Diana Mertz Hsieh Meets The Wall of Hypocrisy

Recommended Posts

George, what Peter copied and pasted (without a citation) appears in a PDF of a monograph at Hsieh's Philosophy Inaction site:

Mind in Objectivism A Survey of Objectivist Commentary on Philosophy of Mind

Diana Mertz Hsieh (diana@dianahsieh.com) 11 January 2003

Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • Replies 309
  • Created
  • Last Reply

Top Posters In This Topic

Oh heavens, Diana got control of Jeb Bush's mind!!!!

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Jeb Bush is eating like a caveman, and he has literally shrunk in size.

Hmmm, sounds like a personal problem...

The former Florida governor, expected to seek the Republican presidential nomination in 2016, is on the popular Paleo diet, which is based on what are believed to be the eating habits of the Paleolithic hunters and gatherers.

For Paleo practitioners, lean meat and fruits and vegetables are in and processed foods, dairy products and sugary delights are out.

For Bush, the results have been noticeable. Late last year he was something of a pudgy doughboy with a full face and soft jawline. Today the 6-foot, 4-inch-tall Bush sports a more chiseled look. His campaign-in-waiting would not say how much he had lost, but he looks to have shed 20 or 30 pounds.

It's all about the shell and nothing about the filling...a very poor pastry choice...Jethro!


Link to comment
Share on other sites

Thanks for answering George's question William. Sorry I am late in responding and sorry for not attributing it in a correct fashion. My saved document did not have the usual Owl or Atlantis heading but I never paid much attention.

I looked it up too and also found:

Mind in Objectivism

A Survey of Objectivist Commentary on Philosophy of Mind

Diana Mertz Hsieh


11 January 2003

Link to comment
Share on other sites

George, what Peter copied and pasted (without a citation) appears in a PDF of a monograph at Hsieh's Philosophy Inaction site:

Mind in Objectivism A Survey of Objectivist Commentary on Philosophy of Mind

Diana Mertz Hsieh (diana@dianahsieh.com) 11 January 2003

Thanks for the cite. That Hsieh published her comments in 2003, before she stabbed Chris Sciabarra in the back to curry favor with ARI, explains why she treated Roger--along with NB and Kelley--fairly. ARI syncophants would not be permitted that kind of commonsense courtesy.


Link to comment
Share on other sites

George, what Peter copied and pasted (without a citation) appears in a PDF of a monograph at Hsieh's Philosophy Inaction site:

Mind in Objectivism A Survey of Objectivist Commentary on Philosophy of Mind

Diana Mertz Hsieh (diana@dianahsieh.com) 11 January 2003

Thanks for the cite. That Hsieh published her comments in 2003, before she stabbed Chris Sciabarra in the back to curry favor with ARI, explains why she treated Roger--along with NB and Kelley--fairly. ARI syncophants would not be permitted that kind of commonsense courtesy.


"Syncophants"? Are they people who synchronize their sycophancy?


Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • 4 years later...

White lies vs. black lies? Noodle soup? These letters might best be understood by philosophy majors. She seems to be an interesting person. I found about 10 old threads where Diana’s name appears or she wrote a letter. Closed up for brevity. Peter

From: Diana M Hsieh To: OWL Subject: OWL: honesty and social construction and personal questions Date: Sun, 14 Jul 2002 11:29:12 -0600 (MDT) A few notes on three different posts:

Eyal Moses wrote: >I think the Objectivist analysis of honesty makes it clear that the answer is yes, people in general should act absolutely honestly. There is no room for personal differences on this.

I agree with Eyal that the virtue of honesty is contextually absolute. If a long-range perspective is taken, faking reality is never in our self-interest in the normal course of life. But there are very difficult personal judgments to be made about honesty, particularly when the question is: How much of this information should I reveal to this particular person at this time?  People committed to honesty struggle with these questions all the time.

For example: Is a father being dishonest in telling his friends that his daughter is "in the hospital" when she is more precisely at the drug rehab center?  When those friends start reasonably inquiring after her illness or injury, then what should the father say?

For example: If your spouse asks you whether you ever fantasize about other women, is it acceptable to refuse to answer the question?  As your spouse, doesn't he/she deserve a truthful answer?  And won't refusing to answer be tantamount to answering "yes"? For example: If you meet a co-worker/friend on her way to the conference room to give an important presentation to some clients and she asks you how she looks, should you tell her that she looks like she hasn't slept in a week?  Is telling her that she looks "fine" dishonest?  Should you deflect the question by saying "Go get 'em!" or some such? In other words, is it acceptable to tell possibly misleading technical truths?  Must we tell the whole truth to some or all people?  Does honesty require is to sacrifice privacy or kindness or other important values?

The failure of traditional accounts of honesty to deal with these questions has opened the door in recent years for defenders of dishonesty (like the very slick David Nyberg).  They argue that full honesty isn't even possible, let alone morally praiseworthy.

In my recent lecture "White Lies, Black Lies" to the TOC Summer Seminar, I addressed these questions in arguing that the standard here ought to be that we tell the contextually-relevant truth.  I gave some primary and secondary criteria for determining that relevant truth, although I'm sure my list is not exhaustive.  That lecture should be available through TOC Live! at some point soon, and my slides from the lecture are available from this page:


BTW, the best in-print discussion of honesty in the Objectivist literature is Tara Smith's _Viable Values_ pages 164-174.

Robert Campbell wrote: >Conclusion: Socially constituted phenomena exist, and we need to take them seriously. Social constructionism, however, isn't needed to explain them. Which is just as well, because it is untenable.

I agree with Robert that social constructionism is false, but that we do need to understand socially constituted phenomena. To self-promote just a bit more, I attempted to do that with respect to norms of masculinity and femininity in my essay "Sex and Gender Through an Egoist Lens: Masculinity and Femininity in the Philosophy of Ayn Rand" in _Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand_.  There I argued that gender norms take on symbolic meaning in a culture (or subculture) and thereby serve as methods of communicating information about our inner selves to others. As egoists, we want to be sure that the norms we adopt are authentic and not harmful to our lives and happiness. (If I were writing that paper again today, I would probably alter and expand upon a number of points, but I think that my basic thesis stands.)

Amy Hayden wrote: >At last year's summer seminar, where I was lecturing about sexual ethics, I was constantly approached by men.  While I had hoped they would want to discuss ethics and philosophy, the majority of the things they had to ask me had to do with my sexual preferences, behavior, and experience.

Having attended the talk, I suspect that Amy got this reaction because her conclusions seemed to rely very heavily upon her own personal experience. That wasn't how she presented her ideas, but the lack of any substantial philosophical justification or citation of relevant psychological research left myself and others with the strong impression that her ideas were basically her own personal opinions.  So it doesn't surprise me that people asked her about her personal experience, as that seemed to be the primary data on which the talk was based.  (I have no doubt that some men were boorish and rude, however.  But that is surely not the explanation for all or likely even most of the inquiries.) diana.


|          diana mertz hsieh *--* diana@dianahsieh.com      |

|               web *--* http://www.dianahsieh.com          |

|               blog *--* http://www.noodlefood.org         |


From: Ram Tobolski To: OWL Subject: OWL: Re: Mind in Objectivism Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2003 19:30:51 +0200

[This is a reply to Diana Mertz Hsieh's post from 1/13. I sent it to Diana off-list a few days ago]

Hi Diana, Following your post at OWL, I've read your essay, and I was much impressed by the scholarly work that you did. This is truly a model example for an "objectivist scholarship". Here are some various comments, related to difficulties that I had with understanding. I hope some of them may be helpful:

1. The term "Humean" causation which you have used several times is strange for me. For example, you wrote: "Efron also warns that adopting a Humean view of causality with respect to the mind (such that "the cause of any event is the occurrence of a preceding physical event")". Hume, as much as I know him, did not hold that view. Such a view could be related to Descartes or to Newton, but Hume's position was that causes (in the sense of "efficient" causes, where one thing has an influence on another thing) do not exist at all. That there are only regularities (which are, more of less, Aristotelian "formal" causes).

2. I did not understand how consciousness can be regarded as an _action_. What could be the related concept of action, the definition of action?

3. A stylistic preference of mine: I feel uneasy with the term 'argues', as in "He argues that the entity-action relationship is different when applied to consciousness than to the physical world". When I encounter the term 'argues' I automatically expect an _argument_; but in fact, what we often get is merely an assertion, without an argument, or only some bits of an argument.

4. Regarding "self-evidence", you wrote: "[Binswanger's] basic approach to the subject, in which fundamental, self-evident facts about consciousness are used to ground an ontology of mind, is a fruitful one". Now I agree that it could be fruitful, heuristically, but I wouldn't want to see any reliance on "self-evidence" in a finished philosophy. In a fundamental philosophy, as I take objectivism to be, nothing is self-evident, in the sense that it doesn't require proof.

5. I didn't really understand your opposition to Binswanger's kind of dualism, as in "Binswanger's advocacy of dualism is strange and startling not just because it stands in opposition to all other Objectivist commentary on philosophy of mind, but also because it destroys the foundation of the mind-body integration so central to the Objectivist epistemology, ethics, and politics". What is that mind-body integration that you take to be central to objectivism, and which is excluded by Binswanger's kind of dualism? Do you think, for example, that consciousness is not a mystery? To me it seems a great, great mystery. I don't understand how anyone can "return to Aristotle" in such a way as if modern science did not happen. How can anyone naively accept Aristotle account on the relation between mind and matter, when his theory of matter was so thoroughly refuted, in a way that made him a symbol of what the scientific revolution was against?

I hope I am not read as rude, or offensive, or reproaching, because that is not my intention. Best, Ram

From: Rafael Eilon To: OWL CC: Diana M Hsieh >, PaleoObjectivist Subject: Re: OWL: Mind in Objectivism Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2003 04:05:55 -0800 (PST)

Hi all, I congratulate Diana M. Hsieh on her survey of Objectivist writings on the philosophy of mind, which is generally well-written, and faithfully represents (with mostly well-based criticism) the views of the various sources. However, I think the picture conveyed by this survey is incomplete: one important position, which is held, so I believe, by many Objectivists, is not well-represented. I mean the position which I would call "physicalist/compatibilist/analytic" (in short: "p/c/a").

One of the sources which Hsieh cites does represent this p/c/a position: Roger E. Bissell's essay, "A Dual-Aspect Approach to the Mind-Body Problem". I admire Bissell very much for coming up with such an advanced theory as early as 1974 (!). Unfortunately, Bissell's essay is the only source that Hsieh seriously misunderstands and misrepresents. The main point of Bissell's position is that mental processes are actually brain processes that can be perceived introspectively, which is the _aspect_ from which they are perceived as mental. Hsieh's misunderstanding consists mainly in thinking that Bissell uses the concept of introspection to define awareness; actually, he only uses it to observe how we become aware of awareness. In other words, Bissell does not say that consciousness _is_ introspection, only that it is _perceived by means_ of introspection; and thus he certainly does not mean that brain processes are the object of consciousness, but simply that certain brain processes _are_ consciousness (and, as such, they are the object of introspection). Misunderstanding this, Hsieh's charges that Bissell's position is circular, and claims that it "inverts the hierarchy of concepts"; but her misunderstanding makes her criticism completely beside the point.

(Note: I have written the above before I became aware of Bissell's earlier (1/17) response to Hsieh's survey. I have now read Bissell's response, but I find nothing essential that I want to change.)

I am here referencing Bissell's essay only with regard to this one important part of the p/c/a position: the relation between the mental and the physical. I haven't yet studied Bissell's application of the Dual-Aspect approach to the free will issue, and I think I have taken a different line from his in defending physicalism against the charge that it is a form of reductionism. I am also concerned whether the mental is sufficiently defined by calling it an "aspect"; if we ask what makes a certain brain process mental, is it just the fact that, for some unspecified reason, it is viewed (or can be viewed) introspectively as mental, or is it something about the process itself that makes it viewable from such an aspect (and then its being mental is not _just_ an aspect). But, anyhow, I find Bissell's central point at least an approximately valid formulation of one essential part of the p/c/a position, namely, that mental processes _are_ physical processes.

I have argued before for the p/c/a position on this forum around 1998, in a discussion with Michael Hardy (unfortunately, this data has been lost, at least to me). I shall now attempt a very concise outline of all three aspects of the p/c/a position, as a candidate for a comprehensive position on the philosophy of mind.

1) Standard materialism, or a mechanistic view, is not the same as the modern _physicalism_. The former position argues that only matter (including mechanical systems) exists, and thus the mind is an illusion (i.e., it is "eliminative"). Physicalism, on the other hand, argues that, ontologically, everything that exists (or happens) is physical, i.e., involves _only_ matter and energy; and that this description applies also to mental states and actions. In other words, in contrast to all those creeds that (explicitly or implicitly) regard the mind as either _non-physical_ or _non-existent_, physicalism regards the mind as _both_ physical _and_ existent. It thus explicitly regards any belief in non-physical entities as superstition, and states unambiguously that, ontologically, _nothing_ is non-physical. (This means, for example, that a brain state or process and the associated mental phenomenon are one and the same thing, ontologically; with the subjective quality of the mental only reflecting _the point of view_ of personal experience; Bissell's point). In the OWL discussion I mentioned above, I used a clarifying formulation and an illustration to make this point, as follows: all the actions of a physical system are physical; for example, if someone said that an automobile is a physical system but its motion down the road is non-physical, no one would take it seriously. Similarly, if we recognize that a human being is a physical system, then we must recognize that _all_ his/her actions--including mental actions--are physical. (At a risk of stating the obvious: here "physical" does not mean "of the muscles" but "of matter and energy").

2) The above does not negate free will; free will is _compatible_ with physicalism, _because_ many of the _physical_ causes of, say, a decision, are actually mental causes. However, since this is not a non-physical account of free will, such a concept of free will does _not_ involve an axiom of uncaused action; it is _compatible_ with overall physical determinism, as also discussed before on this forum (see, for example, my 26 Oct. 2001 post under the title "Questions for Hard Determinists (Spinoza)", which is outside the current archive, but was also posted on Starship Forum under the title "Freewill vs Determinism":

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Starship_Forum/message/192    )

3) This is not reductionism. Saying something like "this chair is composed of nothing but atoms" is not the same as the reductionist claim, which goes something like: "This chair is only atoms, therefore there really is no chair, only atoms." The latter is evidently false. But the former represents the _analytic_ position, which holds that the chair is not _reducible_ to atoms (unless exploded or something), and yet it is _analyzable into_ atomic structures, and _also_ exists and has identity as a whole object; and that this identity derives not only from the atoms themselves but also from their inter-relations and overall structure, but does not imply that anything other than atoms and their combinations must exist to account for the existence of the chair. Similarly, a human being is made of _nothing but_ matter and energy, but has all those characteristics and capabilities that are typical of a human being by virtue of his/her overall structure as a complex system; _not_ because _anything but_ matter and energy goes "into the making" of a human being.

I think the p/c/a position on the philosophy of mind should have been adopted by Objectivism, explicitly, long ago. As it is, the Objectivist position is surrounded by a thick layer of mental fog. OK, mind and body are not separable, but how exactly are they "connected"? As Hsieh's survey shows, views aren't always clear, and differ widely. Most of Hsieh's sources hold that the mind is natural, but not physical; how is that possible? They don't explain, at least not satisfactorily. Hsieh's sources unanimously agree that the mind exists in nature, and that nature is causal; but with the exception of Bissell they all maintain that the mind is somehow capable of uncaused action. How? They don't explain.

These are the questions that Objectivism leaves essentially unanswered. They are questions that only a resolute physicalist position can answer. And they must be answered, if we are to achieve clarity. And clarity must be achieved, if Objectivism is to get anywhere.

I don't believe that polls are a way to establish truth; but I do believe that the fact that a number of people have independently, each by his/her honest effort, reached the same conclusion, carries a great deal of weight. I therefore encourage readers of this forum who agree with the p/c/a position on the philosophy of mind to state their agreement here. Needless to say, criticism is also welcome. Thank you for your attention, Rafael Eilon

From: "Doris Gordon" To: "OWL" Subject: OWL: Re: Aristotle, observation, and experimentation Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2002 23:28:10 -0500 I forwarded  Diana M. Hsieh's 2/4/02 remarks on Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to a friend of mine, Dianne N. Irving for comment.  I'm presuming that Diana and others on OWL will be interested to see her comments.

DMH wrote: The Aristotelian Scholasticism that dominated Europe before the Enlightenment was, in many ways, Aristotelian in name only. Christian thinkers (predominantly Aquinas and his followers) adapted Aristotelian thought to the bizarre doctrines of Christian theology

DNI responded: Hi, Doris --  Well, I would heartily agree with Diana's observations about the deconstruction of Aristotle by Christians -- and, I must add, atheists alike -- although she doesn't seem to acknowledge any of those non-Christian deconstructions of Aristotle.  And I would agree with her that there were and are "bizarre" doctrines of Christian theology -- although she then must admit to any "bizarre" doctrines of many atheists "theologies" as well. Christians are not alone in producing "bizarre" doctrines -- to put it mildly.  The history of philosophy, including and especially that of the Enlightenment, as well as current "dialogues", are replete with "bizarre" doctrines.  Many of them have totally deconstructed the original Aristotle.  So why does she only single out the deconstructions of Aristotle due to Christians?

But she does not seem to be aware that for Thomas philosophy and theology are two different "sciences".  Each has its own subject matter and its own proper method (epistemology).  The subject matter of philosophy for Thomas was NOT God!  There were, however, other philosophers/theologians at the time who did unfortunately conflate philosophy with theology -- and we are still paying dearly for that!  But for Thomas, this is not true, yet I do not "hear" Diana recognize this, or understand the significance of this.

Perhaps Thomas did attempt to adapt Aristotle to his Christian world view, BUT THEN others must too admit of trying to adapt Aristotle to THEIR world views.  Both "adaptations" are just that -- adaptations. NEITHER is the real Aristotle.  The more relevant philosophical question is, do any of these deconstructions work, are they defensible -- scientifically and philosophically -- or are they simply posited?

Because of the way she is approaching the issue, I wonder if perhaps Diana is not aware of her own philosophical prejudices, and how those might affect her own "interpretation" of Aristotle.  After all, the history of philosophy is replete with later philosophers "interpreting" Aristotle through their own lenses coated with the philosophical frameworks and definitions of Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, the mediaeval Islamic philosophers, Hume, Kant, Mill -- even Ayn Rand or Objectivists!  So depending on which presumptive philosophical "lenses" one is wearing, one could quite easily "prejudice one's data", resulting in yet another deconstruction of Aristotle -- and Aristotle would NOT be very appreciative of that!

I would also agree that Aristotle was grossly misinterpreted by "the Scholastics". However, Aquinas was NOT a "scholastic" in either his ontology or his epistemology – and would have surely sided with Diana's complaints.  Aristotle was, indeed, the father of biology, and his scientific method (as practiced in the LIFE sciences, and precisely what I was trained and required to do at the research bench) is still very much based on observation of THINGS OUTSIDE THE MIND FIRST, and then induction -- FOLLOWED BY THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH AND THEN DEDUCTION.  For Aristotle, the starting point of both science and philosophy is IN THE THING OUTSIDE THE MIND.   Once that empirical starting point is lost, e.g., placed inside the mind, then as history has shown it is very difficult if not impossible to "get back outside the mind" to really know reality, or to  apply any legitimately true concepts to reality.

The real Thomas was very much an empirically oriented Aristotelean, although Thomas was not a scientist/biologist like Aristotle.  The historical fact is that for both of them there were only four elements in the material world -- air, earth, fire and water! For Thomas, the STARTING POINT OF DOING PHILOSOPHY was empirical, a posteriori, in the THING outside the mind. His philosophical method was almost identical with Aristotle's scientific method.  He too was fiercely opposed to idealist, rationalist or empiricist deconstructions of "the scientific method" or of "the philosophical method".

I wonder how much Thomas Diana has actually read herself, or how much her knowledge of Thomas' philosophy is based simply on secondary, tertiary or worse renditions/misinterpretations of Thomas -- many of them misinterpretations by Christian thinkers!  One simply cannot read Thomas one's self and come away with a "platonic" interpretation of reality.  And Thomas, like Aristotle, understood quite well the CONSEQUENCES IN THE REAL WORLD of such "reasoning", and wrote around the clock to try to head it off.

Unfortunately, those "scholastics" surrounding Thomas at the time were predominantly Augustinians or similarly educated and trained.  The universities of Paris and Oxford were almost entirely flooded with such "philosophies" and "theologies", and they were definitely "the authorities" – NOT Thomas!  They were, as such,  predominantly Platonists, Neoplatonist’s (i.e. Plotinus), or Latin Averroeists and Avicennians of one sort or another.  Therefore their philosophies and their "scientific methods" were quite different than that of Aristotle -- very rationalistic and erroneous.  It was a priori, where the starting point was with concepts inside the mind, and these concepts were determined to be true or false according to the COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH.  Of course, there are parallel problems with any purely empirical philosophy as well!

Thomas contradicted just about everything he could about these "scholastic" philosophies -- while still trying to draw from them any worthwhile or legitimate concepts that they had offered.  In that he was not "prejudiced".  Because his work was so devastating to these Augustinians, he paid dearly for introducing Aristotle into his philosophy!  In fact, he was excommunicated about 30+ times even before he died!  If ever there was a revolutionary it was Thomas!

So my other concern with Diana's statement is that she has illegitimately grouped Thomas with "the Scholastics".  He might have happened to live during the same historical "period", he might have used the same "question" method of teaching and debating, but most of his philosophy was essentially and inherently COUNTER those Scholastics' philosophies (and therefore their theologies), and more in line with Aristotle rather than with Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, Averroes or Avicenna.  It is also an over-generalization to simply refer to "the Scholastics".  There were virtually dozens of DIFFERENT "scholastic" philosophies AND theologies -- although they did tend, as I said, to fall into the Platonic/Plotinus, etc. categories sooner or later.  And those "Christian" philosophers and theologians who followed Thomas, and who claimed to interpret Thomas, also "read" him through prejudiced "lenses", resulting in an enormous deconstruction of Thomas' Aristotelianism within Christianity itself.  This problem remains true today as well.

While it is true that a "real" scientist -- i.e., a life scientist -- MUST use Aristotle's empirically oriented a posteriori scientific method, it is also true that both Aristotle and Thomas were woefully outdated in their "science".  That puts a terrible burden on any Aristotelean or any Thomist - indeed, any empiricist or Objectivist.  As I have demonstrated in my dissertation (the two Appendices especially), if the empirical Aristotle and if the empirical Thomas were alive today, and if they had access to the correct science (no small "if"!) as the legitimate starting point of doing their philosophies, then they would have had to argue for immediate personhood -- or else they would have violated the premises and conclusions of the rest of their entire philosophical systems.  This is precisely what I had to demonstrate in the Appendices in my dissertation -- surely too long to go into here.

In the process of writing my dissertation, and in teaching the history of philosophy for so many years, I have learned an important lesson -- especially given my interests in the history of philosophy.  No heroes!  No philosopher was all right, no philosopher was all wrong.  That goes for both Aristotle and Thomas!  And it should also go for any Objectivist philosophers.  All philosophy must "regroup" in light of the most current and accurate empirical data about reality -- that is, if they are really interested in explaining reality.

It seems to me that it would be as fruitless to deconstruct Aristotle for Christian  purposes as it would be to  construct Aristotle for Objectivist purposes - right?  Let Aristotle speak for himself, and people must read Aristotle's original treatises first themselves.  No secondary or tertiary sources! But don't make Aristotle, or anyone, an absolute "hero".  It just doesn't work in philosophy.  And don't deconstruct Aristotle even for Objectivist purposes.

All philosophers have at least an intellectual obligation to admit the pros and cons of ANY philosophical theory -- ancient, mediaeval, modern or contemporary --, and then DO THEIR OWN THINKING instead of "appealing to the authority" of Aristotle, Ayn Rand, or any one else.  THAT is doing philosophy.

Of course, if one's purpose is to simply take bits and pieces of any philosopher's system that is available in order to pursue one's own non-philosophical agenda, then these are not truly philosophers, but rather sophists. :-)  We have enough of those, and enough damage has been caused.  Ranting about the "Christianizing" of any philosopher is not doing philosophy;  it is USING philosophy --  for ulterior purposes. Best, Dianne

Doris Gordon, Libertarians for Life -- If you find any serious or fatal flaws there, please let me know.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now