trying to think

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  1. Hi @Jon Letendre, My argument (perhaps it wasn't clear enough) was that it only makes sense to think "middle-long-term", not "really-long-term", since if in the long-term consciousness doesn't survive, then values cannot apply in the really-long-term. I don't think that your points negate that. Even if this is correct, it rests on the notion that future happiness will come. If consciousness doesn't survive the death of the body, then there is no future happiness to contemplate. In the above paragraphs you do not refute my point, but just extend the length of the
  2. Hi @Jon Letendre, Thanks! It was very valuable to me. I think you nailed it. Ok, a few questions : 1) Can you recommend me something to read on this issue (acting on principle rather circumstances of the moment and long term vs short term) ? 2) I would assert that thinking long-term only makes sense in the case that the death of the physical body is not the death of our consciousness (a proposition which I personally find probable). In the case that the death of the physical body is also "death" of our consciousness, thinking "long-term" does not make lit
  3. Hi @Michael Stuart Kelly, thank you for the answer! Nevertheless, I cannot find a single argument in the quotes you gave. The first quote describes literary tastes of Ayn Rand, the second describes the theme of We the Living. The third quote mentions that Frank O'Connor had a benevolent universe premise; good for him, but why is the premise true? I want to know why the malevolent universe premise is false. Where do you think would be a good place to start digging? I thought that the forums would be a good one...
  4. The argument from here "As the simplest empirical refutation of that metaphysics—as evidence of the fact that the material universe is not inimical to man and that catastrophes are the exception, not the rule of his existence—observe the fortunes made by insurance companies." seems to me a very bad one, frankly. All it means that the universe is less malevolent than is commonly believed by humans living in the 20-21 centuries. That's all.
  5. Where can I find the Objectivist arguments that we do not live in a malevolent universe?
  6. I am too not sure that I understand your position. Do you say that some values require no justification? I tend to believe that all values require justification. I am not saying that I am able to justify rationally the idea that all values require a justification. But it does seem true to me. Frankly speaking, there seems to be very little grounds of discussion amongst us, if so. Between a person that feels that values require a justification (though cannot rationally justify this ;) ), and a person who does not feel so, there is almost no common ground for discussion.
  7. Thanks. Yes. Ok, you assert that being treasonous is morally wrong. If so, I can ask how can the value of loyalty (opposite to treason) can be justified from rational self-interest? It seems moral, but my question is one of justification.
  8. I'll explain where am I coming from : As far as I understand, an ethics of selfishness implies that an ethical action is in the rational self-interest of the acting agent (short-term or long-term). Not giving the names of the leaders' to the authorities in East Berlin seems like a moral act to me. But I have a hard time explaining how it is moral from the point of view of rational self-interest. If one asserts that not giving the names of the leaders to the authorities is the rational self-interest of a person in such a situation, I would love to hear how. In case that y
  9. Hi, I have watched this movie trailer, and it got me thinking. In the movie trailer (I have not watched the movie), a situation is described where a group of teenagers (in Berlin, 1956) hold a minute of silence in solidarity with the Hungarian Uprising. The teachers learn of this, and want to know the names of the leaders of the group; so do the state officials. The group members are threatened to tell who the leaders are. It seems to me that not giving the names of the group leaders in such a case is a more virtuous choice. Assuming that you agree, can this
  10. Hi. I am interested in the philosophy of freedom; somewhat critical of Objectivism. Hope that it can be a good place to discuss it.