The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics

[Brant Gaede]

Two elephants fighting it out, each thinking the other is a mouse.

--Brant

[Xray]

What I want to know is when you have deconstructed ITOE and reconstructed it to be without errors, what are you going to use it for? (This is the same question I've been asking about ITOE as is.)

Suppose you have discovered that the ground on which a house was built is not solid enough to keep it up, you would not reconstruct the house in the same place. The 'ground' can be compared to Objectvism's premises. Imo most of them don't hold up either. Like e. g. the premise that only so called 'rational' values are to be pursued, or claiming that there is 'no place for the arbitary in man's life'. All I can say is that some of the best decisions I made in my life were 'arbitrary' ones , so there must be something wrong with that premise of Rand's since it is contradicted by the evidence.

The "subjective" being regarded exclusively as "the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional" is a false premise as well. These are just a few examples of O'ism's premises making the foundation of the whole thing questionable imo.

Imo ITOE is a very unsystematic book, and in large parts an assortment of errors and simplicities. Rand also lets her moral opinions take over in parts of the book.

Thank Galtness it doesn't matter in the least if Xray treats ITOE as edited by Peikoff and Binswanger as primary source material or not.

"Thank Galtness" - good one!

As for Peikoff and Binswanger, while I can understand the suspicion regarding the history of ARI dealing with texts, to assume that P&B must have had had their finger in every 'Randian text pie' containing confusing statements is carrying it too far imo. It can also lead non-ARI Objectivists to assign the role of scapegoats to P&B, in that things which sound contradictory and odd in Objectivist texts written (or edited) by those two are too quickly classified as misinterpretations or even intentional misrepresentations of Rand by P/B.

"Absolute" in Objectivism is more of a cultural than intellectual position. It amounts to we are right and if you don't agree with us then you are wrong. It comes down to cultism and tribalism and is a gross argument from authority and chest puffing. This is why Objectivism gets so larded up with things that strictly speaking aren't philosophy at all and why a Leonard Peikoff can spend 40 years studying it and still doesn't quite get it. He might as well be a scientist who dedicates his life to the achievement of absolute zero.

You hit the nail on the head here, Brant.

The quotes containing 'absolute' from Galt's speech are ideological far more than epistemological: "Reality is an absolute, existence is an absolute, a speck of dust is an absolute and so is a human life. Whether you live or die is an absolute. Whether you have a piece of bread or not, is an absolute. Whether you eat your bread or see it vanish into a looter’s stomach, is an absolute."

http://aynrandlexico.../absolutes.html

Still waiting for an answer to my question what precisely "absolute" means in the word combination "contextually absolute" ...

Formally, absolutism refers to reality as opposed to our best knowledge of same. Knowledge has various levels of tentativeness. "The atom will never be split" got split. For rhetorical purposes, Rand liked to mix up these two categories. One cannot, however, say that Rand was a first-class rhetorician and second-class philosopher even if technically true, because genius trumps it all. That genius was in not any one part of Objectivism, but how she took its four basic components and gave us the integrated whole. Libertarians merely loped off the politics (and economics) preferring not the morality, epistemology and metaphysics--especially that morality and especially not to think about those things.--Brant

I don't think she succeeded in presenting Objectvism as an integrated whole. She was a first-class rhetorician though, and it is the rhetoric in ITOE which can dazzle the reader. But once you start going through it with a fine-tooth comb, stripping off all the rhetoric, what is left?

Interesting observation by you on people picking just parts of the whole Ayn Rand package. It can lead as far as some Christian conservatives ignoring that atheism is one of the pillars of her philosophy. Jennifer Burns remarked on that in an interview.

So what these people are doing is also a form of 'context-dropping'.

Edited August 14, 2010 by Xray

[Neil Parille]

Speaking of Popper's 3 worlds, Ed Feser recently did a post on the topic

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/07/poppers-world-3.html

-Neil Parille

[Dragonfly]

No, the non-omniscient argument pulls in a nonsensical standard, a standard which has no relationship to knowledge anyway, so it doesn't actually tell you anything about the possibility of certainty.

The point of the argument is that from the hypothesis of the existence of a counterexample does follow that this impossible standard would be true, and therefore the counterexample cannot be true - that's the crux of a reductio ad absurdum argument. The certainty with which you know that this nonsensical standard cannot be true is the certainty with which you know that the counterexample is impossible, in other words, the more nonsensical that standard, the stronger the argument.

[George H. Smith]

Popper was very confused, you know, and he often didn't understand the implications of his own theories.

There is no doubt that Popper was sometimes very confused, and often didn't understand the full implications of his own theories.

He even said so himself sometimes, so this is hardly a very cutting criticism or something a typical Popper fan is unlikely to acknowledge.

Funnily enough, I don't remember Rand making too many remarks of this type however.

And I wish I could say the same thing about a typical Rand fan.

Exactly where does Popper admit that he was sometimes very confused and often didn't understand the full implications of his own theories? I have a read a lot of Popper over the years, but I missed that ditty.

Popper, despite his insistence on the value of criticism, sometimes adopted a very intolerant attitude towards those followers, such as Bartley, who dared disagree with him on some points. Popper was not the intellectually modest type, so I would be very interested in reading his admission that he was sometimes very confused.

Ghs: We briefly discussed Popper's Third World theory some time ago. I suggested that you start a thread on this subject and see how well it holds up. As I recall, you replied that you would consider the suggestion. As yet, however, you haven't been willing to stick your neck out.

As I'm about to get a taste of the quality of your Popper criticism, we'll soon see if a Three Worlds thread is going to be a waste of both of our times or not.

The quality of my Popper criticism will match the quality of your Rand criticism. In other words, I will make no attempt to be fair, I will never give Popper a sympathetic reading or the benefit of the doubt, and I will treat Popper as a philosophic charlatan who couldn't reason his way out of a paper bag, while quoting passages as needed, out-of-context, to make him look as ridiculous as possible. I may also cite various "experts" who have condemned his treatment of historical figures, such as Plato, Marx, and Hegel, as amateurish and inaccurate. And should you say something reasonable in Popper's defense, I will ignore it or merely repeat what I said before. My attitude will be premised on the assumption that Popper rarely if ever said reasonable things, so no reasonable defense of his major theories is possible.

In short, as I stated previously, I will adopt the Barnesean style of criticism. A good time should be had by all. True, my game of smoke and mirrors will render it highly unlikely that readers will actually learn something about Popper from my comments, but what does this matter? I will have shown how much more clever I am than Popper -- and that's what really counts.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

I once taught a course based on Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies, and I spent a fair amount of time on his chapter that deals with definitions. It's very weak, one of the worst things Popper ever wrote -- almost as bad as his gibberish about piecemeal social engineering. Popper was very confused, you know, and he often didn't understand the implications of his own theories.

Now I have no idea whether you're being serious.

But there's a simple way you can prove you are. Popper's arguments against the Aristotelian method, in that chapter and its lengthy notes, are primarily logical, and directly relevant to this thread. Just explain where his logic goes awry, and I'll take you seriously.

In Chapter 11 of The Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper says a number of foolish things. For example, in regard to words like "liberty," Popper (pp. 17-18) writes:

Admittedly, the terms mentioned are much misused. But I deny that the attempt to define them can improve matters. It can only makes matters worse....[T]he attempt to define terms would only increase the vagueness and confusion.

Thus, according to Popper, libertarians should defend "liberty" while avoiding all attempts to define what we mean by this word. This would only make matters worse, after all. Let's just let people guess what we mean by the word.

As silly the preceding remarks are, Popper surpasses himself just a few paragraphs later when he writes that "in science, all the terms that are really needed must be undefined terms." (Popper's emphasis.)

Yeah, right. And a few paragraphs after this remark, Popper offers this paradox: "The precision of language depends, rather, just upon the fact that it takes care not to burden its terms with the task of being precise."

Precision requires not being precise? Rand never said anything this stupid.

Then there are Popper's misrepresentations of Aristotle's theory of definitions and its influence, not to mention Popper's claim that Aristotle was engaged in "a secret revolt against reason." A secret revolt? Give me a fucking break. This is on a par with Rand's interpretation of Kant.

I have merely scratched the surface, but this scratching has been sufficient to reveal Popper as a buffoon at work.

No need to thank me for enlightening you about Popper.

Ghs

[sjw]

What is the purpose of the concepts of "contextually absolute" and "contextual certainty" in Objectivism? What role do they play in the minds of Objectivists?

For my part they've never had much play in my mind, I've found it more useful to focus on how one knows something or, in the case of discovering an error, how one might have known, than to deploy concepts of "it was absolutely true in my context of knowledge but now in my new context it's not true." To me that seems like making excuses for intellectual weakness thereby setting yourself up to remain a weakling.

I am certain that unless I interfere with others then I should be left not interfered with by them, and I am certain that nothing will ever overturn this knowledge. I do not call this "contextual certainty" because I do not allow that it would ever be overturned. I could imagine a fantasy where God (but -- how would I know it was God and not space aliens?) came down and told me otherwise. But that wouldn't be an expansion of context, it would be a destruction of all prior context (unless I concluded that "God" was a malicious space alien).

Certainty with regard to physics is different because it is clear at this stage of human knowledge that there are many things we do not know and may even be beyond our knowing, such as: is there a "smallest" particle? We know that when we have obtained the ability to smash atoms to pieces, we've seen a plethora. We have yet no ability to smash those pieces into pieces. Perhaps the physical potential exists to continually break matter into smaller and smaller bits, without the smaller bits actually existing until they are created through smashing them. Unlike the realm of rights, in the realm of physics, we have to qualify, we have to cite experiments, we have to be willing to say "it is as if such and such is true, but what is really going on might be different."

So while we can unqualifiedly be certain in the realm of individual rights, we must qualify our certainty in the realm of physics. So does that make physics a good proving ground for validating induction? I think not. Rather, I think that because it can be such a technical subject, it serves as a way of intimidating followers to think you know something when in fact you haven't a clue. A better proving ground would be something people have to deal with every day, that any common man has experience with and that is crucial to the future of humanity: individual rights.

[Brant Gaede]

Two Objectivisms: 1) One thing leads to another from metaphysics to politics each part having a logical interaction. 2) Morality and a woman's want and understanding of an ideal man is its heart and center leading eventually to a more formal structure which, while valid, is also a rationalization for that center. Actual proper content of Objectivist morality and ethics need more work no matter how legitimate a morality of "rational self-interest" is, which is not "selfishness" commonly understood and hijacked by Rand for purposes of rhetoric. "Concern with one's own interests" is not any dictionary definition nor is it "rational self-interest" either, for that doesn't exclude concern with others' interests, merely keeps them in their proper, hierarchical place. Since the politics derives from the ethics the desirability of laissez faire capitalism must come into some question as well considering it's an Utopian vision. All we really know now is the value of more and more political and economic freedom and that that is the direction society should move in principle, recognizing Utopias are omelets made from broken eggs.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

The cathedral analogy was a close paraphrase of Bacon, who used this example. It's not necessarily an example I would use. Did you not notice that I was discussing Bacon's ideas?

Of course, I expect you to apologize for your misunderstanding of what I wrote, as I did when I misunderstood you. We will soon see if you are willing to practice what you preach.

Yes, I did notice that you were discussing Bacon's ideas. No, I did not misunderstand what you wrote.

However I will apologise anyway, specifically for calling it a "dire, Rand-lite caricature". That was unfair of me, and I regretted it once I wrote it. Thanks for the opportunity to apologise.

I know very well what you are "getting at," and the material I posted recently about fallibilism is directly relevant to your point about skepticism. So do you ever plan on dealing with any of the issues I raised, or are you just going to bury your head in sand, hoping that no one will notice and while whining that are you misunderstood?

My reply to you is simple, and rather like your comment to me about Bacon: if "contextual certainty" means Rand isn't a skeptic, then neither are Critical Rationalists!

This is an evasion, not a reply. You have simply ignored the points I made about the distinction, both theoretical and historical, between fallibilism and skepticism. (Don't you just love the pretentious label "Critical Rationalists"? This stands in contrast to what? -- uncritical rationalists?)

Even so, it does not follow that "if 'contextual certainty' means Rand isn't a skeptic, then neither are Critical Rationalists!" Are you saying that Popper had a theory of contextual certainty? If so, where does this appear?

In an earlier post where you mentioned Popper's skepticism, you linked an article by the Popperian David Miller to support your claim. And as I pointed out in an earlier post, Rand clearly does not meet Miller's conception of a skeptic, viz:

Skepticism in its simplest form denies only that we ever know, in the sense of know for certain, whether a statement that we make is absolutely true or false. We know nothing for certain, the ancient skeptics argued, because the grounds for what is known themselves need grounds, and we embark on an infinite regress of justification....

I concluded:

This obviously does not describe Rand's position, so, by your own standard, Rand was not an epistemological skeptic, whether in science or in any other field.

Rand defended the kind of "justificationism" that Popper rejected. The differences between them are substantial, though I will concede that Popper employed term "justification" in an idiosyncratic and highly misleading manner, so some of the differences may not be as serious as they first appear. (It's a good thing that Popper didn't do the same thing with the word "selfishness," or you would be on him like a fly on shit.)

I have read all (or nearly all) of Popper's major works, and I never pegged him as a "skeptic." Rather, I viewed him as a very confused contextualist who did not understand the historical development of his own approach (as illustrated by his sloppy and inaccurate rendering of Bacon.) But Miller knows more about Popper than I do, so I will defer to his judgment, at least until I reread some pertinent material by Popper.

So, yes, Popper may be a skeptic, but, no, Rand was not.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

I don't think [Rand] succeeded in presenting Objectvism as an integrated whole. She was a first-class rhetorician though, and it is the rhetoric in ITOE which can dazzle the reader. But once you start going through it with a fine-tooth comb, stripping off all the rhetoric, what is left?

Around 98 percent of the book.

You and Daniel should get a room.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

For a brief but insightful critique of Karl Popper, see Chapter 2 of Martin Gardner's book , Are Universes Thicker Than Blackberries?" You will need to scroll down to page 12.

Gardner gives some instances of where Popper fiddled with the meaning of words to produce supposedly original insights that were in fact not very original at all. And he notes that few philosophers of science (outside the band of true-believing Popperians). and virtually no actual scientists, take seriously Popper's claim that inductive reasoning plays no role in science. Nor is is true that scientists do not look for confirming instances to corroborate their hypotheses. (Daniel is surely outraged by Popper's belief that philosophers can tell scientists how to conduct their business. He certainly was when be believed that Rand advocated this.)

Some Popperian replies to Gardner are available online, but it is not my job to point them out.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

NOTE. I don't agree with Daniel's giving the meaning of the quote as (emphasis added) "all of our knowledge might possibly be found to be false." Our scientific theories aren't equivalent to *all* of our knowledge, or even to all of our scientific knowledge.

Btw, Daniel would have trouble hiding behind my "skirt," since I almost always wear pants.

Hi Ellen,

As I mentioned a few posts back, this seems to create the same problem all over again as to the status of non-scientific knowledge. It's a bit back-to-square-one. Which is why I think you should just go all the way with it...;-)

[Daniel Barnes]

The quality of my Popper criticism will match the quality of your Rand criticism. In other words, I will make no attempt to be fair, I will never give Popper a sympathetic reading or the benefit of the doubt, and I will treat Popper as a philosophic charlatan who couldn't reason his way out of a paper bag, while quoting passages as needed, out-of-context, to make him look as ridiculous as possible. I may also cite various "experts" who have condemned his treatment of historical figures, such as Plato, Marx, and Hegel, as amateurish and inaccurate. And should you say something reasonable in Popper's defense, I will ignore it or merely repeat what I said before. My attitude will be premised on the assumption that Popper rarely if ever said reasonable things, so no reasonable defense of his major theories is possible.

In short, as I stated previously, I will adopt the Barnesean style of criticism. A good time should be had by all. True, my game of smoke and mirrors will render it highly unlikely that readers will actually learn something about Popper from my comments, but what does this matter? I will have shown how much more clever I am than Popper -- and that's what really counts.

Isn't this really rather childish? Why would you bother put all that time and energy into writing a bad parody of me? I can do that myself for free...;-)

Actually, what I suggested here was this:

"Popper's arguments against the Aristotelian method, in that chapter and its lengthy notes, are primarily logical.... Just explain where his logic goes awry, and I'll take you seriously."

I then wrote:

"But far from arguing over the meaning of words, which is boring, I am suddenly getting interested in your criticism of Popper's criticism. It would really rock a few CR forums if Popper turned out to be wrong on this particular dogma!...Destroy his arguments effectively and I will be only too happy to push your critique out to the Critical Rationalist community."

Now, I was presenting you here with a clear, straight shot at one of the main roots of my criticism of Rand - her seeming adoption of Aristotelian methodological essentialism, and its at first quite plausible prejudice about the vital importance of precisely defining words (I have basically just applied the relevant part Popper's logical critique to Objectivism - minus his attack on intuitionism, obviously). All you have to do is take the key logical arguments from that essay - you should know what they are, as you claim you taught this chapter and know all about what is wrong with it - and demonstrate why they are fallacies. (Of course, one of the main reasons Popper's criticism is so effective is that he applies Aristotle more consistently than Aristotle does...)

Furthermore, if your demonstration is successful, you would have publicly smashed to the ground one of my favourite hypotheses to the resounding applause of this particular forum at least...;-) But far more than that you will have done major damage to one of Popper's most enduring dogmas. In which case, in the spirit of open criticism, I once again offer to send your refutations to some of my contacts in the Critical Rationalism community - I assure you this will create quite a bit of a ripple of interest if they are any good.

I've looked at your remarks above, which have not yet addressed this. But I'm sure you're planning to do so.

So now you have my full attention.

Edited August 14, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

For a brief but insightful critique of Karl Popper, see Chapter 2 of Martin Gardner's book , Are Universes Thicker Than Blackberries?" You will need to scroll down to page 12.

Gardner gives some instances of where Popper fiddled with the meaning of words to produce supposedly original insights that were in fact not very original at all. And he notes that few philosophers of science (outside the band of true-believing Popperians). and virtually no actual scientists, take seriously Popper's claim that inductive reasoning plays no role in science. Nor is is true that scientists do not look for confirming instances to corroborate their hypotheses. (Daniel is surely outraged by Popper's belief that philosophers can tell scientists how to conduct their business. He certainly was when be believed that Rand advocated this.)

Some Popperian replies to Gardner are available online, but it is not my job to point them out.

Oh, you're appealing to the hapless Gardner already (eyes rolled). Wot, no Nick Dykes? Or maybe that's the ace up your sleeve. LOL.

Not a very promising start. But now perhaps I've clarified how and where I'm using Popper to critique Rand, you could channel your energies in the right direction.

[Daniel Barnes]

(Don't you just love the pretentious label "Critical Rationalists"? This stands in contrast to what? -- uncritical rationalists?)

I pull this quote out because I admit I am increasingly confused.

Are you being facetious here, or do you really not know why Critical Rationalism is so named? What it stands in contrast to?

If this is intended to be a bad parody of me, then you will note I at least give you the benefit of the doubt, rather than simply leaping to the assumption that you don't know what you're talking about...;-)

Edited August 15, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

The cathedral analogy was a close paraphrase of Bacon, who used this example. It's not necessarily an example I would use. Did you not notice that I was discussing Bacon's ideas?

Of course, I expect you to apologize for your misunderstanding of what I wrote, as I did when I misunderstood you. We will soon see if you are willing to practice what you preach.

Yes, I did notice that you were discussing Bacon's ideas. No, I did not misunderstand what you wrote.

However I will apologise anyway, specifically for calling it a "dire, Rand-lite caricature". That was unfair of me, and I regretted it once I wrote it. Thanks for the opportunity to apologise.

I know very well what you are "getting at," and the material I posted recently about fallibilism is directly relevant to your point about skepticism. So do you ever plan on dealing with any of the issues I raised, or are you just going to bury your head in sand, hoping that no one will notice and while whining that are you misunderstood?

My reply to you is simple, and rather like your comment to me about Bacon: if "contextual certainty" means Rand isn't a skeptic, then neither are Critical Rationalists!

This is an evasion, not a reply. You have simply ignored the points I made about the distinction, both theoretical and historical, between fallibilism and skepticism. (Don't you just love the pretentious label "Critical Rationalists"? This stands in contrast to what? -- uncritical rationalists?)

Even so, it does not follow that "if 'contextual certainty' means Rand isn't a skeptic, then neither are Critical Rationalists!" Are you saying that Popper had a theory of contextual certainty? If so, where does this appear?

In an earlier post where you mentioned Popper's skepticism, you linked an article by the Popperian David Miller to support your claim. And as I pointed out in an earlier post, Rand clearly does not meet Miller's conception of a skeptic, viz:

Skepticism in its simplest form denies only that we ever know, in the sense of know for certain, whether a statement that we make is absolutely true or false. We know nothing for certain, the ancient skeptics argued, because the grounds for what is known themselves need grounds, and we embark on an infinite regress of justification....

I concluded:

This obviously does not describe Rand's position, so, by your own standard, Rand was not an epistemological skeptic, whether in science or in any other field.

Rand defended the kind of "justificationism" that Popper rejected. The differences between them are substantial, though I will concede that Popper employed term "justification" in an idiosyncratic and highly misleading manner, so some of the differences may not be as serious as they first appear. (It's a good thing that Popper didn't do the same thing with the word "selfishness," or you would be on him like a fly on shit.)

I have read all (or nearly all) of Popper's major works, and I never pegged him as a "skeptic." Rather, I viewed him as a very confused contextualist who did not understand the historical development of his own approach (as illustrated by his sloppy and inaccurate rendering of Bacon.) But Miller knows more about Popper than I do, so I will defer to his judgment, at least until I reread some pertinent material by Popper.

So, yes, Popper may be a skeptic, but, no, Rand was not.

I am glad that after you have consulted David Miller, you and I can agree on what "skeptic" means. So now, what part of "accidental" are you not getting???

I have read all (or nearly all) of Popper's major works, and I never pegged him as a "skeptic."

No doubt this is due to your incredible ignorance of the history of philosophy etc etc etc....It is quite impossible that you might have there an interesting or original point of view!...;-)

[Philip Coates]

We're now up to 600+ posts.

I've stopped reading Mr. Barnes' stuff. Has little value or sense. GHS, just let the dude have the last word. No one believes him and no one has time to read all of this...especially when it's so many posts a day.

[Daniel Barnes]

We're now up to 600+ posts.

I've stopped reading Mr. Barnes' stuff. Has little value or sense. GHS, just let the dude have the last word. No one believes him and no one has time to read all of this...especially when it's so many posts a day.

I would agree the exchange between GHS and I is well into unproductive territory.

However to try and get some kind of closure, I've given him as clear and direct a shot at destroying my (and Popper's) line of argument as I can. He's also claiming this is a particular field of expertise of his, so I can hardly see how I can make it easier for him to wrap it all up once and for all.

[George H. Smith]

Now, I was presenting you here with a clear, straight shot at one of the main roots of my criticism of Rand - her seeming adoption of Aristotelian methodological essentialism, and its at first quite plausible prejudice about the vital importance of precisely defining words (I have basically just applied the relevant part Popper's logical critique to Objectivism - minus his attack on intuitionism, obviously). All you have to do is take the key logical arguments from that essay - you should know what they are, as you claim you taught this chapter and know all about what is wrong with it - and demonstrate why they are fallacies. (Of course, one of the main reasons Popper's criticism is so effective is that he applies Aristotle more consistently than Aristotle does...)

I reread Popper's chapter, and I don't agree that his "logical" arguments apply to Rand at all. Her view of essential characteristics bears only a superficial resemblance to Aristotle's approach, so you will need to do a lot better than offer some vague generalities. Be specific. What arguments by Popper do you think apply to Rand, and why?

Moreover, I don't even know what you mean by "Aristotelian methodological essentialism." As I would use the term, this doesn't apply to Rand either, so I will need a definition. Try to overcome your Popperian prejudice against definitions and see if you can come up with one. If you defined the expression in an earlier post, then repost it.

Ghs

[9thdoctor]

GHS, just let the dude have the last word.

Shaddup, Phil.

Two elephants fighting it out, each thinking the other is a mouse.

If you asked me, it looks more like this:

[George H. Smith]

I am glad that after you have consulted David Miller, you and I can agree on what "skeptic" means. So now, what part of "accidental" are you not getting???

Nowhere does Miller argue that Popper was an "accidental skeptic." He regards Popper as an outright skeptic, so the comparison to Rand breaks down. I assume you read the Miller article, since you linked it, but perhaps I was mistaken.

As for Rand, if you seriously think that Rand's defense of contextual certainty leads, whether accidentally or not, to a denial of the possibility of certain knowledge, then prove it. You can begin by dealing with the points about fallibilism that I discussed in previous posts. The last time I suggested this, you responded with your "If Rand, then Critical Rationalists" point, thereby suggesting a parallel. But then, when I cited your own source (Miller) and pointed out that Rand does not meet his criteria for skepticism, you retreated into your blather about "accidental skepticism" -- something Popper was not, according to Miller.

If you have a coherent argument to make, then make it -- and make it by dealing with substantive philosophical issues rather than with aphorisms and fragmentary clues.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

For a brief but insightful critique of Karl Popper, see Chapter 2 of Martin Gardner's book , Are Universes Thicker Than Blackberries?" You will need to scroll down to page 12.

Gardner gives some instances of where Popper fiddled with the meaning of words to produce supposedly original insights that were in fact not very original at all. And he notes that few philosophers of science (outside the band of true-believing Popperians). and virtually no actual scientists, take seriously Popper's claim that inductive reasoning plays no role in science. Nor is is true that scientists do not look for confirming instances to corroborate their hypotheses. (Daniel is surely outraged by Popper's belief that philosophers can tell scientists how to conduct their business. He certainly was when be believed that Rand advocated this.)

Some Popperian replies to Gardner are available online, but it is not my job to point them out.

Oh, you're appealing to the hapless Gardner already (eyes rolled). Wot, no Nick Dykes? Or maybe that's the ace up your sleeve. LOL.

Not a very promising start. But now perhaps I've clarified how and where I'm using Popper to critique Rand, you could channel your energies in the right direction.

I feel your pain. I have the same reaction whenever I read the hapless Daniel Barnes on Rand. You're no Xray -- at least, not yet -- but with a little work, who knows what is possible for a human being to achieve?

Ghs

[kiaer.ts]

For a brief but insightful critique of Karl Popper, see Chapter 2 of Martin Gardner's book , Are Universes Thicker Than Blackberries?" You will need to scroll down to page 12.

Gardner gives some instances of where Popper fiddled with the meaning of words to produce supposedly original insights that were in fact not very original at all. And he notes that few philosophers of science (outside the band of true-believing Popperians). and virtually no actual scientists, take seriously Popper's claim that inductive reasoning plays no role in science. Nor is is true that scientists do not look for confirming instances to corroborate their hypotheses. (Daniel is surely outraged by Popper's belief that philosophers can tell scientists how to conduct their business. He certainly was when be believed that Rand advocated this.)

Some Popperian replies to Gardner are available online, but it is not my job to point them out.

Ghs

This excerpt of Gardner's was particularly helpful.

[Daniel Barnes]

I reread Popper's chapter, and I don't agree that his "logical" arguments apply to Rand at all.

Do you agree that Rand thought is was vitally important to first and foremost precisely define your terms - that, supposedly, if you did not start from this secure foundation, all your subsequent knowledge must be erroneous?

One of Popper's key arguments is that while Rand and many others believed this, unfortunately it logically entails an infinite regress of definitions - one analogous to the infinite regress of statements Aristotle was well aware of.

This has the effect of unintentionally ham-stringing discussion with what are, in effect, eternal preliminaries, and is responsible for what he sees as the Scholastic turn into pedantry and irrelevance. It results in "always sharpening one's pencil, but never writing anything."

We might discuss what the consequences might be of adopting this doctrine for Objectivism a little later, but for the time being, if you think Popper's logic is fallacious can you explain how so?

[Daniel Barnes]

I am glad that after you have consulted David Miller, you and I can agree on what "skeptic" means. So now, what part of "accidental" are you not getting???

Nowhere does Miller argue that Popper was an "accidental skeptic."

You are getting so all turned around in this it's just not funny.

Yes, Rand defended certainty. But I suggest the means she adopted, "contextual certainty" accidentally undermines her goal.

So you continually wheeling out the fact that Rand's intention was to defend certainty is just as continually beside the point.

I'm not sure I even follow why you now think I'm saying Miller's saying Popper's an "accidental skeptic"! Perhaps you are making some convoluted point of your own, perhaps you're just misreading again, who knows and increasingly, who cares!

Edited August 15, 2010 by Daniel Barnes