The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics

[George H. Smith]

I am glad that after you have consulted David Miller, you and I can agree on what "skeptic" means. So now, what part of "accidental" are you not getting???

Nowhere does Miller argue that Popper was an "accidental skeptic."

You are getting so all turned around in this it's just not funny.

Yes, Rand defended certainty. But I suggest the means she adopted, "contextual certainty" accidentally undermines her goal.

Yeah, yeah; I got that part. You've said it enough times. So where's the argument?

I was originally responding to your "If Rand, then Critical Rationalists" point. There is no parallel here, nor did you present any kind of argument. I suppose we will have to take your word for all these anecdotal claims.

Btw, did you know that Popper was an Accidental Muslim?

So you continually wheeling out the fact that Rand's intention was to defend certainty is just as continually beside the point.

When did I ever mention Rand's intention? Never, that's when. My point is that Rand presents a sound case for contextual certainty. But you won't deal with the arguments. All you do is repeat your allegation about "accidental skepticism" -- a fabrication that exists only in your mind.

I'm not sure I even follow why you now think I'm saying Miller's saying Popper's an "accidental skeptic"! Perhaps you are making some convoluted point of your own, perhaps you're just misreading again, who knows and increasingly, who cares!

I realize that you have gotten in over your head -- something that invariably happens when we move from allegations to arguments -- but try to keep up as best as you can.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

I reread Popper's chapter, and I don't agree that his "logical" arguments apply to Rand at all.

Do you agree that Rand thought is was vitally important to first and foremost precisely define your terms - that, supposedly, if you did not start from this secure foundation, all your subsequent knowledge must be erroneous?

Nope. I don't agree that this was Rand's position. So much for the rest of your argument.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

I reread Popper's chapter, and I don't agree that his "logical" arguments apply to Rand at all.

Do you agree that Rand thought is was vitally important to first and foremost precisely define your terms - that, supposedly, if you did not start from this secure foundation, all your subsequent knowledge must be erroneous?

Nope. I don't agree that this was Rand's position. So much for the rest of your argument.

Ghs

Flat denial usually signals its it's agree-to-disagree time.

Looks like I won't be thrilling the Critical Rationalism world with your exposition of Popper's logical errors in Chapter 11 then after all, despite the fact that your claim it is "very weak" and "one of the worst things Popper ever wrote". Pity.

But then I somehow I kinda suspected I wouldn't be.

Edited August 15, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[George H. Smith]

Flat denial usually signals its it's agree-to-disagree time.

You made the assertion about Rand, so it's your responsibility to back it up. You have made many such flat assertions without providing a scintialla of evidence that Rand ever said what you attribute to her. Your attacks are mainly directed at a Rand that exists only in your imagination.

Looks like I won't be thrilling the Critical Rationalism world with your exposition of Popper's logical errors in Chapter 11 then after all, despite the fact that you claim it is "very weak" and "one of the worst things Popper ever wrote". Pity.

But then I somehow I kinda suspected I wouldn't be.

First, I said nothing about Popper's "logical errors." Some of his remarks are not so much illogical (in the strict sense) as just plain dumb. This, along with Popper's fast and loose interpretation of history, is what makes the chapter one of the worst things that Popper ever wrote.

Second, I noted a number of foolish remarks by Popper in post #606. (I can't get the link to work properly.) In typical fashion, you bypassed the post and ignored my comments, so what's the point of going any further? You will probably ignore anything else I say about Popper that you find inconvenient. For example, after you stated that Popper, unlike Rand, sometimes admitted that he was confused and didn't understand the implications of his own theories, I expressed some skepticism and requested a citation. Did you provide one? No, of course not.

You are not the first true-believing Popperian that I have encountered; far from it. It's probably a good thing that you don't like Rand, or you would probably be a Randroid -- and we don't need any more of those. So it's best that you have chosen Popper as the object of your cultish devotion.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Since my polemical exchanges with Daniel seem to be winding down, I want to make some general comments about Karl Popper.

I have a very high regard for Popper. I say this despite the fact that I disagree with many of his conclusions. Popper was an original and highly suggestive thinker, so even when I don't follow him to his destination, I almost always find the trip profitable. If I didn't believe this, I wouldn't have read and reread so much of his writing over the years. Until I whittled down my library many years ago -- from around 14,000 books to a mere 4000 -- I owned every major work by Popper, and I still have a half dozen or so of his most essential books. Virtually every page of those books is covered with marginalia, and I don't invest that much intellectual labor in someone that I don't value.

This is also my position on Rand, even though I agree with more of her conclusions. Rand was also an original and highly suggestive philosopher. One needn't agree with Rand to benefit from her remarkable ability to cut to the chase on a number of traditional philosophical problems. As I used to tell students for 16 years at summer conferences, I defy anyone to write as concise of a defense of natural rights as Rand did in her essay "Man's Rights." I have specialized in this area of political philosophy for decades, and I have read many hundreds of books and articles on the subject of rights -- and never have I encountered anything quite like the brilliant conciseness of that essay. (The closest would be some things by Herbert Spencer, Thomas Hodgskin, and perhaps a few other classical liberals.)

Having written a lot on political philosophy myself --most recently, in my book, Themes in the History of Classical Liberalism, which will be published by Cambridge University Press early next year -- I am painfully aware of how difficult it can be not to wander off into lengthy digressions and to stay on point. Rand's remarkable focus is manifested in other articles and books as well, including ITOE. I am in awe of Rand's ability in this regard.

I don't base my evaluations of philosophers on how much I agree with them. If this were my criterion, I would regard myself as the greatest philosopher of all time, since I agree with everything I say. In fact, I often don't read philosophers (e.g., libertarian political theorists) that I already agree with in every major respect, unless I expect to find a new insight or a fresh twist on an old argument. My time is better spent reading intelligent critics of libertarianism and then seeing if I can develop sound rebuttals of their arguments.

I have known many Randian types who like Popper. I have also known Randians who like Kuhn, Lakatos, and even Feyerabend (as unlikely as this may seem.) My personal favorite is Stephen Toulmin's Human Understanding -- perhaps the only book on the nature and historical development of scientific disciplines and the evolution of scientific theories that I would describe as an authentic masterpiece. Toulmin's stress on contextualism probably accounts for a good deal my evaluation, and many of his themes could easily be incorporated into a Randian framework.

I mention these details to emphasize that many Randians don't fit the stereotype of closed minded dogmatists that has been portrayed on OL and elsewhere. In fact, I have run across many more Randians who are eager to learn what they can from Popper than I have encountered Popperians who are willing even to concede that they might -- just might -- learn something from Rand. Daniel's contemptuous and dismissive attitude towards Rand is unfortunately typical of Popperians. But this attitude is not confined to Rand; it frequently extends to other philosophers who do not toe the Popperian line. (Friends and I used to call these people "Poppers.")

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

First, I said nothing about Popper's "logical errors." Some of his remarks are not so much illogical (in the strict sense) as just plain dumb. This, along with Popper's fast and loose interpretation of history, is what makes the chapter one of the worst things that Popper ever wrote.

No, I was the one who talked about Popper's logical arguments. You then avoided discussing them, and talked about some other complaints you had with his piece.

I then gave you an example of one of them: the infinite regress of definitions.

You then claimed that this has nothing to do with Rand. Well, we can get to that in a moment, but might I first extract from you whether you think this particular argument of Popper's is a fallacy or not - and if so, why?

Second, I noted a number of foolish remarks by Popper in post #606. (I can't get the link to work properly.) In typical fashion, you bypassed the post and ignored my comments, so what's the point of going any further? You will probably ignore anything else I say about Popper that you find inconvenient. For example, after you stated that Popper, unlike Rand, sometimes admitted that he was confused and didn't understand the implications of his own theories, I expressed some skepticism and requested a citation. Did you provide one? No, of course not.

Well I can't really win now, can I, with this. On the one hand I have Phil Coates complaining I'm clogging up the board with responses, on the other you're complaining that I don't answer every trivial little question. However, I will nonetheless try. Here is an example of Popper admitting error (Objective Knowledge Chapter 2 note) my book happens to fall open at:

"I am indebted to John Watkins who has read through an earlier version of the essay and who pointed out to me a serious error, which fortunately proved not to be relevant to my main argument. David Miller has...repeatedly saved me not only from at least three similar errors, but also from countless minor muddles of matter and style."

I am sure there are plenty of other places Popper says he was confused and/or mistake about this or that, but I frankly don't have time to read through all of Popper, which is considerable, to extract such thrilling confessions for your benefit. Perhaps I will take a look at Unended Quest tonight and a few others if I have time.

And of course, as far as him admitting he "didn't understand the implications of his theories" goes, as a matter of fact that is an inevitable consequence of Popper's own theory of objective knowledge - that our theories stand outside ourselves as partly independent creations, and thus contain implications that we cannot foresee. If you knew as much about his theories as you claim you would surely know that. So, as such I doubt that it will take me very long to find a quote to that effect when I get a moment.

So much for that.

And of course you've evaded plenty of questions yourself - like this one.

Now, moving to this:

You are not the first true-believing Popperian that I have encountered; far from it. It's probably a good thing that you don't like Rand, or you would probably be a Randroid -- and we don't need any more of those. So it's best that you have chosen Popper as the object of your cultish devotion.

This is more childishness. As I said early on, I know from people who actually worked with the man as to what a deeply unpleasant fellow he could be. I've given important examples of where Popper was shown to deeply and profoundly wrong, and further I've more said kind things about the very people who shot him down - Bartley and Miller.

The fact that you would even suggest a Randroid might say equivalent things about Rand - that a Randroid might call Rand deeply unpleasant, or that some of her most famous and dearly held theories are wrong - just shows how you are now reduced to saying just about something - anything, no matter how witless and spurious - to try to score a point.

Sit down man, you're a bloody tragedy.

Edit: Oh, and just when I'd written you off, you go out of polemical mode and write something interesting and intelligent. It goes to show you never can tell...;-)

Edited August 15, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

For example, after you stated that Popper, unlike Rand, sometimes admitted that he was confused and didn't understand the implications of his own theories, I expressed some skepticism and requested a citation. Did you provide one? No, of course not.

So in the prior post we already have the first example, found almost by opening one of his books at random. Now here's two more, both found in a few minutes:

"I offer my theory with many apologies. It has taken me a long time to think it out fully, and to make it clear to myself. Nevertheless I still feel far from satisfied with it...I blush when I have to make this confession; for when I was younger, I used to say very contemptuous things about evolutionary philosophies. When twenty-two years ago Canon Charles E. Raven, in his Science, Religion, and the Future, described the Darwinian controversy as "a storm in a Victorian teacup," I agreed, but criticized him for paying too much attention "to the vapors still emerging from the cup," by which I meant the hot air of the evolutionary philosophies (especially those which told us that there were inexorable laws of evolution). But now I have to confess that this cup of tea has become, after all, my cup of tea; and with it I have to eat humble pie." [Popper, OK 1972]

And later:

"The fact that the theory of natural selection is difficult to test has led some people...to claim that it is a tautology. . . . I mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits. Influenced by what these authorities say, I have in the past described the theory as "almost tautological,"....I have changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation." [Popper, 1978]

More to follow, as soon as I can be bothered with the sure-to-be-thankless task of looking them up.

Edited August 15, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[George H. Smith]

First, I said nothing about Popper's "logical errors." Some of his remarks are not so much illogical (in the strict sense) as just plain dumb. This, along with Popper's fast and loose interpretation of history, is what makes the chapter one of the worst things that Popper ever wrote.

No, I was the one who talked about Popper's logical arguments. You then avoided discussing them, and talked about some other complaints you had with his piece.

I then gave you an example of one of them: the infinite regress of definitions.

You then claimed that this has nothing to do with Rand. Well, we can get to that in a moment, but might I first extract from you whether you think this particular argument of Popper's is a fallacy or not - and if so, why?

I wouldn't call Popper's argument a fallacy, at least not in any formal sense, but I would say that he has not provided compelling reasons to accept it. Far from it.

Popper begins by objecting to the use of "essentialist" definitions in science. He doesn't reject definitions in science altogether -- indeed, he says that there might be "an urgent practical need" for them -- but he maintains that these are nominal, not essentialist, definitions. Why? Because, according to Popper, "Questions like 'What is life?'" and "What is gravity?" do not play any role in science."

This is a highly problematic claim in its own right, but let's pass it by. Popper may be right about the counterproductive effect of "essentialist" (i.e., Aristotelian) definitions in science, according to which we cannot know what a thing is -- its metaphysical essence -- without knowledge of its definition. This is because to identify the essential characteristic of a thing, in this way of thinking, is the same as stating what that thing is. Aristotle thought that a "real" definition gives us new metaphysical knowledge. It tells us something about a thing that we did not know before.

This was not Rand's view. She did not claim that a definition tells us something about a thing that we did not know before. Unlike Aristotle, she did not claim that a definition provides new metaphysical knowledge. Rather, she presented a "contextual" theory of definitions, according to which definitions serve the cognitive purpose of organizing our concepts into a usable form. In this respect, she was a cognitive pragmatist, not an essentialist. Definitions serve a cognitive function, but they do not provide new knowledge per se. They simply condense and classify the concepts that we already have, thereby enabling us to deal with high-level abstractions in an efficient manner.

In addition to her rejection of metaphysical essences, Rand differed from Aristotle and other essentialists in another crucial respect. She rejected the traditional doctrine that a definition is identical to the meaning of a concept (or word). I don't want to take the time to explain this, but it is clearly expressed in ITOE and in Peikoff's Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy. The upshot of this position, so far as Popper's argument is concerned, is that we don't necessarily need to know the formal definition of a concept in order to know what a concept means. We can understand a concept -- we can understand the nature of the units subsumed by a concept (especially when lower level concepts are involved) -- with no knowledge of its definition. Indeed, unless we already possessed such knowledge before defining a concept, we would not have the information necessary to formulate a definition.

Thus even if formal definitions are necessary when dealing with very high level abstractions, such as "justice," when the units subsumed by a concept are not readily apparent, it does not follow that each and every lower level concept must be similarly defined before a productive argument or exchange can take place. There comes a point where the meaning of a concept is readily apparent to everyone without the use of definitions. For example, I can assert that dogs make better pets than cats without defining these terms. I can do this because people generally know what cats and dogs are, even if they have no inkling of how to define the respective concepts. And if someone didn't understand the concepts "cat" and "dog," it would be more useful to point to examples of each animal and say, "This is what I mean." And in some cases we can employ synonyms to explain what we mean, should this prove necessary.

None of this would be possible for Aristotle, for whom we cannot truly know what cats and dogs are without knowledge of their essences, as expressed in formal definitions. As I noted before, there is a huge difference between Aristotle's position and Rand's.

A metaphor that I sometimes use to illustrate Rand's theory is as follows: If a file folder is a concept, and if the contents of the folder are the units subsumed by a concept (i.e., its meaning), then a definition would be a descriptive label that we attach to the folder in order to keep it distinct from other folders -- a cognitive device that we use to organize our concepts. If, for example, we were dealing with a large collection of personal information, we might have folders labeled "Smith, Adam," "Smith, Barry," "Smith, George," and so forth -- where the last name is the genus, and the first names are differentia. (I realize that there are some problems with this metaphor, but it is adequate to illustrate the point.)

Thus, even if Popper's infinite regress argument applies to Aristotle, it manifestly does not apply to Rand.

After dealing with essentialism in science, and after claiming that nominal definitions are immune to the infinite regress problem, Popper writes: "So far I have tried to show that the scientific or nominalist use of definitions is entirely different from Aristotle's." (Popper neglects to mention that Aristotle discussed nominal definitions.)

This is true, but it is also true that Rand's theory of definitions is entirely different from Aristotle's. It is also true that Rand's theory bears some similarity to earlier conceptualists, such as Gassendi and Locke, who rejected Aristotle's essentialism while insisting that definitions (based on what Locke called "nominal essences," in contrast to real essences) serve an important cognitive function. But Popper doesn't even consider this tradition. Instead, he lumps vastly different approaches under the same label, "essentialism," and presents a package deal.

Popper goes on to expand his objections to essentialism, maintaining that "the essentialist view of definitions is simply untenable in itself." This is where he explains his infinite regress argument in more detail. But I have already explained why Rand's theory does not require that we define each and every term in order to know what we are talking about, so Popper's argument does not apply to Rand.

Aristotle also rejected Popper's argument, maintaining instead that we can know some essences (via intuition) without formal definitions and that some truths are self-evident. Popper does not seriously explore either claim. Instead, he presents the usual hackneyed objection to self-evident truths -- saying, in effect, "Gee, some people have claimed as self-evident propositions that turned out to be false, so how can we possibly depend on this criterion?" Well, some people have claimed truths in the name of science that turned out to be false, so how can we possibly depend on science?

In short, the infinite regress argument works for true essentialists only if one rejects the foundational features of essentialist epistemology. If you wish to ignore the theoretical underpinnings of Aristotle's essentialism and deal with only part of his theory, then I suppose you could say that a regress of definitions is the only remaining alternative. But one first needs to refute (or ignore) some important features of essentialism before the regress argument will work. It does not work from the perspective of Aristotle and other essentialists.

Even here the definitions would be finite, however, since the number of terms requiring definitions would be finite. Popper is quite wrong to insist that this process would go on "to infinity." Thus, if we take the "infinite" in "infinite regress" literally, Popper's argument is wrong on its face. A finite number of terms, however large, would not require an infinite number of definitions. It frankly surprises me that Popper would commit such an elementary blunder.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

Even here the definitions would be finite, however, since the number of terms requiring definitions would be finite. Popper is quite wrong to insist that this process would go on "to infinity." Thus, if we take the "infinite" in "infinite regress" literally, Popper's argument is wrong on its face. A finite number of terms, however large, would not require an infinite number of definitions. It frankly surprises me that Popper would commit such an elementary blunder.

Now THAT's more like it.

Just quickly however, for now: I don't think you are correct in thinking the number of terms are necessarily finite. There are neologisms for example. And the number of possible new concepts (or theories) around any fact or set of facts are infinite. So I'm not sure it is a blunder.

Or perhaps I have missed your point.

Anyway will consider the larger part of your remarks and reply soon.

[George H. Smith]

For example, after you stated that Popper, unlike Rand, sometimes admitted that he was confused and didn't understand the implications of his own theories, I expressed some skepticism and requested a citation. Did you provide one? No, of course not.

So in the prior post we already have the first example, found almost by opening one of his books at random. Now here's two more, both found in a few minutes:

"I offer my theory with many apologies. It has taken me a long time to think it out fully, and to make it clear to myself. Nevertheless I still feel far from satisfied with it...I blush when I have to make this confession; for when I was younger, I used to say very contemptuous things about evolutionary philosophies. When twenty-two years ago Canon Charles E. Raven, in his Science, Religion, and the Future, described the Darwinian controversy as "a storm in a Victorian teacup," I agreed, but criticized him for paying too much attention "to the vapors still emerging from the cup," by which I meant the hot air of the evolutionary philosophies (especially those which told us that there were inexorable laws of evolution). But now I have to confess that this cup of tea has become, after all, my cup of tea; and with it I have to eat humble pie." [Popper, OK 1972]

And later:

"The fact that the theory of natural selection is difficult to test has led some people...to claim that it is a tautology. . . . I mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits. Influenced by what these authorities say, I have in the past described the theory as "almost tautological,"....I have changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation." [Popper, 1978]

More to follow, as soon as I can be bothered with the sure-to-be-thankless task of looking them up.

You don't need to provide any more examples. Popper's remarks are admirable. Popper definitely had a leg up on Rand in this department.

[Daniel Barnes]

For example, after you stated that Popper, unlike Rand, sometimes admitted that he was confused and didn't understand the implications of his own theories, I expressed some skepticism and requested a citation. Did you provide one? No, of course not.

So in the prior post we already have the first example, found almost by opening one of his books at random. Now here's two more, both found in a few minutes:

"I offer my theory with many apologies. It has taken me a long time to think it out fully, and to make it clear to myself. Nevertheless I still feel far from satisfied with it...I blush when I have to make this confession; for when I was younger, I used to say very contemptuous things about evolutionary philosophies. When twenty-two years ago Canon Charles E. Raven, in his Science, Religion, and the Future, described the Darwinian controversy as "a storm in a Victorian teacup," I agreed, but criticized him for paying too much attention "to the vapors still emerging from the cup," by which I meant the hot air of the evolutionary philosophies (especially those which told us that there were inexorable laws of evolution). But now I have to confess that this cup of tea has become, after all, my cup of tea; and with it I have to eat humble pie." [Popper, OK 1972]

And later:

"The fact that the theory of natural selection is difficult to test has led some people...to claim that it is a tautology. . . . I mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits. Influenced by what these authorities say, I have in the past described the theory as "almost tautological,"....I have changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation." [Popper, 1978]

More to follow, as soon as I can be bothered with the sure-to-be-thankless task of looking them up.

You don't need to provide any more examples. Popper's remarks are admirable. Popper definitely had a leg up on Rand in this department.

Oh just one more, which I found just as I was heading off to bed. Mainly because I laughed out loud when I recalled it, and I think you'll find it amusing.

Chapter heading from Unended Quest, p 13: MY FIRST PHILOSOPHICAL FAILURE: THE PROBLEM OF ESSENTIALISM.

[merjet]

Oh just one more, which I found just as I was heading off to bed. Mainly because I laughed out loud when I recalled it, and I think you'll find it amusing.

Chapter heading from Unended Quest, p 13: MY FIRST PHILOSOPHICAL FAILURE: THE PROBLEM OF ESSENTIALISM.

LOL. I read the section using Amazon's "look inside" feature. Popper was about 15 years old. He had already concluded that words and their meanings are unimportant, i.e. his anti-essentialism. His failure was merely to convince his father that his anti-essentialism is correct.

If his admission had been much later and that his anti-essentialism, i.e. the Barnes-vaunted essay Two Kinds of Definitions, is one big train-wreck, it may have been worth reading. That not being the case, it is another Barnes bluff.

Edited August 15, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[George H. Smith]

Even here the definitions would be finite, however, since the number of terms requiring definitions would be finite. Popper is quite wrong to insist that this process would go on "to infinity." Thus, if we take the "infinite" in "infinite regress" literally, Popper's argument is wrong on its face. A finite number of terms, however large, would not require an infinite number of definitions. It frankly surprises me that Popper would commit such an elementary blunder.

Now THAT's more like it.

Just quickly however, for now: I don't think you are correct in thinking the number of terms are necessarily finite. There are neologisms for example. And the number of possible new concepts (or theories) around any fact or set of facts are infinite. So I'm not sure it is a blunder.

Or perhaps I have missed your point.

Anyway will consider the larger part of your remarks and reply soon.

An infinite number of neologisms? That's a real stretch. As for "possible new concepts," even if you believe that their number is potentially infinite (a claim that strikes me as bizarre), the number of concepts involved in a particular argument at a given point in time will be finite. It is gibberish to say that a particular argument might employ an infinite number of terms. If it did, the argument could never be completed; it would continue forever, or, more precisely, until the proponent died. In addition, the proponent could never see a final conclusion to his argument, because there can be no finality to an infinite argument, so he would ramble on with no sense of where he was going.

None of this matters in any case, because Popper doesn't call on these daydreams to illustrate his point about an infinite regress of definitions. He specifically mentions words "such as 'democracy,' 'liberty,' 'duty,''religion,' etc." In regard to "democracy," for example, Popper argues that the elements of its definition, such as "rule" and "people," will need to be defined as well, and this "puts us well on the way to an infinite regression."

No mention of neologisms or an infinite number of concepts here. Popper was just flat wrong.

Even if we accept your improbable hypotheticals, the most they would show is that an infinite regression might occur in some cases. But this wasn't Popper's point. He wished to demonstrate that an infinite regress is an inherent problem of all essentialist definitions. He was not merely claiming that the essentialist might fall prey to an infinite regress in a few hypothetical cases. Such a claim would not be a good reason to abandon essentialist definitions in cases where no infinite regress is required.

Moreover, your examples would also require an infinite number of nominal definitions -- I assume the coiner of neologisms would not merely blurt out strange sounds while giving no indication of what they are supposed to mean -- so Popper's claim that nominal definitions are better than essentialist definitions, because they avoid the trap of an infinite regress, would no longer hold. Popper would find himself in the same infinite regress as essentialists, so he could no longer claim an advantage.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

My personal favorite is Stephen Toulmin's Human Understanding -- perhaps the only book on the nature and historical development of scientific disciplines and the evolution of scientific theories that I would describe as an authentic masterpiece. Toulmin's stress on contextualism probably accounts for a good deal my evaluation, and many of his themes could easily be incorporated into a Randian framework.

Geroge,

I just took a look at the Wikipedia on Stephen Toulmin.

Just that small outline fits perfectly with some developing projects of my own.

Thank you for that tip.

God, do I have a lot to learn...

Michael

[Xray]

We're now up to 600+ posts.

I've stopped reading Mr. Barnes' stuff. Has little value or sense. GHS, just let the dude have the last word. No one believes him and no one has time to read all of this...especially when it's so many posts a day.

Phil,

Your inferring from your own non-belief in what D. Barnes states in his posts that "no one believes him" is a classic non-sequitur.

Ghs is a seasoned debater, very "mercurial", alert and quick in is reactions, but in the recent debate between him and D. Barnes, DB had no intention of throwing in the towel, but stayed in the "ring", consistently addressing Ghs's arguments point per point.

Ghs is also a very emotional type of debater, typical example is a comment like:

You and Daniel should get a room.

That's Ghs all over.

But such remarks are part of a debate, and being not too thin-skinned certainly helps.

Now what could I reply to Ghs here? Simply igoring would be a possibility, but some humor works well too. I'll try the second option this time:

Dear George,

I don't have the habit of "getting a room" with people just because I happen to agree with them on certain issues, and I'm sure you don't either. ;)

What I would appreciate instead is if you answered my direct questions to you that "cyber-room" here. For example, the one I already asked you a while back:

You had written:

Rand also uses "contextually" in regard to essential characteristics: "Essential characteristics are determined contextually (p. 102)."

Could you illustrate with an example of essential characteristics being determined contextually?

There are also other posters here who ask themselves what all this stressing of 'contextual' in O'ism is about:

What is the purpose of the concepts of "contextually absolute" and "contextual certainty" in Objectivism? What role do they play in the minds of Objectivists?

For my part they've never had much play in my mind, I've found it more useful to focus on how one knows something or, in the case of discovering an error, how one might have known, than to deploy concepts of "it was absolutely true in my context of knowledge but now in my new context it's not true."

Imo there's a lot of common sense in that comment by sjw. What do you think, George?

Phil, one last remark about those debates in general: the key point is not to get 'lost in altercation', which can can quickly happen when a debate gets too personal, but to keep focused on the nucleus of the matter. The nucleus of the matter here is that the whole ballyhoo Rand made about the whole "concept" stuff is about something very simple: forming classes and subclasses. There's nothing new in that, nor does it pose any mental challenge to humans in the process of acquiring language.

In addition, there are several instances where in ITOE Rand was downright wrong on fundamental issues, and I invite everyone to a detailed discussion on this book to demonstrate my evidence on that.

Edited August 15, 2010 by Xray

[Ellen Stuttle]

I'm miles behind with the posts here -- and didn't even manage on my last excursion into this thread to address a post of Dragonfly's I hope to get back to eventually.

Meanwhile, I'm reading backward up the thread trying to get an idea of where things have gotten to. I'm surprised by this:

Yes, Rand defended certainty. But I suggest the means she adopted, "contextual certainty" accidentally undermines her goal.

[....]

So you continually wheeling out the fact that Rand's intention was to defend certainty is just as continually beside the point.

[....] My point is that Rand presents a soundcase for contextual certainty.

I thought we'd established that *Rand* did not ever, in any of her published work which appears on the CD-ROM, use the term "contextual certainty."

I'm not even sure that Peikoff used that exact wording. If anyone reading the thread has notes from any of his courses which document his using that wording, I'd appreciate documentation.

Rand doesn't argue anything about scientific method or even how we'd establish the truth of any proposition in ITOE.

The last couple days, for the first time ever, I've been reading Chapter 4, "Objectivity," and Chapter 5, "Reason," in OPAR. I never did get around to reading most of OPAR. When the book first appeared, I turned first to Peikoff's discussion of volition and was so irritated by the gaffes in that, I didn't want to read more at the time. Between then and now, the only further parts of the book I'd read were a few scattered segments. In Chapter 5, he uses the section heading "Certainty as Contextual," so maybe that's where the usage "contextual certainty" came from.

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

I reread Popper's chapter, and I don't agree that his "logical" arguments apply to Rand at all.

Do you agree that Rand thought is was vitally important to first and foremost precisely define your terms - that, supposedly, if you did not start from this secure foundation, all your subsequent knowledge must be erroneous?

Nope. I don't agree that this was Rand's position. [....]

Neither do I agree that this was Rand's position. It's what Daniel keeps *saying* was Rand's position, but that's by virtue of taking a particular sentence out of context and viewing the sentence from a skewed interpretive slant.

Likewise, I don't agree that Popper's "logical" arguments apply to Rand. (And I think there are problems anyway in the "logic" of Popper's arguments.)

Ellen

Edited August 15, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[Ellen Stuttle]

Popper begins by objecting to the use of "essentialist" definitions in science. He doesn't reject definitions in science altogether -- indeed, he says that there might be "an urgent practical need" for them -- but he maintains that these are nominal, not essentialist, definitions. Why? Because, according to Popper, "Questions like 'What is life?'" and "What is gravity?" do not play any role in science."

This is a highly problematic claim in its own right, but let's pass it by.

[....]

After dealing with essentialism in science, and after claiming that nominal definitions are immune to the infinite regress problem, Popper writes: "So far I have tried to show that the scientific or nominalist use of definitions is entirely different from Aristotle's." (Popper neglects to mention that Aristotle discussed nominal definitions.)

Among the problems which I find with that "Two Definitions" essay is the claim that scientific definitions are nominalist. Here I'm referring to definitions in the hard sciences. In the social so-called sciences, and in psychology, there is a use of nominalist definitions, much to the detriment of those fields, as I indicated in post #499. But I think *Popper* was confused in that essay in his classifying as "nominalist" what he describes as the scientific method of defining.

Ellen

[Xray]

I thought we'd established that *Rand* did not ever, in any of her published work which appears on the CD-ROM, use the term "contextual certainty."

I'm not even sure that Peikoff used that exact wording. If anyone reading the thread has notes from any of his courses which document his using that wording, I'd appreciate documentation.

Ellen,

In Peikoff's OPAR, p. 171, there's a whole chapter about "certainty as contextual".

It's about something very simple actually, and imo what James Heaps Nelson wrote explains it perfectly:

I've always found the "contextual certainty" formulation to be strange. Why not simply say: with the available data, conclusion X follows.

This is exactly what Peikoff means when he explains on p. 172: "on the basis of the available evidence, i. e. within the context of the factors so far discovered, the following is the proper conclusion to draw". (LP)

Which means all 'certainty' is contextual. Where is the problem? If the operating principle of evidence discovered which can lead to revision of conclusions previoulsy held were not at work, we would still 'conclude' that the earth is flat.

Any Objectivist here who have problems with the above explanation by LP?

In Why Atheism p. 72, George H. Smith speaks of "a latent tendency toward epistemological relativism" when commenting on Rand's idea of truth being "contextual"; he also said that this latent tendency toward epistemological relativism "sharply conflicts with Rand's spirited insistence that truth is objective". (Ghs)

Like here:

"Truth is the product of the recognition (i.e. identification) of the facts of reality" Rand states in ITOE, p. 48.

Now 'truth' is not the same as 'knowledge', but if knowledge is contextual, it follows that what is considered as truth based on what is believed to be knowledge has to be contextual as well.

In fact, using Peikoff's explanation as a basis, everything which is regarded as "objective" is 'contextual' also.

Are there any Objectivists here who have problems with the idea of 'objectivity' being 'contextual'?

Edited August 15, 2010 by Xray

[Neil Parille]

Speaking of Popper (about whom I have read little), there is a critique of his attack on essentialism in David Oderberg's book Real Essentialism on pages 30-38. You can read the pages on Amazon (except 33) for free. If you do a search for "fish" you can probably see page 33. Also, don't miss the note on page 265.

-Neil Parille

Edited August 15, 2010 by Neil Parille

[Daniel Barnes]

Oh just one more, which I found just as I was heading off to bed. Mainly because I laughed out loud when I recalled it, and I think you'll find it amusing.

Chapter heading from Unended Quest, p 13: MY FIRST PHILOSOPHICAL FAILURE: THE PROBLEM OF ESSENTIALISM.

LOL. I read the section using Amazon's "look inside" feature. Popper was about 15 years old. He had already concluded that words and their meanings are unimportant, i.e. his anti-essentialism. His failure was merely to convince his father that his anti-essentialism is correct.

If his admission had been much later and that his anti-essentialism, i.e. the Barnes-vaunted essay Two Kinds of Definitions, is one big train-wreck, it may have been worth reading. That not being the case, it is another Barnes bluff.

If I hadn't been going to bed at the time, Merlin, I would have pointed that out myself.

Incidentally, that's why i thought it funny - the apparent clash. But no, you think it's a "bluff". And of course you forget the three examples I had already easily provided. And I could offer plenty more, but GHS had already asked me to stop. Why you think that I would try to "bluff", when I know for a fact Ellen has UQ and GHS most likely has it (hence why I thought he too would take it with a small smile) I can only attribute to your tendency to read everything I write with the least sympathetic interpretation possible.

As I've tried to point out to GHS, this attitude is hardly justified by the fact that you think I do it to Rand.

All you do by this, even by your own estimation, is lower yourself to my level...;-)

[Daniel Barnes]

(And I think there are problems anyway in the "logic" of Popper's arguments.)

Well, excellent! That's where we should be starting. And if Popper's argument survives a good bashing - I'm just considering GHS's response now - then we'll consider how or if it really applies to Rand.

I think it is 1) sound and 2) applies to Rand.

But I could be entirely wrong on both counts, so have at it!

[George H. Smith]

I'm miles behind with the posts here -- and didn't even manage on my last excursion into this thread to address a post of Dragonfly's I hope to get back to eventually.

Meanwhile, I'm reading backward up the thread trying to get an idea of where things have gotten to. I'm surprised by this:

Yes, Rand defended certainty. But I suggest the means she adopted, "contextual certainty" accidentally undermines her goal.

[....]

So you continually wheeling out the fact that Rand's intention was to defend certainty is just as continually beside the point.

[....] My point is that Rand presents a soundcase for contextual certainty.

I thought we'd established that *Rand* did not ever, in any of her published work which appears on the CD-ROM, use the term "contextual certainty."

I'm not even sure that Peikoff used that exact wording. If anyone reading the thread has notes from any of his courses which document his using that wording, I'd appreciate documentation.

Rand may not have used the exact expression, but the notion is clearly present in her other remarks about contextualism.

As for Peikoff, I no longer have those detailed notes of his course on Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge. But I did have them when I wrote ATCAG (in 1972-73), and I relied on them heavily when sketching a theory of certainty. I also cited Peikoff's lectures twice -- once as a general source on contextualism and once as a specific source on contextual certainty.

Here is my summary, which is a close paraphrase of the notes I had in hand:

ATCAG, p. 147

Certainty does not mean "static." It simply means that, within the context of one's knowledge, the evidence for a given proposition is overwhelming....Depending on the nature and degree of available evidence, a scientific law may be possible, probable, or certain. These are different stages of an evidential continuum. As the amount of evidence increases, so will the degree of certainty. [Note #31: This approach to certainty is presented in "Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge," a series of recorded lectures by Leonard Peikoff.] Certainty does not require infallibility or omniscience, and to claim certainty is not to claim the theoretical impossibility of error....

As I noted before, it is pretty obvious that Peikoff's discussion would have had a green light from Rand. It is quite possible, even probable, that Rand was the source of this approach.

[Xray]

I'm miles behind with the posts here -- and didn't even manage on my last excursion into this thread to address a post of Dragonfly's I hope to get back to eventually.

Meanwhile, I'm reading backward up the thread trying to get an idea of where things have gotten to. I'm surprised by this:

Yes, Rand defended certainty. But I suggest the means she adopted, "contextual certainty" accidentally undermines her goal.

[....]

So you continually wheeling out the fact that Rand's intention was to defend certainty is just as continually beside the point.

[....] My point is that Rand presents a soundcase for contextual certainty.

I thought we'd established that *Rand* did not ever, in any of her published work which appears on the CD-ROM, use the term "contextual certainty."

I'm not even sure that Peikoff used that exact wording. If anyone reading the thread has notes from any of his courses which document his using that wording, I'd appreciate documentation.

Rand may not have used the exact expression, but the notion is clearly present in her other remarks about contextualism.

As for Peikoff, I no longer have those detailed notes of his course on Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge. But I did have them when I wrote ATCAG (in 1972-73), and I relied on them heavily when sketching a theory of certainty. I also cited Peikoff's lectures twice -- once as a general source on contextualism and once as a specific source on contextual certainty.

Here is my summary, which is a close paraphrase of the notes I had in hand:

ATCAG, p. 147

Certainty does not mean "static." It simply means that, within the context of one's knowledge, the evidence for a given proposition is overwhelming....Depending on the nature and degree of available evidence, a scientific law may be possible, probable, or certain. These are different stages of an evidential continuum. As the amount of evidence increases, so will the degree of certainty. [Note #31: This approach to certainty is presented in "Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge," a series of recorded lectures by Leonard Peikoff.] Certainty does not require infallibility or omniscience, and to claim certainty is not to claim the theoretical impossibility of error....

As I noted before, it is pretty obvious that Peikoff's discussion would have had a green light from Rand. It is quite possible, even probable, that Rand was the source of this approach.

Post # 644 directs you to the source where LP elaborates on 'Certainty as Contextual'.

Edited August 15, 2010 by Xray

[Ellen Stuttle]

What is the purpose of the concepts of "contextually absolute" and "contextual certainty" in Objectivism? What role do they play in the minds of Objectivists?

I haven't seen much talk by Objectivists about "contextually absolute," which Rand used pertaining to definitions.

The role "contextual certainty" seems to me to play for Objectivists is to let them think that they have a grasp which they don't have on physics and the history of physics. I don't see them using it in regard to issues like the defense of individual rights.

So while we can unqualifiedly be certain in the realm of individual rights, we must qualify our certainty in the realm of physics. So does that make physics a good proving ground for validating induction? I think not. Rather, I think that because it can be such a technical subject, it serves as a way of intimidating followers to think you know something when in fact you haven't a clue. A better proving ground would be something people have to deal with every day, that any common man has experience with and that is crucial to the future of humanity: individual rights.

I don't think any field would be good for validating induction, if by that you mean reaching certainty through induction, since I don't think induction -- which I'm using here basically as Harriman uses it, arguing from some cases to laws pertaining to all cases -- ever can be validated. That isn't the way Rand argues for rights.

Ellen

Edited August 15, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle