely not pure randomness, but it may be useful to consider an evolutionary process combining both random inputs and predetermined filtering, as one type of adaptive search method.

The difficult question in free will is the one little discussed, which is what difference does it make whether you have it?  Or as Dennett says, why is it worth wanting?  Surely being random doesn't make it so, but exactly what does do so remains to be fully elaborated. It appears to at least involve adaptivity, goal-direction; if we want to change a condition in the past, or solve a problem, we can do so.  However, we can't do so predictably, perhaps because of the complexity of the problems we solve.  It's like a chess playing computer that works by learning, instead of preprogrammed strategies.  You have to be free to learn from mistakes.  A combination of both short term failures and successes is involved in long-term success.

From: david friedman CC: "Philip Coates"  Subject: OWL: Subject: Infinities, Indeterminate Colors, and the Law of Identity Date: Sat, 16 Feb 2002 11:22:27 -0800 Philip Coates writes, about infinities: >If you tried to lay out all the rational numbers between, say zero and one, on a line, and lay out all the rational and irrational numbers between zero and one beside them, for every number on the first line you would find it (it's match) on the second. But not vice versa. In that sense there are "more"  numbers on the second line.

More precisely, it can be proved that there is no way of matching up the rational and irrational numbers such that each irrational is matched with a different rational. That's a much stronger statement than the statement that there is some way in which every rational is matched with an irrational but not vice versa--the latter  would also be true for infinities that are equal, such as the number of rational numbers and the number of integers.

More important, he writes. >This brings to mind the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. It doesn't say that a particle has no position or velocity, but merely than one can't measure one without affecting the other (or both).

That may be one way of interpreting the principle but it is not the only way nor, I think, the most common. The alternative is to say that there is no such thing as a particle with both a precise position and a precise momentum. We can write the wave function that describes a particle with precise momentum--but that function describes a particle which might be anywhere. Similarly the other way around. The entities that exist don't happen to have the characteristics that we, having formed our intuitions by looking at large objects moving slowly, think they have. -- David Friedman Professor of Law

[Peter]

Yawn. One more search for Hertle. I hope I am not finding things I already found and now, reposted. Peter

From: "Ralph Hertle" To: objectivism Subject: OWL: Re: The Case for Interventionism Date: Sun, 14 Oct 2001 16:54:26 -0400 [Jason Walker wrote: "The simplest solution to this problem would simply be for Israel to divorce church and state, and become fully secular.  There would be no need for a separate Palestinian Muslim state, as all races and religions would be treated equally under the law."]

Jason: You've written an excellent piece that correctly identifies the problem of state religion as well as the consequences of that problem. Interestingly, you show the logical, moral and practical link between the creation of new well-defined universal liberties regarding freedom of religion, and, probably, ideas in general, and the necessary consequence of the diminution of hostilities in Israel.

I think that the people of Israel, and many in Palestine as well, would welcome the new liberties. They would go for liberty in the realm of philosophical ideas in a big way. Israelis should take the lead and strike down the prohibitions that the state invokes on ideas in Israel, and remove the many other evil consequences at the same time. For example, the special favors that are granted to religionists would be removed, and the restrictions upon the rights of women and children, and the rights of property ownership and trade would be removed. Palestinians would love that. The special favors that are granted to the religious racists insofar as grants of land which did not belong to them as that was confiscated from the previous owners would be removed, and justice for the previous owners could be restored.

The USA needs to stop soothing and rubbing the phony racist Israeli egos and demand liberties for all Israelis. Islam would topple by cause of the example to be made and copied. Israel and Palestine could become one free state with the change of a few basic laws. Business would continue as usual – people would simply have more liberty. The causes for civil discontent and strife would be simultaneously removed.

Capitalism means that individuals have the freedom of ideas and action that are the cause for life. Rights are the necessary cause for life. If ideas are restricted there is nothing to correctly guide the actions of individuals insofar as the pursuit of productivity, sustenance and happiness. The religionists want controls over the minds and ideas of individuals in order to control their physical actions.

The problem with the religious states is that they cannot provide the ideas of their citizens which are the cause life for their individual citizens.

The proof is Afghanistan. They had no massive amounts of oil. Nor did they have the massive gifts of capital from the citizens and nation of the USA. Countries such as Iran, Iraq, UAE, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Libya and other Islamic nations would be no wealthier than Afghanistan, or at best Morocco, Syria or Jordan, without the infusions of wealth. Some nations have various natural resources that they depend upon. Egypt, for example, somehow supports 70 million people on an agriculture that depends, to a large extent, on the River Nile.

Without the special sources of wealth the Islamic nations as well as Israel would be poverty ridden. Israel, having more well defined liberties, is able to cause its individual citizens to use their intellects to be more productive in their own interests, and as a result, Israel prospers more than the Islamic nations. Religion, in general, prevents the use of the intellect, and religion is a primary cause for the poverty of nations.

I don't mean to tag your post on OWL, however, your ideas are of significant interest and merit a great deal of discussion. The brilliance of your idea is that the revision of a single provision in the Israeli Constitution or basic law that created new fundamental liberty would enable changes in lesser laws and, also, cause the more peaceful social conduct of the Israeli nation. Ralph Hertle

From: Ralph Hertle  To: objectivism Subject: Re: OWL: Re: Students vs Completed Objectivists Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 02:29:13 -0500 David: It seems to me that you are speaking regarding possibly conflicting multiple personal values, and also, the action consequences of those values.

There are metaphysical and epistemological contexts to the above values and actions. That implies that one's life values are being mulled over. While it is true that some small matters may be reviewed and sorted out, there may also be major issues that need attention.

A rational and value oriented methodology of diagnosis need to be applied to the problem. That means that the matter is likely a psychological matter. Sometimes it may be an educational or practice issue.

Objectivism's "cops" have mashed up a lot of student's lives. Some of the bull in a china shop approaches have met with terrible failures of conduct, e.g., loss of friends or spouse, banishment from one's circle of friends, insidious paranoid judgmentalism by self-proclaimed philosophical and psychological authorities, and worse. The disrupted lives and tears have been numerous.

Vulnerable people may have problems due to their own conflicts. Or, due to the controlling influences of others, the psychologizing influences of others, incorrect logic, value problems, and so on, a person may be caused to become and remain vulnerable.

Therapists can give a person the protection of facts, moral reinforcement, and working  methods that they may need while sorting out and contending with certain problems.

The therapists need to reach out and protect lives. Don't go to a therapist who Pragmatically professionalizes you into educating them about every concern imaginable. You need the type who will give you the means to run your life for your own benefit so that you may learn how to be productive and enjoy life.

Issues of whether or not ones actions are "consistent with Objectivist principles" are not the place to begin setting a person's moral universe and life right, and to see them enjoying rational values in life.

Objectivism needs to allow therapeutic help to people who have certain classes of problems. The official view of Catholicism is that psychotherapy is not accepted by the Church, and that Plato's moral values be accepted instead. (Jesus sure as hell didn't invent those ideas.)

The official viewpoint of Objectivism is divided. On the one hand the exclusion of the "moral monsters" from the realm of moral perfection is invoked. On the other hand private psychotherapy is provided by professionals, and that is strictly a marginal or even suspect moral activity. Woe be the one who would act as a bigamist, or even entertain a contradiction, for example, or who would find a flaw in the system of proofs developed by the Ancient Greek geometers. That could mean moral exclusion. (Well, these aren't the politically correct example, I am sure, however, they may get the point across.

There is a complex middle range of several possible methodologies, and personal value selections, and there is a relatively useful array of epistemological diagnostic, identification, repair, application, demonstration, experiential, practice, and happiness tools available in Objectivism. Objectivism has a great deal of rational and sincere people, and better systems of interaction are gradually being developed and offered.

I will say that there is no proper morality or system of precepts or oughts, Objectivist or otherwise, that can be gained by a person by deduction. That would be the requirement of arbitrary acceptance and duty. The only morality that has any Objective standing or practical basis is that which a person creates for himself or herself, and that needs to be created or built up by the individual from the information critically gained by the individual by means of induction.

Moral monsters are invented by proper slime. Moral perfection and happiness are created by the individual by means of induction and realistic construction. The role of induction in working with moral issues is all important. The Catholic approach is to omit all induction and to replace that with faith in Platonic oughts and rules of proper conduct. Their system results in failure to the extent that their precepts are followed, for example.

A return to induction in Objectivism is necessary, not rule propagation, and if that requires the consideration for others or even the development of the educational means of helping people with their moral value problems, so be it. Ralph Hertle

From: Ellen Moore To: Objectivism Subject: OWL: Objectivism is NOT in trouble! Date: Sun, 07 Apr 2002 16:28:42 -0500 To the members: Objectivism is the philosophy of principles identified and integrated by Ayn Rand.  It is what it is, and it will always be a set of philosophical principles that rational individualists use to guide their lives.  That's it!

So, Kurt Keefner and Ralph Hertle want to have a new charismatic leader such as we had in the 1960's in the persona of Nathaniel Branden.  They want to talk about Branden? - ok, let's talk about Branden.

To give him his due, he was an interesting lecturer - the first one to present a briefly systematized overview of what Ayn Rand taught him about Objectivism.  The lectures were highly spiced (and titillated) with peoples' personal psychological case histories.  I mention this in order to contrast those lectures with Peikoff's (in the 1970's) which optimally dealt with strictly philosophical issues, i.e., I mean there is a clear distinction to be necessarily drawn between the contents of philosophy and psychology.

There are these two men who learned Objectivism at the knee of Ayn Rand.  The big question is:  Were they ever Objectivists?  They both talked the talk [that's easy to memorize] but did either of them walk the walk?  Here we are 40 years later and they are both old men with heart conditions.  Are they Objectivists now?  No, they are not.  Why? Because they do not guide their thinking, their ideas, their actions, or their lives by the principles of Objectivism.  They have never lived up to the objective epistemological or moral standards of what an Objectivist must be and should be.  They have done a great disservice to Objectivism, to Ayn Rand, and to us, their students.

It's time for Objectivist students to judge their teachers.  Do we want any more like them.  No Way!  They've betrayed our trust - over and over again!

Ralph tells about the terrible times that students lived through in NY in the '60's.  I believe him, and I've heard many such stories of those days.  Fortunately, in those early years, I lived far away from the inner circle, and even my rare visits with some of them provided ample evidence to me that they did not practice what they preached.  What I learned from them was that they all wanted me to know that they basked in the glow of Rand's favor and approval - even when that was not actually the case.  And after all, they assumed, Ellen lived too far away and would never find out the truth.  But I did.  Truth will out! I've known many students who suffered at their hands over the years.

Ralph wrote: "Objectivism has a sacred cow. That is the prohibition against polemics."    ..... "There is a ton of polemical information available, but it is not indexed and integrated. Nor is it offered through any identifiable Objectivist source."

I certainly disagree.  One can obtain almost everything that has ever been written or lectured about pro/anti Objectivism from many different sources. Rand's "polemics" still sell in the millions every year.  About the only source that is not open to the public domain is Peikoff's rigidly guarded, inherited archives. And that is only one example of his anti-objective, cultist dogmatism.

Ralph wrote: "Miss Rand did not understand what terrible psychological permissions she had given to the Objectivist psychotherapists. The Objectivist psychotherapists and moralists had a field day disapproving and wrecking people's lives."

Ralph is assuming that Rand knew what went on in private therapy sessions.  I would not assume that she did know what was going on in private.  Ralph speaks harshly about "the exacerbations of the Objectivist Romantic-moralist cops (which for political reasons remain un-named) ..."

Some Psychotherapists have been publicly named in Ellen Plasil's book "Therapist" -- Allan Blumenthal, Lonnie Leonard.  And we can name Nathaniel Branden who was the key figure in setting up that psychotherapy circle because each, being busy tending to their own patients, passed clients on to each other.  It is common knowledge that some of them were unofficially practicing therapists without completed training and credentials at that time.  Talk about exacerbating horrors, and  "wrecking people's lives".  One might add that there were also "friends" who were psycho-therapizing each other.  A sure-fire, non-objective, psychological disaster in the making.

Now, Ralph writes about the Rand-Branden Affair from his own interpretation of who made a play for whom.  He thinks Ayn made a play for Nathan.  I suggest that Ralph reread Nathan's books of confessions. Nathaniel made it clear that he remembers exactly what he was planning - he said,  "I knew  the moves had to be impeccable" and he said, "Of course, Ayn, I love you."  He also said, "I wanted to get inside her consciousness..." - there speaks a knowing psychologist's personal revelation.

Frankly, I've always viewed the sexual affair as a natural outcome of their intimate relationship, i.e., the actual relationship that existed between all four partners. Keep in mind that we have only the two Brandens' *unsubstantiated* accounts of particular private events. Peikoff did make a public statement to the effect that Rand's journals verified that "There was an affair".

Ralph's implication is that the "affair", but for the "gossiping curiosity" of the "Objectivist Romantic cops" - "would not have been the life-wrecker issue it became."

Keep in mind that Nathaniel Branden's October 16, 1968, public statement, "In Answer To Ayn Rand"  - for the record, was that, speaking about a letter he wrote to her at the beginning of July after which time she broke off her personal relationship with Nathan.  The business relationship between her and NBI ended by September.

Branden wrote of the letter, "It was a tortured, awkward attempt to make clear to her why I felt that an age difference between us of twenty-five years constituted an insuperable barrier, for me, to a romantic relationship."

He obviously did not tell the truth to us, his public then - i.e., later we learned he had had a romantic relationship for several years with her, a woman who was 25 years his senior.

Contrary to Ralph's misinterpretation, Rand had been able to "win" Nathan as a romantic partner when, as he reports, he had been married to Barbara for only 1 1/2 years.

Ralph wrote, "The path taken by Nathaniel Brandon was correct. The moralists, however, did not want to hear about it, and they made NB the fall guy. That was really unnecessary, and many people were greatly affected."

I disagree that NB's path "was correct", but yes, many people were affected by those events.

Ralph strays off the topic of NB into an analogy about Jesus, Catholics, Sin, anti-Jewish gossips, etc., to little discernible effect, but it appears that he believes NB was ousted from the Objectivist circles by "hatred for people by gossiping".  That is not in fact what happened. Rand repudiated both he and Barbara publicly in her statement in The Objectivist, dated May 1968, "To Whom It May Concern", written in September 15, 1968.  After that, the ripples of disillusionment traveled far with schisms broken wide.

Ayn Rand was told by Barbara that she, BB, had known for two years that Nathan had been having another affair with Patrecia Wynand for the past 4 years, and Rand was furious that he had been deceiving her for 4 years - get it? - 4 years of continuous deceptions to cover up an affair with a young woman he claimed to love.

Does that sound like the rational actions of an independent, integrated, honest Objectivist?  Why did he not just tell Ayn the truth that he had fallen in love with Patrecia?  She and her husband were part of their inner circle.  Wouldn't an Objectivist adult man stand up for his right to love?  What did he think he could gain by 4 years of deceptions? This is the man who lectured his students for 30 minutes on the evils and consequences of lying.  He played dishonesty out to the inevitable bitter end.

Keep in mind that during those same 4 years he was still married to Barbara; he may have been a sexual partner to Ayn [but as I read his confessions, they indicate that their sexual affair was long over]; and he was sleeping with long-suffering, secretly and patiently waiting, Patrecia.  Surely, it takes a really slick romanticist who can string along three women during many years of deceptions without getting caught. Nathan was a master at it.  Don Juans could take lessons in conning and cover-ups.

Anyway, it was Barbara who told Ayn the truth because she had sufficient conscience to know that Ayn Rand did deserve the justice of being told the truth.  And Nathaniel had finally reached the conflicted end of his romantic-string-flings.

Ralph concludes that, "He [NB] has been given a bad rap by the Objectivist romantic-moralist cops." "In retrospect, Ayn Rand's romantic and emotional interests also need a lot of support. She was married and started a bigamist affair. No Objectivist that I have ever heard has ever said that she had made a mistake. She wasn't accorded the equal criticism that was given to Branden, however negative it was. That was unfair to AR as well as to NB, because once the discussion had been closed, the matter of a romantic involvement had to have been given short shrift by the Objectivist romance cops.

"Ayn Rand was married, however, it appeared that her husband was in poor health. She wanted to continue in her life's ambitions. No one gave her a break. Her interests, love, and passions were ignored."

Well, Ralph, perhaps you are right that NB was given a "bad rap" - re: sexual morality - for having more than one partner at a time -- AR had *only* one affair [as far as we know, and we do not know any details about her private sexual relationship with her husband, but the affair occurred in his home, and if so he knew and sanctioned it - again only the Branden's unsubstantiated "stories" of distress are in the public record.]

My interpretation of those stories is that there is no way for any reader to know how to differentiate between the truth of the events versus the self-justifications and subjective interpretations offered by Barbara and Nathaniel.

What they both admit to in their very public books is that the lies and the deceptions really happened.  And frankly, I view Ayn Rand as having the courage of her principles, convictions, and integrity for explaining as much of the private details to her "public" as we needed to know.

I am one Objectivist who has stated often that Rand made a big mistake - in trusting the character of Nathaniel Branden.  She gave him the benefit of every doubt - ever since he reported he went to a movie with Barbara but told Ayn he was working - and even though she knew and discussed at length his "psycho-epistemological problems".  The simple fact is that Ayn Rand loved him for what she projected and wanted him to be.  Think about it.  He betrayed every principle, value and virtue that an Objectivist should hold dear.   He conned her.  Her mistake was in trusting him.

So what effect did their "breakup" have on Objectivism?  We had strong disagreements among students as to who to believe.  Who was telling us the truth?  And that is still the issue today.  Who is telling us the truth?

Otherwise, Objectivism is what it is, and those who love it will live by its principles, and will work effectively to achieve a happy life.  And the world will go on with the individual effort of those who each do their own part in showing others how to live a rational life.