Question: Why is Man Defined as the Rational Animal?

[Donovan A.]

Hello everyone,

I was recently listening to The Efficient Thinking Lecture from The Basic Principles of Objectivism with my partner (Spencer) and Barbara Branden spent a quite bit of time explaining the process of definitions. Miss Branden defined man as "the rational animal" and Sepncer asked me why isn't man defined as "the rational mammal," since the genus mammal would give more information than the genus animal? He also asked me why couldn't man be defined as the rational entity/being, since he is the only entity that we know of that has the characteristic of rationality?

We talked for awhile and I explained that I did not think man could properly be defined as "the rational entity" since the concept entity is too broad and does not provide any essential information about the genus. We took a look at David Kelley's The Art of Reasoning as well, and Kelley explains that both the genus and the differentia have to adhere to the law of fundamentality, but why is the genus animal more fundamental than the more narrow concept mammal, or the broader concept life form?

Would anyone like to help us think this through?

Thanks so much,

Randall

[merjet]

Apparently mammal wasn't coined until 1758 (link), so rational mammal wasn't feasible before then.

[Xray]

Hello everyone, I was recently listening to The Efficient Thinking Lecture from The Basic Principles of Objectivism with my partner (Spencer) and Barbara Branden spent a quite bit of time explaining the process of definitions. Miss Branden defined man as "the rational animal" and Sepncer asked me why isn't man defined as "the rational mammal," since the genus mammal would give more information than the genus animal? He also asked me why couldn't man be defined as the rational entity/being, since he is the only entity that we know of that has the characteristic of rationality? We talked for awhile and I explained that I did not think man could properly be defined as "the rational entity" since the concept entity is too broad and does not provide any essential information about the genus. We took a look at David Kelley's The Art of Reasoning as well, and Kelley explains that both the genus and the differentia have to adhere to the law of fundamentality, but why is the genus animal more fundamental than the more narrow concept mammal, or the broader concept life form? Would anyone like to help us think this through? Thanks so much, Randall

The term rational animal has a long philosophical tradition: animal rationale is the Latin translation of the Greek zoon logicon.

It is often attributed to Aristotle (but see excerpt from the Wikipedia article below), and I suppose this is why Rand chose it as a category.

http://en.wikipedia....Rational_animal

Rational animal is a classical definition of man.^[1] Though it is often attributed to first appearing as a definition in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Aristotle does not define it here. In the Nicomachean Ethics I.13, Aristotle states that the human being has a rational principle.

The definition of man as a rational animal was common in scholastical philosophy.^[2] Catholic Encyclopedia states that this definition means that "in the system of classification and definition shown in the Arbor Porphyriana, man is a substance, corporeal, living, sentient, and rational".^[2]

I personally would not use rational animal because it suggests that that the opposite (irrationality) is the characterisitic of non-human animals. But this is clearly not the case. One could even argue that each species has the amount of 'rationality' it needs.

Imo defining man as the animal whose cognitive faculties are the most advanced of all species is less ambiguous than "rational animal".

[Donovan A.]

I was talking to my mom about the issue (she was an NBI student and is a long time Objectivist). She made made a point that made me think the following. The essential characteristic of being an animal is consciousness. Mammals, reptiles, fish, birds, etc. are all conscious beings, as opposed to life forms that are non conscious. Out of all the conscious life forms, only man processes the attribute of rationality. That makes sense to me.

[Brant Gaede]

I know that man is the rational animal for two reasons: (1) I am a man (women are irrational) and (2) introspection.

--Brant

intellectual arsonist

[Reidy]

I second #2. If the stock definition were part of a formal biological taxonomy, you'd want to use the immediate genus (which I think is primate, not mammal), but this is a definition for everyday, non-scientific cognition. Such thinking recognizes animals (which are conscious and able to move) more readily than it recognizes the Linnaean categories.

(I'm using 'genus' simply to mean 'next level up,' not in the formal, biological way.)

[Brant Gaede]

I second #2. If the stock definition were part of a formal biological taxonomy, you'd want to use the immediate genus (which I think is primate, not mammal), but this is a definition for everyday, non-scientific cognition. Such thinking recognizes animals (which are conscious and able to move) more readily than it recognizes the Linnaean categories.

(I'm using 'genus' simply to mean 'next level up,' not in the formal, biological way.)

Gee, you almost lost me there.

--Brant

but not quite

[Guyau]

I would add the small point that not all animals are conscious. It is thought today that those without a cerebral cortex are not conscious. Anyway, all should agree that sponge is not conscious (cf.). Rand, like most people I expect, assumed that insects are conscious (ITOE 80). I don’t think so.

That is not to say the proposition “Man is a rational animal” is not true, only that rational is not implicitly dividing man from all animals by dividing among their types of consciousness. Rational does divide among those animals who do possess consciousness. Also, we should note, the statement “Man is a rational animal” does not mean the same for Aristotle and for Rand, since for Rand “rational animal” really means “volitionally rational animal.” (a–b)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

From Rand’s epistemology seminar:

Gotthelf: You say that the ultimate [post-childhood] definition of man is “a rational animal.” I take it then that it would be wrong to define man as “a rational primate.”

Rand: Oh yes.

. . .

Peikoff: I was wondering whether you would agree with the following, which is my understanding of why the genus of man for a general definition would remain "animal."

Definitions and conceptualization always have to take into account the cognitive context. The normal adult does not deal with subdivisions like "primate." And, therefore, for a general literate adult, "rational animal" would be appropriate, even if for a more specialized degree of knowledge you need the further subdivision. . . .

Rand: Yes, that is correct. . . .

(ITOE 233–35)

[merjet]

insects and consciousness

[Donovan A.]

I think the idea that animals are conscious is a general truth. There are certain lifeforms that are transitional. In the case of mammals the platypus is an exception to the general rule. Generally speaking, when I think of animals, I think of conscious lifeforms such as mammals, birds, reptiles, fish. If we define man as the rational primate, we wouldn't be showing the scope of how unique rationality is. Last night Spencer and I talked more about the definitions of animal and rational separately.

I defined rationality as follows:

Genus: a faculty of consciousness

differentia: that integrates sensory data and conceptualizes.

I then defined animal as follows:

Genus: a life form (ogranism)

differentia: processing consciousness

[Silvana Maria]

I think that there are many issues in all sciences starting from the misusing of words. That "rational" really means to refer to our common sense, our understanding past surviving needs. Of course animals are conscious and have logic, but they are limited to what they know will keep them safe and bring them food. Even playing is really training for surviving. We, humans, have an amazing freedom in thinking, choosing priorities and interests.

It's only my opinion, but I believe that this is just another useless confusion starting from misusing and misunderstanding a word. I believe it only means "free thinking animal", but since our thoughts are in the same time based on logic and limited by logic, they went on and called it "rationality".

[Guyau]

Randall,

A philosophical concept such man or life or existence or consciousness must have definite, specifiable relations to those concepts in common usage on the one hand and to their scientific usage on the other. If I am not mistaken, the concept of animal you have in mind in saying “Man is a rational animal” designates the same organisms designated in biology as vertebrates. So your philosophic animal is well-set in its relations to the larger set of organisms studied in zoology. I think vertebrates are the class of organisms typically meant in ordinary usage of animal. So your philosophic concept animal designates the same individuals typically designated in ordinary usage.

That all vertebrates are conscious is, however, a proposition presently open in scientific investigation.* If it is found that all those kinds of organisms and no others are conscious, your philosophic concept animal will remain in good relation (picking out the same individuals is a definite, specific relation) to the scientific concept vertebrate. If some kinds of vertebrates are determined scientifically to be not capable of consciousness or if some non-vertebrates are determined to be capable of consciousness, then your philosophic concept animal would need to be revised to include all and only those organisms possessing consciousness. That response to those contemplated scientific possible outcomes might require defining animal philosophically in a way that does not coincide entirely with any hierarchical division at work in present biology. That is not necessarily a flaw so long as the map between the the philosophic concept and the scientific ones are made explicit.

Then too, one's philosophic concept of consciousness may or may not coincide with what the biological researchers are talking about. That may be all right, provided the relations between the two are specified and provided the philosophic concept of consciousness still stands in the relations legitimate for it to stand with common usage and with scientific usage. At a minimum, I would say, there should be no contradiction between concepts in philosophy and in science. Difference of itself is, of course, not contradiction.

As we see in Rand’s discussion with Gotthelf, Peikoff, and Binswanger, Rand thought philosophic concepts should be understandable to people not possessing specialized scientific knowledge (but isn’t one who is able to understand her ethical theory informed by some knowledge of biology?) She also thought correctly formulated philosophic concepts will not need to change with advances in scientific knowledge. Do you concur with Rand on those two points?

I would say philosophy most worthwhile is openly informed by modern science, where the philosophers of that stripe are actually informed about the pertinent science. In such philosophy, the need for warranted changes in philosophic concepts might be as rare as or even more rare than settled scientific revolutions. Other philosophers, aiming to discourse truly on the world, yet not wanting to be informed by science, will not succeed in that avoidance (even if the science is only from past ages). Indeed it is all too likely “the scientific tail will be wagging the philosophical dog,” paraphrasing Nozick.

I would not go for your definition of man, given your meaning for animal. As we read in Rand’s comments at the seminar, she would not go for it either. I would stay in our adult philosophic concept of man with the genus animal as defined in modern biology, which divides animal from the other kingdoms by type of cell wall (first link in #8). That engineering solution is what ultimately gives organism types within this kingdom their salient trait of mobility; that solution made possible the emergence of muscle and nerves. Having animal in the scientific sense in our philosophic definition is harmonious with “man-in-the-street” concepts of animal, for it includes them. Having animal in the scientific sense in our philosophic definition keeps our root kinship to this broad, naturally and sharply distinguished kingdom of organisms as the noteworthy organic background against which our distinguishing mode of conscious control should be seen. It keeps our highest consciousness appropriately tied to our organic tissue. It keeps our philosophy manifestly wed to our best scientific understanding of the world.

(And it comports with Rand’s ambition to craft a scientific ethical theory.)

–Stephen

Sylvana Maria, welcome to Objectivist Living!

[Donovan A.]

Hi Stephen,

When I looked up "animal" on my Apple computer dictionary I was given the following definition:

"noun: living organism that feeds on organic matter, typically having specialized sense organs and nervous system and able to respond rapidlyto stimuli"

and..

Animals are generally distinguished from plants by being unable to synthesize organic molecules from inorganic ones, so that they have to feed on plants or on other animals. They are typically able to move about, although this ability is sometimes restricted to a particular stage in the life cycle. The great majority of animals are invertebrates, of which there are some thirty phyla; the vertebrates constitute but a single subphylum. See also higher animals, lower animals.

Regarding Rand's comment in the Epistemology Seminar. I think her point was that the concept "animal" is understandable to a generally educated adult based on his context of knowledge. The question I have is, why is "rational animal" an appropriate definition for a person with a generally literate adult context? Even a person with an American high school education has fairly advanced knowledge. What is the principle for determining the proper genus? How would you generally define "man" and why?

As we see in Rand’s discussion with Gotthelf, Peikoff, and Binswanger, Rand thought philosophic concepts should be understandable to people not possessing specialized scientific knowledge (but isn’t one who is able to understand her ethical theory informed by some knowledge of biology?) She also thought correctly formulated philosophic concepts will not need to change with advances in scientific knowledge. Do you concur with Rand on those two points?

I'd like to give further thought to your two questions, but I'll attempt a short answer.

In order to understand Rand's ethics, one needs to know that all living entities face the alternative of life or death, that each life form must act in accordance with its nature in order to survive and that the concept value is derived from the concept of life. Practical philosophy is typically understandable to 13 year olds, and I don't think those basic biological truths would qualify as specialized scientific knowledge.

Regarding the influence of science on philosophical concepts, I think Rand is right. Correctly formulated philosophical concepts are typically very simple and are necessary for science to even get off the ground. I'm talking about concepts such as axiom, certainty, good and evil, volition, justice, etc. It's not the function of sciences like biology, chemistry, geology, physics, etc, to deal with such concepts. Can you give me an example of how you think scientific advancements have given rise for a need to change some correctly formulated philosophical concept? I can see how new developments in technology mean that new applications of already established philosophical concepts will have to be formulated, but I can't think of anything else.

[Brant Gaede]

"Animal" is right because "primate" or other such would imply that other animals might be "rational" too. The real problem is with "rational," which has a broader meaning than only the way she used it. My dog goes hunting a female with his nose. Is this irrational behavior? Not for him. The way Rand used "rational" is tautological. No animal but the man-animal acts irrationally. So, man is the rational-irrational animal. I don't think Rand could stand that qua definition qua her idealization of man (men), so she didn't. But by her lights and particular understanding of "rational" and "man," other animals are non-rational, not irrational.

--Brant

you can say that her counterpoint was not "irrational" but "non-rational," but that would exclude her primary animadversion upon her enemies and how she viewed herself, above all, as a moralist

[Guyau]

. . .

Can you give me an example of how you think scientific advancements have given rise for a need to change some correctly formulated philosophical concept?

. . .

There is a fork. Shall we say any concept that turns out to be incorrect was incorrectly formulated or that it was correctly formulated but turned out to be incorrect? I’ll go with the latter.

Until Descartes formulated the principle of inertia, that every body would continue in a straight line and at constant velocity were it not acted upon by things external to it, it had been maintained by philosophers that every change requires a cause. The concept of change needed to be revised to allow that some changes require efficient causes, some do not. The body in uniform, inertial motion is changing location, but such change under the new science of mechanics required no efficient (or final) cause.

Newton formulated the correct definition and measure of causes that bring about deviations from inertial motion. With him we call such causes forces. He made the principle of inertia itself his first law of mechanics. A century later, we find Kant still repeating the old saw that every change requires a cause, even though he was very well acquainted with the principle of inertia. It is unfortunately easy to go to sleep at the reins or wheel and fail to bring pertinent scientific conceptual reformations to bear.

In my lifetime the philosophic idea of determinism has had to be altered in that the modern scientific discipline of chaos theory showed that the determined is not necessarily predictable (a prediction requiring more computational bits than there are in the universe is not predictable). Previously, it was part of our concept of the determined that the future unfolding was predictable.

By the way, the problem of free will versus determinism became acute by the time of Spinoza and continues to the present because of what science seemed to be saying a about mechanical law (in the classical regime) and its coverage of physical phenomena. As in my "Volitional Synapses," I think the resolution lies in more astute understanding of the physics and neurophysiology.

The more an epistemologist or philosopher of mind keeps informed and takes to heart the work of the cognitive sciences, the better will be the philosophic concepts (e.g.). Likewise for metaphysics in respect of physics and for ethics in respect of biology and dynamic psychology.

The concepts function and need for metaethics and how it is situated in general metaphysics should be tied to modern biology and physics, and not to Aristotle’s biology and physics. The concept volition for ethics and metaethics, and how those domains are situated in general metaphysics should be informed by psychology, neuroscience, and physics. I say should, and by that I mean should if one is to have formulated one’s philosophic concepts correctly and have the best shot at their being correct.

Concerning the concept existence, I think Azzouni (2011) makes a strong case that scientific (and mathematical) changes cannot affect it.* I have not seen such a reflection as his performed on any other philosophical concept. Arguments for axiomatic philosophic propositions such as in my "Randian Axioms and Postulates in Metaphysics" certainly claim the propositions true in every possible context of knowledge. That entails the concepts in those propositions be valid and constant under any possible advance in knowledge. I'll have to let this sink in in my own thinking. I need to consider relative merits of fundamental category systems alternative to Rand's (e.g.).

I suspect actually that it is not only changes in scientific concepts and introduction of new scientific concepts (such as spacetime) that can warrant local changes in philosophic concepts. I suspect that the shift a certain modern philosopher made from being and existence to existence alone and from substance to entity, and from form to identity was much informed and motivated by the modern scientific picture of the world.