Nathaniel Branden on Mind-Body and the Dual-Aspect Theory


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This is the story of my and Bill Dwyer's discussion with Nathaniel Branden about the Mind-Body Problem and the Dual-Aspect Theory of Mind...reb

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Back in 1997 on the Objectivism-L list, there was a discussion of Nathaniel Branden's new book The Art of Living Consciously. Ken Barnes kicked off the discussion on September 13 with some brief remarks under the heading "An Underlying Reality." Ken wrote:

...beginning on page 200 Branden gets into a discussion of the ultimate 'stuff' of reality. Briefly, the mystical traditions conclude that this ultimate 'stuff' is consciousness or mind. On the other hand, materialists say that all that exists is matter and its motions, and that all phenomena of consciousness can ultimately be reduced to these motions. To reconcile these positions Branden posits an underlying reality of which both matter and consciousness are manifestations.

Then Barnes quoted this passage by Branden:

Metaphysically, mind and matter are different. But if they are different in every respect, the problem of explaining their interaction seems insuperable. How can mind influence matter and matter influence mind if they have absolutely nothing in common? And yet, that such reciprocal influence exists seems inescapable...Without going into details, I will suggest a possible way out. There is nothing inherently illogical—nothing that contradicts the rest of our knowledge—in positing some underlying reality of which both matter and consciousness are manifestations. The advantage of such a hypothesis is that it provides a means to resolve a problem that has troubled philosophers for centuries—”the mind-body problem,” the problem of accounting for the interaction of consciousness and physical reality. If they have a common source, then they do have a point of commonality that makes their ability to interact less puzzling. How we would test this hypothesis, or provide justification for it, is another question.' (Branden 1997, 201-2)

I was intrigued and posted the following comments on September 17, 1997:

I've read this excerpt several times already, and each time I do, I can't help but note how it smacks of the Lockean conception of a "substance" (entity) that is like a metaphysical pin-cushion, into which its various attributes are stuck like pins. But we don't know the pin-cushion, only the pins! The "manifestations." Of course, Branden and any other Objectivists that go this route, might reply: oh, but its "manifestations" are how we know the "underlying reality."  

Maybe so, though I suspect that this is an opening big enough for Kant to drive a Mack truck through. :-) Anyway, the main problem I have with this view is that it doesn't really solve the problem of the supposed "interaction" of consciousness and matter. As I have relentlessly harped over the years, consciousness does not have causal efficacy--but neither does matter! They are just attributes of entities, by virtue of which entities have causal efficacy.

 

It is entities and their parts--which are characterized by material and/or conscious attributes--that interact, not the attributes. If you like, an entity's attributes may be regarded as being the causal efficacies of the entity. But they do not themselves have causal efficacy. The entity, by virtue of having them, has causal efficacies of various kinds. So, it is reification of the most misleading kind to regard matter and consciousness as doing things.

 

Some Objectivists (I think Rick Minto is working in this direction, but this is third-hand information, and he is welcome to clarify or object) want to talk about processes interacting, and since consciousness is regarded as a process, why not allow for interaction between conscious processes and non-conscious material processes? We should not be scared about "process-talk" in discussions of causality. Fine, so long as we acknowledge that what is really interacting is a part of the brain that is engaging in a conscious process (along with other, physical processes, I would maintain)--interacting with a part of the brain that is engaging in non-conscious physical processes only. Otherwise, we are reifying--attributes or actions, it doesn't matter. It is an inductively graspable fact that all entities (so far!) are physical in nature, and some entities are also conscious in nature, and that the existence of consciousness is dependent upon the existence of matter. This doesn't mean that consciousness is matter, however. So, there is a dualism of attributes. But this is actually irrelevant to the causality involved.

 

What is interacting causally is one part of the brain with another. And just as a living physical entity can interact with a non-living physical entity, but only by virtue of the physical attributes (matter) they both possess, so too can a conscious physical entity (or part) interact with a non-conscious physical entity (or part), but only by virtue of the physical attributes they both possess. Since it is always physical entities (or parts) that are interacting, it seems clear to me that any causal efficacy we attribute to consciousness is piggybacked on the causal efficacy we attribute to matter--and that it properly belongs to the entities, in any case!

 

So, from this, I hope it's clear why I think Branden's quasi-Leibnitzian view doesn't really explain anything. "Manifestations of an underlying reality" do not interact. It's not how entities manifest themselves to us that interacts, but the entities themselves (and their parts) that do so. The alternative is to abandon the hard-won understanding gained from the Aristotelian/Randian view that actions are caused by entities, and thus that interactions are caused by (i.e., between) entities. They indeed are caused by virtue of various attributes they have, but the attributes themselves are not the causes or the interactors. Aristotle, Rand, etc., framed their categories such that the prime foci of change are entities, and that attributes and actions (or properties and processes) are to be understood as of entities, and that causality is the (internal) relation between an entity and its actions. If this is truly metaphysically basic stuff, then no empirical observations can overturn it. On the other hand, if there can be processes and causal relations between events with no entities in evidence, then gee, I guess Aristotle and Rand are wrong, and that we can go with Hume in talking about events causing each other.

 

Assuming, then, that this is an open question, OK, what I have written is hypothetical and up for grabs. (Hmmm--conditional metaphysics!) But what I most want to drive home to Objectivists is the full implication of the stand they are taking with Rand and Aristotle on the Categories and the nature of causality. If this stance is ontologically solid, then talk of mind-body interaction and "causal efficacy of mind" is nonsense! Or, as Gilbert Ryle would have said, category mistakes.

 

Branden, whose work I admire very much, seems not to have sorted out the implications of and conflicts between the concepts he wrote about in The Psychology of Self-Esteem. He, more than anyone else, taught me the hard-headed Aristotelian-Randian approach to understanding action and causality as entity-based. Now he does a "180" and talks of "manifestations" interacting with each other. Huh???

Dr. Branden replied to me briefly on September 18:

For your information, whatever this may be worth (not much), the view I conveyed re "manifestations" is one that Rand found quite plausible when I presented it to her. I grant my presentation in the book was much too brief to adequately convey what I had in mind.

Probably what Branden was groping toward was not some kind of "proto-panpsychism" (as Diana Hsieh opined, in her characteristically over-the-top tendency to put the worst possible negative interpretation on Branden's writings), but instead a way to express what is usually referred to as the dual-aspect theory or dual-perspective theory of the mind-body relation. Kelley wrote about this in the first chapter of The Evidence of the Senses, and some time earlier, I gave a paper eventually published in 1974 in Reason Papers #1, called "A Dual-Aspect Solution to the Mind-Body Problem." Whether you call them "aspects" or "manifestations" or "forms of awareness," though, what is clear is that they are not different things, but the same thing--the conscious, living organism--as we are aware of it in different ways.

In any case, Branden's comments in The Art of Living Consciously did not, in my opinion, represent progress in our understanding of the mind-body problem. It was as if he were saying, "Well, since I believe in the 'causal efficacy of mind,' I will abandon my idea that actions are generated by entities and instead say that they can be generated by capacities or 'manifestations.'" There may be a place for "fuzzy logic," but fuzzy metaphysics???

On September 25, 1997, Bill Dwyer posted comments on Nathaniel Branden's "underlying reality" view to Objectivism-L. (His comments were similar in content to what he posted more recently on SOLO HQ website; see the Rebirth of Reason archives for SOLO.) Later that day, he received the following brief reply from Branden:

You would do well to educate yourself concerning the many philosophical criticisms that have been made against the "double=aspect" theory that you propose. Rand shared my view, as expressed in the brief passage in Living Consciously, and she called that "underlying reality" by the name of "little stuff." We did not share the implicit materialist bias that seems implicit in your remarks. We regarded consciousness as radically different from matter. The problem is not solved by calling consciousness "an attribute of matter." For more on this, see chapter 1 of The Psychology of Self-Esteem. You don't have to agree, of course, but at least you ought to understand that the view you dismiss as "nonsensical" was held by AR.

Bill shared this response with me, and the next day (September 26), I wrote the following:

Dr. Branden, what interests me most about this interchange is that not only William Dwyer and I, but also you and Ayn Rand hold some version or other of a "dual-aspect theory." And, ironically, the version of dual-aspect theory that held the most pitfalls, historically, was the kind espoused by you and Miss Rand....

 

Quoting Jerome Shaffer's article "Mind-Body Problem" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (New York: Macmillan, 1967):

DOUBLE ASPECT THEORIES. Some philosophers have held the view that the mental and the physical are simply different aspects of something that is itself neither mental nor physical. Spinoza is the most famous example. He held that man could be considered an extended, bodily thing and, equally well, a thinking thing, although neither characterization, nor even both taken together, exhausted the underlying substance [compare with your "underlying reality"].....

There are two crucial obscurities in the double-aspect theory. First, what is the underlying unity ["reality"] that admits of the various aspects? Spinoza called it "God or Nature"....Herbert Spencer, calling a spade a spade, referred to it simply as the Unknowable. [And Rand, as you report, had her own special term: "little stuff."] Contemporary philosophers suggest that the underlying unity is the "person." [P.F. Strawson attempted a definition: 'a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a single individual of a single type.' Individuals, 1959, p. 102. This is too circular to be of much help.]

The second obscurity in the double-aspect theory is that it is not clear what an 'aspect' is. [You use another term, "manifestation," which seems identical in meaning, if my Webster's unabridged dictionary is any judge.] The point of talking about different aspects...is to suggest that the differences are not intrinsic to the thing [in other words, as Rand frequently stated, that there is no mind-body dichotomy in reality!] but only exist in relation to human purposes, outlook, conceptual scheme, frame of reference, etc. This point is even reflected in Spinoza's definition of 'attribute' (for example, extension or thought) as 'that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance.' (Ethics I, Def. 4)"

 

Shaffer concludes this section with a very telling point, which seems to echo the point Dwyer and I and others have made regarding your and Rand's concept of an "Underlying Reality": "In general, double-aspect theories fail to improve our understanding of the mind-body relationship."

 

In general, I would agree. It certainly is true of the version that you and Rand maintained (entertained?). My own version simply sees matter and consciousness as attributes, viz., as capacities for different kinds of action–and that we are aware of these capacities and their activation through different channels of awareness (perception and introspection, respectively). And what they are attributes of is not some mysterious "underlying reality," but simply a conscious, living, material entity–i.e., a human being. Further, since they are capacities, not entities, there is no need to seek after a will-o-the-wisp explanation of how they interact. They do not, because they cannot; they are not the kinds of existents that interact....

 

Matter is generic, in the Aristotelian sense of capacity, and it is not right to think of it as a kind of stuff that can do things, apart from the entity that does things by virtue of that capacity. There are inanimate physical capacities of entities–"inanimate" being the most common understanding of "matter;"and there are animate physical capacities ("living matter"); and there are conscious physical capacities ("conscious matter"). Thus, as Aristotle defined "matter"–i.e., as potential (to do something)–it is obvious that any attribute, including consciousness, is material. Of course, he was contrasting matter not with spirit, but with form or actualization. And as various people including you and Rand have pointed out, what a thing is (its actuality/form) determines what it can do (its potential/matter). So, again, there is no need to wrack our brains trying to figure out how mind and matter interact, for they do no such thing. Instead, ...they are both matter–i.e., they are both potentials or capacities, by virtue of which various parts of one's physical body interact with one another (or with other entities).  

 

Thus, there are two distinct senses in which one can appropriately have what you refer to as a "materialistic bias" in one's view of consciousness, without getting into the obvious pitfall of reductive materialism:

(1) one can view consciousness as part of the (Aristotelian) matter or potency of certain living organisms to engage in certain actions, and  

(2) one can view consciousness as necessarily dependent upon physical matter, but not vice versa. I would like to think that this is a view that all Objectivists, including you (and Rand, if she were still alive) would be comfortable with.  

                                                                                                             I'll conclude by quoting Dwyer's last paragraph, which I think was very good, and then restate it in terms more compatible with what I've outlined above:

...Mind is the conscious awareness characteristic of certain entities, and matter is the physical capacity for action necessarily characteristic of any entity with conscious awareness. Thus, there can be matter without consciousness–i.e., material entities that are not conscious; but there cannot be consciousness without matter–i.e., conscious entities that are not material.) Any problem in explaining their "interaction" vanishes as soon as one recognizes that they are two aspects of the same entity–and that only the parts (i.e., its cells and organs and systems) of an entity interact, not its aspects. (The aspects of an entity include its attributes– whether its length or weight or density or other material characteristics, or its being percipient or being emotional or being evaluative or being conceptual or being imaginative or other conscious characteristics–and its actions and relationships.)

As I see it, you cannot escape the logic of causality being the relationship between an entity and its actions, something drilled home to me by you and Rand and Peikoff and Kelley and a number of others who were transmitting the Aristotelian view (as against the Humean event-event view). You cited "underlying reality," "little stuff," and interactions between "manifestations" as a model of mind-body held by Ayn Rand. But so is the above model of causality, which sees interactions as being between entities, not "manifestations" or attributes or processes or events or whatever. The two models seem to be incompatible, don't you think? If you can find a way to reconcile them, I'm all ears!

Dr. Branden graciously responded the same day:

I think you gave a very nice answer to my post. When I spoke of "matter" I did so in the contemporary not the Aristotelian sense. With the latter sense I have no argument. As to the rest, I used to think as you do–that mind depends for its existence on a physical body to which it is attached. ("Attached" is obviously a very imprecise term, but I'm in a hurry.) But in the last decade or so I've come across data that puts my own past assumption in question. I am no longer certain that brain activity exhausts the possibilities of mind activity. If mind really is, in some sense, "a separate entity" (Rand's terms)–if this is not merely a figure of speech–then its absolute dependence on a physical body is not axiomatic but becomes an empirical question. I wrestle with this a good deal. I am even willing to admit that sometimes the problem drives me nuts. But something is bothering me about even the "traditional" Objectivist take on all this. I apologize for not being clearer.

That concluded my correspondence with Dr. Branden on the matter. (Bill had some further correspondence with him later in the fall. I'll let him decide whether to share it here on RoR.) I then wrote to Bill, again that same day:

Branden is right that mind's dependence on a physical body is not axiomatic but instead an empirical matter. But jeez, if science hasn't by now adequately established that point–especially for an atheist who rejects the mind/body dichotomy!–when could it ever??

The "data" Branden refers to that supposedly puts this assumption of necessary mind-body connection in question is alleged instances of people having little or no cerebral cortex nonetheless walking out among the rest of us in society, with seemingly no easy way of distinguishing them from people with intact brains. (I believe the phrase he used at lunch with me and my wife several years ago was "a thin, almost microscopic layer of cortical cells.") I have yet to hear of anything remotely like this from anyone else. Sounds more like a thought-experiment than something real! If you know anything about it, or could find out, it would really help me in laying this (I think) pseudo-objection to rest.

As I recall, this particular point was never resolved (although there have been recent reports of single neurons being associated with a particular thought or memory). What Bill and I both came away from this phase of the discussion with was a sense of how odd it was that Branden would advocate the form of dual-aspect theory he did, while claiming to be familiar and in agreement with the criticisms of that theory.

[Note to the reader: these comments were originally posted on SOLOHQ on December 8, 2005.]

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  • 2 months later...

Roger,

At some point I would like to sit down and post a worthy reply. My attention was also caught by NB's statements about an underlying substance common to consciousness and matter. The only thing is, I found what he said quite resonant with my own perspective. I don't know exactly what NB had in mind but I think I can put together a point of view consistent with his that does not fall into the traps you discuss.

In the meantime, I think the brain condition NB was referring to might be hydro-encephalitis. This results in massive amounts of fluid in the cranial cavity which retards the neural development of the fetus and young child.

The amazing thing is that, despite the massive loss of neural matter, these children can grow to lead normal lives.

So just where is that soul located?

TTFN

Paul M.

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I'll be interested to see what you come up with along the lines of Rand's and Branden's "little stuff" (sounds a lot like Bertrand Russell's neutral monism to me) -- or whatever else you can propose that doesn't end up being a first cousin to my view. When you have time & gumption, please write it up and share it!

As for the near-empty head syndrome Branden talked about, I think you're right that it was hydro-encephalitis or something like it. But I have two questions about that: (1) what do they really have in their heads that is carrying the brain functions that allow them to act and appear for all the world as if they are normal, functional human beings? and (2) what is all the extra stuff we have that they don't good for? :-) (Maybe it's redundant stuff, just like the "junk DNA" in genes?)

REB

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Roger replying to Paul:

As for the near-empty head syndrome Branden talked about, I think you're right that it was hydro-encephalitis or something like it.

The term you want is "hydrocephalus" or "hydrocephaly," defined in my Webster's New Collegiate as "an abnormal increase in the amount of cerebrospinal fluid within the cranial cavity that is accompanied by expansion of the cerebral ventricles, enlargement of the skull and esp. the forehead, and atrophy of the brain."

When I was a teenager, I knew a young lad who was a hydrocephalic -- also mildly cerebral palsic. He died before the age of ten. As I recall, the general life-span prognosis for hydrocephaly is: death at an early age. Of course, medical knowledge of how to treat the condition might have improved since my teen years.

Ellen

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Ellen,

Thanks. You may be right. It might be hydrocephalus NB is referring to. I am still questioning whether or not it is because what I have found when I do searches on hydrocephalus does not quite fit my impression of what I thought NB was referring to.

It was probably in a Biological Psych. course that I learned about a condition that caused water on the brain. I thought it was hydro-encephalitis– which seems to be a less common name for the same thing. I remember seeing MRI of brains of adults who had perhaps 30% of their cerebral cortex remaining. The point being made at the time was that they were able to live normal lives and would be outwardly assessed as normal functioning adults.

If such is the case, it throws an interesting curve at any understanding of the relation of mind and body.

BTW- Ellen, it’s good to see you are still posting here. I value the perspective you bring. Any time I come across a person who is authentic and intelligent, who has spent a lifetime crafting her own unique personal perspective, I want to understand what that person sees and why. I commend Michael and Kat, this forum seems to be attracting just these types of people. Your presence here played a significant role in my initial evaluation of this forum. In our previous, brief interaction we were discussing physics. I had no idea you had such a long history with Objectivism. Your accounts are very enlightening. I hope to read your posts for a long time to come.

I wish you the best of health,

Paul

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It might be hydrocephalus NB is referring to. I am still questioning whether or not it is because what I have found when I do searches on hydrocephalus does not quite fit my impression of what I thought NB was referring to.

It was probably in a Biological Psych. course that I learned about a condition that caused water on the brain. I thought it was hydro-encephalitis– which seems to be a less common name for the same thing. I remember seeing MRI of brains of adults who had perhaps 30% of their cerebral cortex remaining. The point being made at the time was that they were able to live normal lives and would be outwardly assessed as normal functioning adults.

Hmm. It doesn't sound to me, then, like the same condition as "hydrocephalus" (or "hydrocephaly"). "Encephalitis" means inflammation of the brain. Possibly there are types of encephalitis in which fluid is built up in the cranial cavity with consequent shrinking of cortical mass. I don't know. If you find anything further, I'd be interested to hear it.

Thanks for your words of appreciation, and the good wishes re health. I regret that I can't participate more extensively in the discussions here. I'm certainly interested by what's being said!! (And I, too, am grateful to Michael and Kat for providing this forum.)

Ellen

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  • 1 year later...

I may have found an article referring to the brain condition NB was talking about: see here

A man with an unusually tiny brain managed to live an entirely normal life despite his condition, caused by a fluid buildup in his skull, French researchers reported on Thursday.

Scans of the 44-year-old man's brain showed that a huge fluid-filled chamber called a ventricle took up most of the room in his skull, leaving little more than a thin sheet of actual brain tissue.

"He was a married father of two children, and worked as a civil servant," Dr. Lionel Feuillet and colleagues at a university in Marseille wrote in a letter to the Lancet medical journal.

Where should we locate consciousness?

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I may have found an article referring to the brain condition NB was talking about:

Where should we locate consciousness?

In the case of this man, we locate it in his thin sheet of actual brain tissue. Where else? Is consciousness some magical process that has its origin outside of the body? Now if this man's skull were empty (except for fluid) we would -really- have something to discuss.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited by BaalChatzaf
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I may have found an article referring to the brain condition NB was talking about:

Where should we locate consciousness?

In the case of this man, we locate it in his thin sheet of actual brain tissue. Where else? Is consciousness some magical process that has its origin outside of the body? Now if this man's skull were empty (except for fluid) we would -really- have something to discuss.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Magic? No. I would never consider a model that requires magic. A more complex nature and causation than meets the eye? Yes. It is suggestive that other more "primitive" areas of the brain are of primary importance for consciousness and that consciousness requires more than neural complexity in the cerebrum. It points the way to new ways of thinking about consciousness.

Paul

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Magic? No. I would never consider a model that requires magic. A more complex nature and causation than meets the eye? Yes. It is suggestive that other more "primitive" areas of the brain are of primary importance for consciousness and that consciousness requires more than neural complexity in the cerebrum. It points the way to new ways of thinking about consciousness.

Paul

That is a sensible approach. Maybe Aristotle was right and that our center of awareness is the heart. No matter where consciousness is distributed or centered (as the case may be) it has a physical origin.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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It is suggestive that other more "primitive" areas of the brain are of primary importance for consciousness and that consciousness requires more than neural complexity in the cerebrum. It points the way to new ways of thinking about consciousness.

The problem with this idea is that if it is of a more primitive nature then would not animals also possess it? I think what we are trying to do here is establish human conciousness as different from animal. If that is right then we should be looking at brain structure that animals do not have, ie. well developed cerebral cortex.

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GS,

OK. So where did well developed cerebral cortex go in the example Paul mentioned?

Michael

I have no idea what they found in this guys head. I do know that our brains have incredible ability to adapt. Besides, he was only civil servant - it's not like he had to do much heavy thinking :) I'm not sure what you are getting at, just because he had a severly reduced brain mass doesn't mean he didn't have cortical tissue, does it?

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No matter where consciousness is distributed or centered (as the case may be) it has a physical origin.
Agreed! But what is the origin of physical existence and is science alone able to answer this question? Or do we still need philosophy as a compliment to science?

Paul

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No matter where consciousness is distributed or centered (as the case may be) it has a physical origin.
Agreed! But what is the origin of physical existence and is science alone able to answer this question? Or do we still need philosophy as a compliment to science?

Paul

We don't know how life began on this planet but we have several effective sciences of life, including molecular chemistry, biochemistry, genetics and the thermodynamics of living systems. The bottom line is that we do not have to know origins and beginnings to have sciences about various things.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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We don't know how life began on this planet but we have several effective sciences of life, including molecular chemistry, biochemistry, genetics and the thermodynamics of living systems. The bottom line is that we do not have to know origins and beginnings to have sciences about various things.
True, but this seems trivial to me. If we want to know origins and beginnings, can science alone tell us about these things? Science tells us there is a limit to science, defined by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, whereby we can observe and measure no further. Is the limit to the scientific method also the limit to human investigation about the nature of the universe? Or is there another method of investigation that can maintain a satisfactory standard of objectivity and raise our understanding of existence beyond what can be generated by scientific methods alone? Can we model existence beyond the Heisenberg limit without our models being reduced to pure fantasy?

To bring this thread back on topic: Can a model of existence be constructed that explains how the known physical laws, life and consciousness emerge from a underlying monistic substance that is common to both matter and consciousness? In agreement with NB, I think yes.

Paul

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True, but this seems trivial to me. If we want to know origins and beginnings, can science alone tell us about these things?

Yes, of course. And if it can't, nothing else can.

Science tells us there is a limit to science, defined by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, whereby we can observe and measure no further.

That's not a limit to science, it is a limit to our naive interpretation of reality.

Is the limit to the scientific method also the limit to human investigation about the nature of the universe? Or is there another method of investigation that can maintain a satisfactory standard of objectivity and raise our understanding of existence beyond what can be generated by scientific methods alone?

No.

To bring this thread back on topic: Can a model of existence be constructed that explains how the known physical laws, life and consciousness emerge from a underlying monistic substance that is common to both matter and consciousness? In agreement with NB, I think yes.

No. There is no substance "common" to matter and consciousness, just as there is no substance common to a computer and its software. Occam's axe.

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Dragonfly,

Your assertions are very definitive. I wonder by what means you arrived at this knowledge.

Science is the only means to knowledge with objective standards?

Heisenberg's uncertainty principle does not define a limit to scientific exploration? It doesn't define a limit to what we can measure and quantify-- the grist for the scientific mill?

What makes our interpretation of reality naive? What would make it wise? What would make it objective?

There is no substance "common" to matter and consciousness, just as there is no substance common to a computer and its software.
This assumes there is no difference, in principle, between consciousness and a computers software. Does this not require a bit of a (naive?) intuitive leap?

I don't disagree that there is the equivalent of neural hardware and neural programming. I just don't think this captures all of what I experience in my consciousness. I can't speak for what you or anyone else experiences. You seam to think the hardware/software analogy is a perfect fit for what you experience in your consciousness. Neither of us has any more than our naive interpretations to go by. You claim introspection is useless and I claim it is a landscape to be explored with components and dynamics to be identified and modeled. It is possible that you have not discovered things in your consciousness because of your predisposition to devalue the information contained in the introspective field? It is also possible I am mistaken about what I have discovered in my consciousness because there is no way other than the methods of science to be objective. Of course, I am biased. I think I'm right. But I am willing to consider the possibility that I am wrong in the interests of objectivity. This is why I enjoy your perspective. You help me explore my doubts.

One reason I believe some of my actions are not part of a deterministic chain of causation is I know I have the ability to generate new understandings of myself and my world, and these changes will affect my behavior. To maintain the deterministic stand we would have to assume that these new understandings are generated by the environment acting on my consciousness without any initiation of action on my part. My experience tells me that I work very hard to generate new understandings. It is a creative process that generates integrations I have often not seen before. New creative integrations generate new action possibilities and new choices. Thus, my actions are causal but not determined because I have the ability to generate changes in how environmental forces interact with who I am by initiating changes in how I interpret and process information. That I can initiate these changes casts doubt on deterministic causation and leads me to attempt to create a new model of causation. Of course, if introspection is of no use, none of this matters.

Paul

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To bring this thread back on topic: Can a model of existence be constructed that explains how the known physical laws, life and consciousness emerge from a underlying monistic substance that is common to both matter and consciousness? In agreement with NB, I think yes.

Paul

Probably or possibly yes, but to date, no one has done it.

Bal'Chataf

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To bring this thread back on topic: Can a model of existence be constructed that explains how the known physical laws, life and consciousness emerge from a underlying monistic substance that is common to both matter and consciousness? In agreement with NB, I think yes.

Paul

Probably or possibly yes, but to date, no one has done it.

Bal'Chataf

I am so used to Dragonfly's definitive NO's that your "Probably or possibly yes" response caught me by surprise. Does this mean that you find value in the qualitative causal models of philosophy that can take us beyond the measurable and quantifiable, while acknowledging that such models must be tied to such measurements and quantities that science produces?

Paul

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To bring this thread back on topic: Can a model of existence be constructed that explains how the known physical laws, life and consciousness emerge from a underlying monistic substance that is common to both matter and consciousness? In agreement with NB, I think yes.

Paul

Probably or possibly yes, but to date, no one has done it.

Bal'Chataf

I am so used to Dragonfly's definitive NO's that your "Probably or possibly yes" response caught me by surprise. Does this mean that you find value in the qualitative causal models of philosophy that can take us beyond the measurable and quantifiable, while acknowledging that such models must be tied to such measurements and quantities that science produces?

Paul

As long as the hypotheses you suggest lead to testable predictions. Unlike the Positivists, I do not insist that every aspect of a theory be made to correspond to a perceptable state of the world. I do insist that those statements of the theory which have something definite to say about the world (a prediction, retrodiction or explanation) be empirically testable.

This is why I have reconciled myself to emergent descriptions of the world. I am not totally comfortable with emergence, but when reduction hits a wall, one must resort to alternative modes of explanation and prediction. As long as testability (along with possible falsification) obtain, I am willing to play.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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The first fact that convinces me that consciousness is wholly dependent on brain function is that no one has ever rigorously documented the existence of a disembodied consciousness.

The second fact is the body of work of Antonio DaMasio ([Descartes' Error, The Feeling of What Happens]).

DaMasio is a neurologist who has rigorously and intensively studied the deficits in consciousness that result from damage to various areas of the brain. His findings are very persuasive that different areas of the brain are required for emotion, long-term memory etc.

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The first fact that convinces me that consciousness is wholly dependent on brain function is that no one has ever rigorously documented the existence of a disembodied consciousness.

Steve,

I certainly cannot speak for NB but when I question the location or nature of consciousness I am not looking to remove it from the brain. I am only looking to understand it with greater causal complexity than is generally used to interpret the relationship between the introspective dynamics of the psyche and brain functions. What NB may have in mind might be similar to the direction Roger Penrose was heading when he suggested a possible quantum level process in the brain to account for certain elements of consciousness. If the experience and manipulation of qualia is a related but distinct process from the more computer-like processes of the cerebrum, then maybe there is a case for suggesting that observed brain functions do not fully account for consciousness, but consciousness is not disembodied. The phenomena of awareness and consciousness may require an understanding of deeper structures and processes than we have yet explored. This would connect to NB's idea that there is a more fundamental substance common to both mind and matter. Awareness and consciousness might emerge from a quantum level holistic system that operates beneath the observed firing of neurons. It's a monistic approach rather than a dual aspect approach.

Paul

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What NB may have in mind might be similar to the direction Roger Penrose was heading when he suggested a possible quantum level process in the brain to account for certain elements of consciousness.

Any theory of the brain would necessarily be subject to quantum theory - after all the brain is composed of sub-atomic particles just like all other matter right? Whatever we say 'consciousness' represents, at some deeper level it manifests itself as chemical reactions and ultimately quantum mechanics, it seems to me.

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Any theory of the brain would necessarily be subject to quantum theory - after all the brain is composed of sub-atomic particles just like all other matter right? Whatever we say 'consciousness' represents, at some deeper level it manifests itself as chemical reactions and ultimately quantum mechanics, it seems to me.

This would be different. Yes, the brain is composed of subatomic particles but the chance nature of quantum events does not make for a possible holistic system from which consciousness can arise. The brain, and the whole nervous system, would have to be intricately wired with a conduit that can transmit impulses and maintain a holistic quantum system. Awareness and willed action would be emergent from this holistic quantum system. I think it was something like this that Penrose was pointing to with his tubules.

I really do have to read that book.

Paul

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