Objectivism is not Philosophy!

[Mike Renzulli]

I found this review on Amazon.com and thought I would post it. The author lists some scientists/philosophers who may have already covered the territory David Harriman and Leonard Peikoff are covering years before The Logical Leap was published.

If this is the case, good for the scientists/philosophers Mcginnis lists but it might be too little too late for ARI.

Objectivism is not 'philosophy.' Full stop., January 11, 2011

By Nicolas Mcginnis

This review is from: The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics (Paperback)

Harriman writes: 'In my physics lab course, I learned how to determine the atomic structure of crystals by means of x-ray diffraction and how to identify subatomic particles by analyzing bubble-chamber photographs. In my philosophy of science course, on the other hand, I was taught by a world-renowned professor (Paul Feyerabend) that there is no such thing as scientific method and that physicists have no better claim to knowledge than voodoo priests. I knew little about epistemology [the philosophy of knowledge] at the time, but I could not help noticing that it was the physicists, not the voodoo priests, who had made possible the life-promoting technology we enjoy today.'

This is enough to know this book is a hack piece of garbage that should not be tossed aside lightly; it should be thrown, with great force.

The only evidence I need is that the author makes sweeping claims about philosophy of science by citing exactly one philosopher, Feyerabend. If the author, either of the review or the book, were serious, they would engage with the field as a whole. They would also know that philosophy of science, as practiced in analytic departments, has taken a strong stand against post-modern relativism and has able, articulate and competent writers with scientific backgrounds: Bas van Fraasen, Hilary Putnam, Nelson Goodman, Philip Kitcher, Harvey Brown, Eliot Sober, Nancy Cartwright, Patrick Suppes... I could go on.

The author would know, as well, that Putnam made the very same argument against Feyerabend over 40 years ago: namely, that if scientific methodology does not track truth, then we have no way of explaining technological applications. This ignorance betrays a fundamental ignorance of the literature in philosophy of science.

There are real issues in philosophy: questions about deductive and inductive logic, Bayesian confirmation, biomedical ethics, clinical trial structure, physical interpretation, but of course our authors prefer to dwell the disputed (and here, unsurprisingly, mischaracterized) claims of a single figure. A contrarian figure that, if anything, stands opposed to the mainstream consensus in philosophy of science, positivistic (e.g., the Vienna Circle, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Moritz Schlick, and so on) and post-positivistic: that science works, works best, and likely describes real, knowable entities.

It's plenty clear both authors don't have a clue what they are talking about. That Ayn Rand is brought up only underscores this. I suggest no one wastes their time on this obvious trash. If you want good, relevant, interesting philosophy of science, any of the above-mentioned authors would do fine.

Edited March 11, 2011 by Mike Renzulli

[merjet]

The pot calls the kettle black. Mcginnis slams Harriman for making sweeping claims about philosophy of science by citing exactly one philosopher, Feyerabend, and ignoring other philosophers. Yet Mcginnis makes sweeping claims about the book based on one tiny part of it and ignores the rest of it.

[Brant Gaede]

I found this review on Amazon.com and thought I would post it. The author lists some scientists/philosophers who may have already covered the territory David Harriman and Leonard Peikoff are covering years before The Logical Leap was published.

If this is the case, good for the scientists/philosophers Mcginnis lists but it might be too little too late for ARI.

Objectivism is not 'philosophy.' Full stop., January 11, 2011

By Nicolas Mcginnis

This review is from: The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics (Paperback)

Harriman writes: 'In my physics lab course, I learned how to determine the atomic structure of crystals by means of x-ray diffraction and how to identify subatomic particles by analyzing bubble-chamber photographs. In my philosophy of science course, on the other hand, I was taught by a world-renowned professor (Paul Feyerabend) that there is no such thing as scientific method and that physicists have no better claim to knowledge than voodoo priests. I knew little about epistemology [the philosophy of knowledge] at the time, but I could not help noticing that it was the physicists, not the voodoo priests, who had made possible the life-promoting technology we enjoy today.'

This is enough to know this book is a hack piece of garbage that should not be tossed aside lightly; it should be thrown, with great force.

The only evidence I need is that the author makes sweeping claims about philosophy of science by citing exactly one philosopher, Feyerabend. If the author, either of the review or the book, were serious, they would engage with the field as a whole. They would also know that philosophy of science, as practiced in analytic departments, has taken a strong stand against post-modern relativism and has able, articulate and competent writers with scientific backgrounds: Bas van Fraasen, Hilary Putnam, Nelson Goodman, Philip Kitcher, Harvey Brown, Eliot Sober, Nancy Cartwright, Patrick Suppes... I could go on.

The author would know, as well, that Putnam made the very same argument against Feyerabend over 40 years ago: namely, that if scientific methodology does not track truth, then we have no way of explaining technological applications. This ignorance betrays a fundamental ignorance of the literature in philosophy of science.

There are real issues in philosophy: questions about deductive and inductive logic, Bayesian confirmation, biomedical ethics, clinical trial structure, physical interpretation, but of course our authors prefer to dwell the disputed (and here, unsurprisingly, mischaracterized) claims of a single figure. A contrarian figure that, if anything, stands opposed to the mainstream consensus in philosophy of science, positivistic (e.g., the Vienna Circle, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Moritz Schlick, and so on) and post-positivistic: that science works, works best, and likely describes real, knowable entities.

It's plenty clear both authors don't have a clue what they are talking about. That Ayn Rand is brought up only underscores this. I suggest no one wastes their time on this obvious trash. If you want good, relevant, interesting philosophy of science, any of the above-mentioned authors would do fine.

You might learn how to use quotation marks, Mike, or quotation differentation. Was the last paragraph yours? The last two? Three?

--Brant

[Mike Renzulli]

No the last statement by me was the sentence before the highlighted title of the review. The section that is all slanted is/are Mcginnis's comments. I will use quotation marks in the future.

You might learn how to use quotation marks, Mike, or quotation differentation. Was the last paragraph yours? The last two? Three?

--Brant

Edited March 12, 2011 by Mike Renzulli

[Mike Renzulli]

I agree, Merlin and your reply says what I wanted or neglected to say. As my initial post may indicate the main focus of my posting the review was the part of Mcginnis's review which I highlighted in bold black letters.

The pot calls the kettle black. Mcginnis slams Harriman for making sweeping claims about philosophy of science by citing exactly one philosopher, Feyerabend, and ignoring other philosophers. Yet Mcginnis makes sweeping claims about the book based on one tiny part of it and ignores the rest of it.

Edited March 12, 2011 by Mike Renzulli

[Brant Gaede]

No the last statement by me was the sentence before the highlighted title of the review. The section that is all slanted is/are Mcginnis's comments. I will use quotation marks in the future.

You might learn how to use quotation marks, Mike, or quotation differentation. Was the last paragraph yours? The last two? Three?

--Brant

In this case I wouldn't use quotation marks as they'd be too cumbersome. I'd just indicate in the text that all the following material was a quotation. Another way would be changing the font size, making your stuff slightly bigger. You could have also ran a solid ( ________________ ) separating line. I don't think it's practical to indent the quoted material here on OL and maybe not possible, which is standard in texts. Your use of bold face and italics was also somewhat confusing. It was too extensive and we aren't sure who put them in, you or the other guy. Those things are done for emphasis, not to confuse or distract.

--Brant

Edited March 12, 2011 by Brant Gaede

[Mike Renzulli]

Alright I will remember that next time. Thanks!

No the last statement by me was the sentence before the highlighted title of the review. The section that is all slanted is/are Mcginnis's comments. I will use quotation marks in the future.

You might learn how to use quotation marks, Mike, or quotation differentation. Was the last paragraph yours? The last two? Three?

--Brant

In this case I wouldn't use quotation marks as they'd be too cumbersome. I'd just indicate in the text that all the following material was a quotation. Another way would be changing the font size, making your stuff slightly bigger. You could have also ran a solid ( ________________ ) separating line. I don't think it's practical to indent the quoted material here on OL and maybe not possible, which is standard in texts. Your use of bold face and italics was also somewhat confusing. It was too extensive and we aren't sure who put them in, you or the other guy. Those things are done for emphasis, not to confuse or distract.

--Brant

[syrakusos]

Platonists, Scholastics, Logical Positivists, Existentialists, Objectivists, Postmodernists, who speaks for philosophy? What is philosophy? Hegelians faced Young Hegelians and then Marx said that he was not a Marxist. Logical Positivism sought to lay a better foundation for positivism. Was positivism no longer philosophy?

Perhaps the intention is that Harriman and Peikoff are not good philosophers. That may be, but the original post does nothing to establish that. I might agree with the intention. After all, my own criticisms of The Logical Leap have appeared on this and other Objectivist boards, as well as my own website and blog. However, it is easy enough to see the reference to Paul Feyerabend as a literary device, no less than citing "the man who says..." OK, which man? Show me the man! Bertrand Russell's essays are replete with such imaginary men and women saying things that he analyzes or refutes. Russell is nonetheless a philosopher and is generally regarded as a good one, even though many of us here might disagree with much (if not all) of what he wrote.

In point of fact, in my recent university classes in criminology, Paul Feyerabend - but not Polanyi or Mach or Popper - was trotted out. We started with classicism and free will went through positivism and Comte to Beccaria and Lombroso, to Sutherland and ended with the post modernists in the lectures on the "science" (ahem) of criminology. I don't know what physicists and chemists learn, but it seems to me just from general reading that the only people who actually read and write on the philosophy of science are philosophers of science.

True enough, Feynman wrote The Character of Physicsl Law. True, also, Harriman does not mention him, but does indeed, broadly and strongly criticize the commonly accepted "scientific method" (hypothetico-deductive). Sagan's Demon-Haunted World is another example of a scientist writing on the philosophy of science. I point also to Feynman's "Cargo Cult Science." Rather than knocking down strawmen, I think that David Harriman should have attempted the tougher challenge and shown why Feynman, rather than Feyerabend, was wrong.

That Harriman did not has no bearing whatsoever on whether or not Objectivism is a school philosophy.