One true philosophy or not

[Dglgmut]

John, can you please answer, if we are born blank slates, what it is we base our choices on?

This question is the same as asking how conscious could exist without reality, yet the Objectivist answer is different for some reason in that scenario.

[anthony]

I do think you should correct "rational faculty", 'cos now it is springing up all over. Objectively it's a contradiction in terms. Xray was right - I do agree with her sometimes - that a faculty can be innate. It is an 'aptitude' after all. But she somehow missed your central point that rationality is tabula rasa. This is 100% true. Rand used "cognitive faculty", not ever as far as I know, "rational faculty".

Rationality isn't any better in my opinion. If it's an "aptitute", how can it be tabula rasa? Tabula rasa is the memory for the faculty. I'm talking about the conceptual memory that is blank. Rand used the term rational faculty, but I don't think she was *that* picky about words. It's clear what she meant anyway for anyone who uses the interpretation that makes sense rather than one that is so obviously wrong that you'd have to believe Rand was a moron to consider it.

I imagine having a turbo-charged eight-cylinder engine at one's disposal at birth: the human brain possesses the faculty (aptitude) of cognition.

However, there is no certainty and guarantee that one can design and build the rest of the vehicle, learn to drive it skilfully, and win at Le Mans.

Rationality requires purpose, choice and effort.

Faculty is the "potential" of the engine, which does not contain the potential of driving it - or, the engine contains no concepts or "conceptual memory", of what it is 'supposed to be' ... and achieve.

The designer/engineer/driver/navigator decides, according to reality and his life.

(Stretched the metaphor as far as I can!)

That Rand used "rational faculty" is surprising to me. I have found her extremely precise on words and terms.

"Man is born with an emotional mechanism, just as he is born with a cognitive mechanism;

but at birth, BOTH are 'tabula rasa'. It is man's cognitive faculty, his mind, that determines the content of both." [VoS]

[john42t]

I imagine having a turbo-charged eight-cylinder engine at one's disposal at birth: the human brain possesses the faculty (aptitude) of cognition.

However, there is no certainty and guarantee that one can design and build the rest of the vehicle, learn to drive it skilfully, and win at Le Mans.

Rationality requires purpose, choice and effort.

Faculty is the "potential" of the engine, which does not contain the potential of driving it - or, the engine contains no concepts or "conceptual memory", of what it is 'supposed to be' ... and achieve.

The designer/engineer/driver/navigator decides, according to reality and his life.

(Stretched the metaphor as far as I can!)

We two probably still have a slightly different model that reflects in our choice of words. "Faculty" and "engine" seem interchangable to me.

Also, I wouldn't say I drive that engine... I *am* that engine. The thing that is most fundamentally me is the rational/cognitive faculty. Of course I'm also my legs, but it's possible to lose them and go on. It's possible to lose eye sight and go on. It's possible to lose various instincts and go on. Everything else that is vital could conceivably be replaced by advanced technology. But the rational faculty, or it's memory to be precise, is the thing that defines me in such a way that losing it would be nothing less than death by any reasonable standard.

That Rand used "rational faculty" is surprising to me. I have found her extremely precise on words and terms.

Hmmm...

Of course she was precice, at least compared to any other philosopher (which isn't difficult), but you still have to make an effort of digging into what she actually understood by various words. The cool thing about her is that she would take a word and arrive at the best possible definition that reflects current usage or connotation and practicality. If practicality isn't possible, the word would go into her anti-concept bin. That resonates very strongly with what I've been doing all my life and I usually approve of her choices.

But then neither rational faculty nor cognitive faculty nor rationality have a accepted meaning that is exact enough for our purposes.

"Man is born with an emotional mechanism, just as he is born with a cognitive mechanism;

but at birth, BOTH are 'tabula rasa'. It is man's cognitive faculty, his mind, that determines the content of both." [VoS]

Put that way, you could believe she really meant that you can't feel pain unless the mind has an opinion about it. She didn't mean that, did she?

Am I fooling myself? Do I believe that she didn't mean it because I want to agree with her, but couldn't otherwise?

[Brant Gaede]

Rand's grossly distorting simplification of the brain's development is only valuable as a point of reference or an Objectivist benchmark, if you will.

--Brant

[Xray]

I define it [Objectvism] as the one, true philosophy.

This is not a definition but a personal value judgement voicing what this philosophy means to you. It's bit like saying "Jane is my one, true love, the most wonderful woman on earth."

Not a bit. The analogy would be "I define the name Jane to refer to whomever is my one, true love." Which is a confusing and impractical definition, but perfectly valid.

Jane is not defined in this example. Instead a personal value judgement is attributed to her.

Just like stating that potato salad is my all-time favorite dish does not define what potato salad is. It merely informs the discussion partner what potato salad means to me personally.

What I'm getting at: The term "true" used in statements about personal preferences does not have an epistemological function. It has the function of emphasizing the personal value someone/something has to an individual.

This 'emphatic' function of "true" exists in German as well: just think of colloquial German phrases like "Fussball ist das einzig Wahre!" ('Soccer is the one, true thing!')

[Xray]: When one speaks of "philosophy" without the indefinite article, it is used as a general term, as the general category When philosophy is used with an article or the genitive, it refers to a specific philosophy (like e. g. "The philosophy of Immanuel Kant", "William Occam's philosophy of nominalism").

The implicit assumption being that you do not need a word for the one that is actually true. Because you believe there is no such thing as the true philosophy.

As I have pointed out on the thread from which the discussion has been taken over to here: since a philosophy is composed of many statements, to claim truth for the complete philosophy implies truth of all statements made there.

I can't think of any philosopher not having been in error about some facts, and therefore can't see evidence of any such thing as the true philosophy (as a complete package).

I do believe though that a philosophy can contain several truths.

[Dglgmut]

Even in the hypothetical situation of someone having their memory wiped completely... the first choices, the first actions, could not be based in rationality. When is the flip? How do we transition from being completely irrational by default, to being rational?

A choice doesn't start with a choice, it starts with options. You can't choose which options you have, only which one of the options you'd like to go with. You honestly think people choose to be irrational? That they think to themselves, "What is best for me?" and they choose an option that is less attractive than any others?

And if you say that the problem is that they don't ask themselves that question (or enough), then I ask... Why?

Why is introspection so rational, especially when happiness is not your purpose for reason?

And how can you separate intelligence from rationality? Intelligence is the combination of experience, memory, and REASON. Rationality is choosing to use reason... but reason is a fundamental part of how we make choices!

Reason is not a tool, it's a force. Your options are limited by your mental capabilities and reality, but within the span of the options you are aware of, reason directs your choices as water forces a fishing bobber to rise and fall over waves.

You ever convince yourself not to do something and feel lucky afterwards that you reconsidered? Well, you were lucky.

We are often forced to make choices we aren't prepared for. We were born unprepared, and the preparedness can only come from experience. Our experience, or what we remember of it, makes us aware of more options in future, related scenarios.

[Brant Gaede]

Even in the hypothetical situation of someone having their memory wiped completely... the first choices, the first actions, could not be based in rationality. When is the flip? How do we transition from being completely irrational by default, to being rational?

A choice doesn't start with a choice, it starts with options. You can't choose which options you have, only which one of the options you'd like to go with. You honestly think people choose to be irrational? That they think to themselves, "What is best for me?" and they choose an option that is less attractive than any others?

And if you say that the problem is that they don't ask themselves that question (or enough), then I ask... Why?

Why is introspection so rational, especially when happiness is not your purpose for reason?

And how can you separate intelligence from rationality? Intelligence is the combination of experience, memory, and REASON. Rationality is choosing to use reason... but reason is a fundamental part of how we make choices!

Reason is not a tool, it's a force. Your options are limited by your mental capabilities and reality, but within the span of the options you are aware of, reason directs your choices as water forces a fishing bobber to rise and fall over waves.

You ever convince yourself not to do something and feel lucky afterwards that you reconsidered? Well, you were lucky.

We are often forced to make choices we aren't prepared for. We were born unprepared, and the preparedness can only come from experience. Our experience, or what we remember of it, makes us aware of more options in future, related scenarios.

Look, you can make your interesting observations about this and that and that I'll embrace, but don't go didactic on us about Objectivism--why? You don't know it.

--Brant

[Dglgmut]

If I'm trying to make you aware of anything it's the process an outsider may go through when introduced to your nontraditional philosophy.

I'm sorry if my posts seem preachy, I guess I do it to get critical responses.

I do appreciate what a lot of people say here, if not right away.

But I don't think I made any presumptions about Objectivism in that last post!

[Brant Gaede]

If I'm trying to make you aware of anything it's the process an outsider may go through when introduced to your nontraditional philosophy.

I'm sorry if my posts seem preachy, I guess I do it to get critical responses.

I do appreciate what a lot of people say here, if not right away.

But I don't think I made any presumptions about Objectivism in that last post!

That's right. But "Brant Remembers!"

--Brant

[Xray]

Just curious, why is ants building an anthill any different than an innate sense of duty in humans?

Xray:

See what I mean?

This kind of talk is what prompted Rand to talk about the issue at all.

John:

Sometimes I have the feeling that poster Calvin (Dglgmut) is pulling our leg with questions like in the above quote.

Calvin:

You don't seriously believe that ants have an innate sense of duty, do you?

Or is your comment directed toward starting a discussion about "collectivism" where the ant state serves as a role model?

The ant hill example is quite good though to refute Rand's "ought from is" claim. Her theory is that if e. g. a fish is to survive, it "ought to" live in water. This is wrong. The fish must live in water if it is to survive. The alternative of choice suggested by the "ought to" does not exist.

Same goes for the ant. If it is to survive, it must live the way ants do. Again, there is no alternative. A worker ant does not possess the choice to act other than as a worker ant, etc.

Rand's trying to borrow from biology in order to transfer an "ought from is" to her moral system has failed because it was built on a wrong premise.

Why she needs the "ought to" for her ethics is quite obvious: For to demand that people morally "must" do this or that would go against the idea of individualism. A moral "must" is also too close to the idea of moral duty.

I do ask myself though how a catalog of moral values and virtues (accompanied by the requirement to "pronounce moral judgement") can do without the idea of moral duty. (?)

In other words, can't one say that Objectivists have the (moral) duty to be rational? I know this sounds heretic in view of Rand's take on duty, but then I'm not really convinced whether constantly having to ask oneself if one's acts meet the requirements of a moral catalog isn't connected with the idea of moral duty (even if the term duty isn't explicitly used).

[Xray]

Quite the contrary, incredible wealth in the hands of moral individuals is a blessing.

[Xray]:

Do you connote "moral" also with having a social consciousness?

Hell no, I equate it with rational.

There have been many discussions about this here on OL. The problem with the equation is that "rational" is a cognitive, not a moral category.

If you equate the moral with the rational, then the immoral is the irrational, right?

But is a person who e. g. acts irrationally an 'immoral' person?

And is a person acting rationally to achieve a goal a 'moral' person, no matter what the goal?

"Rational" very often goes toward assessing and choosing adequate means to achieve a goal. For example, to believe one can climb Mount Everest wearing sandals is irrational because sandals are an inadequate means to achieve the goal.

But this has nothing to do with being 'immoral'. Nor am I 'moral' in rationally assessing that I just don't possess certain faculties, like e. g. a talent for sewing.

[john42t]

There have been many discussions about this here at OL. The problem with the equation is that "rational" is a cognitive, not a moral category.

If you equate the moral with the rational, then the immoral is the irrational, right?

But is a person who e. g. acts irrationally an 'immoral' person?

And is a person acting rationally to achieve a goal a 'moral' person, no matter what the goal?

3x yes.

There is no moral category beside the rational/cognitive.

"Rational" very often goes toward assessing and choosing adequate means to achieve a goal. For example, to believe one can climb Mount Everest wearing sandals is irrational because sandals are an inadequate means to achieve the goal.

The attempt is likely to result in tears, potentially death. So it was indeed immoral.

But this has nothing to do with being 'immoral'. Nor was I 'moral' in rationally realizing that I just don't possess certain faculties, like e. g. a talent for sewing.

If that realization is correct, it's also moral.

I know it sounds weird and I'm not normally a fan of using peculiar definitions, but the term "morality" is probably the most important of all those you would have reason to fight over. I can't surrender that one.

Let's try it this way: Name one deed you'd consider immoral that doesn't involve someone else. If you can't, it implies you restrict the term to dealings with other people. Morality would depend on others, which is the altruist premise.

[EDIT: "Sometimes I have the feeling that poster Calvin (Dglgmut) is pulling our leg with questions like in the above quote. " If he's trolling, I'm impressed.]

[Xray]

There have been many discussions about this here at OL. The problem with the equation is that "rational" is a cognitive, not a moral category.

If you equate the moral with the rational, then the immoral is the irrational, right?

But is a person who e. g. acts irrationally an 'immoral' person?

And is a person acting rationally to achieve a goal a 'moral' person, no matter what the goal?

3x yes.

But in that case you would have to call e. g. a bank robber 'moral' if he achieves his goal: succesfully carrying out a perfectly prepared bank robbery.

"Rational" very often goes toward assessing and choosing adequate means to achieve a goal. For example, to believe one can climb Mount Everest wearing sandals is irrational because sandals are an inadequate means to achieve the goal.

The attempt is likely to result in tears, potentially death. So it was indeed immoral.

You regard being cognitively mistaken about facts as immoral then? For this follows from your premise:

"There is no moral category beside the rational/cognitive" (john42t)

But this has nothing to do with being 'immoral'. Nor was I 'moral' in rationally realizing that I just don't possess certain faculties, like e. g. a talent for sewing.

If that realization is correct, it's also moral.

I know it sounds weird and I'm not normally a fan of using peculiar definitions, but the term "morality" is probably the most important of all those you would have reason to fight over. I can't surrender that one.

And I was tempted to suggest that you use Occam's razor and drop either the term morality or rationality if you regard them as interchangeable.

[Dglgmut]

You regard being cognitively mistaken about facts as immoral then? For this follows from your premise:

"There is no moral category beside the rational/cognitive" (john42t)

Good point.

And about the anthill analogy, you're right. I think I brought it up just to point out the extent of biological automation. Unconscious cooperation just doesn't make sense, and it's existence should rightfully bring up a lot of questions. Not to jump to any conclusions...

[john42t]

There have been many discussions about this here at OL. The problem with the equation is that "rational" is a cognitive, not a moral category.

If you equate the moral with the rational, then the immoral is the irrational, right?

But is a person who e. g. acts irrationally an 'immoral' person?

And is a person acting rationally to achieve a goal a 'moral' person, no matter what the goal?

3x yes.

But in that case you would have to call e. g. a bank robber 'moral' if he achieves his goal: succesfully carrying out a perfectly prepared bank robbery.

Which is a rational goal if it's part of the larger goal of going to prison.

Which is a rational goal if it's part of the larger goal of being lonely, alienated, poor and raped.

Which is a rational goal if it's part of the larger goal of dying.

Which it isn't.

You regard being cognitively mistaken about facts as immoral then? For this follows from your premise:

"There is no moral category beside the rational/cognitive" (john42t)

Would you consider being cognitively mistaken about facts as irrational?

If so, I'll follow you with my definition with morality.

I'm unsure about my preference.

And I was tempted to suggest that you use Occam's razor and drop either the term morality or rationality if you regard them as interchangeable.

I need to use the word "morality" because its accepted meaning is "what one ought to do" (or so). Rationality is defined by a different essential. Dropping the words would make it more difficult for me to communicate that I consider those essentials to yield the same concept.

[anthony]

"Man is born with an emotional mechanism, just as he is born with a cognitive mechanism; but at birth, BOTH are 'tabula rasa'. It is man's cognitive faculty, his mind, that determines the content of both." [VoS]

Put that way, you could believe she really meant that you can't feel pain unless the mind has an opinion about it. She didn't mean that, did she? Am I fooling myself? Do I believe that she didn't mean it because I want to agree with her, but couldn't otherwise?

Not an "opinion about pain", exactly.

Remember that "Emotions are the *automatic* results of man's value-judgments integrated by his subconscious."

Emotions are an involuntary consequence of the mind subconsciously judging itself - is my clumsy interpretation on it.

Continuing with Rand: "In psychological terms, the issue of man's survival does not confront his consciousness as an issue of "life or death", but as an issue of "happiness or suffering". Happiness is the successful state of life, suffering is the warning signal of failure, of death. Just as the pleasure-pain mechanism of man's body is an automatic indicator of his body's welfare or injury...so the emotional mechanism of man's consciousness is geared to perform the same function ... by means of two basic emotions: joy, or suffering."

Tony

[anthony]

The ant hill example is quite good though to refute Rand's "ought from is" claim. Her theory is that if e. g. a fish is to survive, it "ought to" live in water. This is wrong. The fish must live in water if it is to survive. The alternative of choice suggested by the "ought to" does not exist. Same goes for the ant. If it is to survive, it must live the way ants do. Again, there is no alternative. A worker ant does not possess the choice to act other than as a worker ant, etc. Rand's trying to borrow from biology in order to transfer an "ought from is" to her moral system has failed because it was built on a wrong premise. Why she needs the "ought to" for her ethics is quite obvious: For to demand that people morally "must" do this or that would go against the idea of individualism. A moral "must" is also too close to the idea of moral duty. .

"Rand's trying to borrow from biology" is untrue. With the fish, or whatever, Rand was 'borrowing from analogy'.

We go back again to Man's Nature. Rand was a philosopher, which meant she concerned herself with the metaphysical nature of man - not his physical being.

Do you accept that man is a being of volitional consciousness?

That he is an autonomous, independent organism?

If so, he must, should - he ought to do nothing else - act upon this (metaphysical) nature, to its maximum. Except he can evade his reality, unlike a fish.

The 'ought',derives from the 'is'.

After that, comes his epistemology, and then his morality of rational egoism.

Your clever word-play of a distinction she's supposed to have made between "ought to" and "must", in order to expose Rand for avoiding

"moral duty"- to arrive at her individualism - is laughable and an insult to your readers' intelligence, as well as to her intellectual integrity.

I know you know better, Xray.

[Xray]

Rand's trying to borrow from biology" is untrue. With the fish, or whatever, Rand was 'borrowing from analogy'.

An analogy she (in the fish case) took from biology.

Biology played a crucial role in Rand's philosophy:

http://www.troynovan...and-Ethics.html

Rand's most basic statement on ethics is that "It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible" (John Galt's speech in Atlas Shrugged; quoted in The Virtue of Selfishness). She views valuing as a function of a living organism; and she asserts that "the functions of all living organisms ... are actions generated by the organism itself and directed to a single goal: the maintenance of the organism's life" ("The Objectivist Ethics", in The Virtue of Selfishness; quoted further below). Based on this, she identifies the organism's life as its standard of value, and she amplifies the organism's life as meaning "that which is required for the organism's survival."

[john42t]

The ant hill example is quite good though to refute Rand's "ought from is" claim. Her theory is that if e. g. a fish is to survive, it "ought to" live in water. This is wrong. The fish must live in water if it is to survive. The alternative of choice suggested by the "ought to" does not exist.

The alternative choice does exist. It can also die. This is the *whole* point of the idea of the mystics: That they are working on death-premises.

Rand's trying to borrow from biology in order to transfer an "ought from is" to her moral system has failed because it was built on a wrong premise.

Why she needs the "ought to" for her ethics is quite obvious: For to demand that people morally "must" do this or that would go against the idea of individualism. A moral "must" is also too close to the idea of moral duty.

The idea that an individual *must* work for a living goes against the idea of individualism?

And this is close to the idea of moral duty?

I do ask myself though how a catalog of moral values and virtues (accompanied by the requirement to "pronounce moral judgement") can do without the idea of moral duty. (?)

This is a different kind of duty. It's the kind in "Nature, to be commanded, is to be obeyed." It's the kind where the software developer *must* comply with the language rules or else his code won't compile. It's the "tyranny of reality".

This has nothing to do with duty-ethics.

I'm sure that there are some "Objectivists" who don't get this and are honest for honesty's sake, diligent for diligence's sake and condemn people as a sacrifice to Rand or Objectivism as an end in themselves. Rand was not promoting any of this and they are as mistaken as you are.

Actually I take that back - you are less mistaken because you only think Objectivism to be impractical rather than trying to live the impractical. That is much better.

I've lied, I've been lazy, I've been a coward, I betrayed values I held dear. And I should have known better.

I regret many things, but only because I see a connection between those things and my happiness.

To make that abundantly clear: I regret those things in exactly the same way that I regret programming errors I made. The intensity of the regret is proportional to the damage caused, but there is no conceptual difference. In both cases I appreciate what I learned from the mistake. And if there was no damange I have nothing to regret.

The catalog is justified point by point and each point stands and falls with the justification. Rand lied in her life (to get out of Russia, if that accusation is true). She accepted medicare, thereby jeopardizing independence (if this accusation is true). She often failed to pronounce judgement when she wanted to profit from people.

None of these "violations of the catalog" are in any way a contradiction to her philosophy and I have no reason to assume them to be anything but perfectly selfish.

[anthony]

Rand's trying to borrow from biology" is untrue. With the fish, or whatever, Rand was 'borrowing from analogy'.

An analogy she (in the fish case) took from biology. Biology played a crucial role in Rand's philosophy:

http://www.troynovan...and-Ethics.html Rand's most basic statement on ethics is that "It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible" (John Galt's speech in Atlas Shrugged; quoted in The Virtue of Selfishness). She views valuing as a function of a living organism; and she asserts that "the functions of all living organisms ... are actions generated by the organism itself and directed to a single goal: the maintenance of the organism's life" ("The Objectivist Ethics", in The Virtue of Selfishness; quoted further below). Based on this, she identifies the organism's life as its standard of value, and she amplifies the organism's life as meaning "that which is required for the organism's survival."

William H. Stoddard at least presents some thoughtful criticism - in the quick read I had of the essay.

I think he also doesn't get it - with the biology-analogy for metaphysics.

And he makes that common error of trying to find hidden meaning in one, single scene of Atlas Shrugged.

Many fiction readers can't seem to see the forest for the trees. Especially with Rand: she was an artist/author, as well as philosopher.

WHS:

"...and she amplifies [?] the organism's life as meaning "that which is required for the organism's survival"." - is a meaningless tautology.

Life is required for survival?

You get misinterpretation, from critics, and then sometimes deliberate misrepresentation; I think Stoddard's the first category - he does make an effort to understand.

[anthony]

I do ask myself though how a catalog of moral values and virtues (accompanied by the requirement to "pronounce moral judgement") can do without the idea of moral duty. (?)

This is a different kind of duty. It's the kind in "Nature, to be commanded, is to be obeyed." It's the kind where the software developer *must* comply with the language rules or else his code won't compile. It's the "tyranny of reality". This has nothing to do with duty-ethics.

Quite. It's too easy to forget the extent to which 'normal', imperative ethics has insinuated itself in the "Zeitgeist"- with duty to people, or to an Authority. It is not going anywhere, either, it's here to stay.

(Which is the greatest obstacle to the growth of Objectivism, as far as I'm concerned.)

Bacon's "Nature, to be commanded, must be.." is the key, as you say.

That's man's sole duty, to 'obey' nature, including his own nature - as he simultaneously, or eventually, learns to command it.

I do take it for granted that this is known to OL'ers, who should - but don't always -understand, that reality is the only authority in Objectivism.

Informing other people is hard enough...

[Xray]

The ant hill example is quite good though to refute Rand's "ought from is" claim. Her theory is that if e. g. a fish is to survive, it "ought to" live in water. This is wrong. The fish must live in water if it is to survive. The alternative of choice suggested by the "ought to" does not exist.

The alternative choice does exist. It can also die. This is the *whole* point of the idea of the mystics: That they are working on death-premises.

No, the alternative choice does not exist in the statement phrased "The fish must live in water if it is to survive." That is, the fish does not have the alternative to survive by not living in water.

Another example: If you are to survive, you must take in fluids.You don't have the alternative to survive without taking in fluids.

And is a person acting rationally to achieve a goal a 'moral' person, no matter what the goal?

You answered with "Yes".

But in that case you would have to call e. g. a bank robber 'moral' if he achieves his goal: succesfully carrying out a perfectly prepared bank robbery.

Which is a rational goal if it's part of the larger goal of going to prison.

Let's assume it is part of the larger goal to get away with it and the bank robber successfully reaches this goal, then, going by your above principles, he would have acted rationally and therefore be a moral person since you equate the rational with the moral.

Actually anyone succesfully achieiving a goal would then be both rational and moral, no matter what the goal (see my above question to you, to which you replied with "yes").

See how fast one can land in ethical quicksand if one equates the rational with the moral?

Not to be misunderstood: I do think rationality is essential for establishing an ethics, but that additional elements have to be built in as well.

A huge problem in ethics is the difficulty to establish "moral universals", as one could call them. By moral universals, I mean moral values that have always been held in high esteem throughout the history of mankind and whose violation has always been severely condemned by all societies throughout history.

The result is sobering enough. What can objectively be noted is that many 'moral' (often dowright inhuman!) systems exist, and while they may well be subject to change, to distill moral universals valid over all time seems to be impossible.

Like values, morality seems to be contextual. Take homicide as a drastic example. It is regarded as severe, immoral crime in most, but not in all contexts. In wars for example, soldiers can get decorated for killing.

On the other hand, in modern society ethics is evolving toward more humanity.

It would interest me whether one can at least agree on certain ethical principles universally valid for our current civilized society?

I'm looking for statements to which it is difficult to object, like "It is of high ethical value not to inflict unnecessary suffering onto others". Would such 'pathocentric ethics' serve at least as a fundament? Like the primum non nocere in medicine, a moral primary not to inflict unnecessary suffering could provide an essential basis for ethics imo.

[anthony]

The ant hill example is quite good though to refute Rand's "ought from is" claim. Her theory is that if e. g. a fish is to survive, it "ought to" live in water. This is wrong. The fish must live in water if it is to survive. The alternative of choice suggested by the "ought to" does not exist.

The alternative choice does exist. It can also die. This is the *whole* point of the idea of the mystics: That they are working on death-premises.

No, the alternative choice does not exist in the statement phrased "The fish must live in water if it is to survive." That is, the fish does not have the alternative to survive by not living in water. Another example: If you are to survive, you must take in fluids.You don't have the alternative to survive without taking in fluids.

And is a person acting rationally to achieve a goal a 'moral' person, no matter what the goal?

You answered with "Yes".

But in that case you would have to call e. g. a bank robber 'moral' if he achieves his goal: succesfully carrying out a perfectly prepared bank robbery.

Which is a rational goal if it's part of the larger goal of going to prison.

Let's assume it is part of the larger goal to get away with it and the bank robber successfully reaches this goal, then, going by your above principles, he would have acted rationally and therefore be a moral person since you equate the rational with the moral. Actually anyone succesfully achieiving a goal would then be both rational and moral, no matter what the goal (see my above question to you, to which you replied with "yes"). See how fast one can land in ethical quicksand if one equates the rational with the moral? Not to be misunderstood: I do think rationality is essential for establishing an ethics, but that additional elements have to be built in as well. A huge problem in ethics is the difficulty to establish "moral universals", ...

John,

I was wondering how long it would take for this to happen!

You allow in one false premise, and it comes back to bite you on the you-know-what.

Rationality equates to morality - which implies values, virtues and ultimate goals.

A bank robber cannot be rational, by definition.

"Value is that which one acts to gain or keep. Virtue is the action by which one gains and keeps it."

(It sounds circular, but it isn't.)

"To live, man must hold 3 things as the supreme and ruling values of his life:- Reason, Purpose, Self-esteem."

These 3 Values imply and require ALL of man's Virtues, and all of his virtues pertain to the relation of Existence and Consciousness.ie, Rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, pride."

The bank-robber. His value is living off other peoples' wealth. A non-value. His virtues are also null: no rationality (logic, yes, as I've pointed out), no honesty, no independence, integrity, productiveness, nor pride.

All of them are the objectively rational definitions, the egoistic ones. For example, by honesty, O'ists don't mean being truthful to others - primarily- we mean not faking reality to ourselves (prior to anyone else coming into it.)

Therefore, a rationally-moral action toward an irrational goal is self-contradictory - and impossible.

The end does not justify the means, and the means do not justify the end.

This is of high importance to make clear. Otherwise the straw man of rational morality being "doing what pleases you anytime" gets shoved at us. As usual.

Excuse me telling you stuff you know very well, but I get weary of strawman arguments.

(In winter, is that a 'snowman argument'?)

Tony

[john42t]

Let's assume it is part of the larger goal to get away with it and the bank robber successfully reaches this goal, then, going by your above principles, he would have acted rationally and therefore be a moral person since you equate the rational with the moral.

Actually anyone succesfully achieiving a goal would then be both rational and moral, no matter what the goal (see my above question to you, to which you replied with "yes").

See how fast one can land in ethical quicksand if one equates the rational with the moral?

I don't believe that this is possible, so we're talking about a ficticious world.

It's like saying: Let's assume that there is a God who will punish you unless you sacrifice your son, would it then not be rational to comply?

The answer is yes. But meaningless.

I would interest me whether one can at least agree on certain ethical principles universally valid for our current civilized society?

I'm looking for statements to which it is difficult to object, like "It is of high ethical value not to inflict unnecessary suffering onto others". Would such 'pathocentric ethics' serve at least as a fundament?

This is the core of our differences. I severely reject such a fundament and the fact that they have been universal to most societies is the reason why it took mankind so long to get where we are. It's a fundament similar to the ones of Communism (in the end we're all equal), of the dark ages (the worst will be rewarded) and of all the rest of what's wrong with the world.

If it's any consolation to you, I don't intentionally cause unnecessary suffering to others. But I don't think many do.

If it's any consolation to you, I believe a world free of wars, free of crime, free of poverty, free of sick malice is desirable. I believe most think so.

Those things are so trivially common opinion, there's no need to even spell them out.

But I am convinced that your premise (which is very common, even here on OL), are supporting the evil, not the good.

This core premise, the "do-gooder" premise if you will, is what I fear more than any religious nuttery.

This is of high importance to make clear. Otherwise the straw man of rational morality being "doing what pleases you anytime" gets shoved at us. As usual.

Excuse me telling you stuff you know very well, but I get weary of strawman arguments.

The difference you make is important to oneself, but dangerous in communication with others. When you talk about virtues of integrity and honesty, others all to easily assume that you promote them for their own sake.

They will then agree with you, although there's no actual agreement.

The primary, fundamental part of morality is rationality. If someone considers a robber career, it should be argued how that will destroy his life rather than any lectures on how it hurts others - that is the honest way of dealing with people. Contrast this to the crap that is taught to innocent children.

Those who teach children that virtues are to protect others from them don't misunderstand Objectivism. They sometimes understand it very well in that regard, and deep down they fear it to be true.

[Xray]

"Man is born with an emotional mechanism, just as he is born with a cognitive mechanism; but at birth, BOTH are 'tabula rasa'. It is man's cognitive faculty, his mind, that determines the content of both." [VoS]

Put that way, you could believe she really meant that you can't feel pain unless the mind has an opinion about it. She didn't mean that, did she? Am I fooling myself? Do I believe that she didn't mean it because I want to agree with her, but couldn't otherwise?

Not an "opinion about pain", exactly.

Remember that "Emotions are the *automatic* results of man's value-judgments integrated by his subconscious."

Emotions are an involuntary consequence of the mind subconsciously judging itself - is my clumsy interpretation on it.

My dog has emotions too. Are its emotions "automatic results of value-judgemnts integrated by its subconscious? Is the dog's mind 'subconsciously judging itself' when the animal expresses joy at being fed and taken for a walk?

As for man's emotional and cognitive mechanisms being tabula rasa at birth, research contradicts this:

Example: http://www.ncbi.nlm....pubmed/10531533