Objectivist and Popperian Epistemology

[Brant Gaede]

We have all kinds of certain knowledge. That it is certain doesn't mean it's not reviewable. Knowledge qua knowledge is certain. (Knowledge per se is tentative.) Reality itself too. The only problem is matching them up. Generally the more basic what we know the more certain we are. Facts, for instance, are more certain than the higher abstractions. The invalidation of theory by reproducible experiment is a rule created to honor the certainty of reality. (Logic itself is a human invention also honoring reality.) Knowledge makes the human world go round. Reality makes the physical world (Earth) go round. Ignorance is the spike in the wheels of human (creative and productive) action. The world still spins. Reality is the immutable positive. Knowledge is mutable, but cars go and airplanes fly.

--Brant

beware wrong science and mediocre and evil scientists positively vetted by same as in "peer review" and government grantors

[Darrell Hougen]

Ayn Rand has the best moral philosophy ever invented. Karl Popper has the most important breakthrough in epistemology. Most Objectivists seem to think that Popper and Rand are incompatible, and Popper is an enemy of reason. They have not understood him. These lists are intended to help explain my motivation for integrating Rand and Popper, and also to help highlight many similarities they already have.

Points Popperian epistemology and Objectivist epistemology have in common. In Popperian epistemology I include additions and improvements by David Deutsch and myself:

- opposition to subjectivism and relativism

- fallibilism

- says that objective knowledge is attainable (in practice by fallible humans)

- realism: says reality is objective

...

My understanding of Popper is that, although he would like to show that objective knowledge is possible, he ends by saying that all of our theories are just the best approximation we currently have to reality, that they are contingent, that they can be superseded at any time, that certainty is impossible. Clearly, that is in opposition to Objectivism which requires the possibility of certainty.

I don't think either Popper or Rand solved the problem of knowledge (epistemology) --- how do we know things? --- but I can certainly see how the philosophies are incompatible.

Darrell

Not really. Objectivism recognizes that one is not infallible, so judgements are certainly contingent.

Here and here are the first two segments in a lecture by Leonard Peikoff on Objectivsim. If you forward to about minute 5 in the second segment, Peikoff states:

The result of using reason as your means to knowledge is that you can rely on the conclusions that you come to; your knowledge is certain, and we therefore reject skepticism. Skepticism is the idea there are no absolutes, nobody can be certain of anything, it's all a matter of opinion, what's true for you isn't true for me, etc. We reject that entirely. We hold that truth is objective, rational, and every truth properly understood is an absolute. Even the truth that there are less than 100 people in this room, if you specify time an place, is eternal and immutable. For all time it will be true that today, in this room, there are less than 100 people. So, so far from there being no absolutes, every truth is an absolute, but you must use reason to arrive at the truth.

That doesn't sound like fallibilism to me.

Darrell

[BaalChatzaf]

That doesn't sound like fallibilism to me.

Darrell

Indeed it is not. Here is an example. For many centuries very smart and reasonable people believed that heat was a substance or fluid that was contained in matter (in between the atoms, so to speak). This view of heat explained some phenomena (expansion of metals when heated, for example) but did not square with other phenomena. Eventually more careful study revealed that heat is the average kinetic energy of ensembles of matter.

The fluid theory was arrived at by sound reasoning and observation (in the context of the times) but it was -wrong-.

Reason, as such, is no guarantee of empirical or even theoretical correctness.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Darrell Hougen]

That doesn't sound like fallibilism to me.

Darrell

Indeed it is not. Here is an example. For many centuries very smart and reasonable people believed that heat was a substance or fluid that was contained in matter (in between the atoms, so to speak). This view of heat explained some phenomena (expansion of metals when heated, for example) but did not square with other phenomena. Eventually more careful study revealed that heat is the average kinetic energy of ensembles of matter.

The fluid theory was arrived at by sound reasoning and observation (in the context of the times) but it was -wrong-.

Reason, as such, is no guarantee of empirical or even theoretical correctness.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I'm not necessarily defending Peikoff. I just don't think that Objectivism and Popper's fallibilism are entirely compatible, which is where this thread started.

But, in defense of the Objectivist view, how do you know that "heat is the average kinetic energy of ensembles of matter"? And if you don't know that fact with certainty, how do you know that the earlier theory is incorrect?

Darrell

[BaalChatzaf]

That doesn't sound like fallibilism to me.

Darrell

Indeed it is not. Here is an example. For many centuries very smart and reasonable people believed that heat was a substance or fluid that was contained in matter (in between the atoms, so to speak). This view of heat explained some phenomena (expansion of metals when heated, for example) but did not square with other phenomena. Eventually more careful study revealed that heat is the average kinetic energy of ensembles of matter.

The fluid theory was arrived at by sound reasoning and observation (in the context of the times) but it was -wrong-.

Reason, as such, is no guarantee of empirical or even theoretical correctness.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I'm not necessarily defending Peikoff. I just don't think that Objectivism and Popper's fallibilism are entirely compatible, which is where this thread started.

But, in defense of the Objectivist view, how do you know that "heat is the average kinetic energy of ensembles of matter"? And if you don't know that fact with certainty, how do you know that the earlier theory is incorrect?

Darrell

The predictions of kinetic molecular heat theory are dead on right to twelve decimal places.

There earlier theory (the caloric theory of heat) was disproved by Count Rumford (Thompson) who observed that cannons when drilled by a drilling tool got nearly red hot and remained heated so long as the drilling (with its attendant friction) continued. If heat was a fluid (caloric) then where did all this caloric come from? Certainly not the drill which could only hold so much. The observation proved that the heat induced in the cannon barrel was motions in the metal produced by the metal to metal friction. Later on Joule was able to show a constant relation between mechanical work done on water and the raising of the water temperature. There was an exact equivalence between work (kinetic energy) and heat with its associated temperature. This and other similar observations falsified caloric theory and by the middle of the 19th century it was pretty much a dead letter among physicists.

The point is the people who invented the caloric theory were not fools. There information was limited by their technique of observation and within the context of observation the caloric theory actually did explain some of the observed phenomena (e.g. the expansion of metal when heated). Think of what happens to a dry sponger when it soaks up water. Likewise, when metal absorbed caloric (i.e. when it got hot) it too expanded like a sponge. Later observations proved there was no such substance, a fluid form of heat. However to this day we still speak of heat flow from a hotter to a colder body, but that is only a figure of speech and not to be taken literally. By the way, Sadi Carnot in 1824, was able to derive a pretty good first cut at the second law of thermodynamics, even though he based his argument on caloric. In the 1850's Clausius was able to get Carnot's result using the more correct kinetic theory of heat. So very smart people reasoning as well as they could (in their circumstances) came to incorrect conclusions. Reason, however skillfully applied is not absolute guarantee of truth or correctness.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Darrell Hougen]

That doesn't sound like fallibilism to me.

Darrell

Indeed it is not. Here is an example. For many centuries very smart and reasonable people believed that heat was a substance or fluid that was contained in matter (in between the atoms, so to speak). This view of heat explained some phenomena (expansion of metals when heated, for example) but did not square with other phenomena. Eventually more careful study revealed that heat is the average kinetic energy of ensembles of matter.

The fluid theory was arrived at by sound reasoning and observation (in the context of the times) but it was -wrong-.

Reason, as such, is no guarantee of empirical or even theoretical correctness.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I'm not necessarily defending Peikoff. I just don't think that Objectivism and Popper's fallibilism are entirely compatible, which is where this thread started.

But, in defense of the Objectivist view, how do you know that "heat is the average kinetic energy of ensembles of matter"? And if you don't know that fact with certainty, how do you know that the earlier theory is incorrect?

Darrell

The predictions of kinetic molecular heat theory are dead on right to twelve decimal places.

There earlier theory (the caloric theory of heat) was disproved by Count Rumford (Thompson) who observed that cannons when drilled by a drilling tool got nearly red hot and remained heated so long as the drilling (with its attendant friction) continued. If heat was a fluid (caloric) then where did all this caloric come from? Certainly not the drill which could only hold so much. The observation proved that the heat induced in the cannon barrel was motions in the metal produced by the metal to metal friction. Later on Joule was able to show a constant relation between mechanical work done on water and the raising of the water temperature. There was an exact equivalence between work (kinetic energy) and heat with its associated temperature. This and other similar observations falsified caloric theory and by the middle of the 19th century it was pretty much a dead letter among physicists.

The point is the people who invented the caloric theory were not fools. There information was limited by their technique of observation and within the context of observation the caloric theory actually did explain some of the observed phenomena (e.g. the expansion of metal when heated). Think of what happens to a dry sponger when it soaks up water. Likewise, when metal absorbed caloric (i.e. when it got hot) it too expanded like a sponge. Later observations proved there was no such substance, a fluid form of heat. However to this day we still speak of heat flow from a hotter to a colder body, but that is only a figure of speech and not to be taken literally. By the way, Sadi Carnot in 1824, was able to derive a pretty good first cut at the second law of thermodynamics, even though he based his argument on caloric. In the 1850's Clausius was able to get Carnot's result using the more correct kinetic theory of heat. So very smart people reasoning as well as they could (in their circumstances) came to incorrect conclusions. Reason, however skillfully applied is not absolute guarantee of truth or correctness.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Ok, the caloric theory of heat made certain predictions and some of those predictions were shown to be false by experimental evidence, so the caloric theory had to be abandoned. However, taking a Popperian/fallibilist approach, I would say that the thermodynamic theory of heat also makes predictions and some of those might be shown to be incorrect by future experimental evidence so the thermodynamic theory might also have to be abandoned. A weak point might include the classical model of atoms used in the derivation of the Boltzmann distribution. The thermodynamic theory might be a better explanation than the caloric theory as it accounts for more phenomena, but, according to the Popperian/fallibilist approach, one can never be sure it's correct. On the other hand, the thermodynamic theory might be exactly correct. So, my question is, is it possible to ever know whether all of the relevant factors have been thoroughly analyzed and declare that the answer is known?

In fairness to Peikoff, his example didn't involve a universally quantified statement. He sort of sidestepped that entire issue. So, his statement that there were less than 100 people in the room was a statement about a particular instance, not an infinite number of potential instances. It is much different to say that a particular instance is known with certainty, which seems reasonable, than to state that the truth of a universally quantified statement can be known with certainty.

Darrell

[BaalChatzaf]

when future experiments and observations show that kinetic heat theory (modified according to quantum physics) predicts some outcomes incorrect, then the theory will be modified or abandoned. Here is the rule: If there is a single wrong prediction that cannot be accounted for by faulty determination of initial or boundary conditions or by faulty equipment then the theory is WRONG. A true theory must ALWAYS predict correctly. Every single time.

That is the difference between science on the one hand and philosophical bullshit or religion on the other hand.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Darrell Hougen]

Robert,

It sounds like you've already resigned yourself to the proposition that the kinetic theory of heat will be proven wrong. But, I guess, my question would be: Is there some sense in which we can say that the kinetic theory is more correct than the caloric theory? And, if that is the case, doesn't that imply we actually know something beyond individual instances?

Darrell

[BaalChatzaf]

Robert,

It sounds like you've already resigned yourself to the proposition that the kinetic theory of heat will be proven wrong. But, I guess, my question would be: Is there some sense in which we can say that the kinetic theory is more correct than the caloric theory? And, if that is the case, doesn't that imply we actually know something beyond individual instances?

Darrell

The history of science is a trail littered with the corpses of busted theories. I assume that as our technology improves facts concerning domains of nature which we cannot yet adequately observe will emerge that will force us to modify or abandon some of our favorite theories.

People in the physical sciences will continue to do the best the can based on what they know. What they know is highly dependent on the technologies of measurement and observation. There is more going in Nature than we can readily observe with our unaided senses and the expectation that improved technologies will bring to us as yet unexplainable facts is a reasonable expectation.

For example after radioactivity was discovered in the late 19th century greater knowledge of the structure of atoms (yes, atoms have parts!) new facts were revealed that gave further support to the newly emerging quantum theories of light and matter. Classical physics was a failure in this domain. In fact it was the success of the classical theory of electromagnetic phenomena that gave rise to the technologies that later show classical electrodynamics was at least incomplete and in some aspects just plain wrong.

One of the most amusing was the discovery by J. J. Thompson of the electron an electrically charge particle that goes about the nucleus of an atom and it goes rather fast. According to classical electrodynamics this means the motion of the electron should cause it to radiate out its energy and collapse onto the nucleus. Larmor showed that if this is true an atom should collapse in about 10^-11 seconds. To put it briefly, all atoms should collapse before you could say boo! This is clearly not the case so there is something radically wrong with classical electrodynamics. This was later cured by the development of quantum electrodynamics which to this day is the most accurate physical theory ever formulated.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dglgmut]

It all starts with a priori knowledge--unarticulable but irrefutable.

The certainty that we exist comes before reason. How do we know? Because we exist... no theory can explain raw induction.

The more consistent our theories are with our a priori knowledge the more certain we can be that they are true. If we could only understand very basic concepts we would not have any disagreements. It's because we can create such abstract knowledge that we can have some parts true and some parts false.

I think of it as a tree diagram with each further abstracted concept having more information branching off of it--and having exponentially more probability of being wrong (just out of human error). We know there is basic knowledge that cannot be disproved--we know there is absolutely no disconfirming evidence to the question of whether existence exists. How can we be sure that one day there won't be more evidence relevant to that question? How do we know we have all the data necessary to sufficiently answer that question?

[BaalChatzaf]

We have practically zero a prior knowledge. Virtually everything we know is derived from experience.

[Dglgmut]

We have practically zero a prior knowledge. Virtually everything we know is derived from experience.

All of our "knowledge" depends on a priori knowledge--otherwise they're just memories, not facts.

You might want to give chapter 6 a read: http://library.mises.org/books/Hans-Hermann%20Hoppe/Theory%20of%20Socialism%20and%20Capitalism,%20A.pdf

Starts on page 118 of the PDF.

[BaalChatzaf]

We have practically zero a prior knowledge. Virtually everything we know is derived from experience.

All of our "knowledge" depends on a priori knowledge--otherwise they're just memories, not facts.

You might want to give chapter 6 a read: http://library.mises.org/books/Hans-Hermann%20Hoppe/Theory%20of%20Socialism%20and%20Capitalism,%20A.pdf

Starts on page 118 of the PDF.

Nonsense. Name a single a priori axiom from which we can derive -detailed- knowledge of the world. Underline the word "detailed". Facile generalities about existence existing will not fix a flat tire or diagnose a misfiring engine. These folks you quote. How much physics do they know.

There is physics, there is tiddly winks and there is philosophical hot air.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dglgmut]

"Experience, it should be noted, only reveals that two or more observations regarding the temporal sequence of two or more types of events can be ''neutrally" classfied as "repetition" or "nonrepetition." A neutral repetition only becomes a "positive" confirmation and a nonrepetition a "negative" falsification if, independent of what can actually be discovered by experience, it is assumed that there are constant causes which operate in time-invariant ways. If, contrary to this, it is assumed that causes in the course of time might operate sometimes this way and sometimes that way, then these repetitive or nonrepetitive occurrences simply are and remain neutrally registered experiences, completely independent of one another, and are not in any way logically related to each other as confirming or falsifying one another. There is one experience and then there is another, they are the same or they are different, but that is all there is to it; nothing else follows.

Thus, the prerequisite of being able to say ''falsify" or "confirm" is the constancy principle:

the conviction that observable phenomena are in principle determined by causes that are constant and time-invariant in the way they operate, and that in principle contingency plays no part in the way causes operate. Only if the constancy principle is assumed to be valid does it follow from any failure to reproduce a result that there is something wrong with an original hypothesis; and only then can a successful reproduction indeed be interpreted as a confirmation. For only if two (or more) events are indeed cause and effect and causes operate in a time-invariant way must it be concluded that the functional relationship to be observed between causally related variables must be the same in all actual instances, and that it this is not indeed the case, something must be at fault with the particular specification of causes.

Obviously now, this constancy principle is not itself based on or derived from experience. There is not only no observable link connecting events. Even if such a link existed, experience could not reveal whether or not it was time-invariant."

Hans-Hermann Hoppe: A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism

[BaalChatzaf]

"Experience, it should be noted, only reveals that two or more observations regarding the temporal sequence of two or more types of events can be ''neutrally" classfied as "repetition" or "nonrepetition." A neutral repetition only becomes a "positive" confirmation and a nonrepetition a "negative" falsification if, independent of what can actually be discovered by experience, it is assumed that there are constant causes which operate in time-invariant ways. If, contrary to this, it is assumed that causes in the course of time might operate sometimes this way and sometimes that way, then these repetitive or nonrepetitive occurrences simply are and remain neutrally registered experiences, completely independent of one another, and are not in any way logically related to each other as confirming or falsifying one another. There is one experience and then there is another, they are the same or they are different, but that is all there is to it; nothing else follows.

Thus, the prerequisite of being able to say ''falsify" or "confirm" is the constancy principle:

the conviction that observable phenomena are in principle determined by causes that are constant and time-invariant in the way they operate, and that in principle contingency plays no part in the way causes operate. Only if the constancy principle is assumed to be valid does it follow from any failure to reproduce a result that there is something wrong with an original hypothesis; and only then can a successful reproduction indeed be interpreted as a confirmation. For only if two (or more) events are indeed cause and effect and causes operate in a time-invariant way must it be concluded that the functional relationship to be observed between causally related variables must be the same in all actual instances, and that it this is not indeed the case, something must be at fault with the particular specification of causes.

Obviously now, this constancy principle is not itself based on or derived from experience. There is not only no observable link connecting events. Even if such a link existed, experience could not reveal whether or not it was time-invariant."

Hans-Hermann Hoppe: A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism

I wonder how handy this guy would be estimating the thermodynamic efficiency of a heat engine.

The link between cause and effect does not need to be absolutely time invariant. It just has to be steady enough so you can do something useful.

The thing that you quoted is what happens when you let a philosopher pontificate on physics. It is almost always useless and sometimes dangerous and counterproductive.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dglgmut]

He was not pontificating on physics... he was making a point that applies to all knowledge. Experience alone will not tell you anything. Neither will deduction, alone.

[anthony]

He was not pontificating on physics... he was making a point that applies to all knowledge. Experience alone will not tell you anything. Neither will deduction, alone.

But you should recognise that your statement is in itself, experiential and a posteriori.

Hoppe's anti-inductive stance is only one more pony in the Kantian intellectual stable, I think.

I hesitate to stick the label of prejudicial motives on him, but the end result is always going to cause loss of self-authority for the individual consciousness. Ultimately, anti-induction is anti-conceptual, and anti-ego.

[BaalChatzaf]

I recommend the following two words be avoided as much as possible. (1) the word "a" and (2) the word "priori"

[Dglgmut]

But you should recognise that your statement is in itself, experiential and a posteriori.

Hoppe's anti-inductive stance is only one more pony in the Kantian intellectual stable, I think.

I hesitate to stick the label of prejudicial motives on him, but the end result is always going to cause loss of self-authority for the individual consciousness. Ultimately, anti-induction is anti-conceptual, and anti-ego.

If you throw out time-invariable causation you throw out the application of any theory ever conceived. Maybe some causes are not time-invariable--who knows? But there is no point considering that possibility when dealing with theories.

In the case of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, he was talking about politco-economic systems.

[anthony]

We have practically zero a prior knowledge. Virtually everything we know is derived from experience.

No, no. You can't have one without the other!

Peikoff put it simply: "Man's knowledge is not acquired by logic apart from experience or by experience apart from logic, but ~ by the application of logic to experience.

All truths are the product of a logical identification of the facts of experience".

Scientists need to breathe some "philosophical hot air".

[anthony]

But you should recognise that your statement is in itself, experiential and a posteriori.

Hoppe's anti-inductive stance is only one more pony in the Kantian intellectual stable, I think.

I hesitate to stick the label of prejudicial motives on him, but the end result is always going to cause loss of self-authority for the individual consciousness. Ultimately, anti-induction is anti-conceptual, and anti-ego.

If you throw out time-invariable causation you throw out the application of any theory ever conceived. Maybe some causes are not time-invariable--who knows? But there is no point considering that possibility when dealing with theories.

In the case of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, he was talking about politco-economic systems.

Calvin, I always figured you to be a highly adept inductionist.

Now don't go 'deducing' yourself out of that ability ...;)

[Samson Corwell]

Well, Daniel...

I don't call support of "it might all be a dream" and of "who knows, we might be figments of a virtual reality" and of the opinion of a poster who bizarrely internally contradictorily claimed that he'd convinced himself that he might be a brain in vat and of Greg's saying that a person holding to an imaginal reality could just change the meaning of "proof" to avoid self-exclusion problems...signs of commitment to realist metaphysics. Looked to me like you were fine with dismissing realist metaphysics as long as the dismisser was someone negative toward Rand.

Ellen

I'm afraid that I don't understand how modus tollens requires a commitment to realist metaphysics of the kind that Ayn Rand speaks of. Could you carify/elaborate?

[Samson Corwell]

"Experience, it should be noted, only reveals that two or more observations regarding the temporal sequence of two or more types of events can be ''neutrally" classfied as "repetition" or "nonrepetition." A neutral repetition only becomes a "positive" confirmation and a nonrepetition a "negative" falsification if, independent of what can actually be discovered by experience, it is assumed that there are constant causes which operate in time-invariant ways. If, contrary to this, it is assumed that causes in the course of time might operate sometimes this way and sometimes that way, then these repetitive or nonrepetitive occurrences simply are and remain neutrally registered experiences, completely independent of one another, and are not in any way logically related to each other as confirming or falsifying one another. There is one experience and then there is another, they are the same or they are different, but that is all there is to it; nothing else follows.

Thus, the prerequisite of being able to say ''falsify" or "confirm" is the constancy principle:

the conviction that observable phenomena are in principle determined by causes that are constant and time-invariant in the way they operate, and that in principle contingency plays no part in the way causes operate. Only if the constancy principle is assumed to be valid does it follow from any failure to reproduce a result that there is something wrong with an original hypothesis; and only then can a successful reproduction indeed be interpreted as a confirmation. For only if two (or more) events are indeed cause and effect and causes operate in a time-invariant way must it be concluded that the functional relationship to be observed between causally related variables must be the same in all actual instances, and that it this is not indeed the case, something must be at fault with the particular specification of causes.

Obviously now, this constancy principle is not itself based on or derived from experience. There is not only no observable link connecting events. Even if such a link existed, experience could not reveal whether or not it was time-invariant."

Hans-Hermann Hoppe: A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism

I wonder how handy this guy would be estimating the thermodynamic efficiency of a heat engine.

The link between cause and effect does not need to be absolutely time invariant. It just has to be steady enough so you can do something useful.

The thing that you quoted is what happens when you let a philosopher pontificate on physics. It is almost always useless and sometimes dangerous and counterproductive.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Worse. An economist trying to do philosophy.

[BaalChatzaf]

We have practically zero a prior knowledge. Virtually everything we know is derived from experience.

No, no. You can't have one without the other!

Peikoff put it simply: "Man's knowledge is not acquired by logic apart from experience or by experience apart from logic, but ~ by the application of logic to experience.

All truths are the product of a logical identification of the facts of experience".

Scientists need to breathe some "philosophical hot air".

Hopefully as little as possible

Ba'al Chatzaf

[BaalChatzaf]

"Experience, it should be noted, only reveals that two or more observations regarding the temporal sequence of two or more types of events can be ''neutrally" classfied as "repetition" or "nonrepetition." A neutral repetition only becomes a "positive" confirmation and a nonrepetition a "negative" falsification if, independent of what can actually be discovered by experience, it is assumed that there are constant causes which operate in time-invariant ways. If, contrary to this, it is assumed that causes in the course of time might operate sometimes this way and sometimes that way, then these repetitive or nonrepetitive occurrences simply are and remain neutrally registered experiences, completely independent of one another, and are not in any way logically related to each other as confirming or falsifying one another. There is one experience and then there is another, they are the same or they are different, but that is all there is to it; nothing else follows.

Thus, the prerequisite of being able to say ''falsify" or "confirm" is the constancy principle:

the conviction that observable phenomena are in principle determined by causes that are constant and time-invariant in the way they operate, and that in principle contingency plays no part in the way causes operate. Only if the constancy principle is assumed to be valid does it follow from any failure to reproduce a result that there is something wrong with an original hypothesis; and only then can a successful reproduction indeed be interpreted as a confirmation. For only if two (or more) events are indeed cause and effect and causes operate in a time-invariant way must it be concluded that the functional relationship to be observed between causally related variables must be the same in all actual instances, and that it this is not indeed the case, something must be at fault with the particular specification of causes.

Obviously now, this constancy principle is not itself based on or derived from experience. There is not only no observable link connecting events. Even if such a link existed, experience could not reveal whether or not it was time-invariant."

Hans-Hermann Hoppe: A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism

David Hume said the some thing much earlier and more clearly.

Ba'al Chatzaf