Flaw in Rand's Argument


SoAMadDeathWish

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Hi guys, this is gonna be my first post on this forum.

A bit about myself, I've been an objectivist since I was 16, when my econ101 teacher in Highschool turned me onto Atlas Shrugged. I've been studying the works of Rand and Piekoff for about 6 years.

Anyway... lately I've been talking about Objectivism with one of my friends by email. She pointed out what seems to be a flaw in Rand's argument for egoism.

Now, she practically wrote a book about this, but to get to the bottom of it, the problem is basically this:

P1: For all agents, only an agent's life is valuable as an end in itself.

(P2): Agents ought to act to obtain their own values.

C3: Therfore, agents ought to act to promote their own lives.

The first problem is that Rand's ultimate conclusion, C3, does not follow unless you also accept the implicit premise (P2, a premise that Rand didn't include in her arguments, but that is necessary to keep the argument valid).

There's something tricky about P2, though. In one sense (and I think the one that Rand seems to imply), the "ought" can be interpreted practically. That is, in the sense of, "If I want to quench my thirst, I ought to drink water". In this case, the premise is tautological, essentially saying that agents ought to do what they ought to do. However, the "practical interpretation" doesn't fit with the rest of the argument, because the "ought" in C3 is a moral "ought" and not a practical "ought". The conclusion that would follow from this interpretation of P2 would not be C3, but rather C3*: "If an agent values its life as an end in itself, then it ought to act to promote its own life". Now, obviously, there's no issue here if the agent values its life as an end in itself. But what if the agent doesn't value its life as an end in itself? In that case, we cannot conclude that it ought to act to promote its own life. More disturbingly, it would mean that the Toohey's and second-handers cannot be judged on the basis of rational ethics! If we accept the tautologous sense of P2, we are literally compelled to believe that "Hitler did nothing wrong"!

The trouble with going in the other direction and interpreting P2 as a moral "ought" is that the argument then essentially begs the question.

My objection at this point was that P2 is true by tautology, regardless of sense. However, if we accept that agents cannot choose other than to promote their moral values, then ethics becomes impossible! Any action you take would then necessarily be promoting your own life (even suicide).

I've been going over this for hours and I can't figure out the flaw in her argument. Little help?

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1. Arguably, the argument is only about the agent's motivation and says nothing about the nature of what the agent chooses to value. See page 554 of Letters of Ayn Rand as a start. It can be read on Amazon using the "look inside" feature (hardbound or paperback).
2. Was P1 intended to mean the agent could not value the life of another person or happiness?

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Hi Naomi, welcome to OL.

P1 should be: for all agents, only an agent’s own life is an end in itself setting the agent’s values for making that life. It would be incorrect in Rand’s philosophy to say that only an agent’s life is an end in itself. Every life is an end in itself according to this philosophy, and right understanding for right actions includes recognition that one’s fellows, like oneself, are ends in themselves.

Under Rand’s conception of human life, one is to not only provide for continued physical existence and health, one is to provide for continued psychological health for making those physical provisions in a human setting. According to Rand, those psychological provisions are moral provisions and include virtues such as independence, pride, and productivity, with productivity as central organizing activity of one’s living. Those virtues have quite a lot to do with one’s fellows, in one’s relations to them. Likewise for Rand’s virtues of honesty, integrity, justice, and for that matter, rationality. She has her character John Galt say “Do you ask what moral obligation I owe my fellow men? None—except the obligation I owe to myself, to material objects and to all existence: rationality.”

In her transition from nature of human life to right choices, Rand uses the practical premise: live! Choose life. Choose to make life in the only general way a human can make life and make it well human, which is to say (i) end-in-itself life setting overall one’s subsidiary pursuits and (ii) conscious, thinking life consonant with biological and psychological needs and (iii) life one’s own and (iv) one’s own end-in-itself life being the one always to promote.

P1 as formulated above and (iv), which is your C3, should be challenged by one questioning ethical egoism. Finding a way that P1 and (iv) can be denied and reformed, consistent with everything else above, would be one approach to refuting the ethical egoism of Rand and replacing it with something better.

Yes, one does not have to choose life. I am old. I’ve found long life is good with enough health and memory. Choose life. Love your existence. Nature will bring death soon enough.

Stephen

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1. Arguably, the argument is only about the agent's motivation and says nothing about the nature of what the agent chooses to value. See page 554 of Letters of Ayn Rand as a start. It can be read on Amazon using the "look inside" feature (hardbound or paperback).

2. Was P1 intended to mean the agent could not value the life of another person or happiness?

1. Can you just post the relevant paragraph? It doesn't look like its available on Amazon's look inside feature.

2. It's from The Objectivist Ethics, and no. It seems to me that it says that only an agent's life could be an end in itself. The agent could have other values, but not as ends in themselves.

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P1 should be: for all agents, only an agent’s own life is an end in itself setting the agent’s values for making that life. It would be incorrect in Rand’s philosophy to say that only an agent’s life is an end in itself. Every life is an end in itself according to this philosophy, and right understanding for right actions includes recognition that one’s fellows, like oneself, are ends in themselves.

I understand what you're trying to say, Stephen. However, up until that point, Rand has not yet established that "only an agent’s own life is an end in itself setting the agent’s values for making that life" or that "Every life is an end in itself".

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1. Arguably, the argument is only about the agent's motivation and says nothing about the nature of what the agent chooses to value. See page 554 of Letters of Ayn Rand as a start. It can be read on Amazon using the "look inside" feature (hardbound or paperback).

2. Was P1 intended to mean the agent could not value the life of another person or happiness?

1. Can you just post the relevant paragraph? It doesn't look like its available on Amazon's look inside feature.

2. It's from The Objectivist Ethics, and no. It seems to me that it says that only an agent's life could be an end in itself. The agent could have other values, but not as ends in themselves.

1. I suspect you used the Kindle edition. That's why I said hardbound or paperback. A search for motivation will get to page 554.

2. Where? Quote, please.

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SoAMadDeathWish,

Welcome to OL.

I don't agree that the premises of your formulation are accurate, not the one you attribute to Rand, nor the one (the tautology) you say she left out.

A simple example to contradict the first is that an "agent" can create a work of art. According to Rand, a work of art is both a value and an end in itself. Therefore, the statement: "For all agents, only an agent's life is valuable as an end in itself," is not only not true, I don't recognize it as anything I have ever read by Rand.

But I don't want to quibble.

I read something by Nathaniel Branden once that shed light on this, as confusion over this issue is a common problem--at least one I have seen often enough online. (I can't remember where I read it, though.) And, I am extrapolating from what I remember, so the following is probably not the way he put it--on second thought, almost certainly not the way he put it. :smile:

In this context, a standard is used for measurement, a purpose is limited to the individual.

"Man's life" is a standard.

Your own life is your purpose.

Both can be chosen. This means both can be rejected.

Man's life is an abstraction that can be used as a "mental concrete" for measurement (a standard).

Your life is a concrete that you can abstract so you can measure it.

"Man's life" is used as the foundation for Objectivist ethics when qualified by the statement that man is an end in himself.

You can choose to use that standard, or you can choose to be the means for someone else's ends (like with altruism).

If you choose man's life (as an end in himself) as your standard, and you choose to hold your own life as your purpose, and you agree with the law of identity, etc., you ought to act rationally to promote your own life.

That is where "ought" comes from "is."

Let's suppose you do not choose that standard and/or purpose. In this case, you have no real "ought"--or at least your "ought" will not be based on any "is" in reality--so it can be based on any whim or imaginary "is" or wish you like (the normal term is "subjective"). Nature will take care of you in pretty short order, anyway, and you will no longer exist. But since you gave up concern with that as your grounds for ethics, that's not a real problem. Or is it, even though you (meaning someone in your position) may say it isn't?

:smile:

Michael

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1. Arguably, the argument is only about the agent's motivation and says nothing about the nature of what the agent chooses to value. See page 554 of Letters of Ayn Rand as a start. It can be read on Amazon using the "look inside" feature (hardbound or paperback).

2. Was P1 intended to mean the agent could not value the life of another person or happiness?

1. Can you just post the relevant paragraph? It doesn't look like its available on Amazon's look inside feature.

2. It's from The Objectivist Ethics, and no. It seems to me that it says that only an agent's life could be an end in itself. The agent could have other values, but not as ends in themselves.

1. I suspect you used the Kindle edition. That's why I said hardbound or paperback. A search for motivation will get to page 554.

2. Where? Quote, please.

1. It won't let me look at it on any edition, even when I'm signed in.

2. There are multiple versions of the book, but this is the relevant passage:

No choice is open to an organism in this issue: that which is required for its survival is determined by its nature, by the kind of entity it is. Many variations, many forms of adaptation to its background are possible to an organism, including the possibility of existing for a while in a crippled, disabled or diseased condition, but the fundamental alternative of its existence remains the same: if an organism fails in the basic functions required by its nature—if an amoeba’s protoplasm stops assimilating food, or if a man’s heart stops beating—the organism dies. In a fundamental sense, stillness is the antithesis of life. Life can be kept in existence only by a constant process of self-sustaining action. The goal of that action, the ultimate value which, to be kept, must be gained through its every moment, is the organism’s life. (P1)

An ultimate value is that final goal or end to which all lesser goals are the means—and it sets the standard by which all lesser goals are evaluated. An organism’s life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil.

Without an ultimate goal or end, there can be no lesser goals or means: a series of means going off into an infinite progression toward a nonexistent end is a metaphysical and epistemological impossibility. It is only an ultimate goal, an end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself:(C3) a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of “value” is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of “life.” To speak of “value” as apart from “life” is worse than a contradiction in terms. “It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible.”

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Hi Michael. Thank you for your thoughtful response.

1. The source for P1 is in my previous post in response to Merlin.

2. If Rand holds that art is an and in itself, then she is contradicting herself.

3. I understand the idea, and you've explained it quite clearly. However, your justification for the claim that "One ought to accept Man's life as the standard of value", i.e. "Nature will take care of you in pretty short order, anyway, and you will no longer exist." is merely an appeal to consequences.

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Hi Michael. Thank you for your thoughtful response.

1. The source for P1 is in my previous post in response to Merlin.

2. If Rand holds that art is an and in itself, then she is contradicting herself.

3. I understand the idea, and you've explained it quite clearly. However, your justification for the claim that "One ought to accept Man's life as the standard of value", i.e. "Nature will take care of you in pretty short order, anyway, and you will no longer exist." is merely an appeal to consequences.

I wonder if Objectivism isn't largely an appeal to consequences, i.e., happiness.

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However, your justification for the claim that "One ought to accept Man's life as the standard of value", i.e. "Nature will take care of you in pretty short order, anyway, and you will no longer exist." is merely an appeal to consequences.

SoAMadDeathWish,

Of course it is. That's because Objectivism (as I understand it) is a philosophy where one induces principles from reality at the start rather than trying to deduce reality from principles. (This last comes later after a solid reality foundation, not at the start.)

It's easy in these academic-like discussions to say "agent" and deduce stuff all over the place, including things like consciousness does not exist (not saying this is you), while leaving out the fact that one is an "agent" whose very acts contradict the premises of the deduction.

I don't agree with everything in the Objectivist canon, and I believe there is a serious scope problem in many of Rand's pronouncements, but I 100% agree with her approach of grounding logic in reality for knowledge about reality.

Michael

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Replying to #8:

Here is what I referred to in Letters of Ayn Rand:

I certainly maintain that an egoist is a man who acts for his own self-interest and that man should act for his own self-interest. But the concept of "self-interest" identifies only one's motivation, not the nature of the values that one should choose. The issue, therefore, is: what is the nature of man's self-interest? Since arbitrary desires, wishes or whims are not a valid standard of value or criterion of self-interest—an egoist has to have a rational standard of value and a rational code of morality in order to be able in fact to achieve his self-interest.

The "traditional" concept of egoism assumes that an egoist's standard is: "My self-interest consists of doing whatever happens to please me." A drunkard, a drug addict, a hot-rod car driver are men who act on that standard; they could hardly be regarded as exponents of self-interest.

Okay, your quote from The Objectivist Ethics is about life being an end in itself, but the argument you present in #1 says nothing about acceptable means to that end.

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The source for P1 is in my previous post in response to Merlin.

SoAMadDeathWish,

I'm going to reflect on this a bit. I don't care much for that particular essay because I don't agree with the scope of how Rand defines humans. I have avoided delving into it because of all the is-ought bickering I have read over the years that make my eyes glaze over. And I am not a fan of what I call argument by proclamation. This means you proclaim something is XXX and go on from there. Rand does this at times and this essay certainly has its fair share of instances. (I think she got this habit from Aristotle. :smile: )

Where I am going to reflect in particular is in Rand's choice of language. I have noticed in a few cases where she uses a term to mean one thing, then later uses the same term to mean something else. But you have to detect the meaning on your own.

For instance, she identifies altruism as a system of morality, then says doing something is not moral that (when you look at it) is altruistic at root. If you align the correct meaning with the context, this makes sense, but if you try to restrict the term to one meaning only, it sounds like she is contradicting herself.

This happens most often (in the ones I have detected) with what I call cognitive and normative meanings. In one meaning, it is a kind, and in another meaning it is a value judgment.

I'm pretty sure something similar is going on here, too, but I don't have a clear explanation right now.

Or this might be another case of a scope problem.

Like I said, I have to reflect on it.

At least I can now see where you got your notion.

Michael

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SoAMadDeathWish,

Of course it is. That's because Objectivism (as I understand it) is a philosophy where one induces principles from reality at the start rather than trying to deduce reality from principles. (This last comes later after a solid reality foundation, not at the start.)

It's easy in these academic-like discussions to say "agent" and deduce stuff all over the place, including things like consciousness does not exist (not saying this is you), while leaving out the fact that one is an "agent" whose very acts contradict the premises of the deduction.

I don't agree with everything in the Objectivist canon, and I believe there is a serious scope problem in many of Rand's pronouncements, but I 100% agree with her approach of grounding logic in reality for knowledge about reality.

Michael

An appeal to consequences fallacy is not a method of induction, it's a fallacy and irrational no matter how you look at it.

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Replying to #8:

Here is what I referred to in Letters of Ayn Rand:

I certainly maintain that an egoist is a man who acts for his own self-interest and that man should act for his own self-interest. But the concept of "self-interest" identifies only one's motivation, not the nature of the values that one should choose. The issue, therefore, is: what is the nature of man's self-interest? Since arbitrary desires, wishes or whims are not a valid standard of value or criterion of self-interest—an egoist has to have a rational standard of value and a rational code of morality in order to be able in fact to achieve his self-interest.

The "traditional" concept of egoism assumes that an egoist's standard is: "My self-interest consists of doing whatever happens to please me." A drunkard, a drug addict, a hot-rod car driver are men who act on that standard; they could hardly be regarded as exponents of self-interest.

Okay, your quote from The Objectivist Ethics is about life being an end in itself, but the argument you present in #1 says nothing about acceptable means to that end.

I don't think that matters when we have not yet established that C3 is true. Unless you adopt one or the other form of (P2) there can be no such thing as an Objectivist ethics. To reiterate, if you accept the first form of P2, then any means are acceptable for someone who does not choose life as the standard of value. Thus, we cannot rationally condemn non-objectivists. But if you go with the second version, then all means are necessarily acceptable as they all necessarily promote one's own life. I don't think that either of these conclusions are acceptable for a rational system of ethics.

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I'm pretty sure something similar is going on here, too, but I don't have a clear explanation right now.

Or this might be another case of a scope problem.

Like I said, I have to reflect on it.

At least I can now see where you got your notion.

Michael

Thank you. If you could find the source of the confusion that would be really helpful.

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An appeal to consequences fallacy is not a method of induction, it's a fallacy and irrational no matter how you look at it.

SoAMadDeathWish,

Bullshit.

I was not making a logical argument, but instead ending with rhetorical commentary.

That's called context.

I sincerely hope you are not one of those anal nitpickers who sometimes crop up in O-Land who don't know the difference between rhetoric and logic.

Besides, I play by my rules, not by yours. You can like that or not. And you are free to disagree, but you will not set the rules.

Michael

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There's something tricky about P2, though. In one sense (and I think the one that Rand seems to imply), the "ought" can be interpreted practically. That is, in the sense of, "If I want to quench my thirst, I ought to drink water". In this case, the premise is tautological, essentially saying that agents ought to do what they ought to do. However, the "practical interpretation" doesn't fit with the rest of the argument, because the "ought" in C3 is a moral "ought" and not a practical "ought". The conclusion that would follow from this interpretation of P2 would not be C3, but rather C3*: "If an agent values its life as an end in itself, then it ought to act to promote its own life". Now, obviously, there's no issue here if the agent values its life as an end in itself. But what if the agent doesn't value its life as an end in itself? In that case, we cannot conclude that it ought to act to promote its own life. More disturbingly, it would mean that the Toohey's and second-handers cannot be judged on the basis of rational ethics! If we accept the tautologous sense of P2, we are literally compelled to believe that "Hitler did nothing wrong"!

Rand addressed this some, such as: "No, you do not have to live; it is your basic act of choice; but if you choose to live, you must live as a man-—by the work and the judgment of your mind" (Galt's speech). "Life or death is man's only fundamental alternative. To live is his basic act of choice. If he chooses to live, a rational ethics will tell him what principles of action are required to implement his choice. If he does not choose to live, nature will take its course" (Causality Versus Duty).

Your last two sentences don't logically follow.

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Rand addressed this some, such as: "No, you do not have to live; it is your basic act of choice; but if you choose to live, you must live as a man-—by the work and the judgment of your mind" (Galt's speech). "Life or death is man's only fundamental alternative. To live is his basic act of choice. If he chooses to live, a rational ethics will tell him what principles of action are required to implement his choice. If he does not choose to live, nature will take its course" (Causality Versus Duty).

Your last two sentences don't logically follow.

If you accept this conditional interpretation of Rand's ethics, then the last two sentences definitely do logically follow. Under this interpretation, the objectivist imperative has the logical form "If A, then B", more specifically "If you choose to live, then you ought to do so as a man." However, if you do not choose to live, i.e. you believe that "not A" is true and you also believe that the objectivist imperative is true (that "If A, then B" is true), then it does not follow that "B" or that "not B". You cannot rationally conclude that you ought to live as a man.

Thus, if we know that Hitler does not choose to live, then we cannot say that he ought to live as a man. In conclusion, we cannot say he was doing anything wrong since no moral "oughts" apply to him.

If you deny this anyway and believe that the objectivist imperative is true as well as that "Hitler ought to live as a man", then you're simply begging the question, and have no rational basis for ethics.

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To any reader new to Objectivist ideas, there is no "Objectivist imperative."

That's the kind of language used by people who only see the world in terms of power games among human beings, with outside reality being a mere inconvenience.

The core of Objectivism is about individual sovereignty and using reason as the best faculty for pursuing or maintaining values. It is not about dictating what those values are from on high.

Free choice and all...

The only master acknowledged in Objectivism that I know of is reality. Rand constantly stated the old saying that reality to be commanded must be obeyed. She never said to command your life, you must obey Objectivism and follow the "Objectivist imperative."

Or worse, people to be commanded must be obeyed. (Although this last does work if you are sneaky enough. :smile: )

The core storyline of power blinds the person who lives by it to the rest of reality. It's a cybernetic system that's as addictive as any drug I know of.

People in this story even think Rand wants to rule. But in her core meaning, in the subtext of everything she said and wrote, she never said, "Obey me."

Instead, she said, "Get the hell out of my way."

Michael

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Rand addressed this some, such as: "No, you do not have to live; it is your basic act of choice; but if you choose to live, you must live as a man-—by the work and the judgment of your mind" (Galt's speech). "Life or death is man's only fundamental alternative. To live is his basic act of choice. If he chooses to live, a rational ethics will tell him what principles of action are required to implement his choice. If he does not choose to live, nature will take its course" (Causality Versus Duty).

Your last two sentences don't logically follow.

If you accept this conditional interpretation of Rand's ethics, then the last two sentences definitely do logically follow. Under this interpretation, the objectivist imperative has the logical form "If A, then B", more specifically "If you choose to live, then you ought to do so as a man." However, if you do not choose to live, i.e. you believe that "not A" is true and you also believe that the objectivist imperative is true (that "If A, then B" is true), then it does not follow that "B" or that "not B". You cannot rationally conclude that you ought to live as a man.

Thus, if we know that Hitler does not choose to live, then we cannot say that he ought to live as a man. In conclusion, we cannot say he was doing anything wrong since no moral "oughts" apply to him.

If you deny this anyway and believe that the objectivist imperative is true as well as that "Hitler ought to live as a man", then you're simply begging the question, and have no rational basis for ethics.

Hitler chose to live right up until the moment that he chose not to and took his own life. This is a choice that every person makes every day - the choice to live - and unless one chooses otherwise and takes one's own life, then one ought to live as a man. What else would one live as?

I don't know about objectivist imperatives and I can't speak logic-ese, but this seems practically self-evident, and I'm always bewildered when someone wants to needlessly complicate it.

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