The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics


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Imo when Rand spoke of definitions being contexually absolute, she used "absolute" in a rhetorical sense: as a strong emphasis, ("The defense lawyer's tactic at trial was an absolute success" is an example of "absolute" used as emphasis), and that by her statement about definitions being "contextually absolute", she actually meant to say that they are "absolutely contextual", in that they are contextual without exception, i.e always contextual.

Xray,

I tried to interact with you again, but this stuff (and your continuation) is too far removed from reality to be worth debating. What's worse is that you do imply one truth in Objectivism, that knowledge is always contextual. But that has nothing to do with turning "absolute" into an adverb denoting rhetorical emphasis and saying that Rand really meant this.

Do carry on.

I've got other stuff I need to attend to.

Michael

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Ellen's opinions about similarities between Rand and Popper have nothing to do with whether or not Rand was a skeptic. She was not; the claim is absurd on its face. If Ellen agrees with your position, then Ellen is wrong as well.

Well, that's as well as may be, but at least you can't accuse Ellen of coming up with such a theory purely as a result of her ignorance of, and bias against, Objectivism.

Ellen doesn't have a bug up her butt about Rand, and she actually knows a lot about Rand's ideas. You fail in both respects. You're a philosophic hack.

Even more horrendously, she also inhabits the "alternate universe" where Rand is an essentialist!

This may perhaps give you pause in your increasingly brittle comments. Or perhaps not.

"Perhaps not" is a better guess.

Okay, big shot: Quote a passage or two from Rand where she defends epistemological skepticism. Time to put up or shut up.

I look forward to reading your excuse when you fail to quote even one such passage.

George, have you even vaguely been paying attention to this thread? If so, what part of "Accidental Skeptic" don't you understand?

Ellen, as I recall, used the term "Accidental Skeptic" in regard to Rand's view of science. In our exchanges, in contrast, you have called Rand an "epistemological skeptic," with no qualifications.

You obviously cannot support your charge of epistemological skepticism by citing any passages from Rand, so you have chosen to hide behind Ellen's skirt. Okay, fine; how about quoting even one passage from Rand that qualifies her as an "Accidental Skeptic?"

Ghs

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Rand maintained that certainty in science, as in other fields of knowledge, is attainable. To call this approach "skepticism" is more than odd; it is downright perverse.

What's downright perverse is to claim that the statement:

"No person can claim omniscience or infallibility, so there always (my emphasis) is the possibility that later knowledge will require revisions of our current scientific theories"

...isn't a skeptical position. It means all of our knowledge might possibly be found to be false - ergo it is hypothetical, ergo it has no final justification.

If this is what Rand believed, then she's a skeptic. A certain flavour of skeptic, but a skeptic nonetheless.

You obviously haven't done much thinking about this subject, and you appear to know next to nothing about the development of "fallibilist" theories of knowledge in the empiricist tradition (beginning mainly with Francis Bacon) and how fallibilism differs from skepticism. In many cases, fallibilist theories of knowledge were developed as rebuttals of skepticism, both Pyrrhonic and Academic.

I discuss some historical features of fallibilism, and how it was used to rebut skepticism, in Chapter 7 ("The Career of Reason")of Why Atheism? Many years earlier, in Chapter 5 of ATCAG (the section titled "The Contextual Nature of Knowledge"), I dealt more directly with the philosophical aspects. I there quote the Scottish "common sense" philosopher Thomas Reid, the linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin, and the epistemologist D.W. Hamlyn. Here is an edited passage from my discussion in ATCAG:

The main lesson of the preceding discussion is that man's fallibility does not invalidate his knowledge claims. Man's capacity for error is not sufficient reason to suppose that he has committed an error in any specific instance. The skeptic cannot appeal solely to man's fallibility as the grounds for skepticism; further argumentation is required.

...The modern analytic philosopher J.L. Austin argues in a similar vein: the fact that man is "inherently fallible," he writes, does not entail that he is "inveterately so."

"Machines are inherently liable to break down, but good machines don't (often). It is futile to embark on a 'theory of knowledge' which denies this liability: such theories theories constantly end up by admitting the liability after all, and denying the existence of 'knowledge.'"

According to Austin, if the skeptic wishes to attack a knowledge claim for which evidence has been provided, he must attack the evidence itself; he cannot merely appeal to human fallibility. "...being aware that you may be mistaken doesn't mean merely being aware that you are a fallible human being; it means that you have some concrete reason to suppose that you may be mistaken in this case."

D.W. Hamlyn presents a systematic development of this theme in his recent book, The Theory of Knowledge. Hamlyn rejects universal skepticism on the grounds that the existence of knowledge "cannot be rationally questioned." Therefore,

"when someone shows skepticism about certain claims to knowledge, what is required is that the ball be put firmly in his court. He is the one who must produce justification for his position. Skepticism without grounds is empty, and empty suggestions need not be regarded seriously."

The above philosophers have a vital point in common: they adopt what may be termed a contextual approach to doubt. Universal doubt is rejected because of its inherent contradiction and presumption of infallibility. Rational doubt arises contextually; that is to say, doubt emerges in specific circumstances when the arguments and evidence offered in support of a proposition are determined to be defective or insufficient. The skeptic cannot bypass the particulars of a knowledge claim and merely assert that, since man is fallible, his knowledge claim deserves to be doubted. To do so is to commit the "infallibilist fallacy."

In order to justify his doubt, the skeptic must take issue with the specific arguments and evidence offered in support of a knowledge claim. If the proposition can withstand scrutiny, it qualifies as knowledge; and if the evidence in favor of the proposition is overwhelming, it rationally qualifies as certain knowledge -- man's fallibility notwithstanding.

I go on to explain how Rand's contextual theory of knowledge provides a foundation for this approach to doubt. Indeed, my arguments were very similar to those presented by Peikoff in his lectures on Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge. (I assume these are also presented in OPAR, but I haven't checked.)

According to your argument, Rand's epistemology, because it rejects infallibility as a criterion of knowledge, is implicitly skeptical. This is by no means the case, of course, but you also suggest that this is more evidence of Rand's confusion. The subtext here is one that we often find in your posts, namely, that Rand concocted some oddball theory that only a fool would conceive. In fact, however, Rand's general approach is a fairly common one, and it can be traced back at least to Francis Bacon and other early empiricists who sought to construct a theory of knowledge on fallibilist grounds.

Of course, this pedigree doesn't mean that Rand was correct. But it does illustrate how astonishingly ignorant you are about the history of philosophy.

Ghs

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Imo when Rand spoke of definitions being contexually absolute, she used "absolute" in a rhetorical sense: as a strong emphasis, ("The defense lawyer's tactic at trial was an absolute success" is an example of "absolute" used as emphasis), and that by her statement about definitions being "contextually absolute", she actually meant to say that they are "absolutely contextual", in that they are contextual without exception, i.e always contextual.

Xray,

I tried to interact with you again, but this stuff (and your continuation) is too far removed from reality to be worth debating. What's worse is that you do imply one truth in Objectivism, that knowledge is always contextual. But that has nothing to do with turning "absolute" into an adverb denoting rhetorical emphasis and saying that Rand really meant this.

Do carry on.

I've got other stuff I need to attend to.

Michael

Michael,

I was not implying anything about "knowledge" being 'contextual'. A "definition" is not the same as "knowledge". I want to know what exactly Rand means by "absolute", and offered an interpretation.

Anyone here feel to refute it if you think it is way off base, but please be specific and explain the what and why; merely alleging that what someone writes is "far removed from reality" without providing evidence does not meet the burden of proof, which falls on the person who claims something to be fact.

Michael, as for your "absolute" = 'true in all cases' - imo it does not fit the quotes I listed from Galt's speech. Maybe others can answer my questions on that?

I would like to see material from Rand's text corpus where she says that "absolute" means 'true in all cases'.

Looking up "absolute" in the AR lexicon, it quotes from Galt's speech:

"Reality is an absolute, existence is an absolute, a speck of dust is an absolute and so is a human life. Whether you live or die is an absolute. Whether you have a piece of bread or not, is an absolute. Whether you eat your bread or see it vanish into a looter’s stomach, is an absolute.

http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/absolutes.html

"Absolute" meaning 'true in all cases' does not fit here.

For one would get "a speck of dust is a 'true in all cases' ". Does not make sense.

I have no idea what Rand means by calling a speck of dust "an absolute". (?)

"Whether you have piece of of bread or not is an absolute".

Again, what is meant by "absolute" here?

Ellen, as I recall, used the term "Accidental Skeptic" in regard to Rand's view of science.

George,

Where exactly do you see the difference between a 'skeptic' in regard to science and and a 'skeptic' in regard to epistemology?

Granted that nowhere (I know of) in Rand's writings does she use the word "hypotheses" about definitions. But ixnay on the "merely" and on the "highly speculative." You're using "hypotheses" with a more-iffy coloration, and a narrower implication, than I'm meaning it. I'm thinking of "hypotheses" as constant in the living of animalian life, a process of always testing the environment and adjusting action accordingly. Perceptual systems constantly test the environment. "What is it?" "What is it?" -- the question present in every instant of perceiving as well as of thinking. If you don't like "hypotheses," maybe "conjectures" will seem acceptable.

Ellen,

Do you really believe that Rand would have thought of definitions as "conjectures"??

Edited by Xray
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"Absolute" in Objectivism is more of a cultural than intellectual position. It amounts to we are right and if you don't agree with us then you are wrong. It comes down to cultism and tribalism and is a gross argument from authority and chest puffing. This is why Objectivism gets so larded up with things that strictly speaking aren't philosophy at all and why a Leonard Peikoff can spend 40 years studying it and still doesn't quite get it. He might as well be a scientist who dedicates his life to the achievement of absolute zero.

Formally, absolutism refers to reality as opposed to our best knowledge of same. Knowledge has various levels of tentativeness. "The atom will never be split" got split. For rhetorical purposes, Rand liked to mix up these two categories. One cannot, however, say that Rand was a first-class rhetorician and second-class philosopher even if technically true, because genius trumps it all. That genius was in not any one part of Objectivism, but how she took its four basic components and gave us the integrated whole. Libertarians merely loped off the politics (and economics) preferring not the morality, epistemology and metaphysics--especially that morality and especially not to think about those things.

--Brant

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George, have you even vaguely been paying attention to this thread? If so, what part of "Accidental Skeptic" don't you understand?

Ellen, as I recall, used the term "Accidental Skeptic" in regard to Rand's view of science. In our exchanges, in contrast, you have called Rand an "epistemological skeptic," with no qualifications.

You obviously cannot support your charge of epistemological skepticism by citing any passages from Rand, so you have chosen to hide behind Ellen's skirt. Okay, fine; how about quoting even one passage from Rand that qualifies her as an "Accidental Skeptic?"

Ghs

Brief popping in here. Haven't had time to catch up, but I noticed on quick glancing through that you seem to be attributing "Accidental Skeptic" to me as the originator. I borrowed that description from Daniel. I think it's a good description in regard to AR's view of science. As to quoting a passage which qualifies Rand thus, Daniel already did in post #569:

Rand maintained that certainty in science, as in other fields of knowledge, is attainable. To call this approach "skepticism" is more than odd; it is downright perverse.

What's downright perverse is to claim that the statement:

"No person can claim omniscience or infallibility, so there always (my emphasis) is the possibility that later knowledge will require revisions of our current scientific theories"

...isn't a skeptical position. It means all of our knowledge might possibly be found to be false - ergo it is hypothetical, ergo it has no final justification.

If this is what Rand believed, then she's a skeptic. A certain flavour of skeptic, but a skeptic nonetheless. [....]

NOTE. I don't agree with Daniel's giving the meaning of the quote as (emphasis added) "all of our knowledge might possibly be found to be false." Our scientific theories aren't equivalent to *all* of our knowledge, or even to all of our scientific knowledge.

Btw, Daniel would have trouble hiding behind my "skirt," since I almost always wear pants. :)

Ellen

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Well, that's as well as may be, but at least you can't accuse Ellen of coming up with such a theory purely as a result of her ignorance of, and bias against, Objectivism.

Ellen doesn't have a bug up her butt about Rand, and she actually knows a lot about Rand's ideas. You fail in both respects.

Let's see now. When Ellen, who is undoubtedly more familiar than me with Rand and Objectivism, calls her a "accidental scientific skeptic" you don't feel the sudden need to unleash a tirade of personal abuse, or denounce this theory as a tale told by an idiot.

This is because she's basically sympathetic to Rand. So apparently when she says such outrageous things you merely say this is "wrong" and then proceed to look out the window.

Whereas after I, being basically unsympathetic to Rand, call Rand an "accidental skeptic" - the deluge!

Likewise, when I suggest Rand is basically an "essentialist", you claim that I must inhabit some kind of "alternate universe" and that this is evidence of my astounding ignorance etc etc.

Yet when Ellen agrees with me that Rand is basically an "essentialist", you again suddenly decide to look out the window.

I offer this not to use Ellen's views to justify mine, but only to illustrate the striking difference in your reaction when two similar positions are put forward by two people with different motivations. Further, not only is the position similar, but from what Ellen has said so far it seems I would almost entirely agree with her argument, with my main difference being that she does not go quite far enough with it.

I can't help but conclude on this basis that you are for some reason more concerned with supposed personal motivations than the arguments that are being put forward. For this reason I seriously doubt there is much more that I can discuss with you, but I will push forward nevertheless for a while.

In fact, someone else might actually find it rather interesting that someone who is extremely knowledgeable and sympathetic about Rand, and someone who is admittedly less knowledgeable, yet unsympathetic to Rand, might end up with a very similar position based on their reading of Rand's work. But that would mean a somewhat more adult attitude than you're currently displaying.

So in short, it might be time for a bit fewer assertions of your intellectual superiority, and a bit more evidence of it.

As to whether I am "hiding behind [Ellen's] skirts" - well, I first put forward the idea that Rand's theory of contextual certainty* entailed an unwittingly skeptical outcome several years ago. I have had a reasonable amount of general correspondence both on and offline with Ellen over the years and I do not recall her directly calling Rand a skeptic - accidental, scientific, or otherwise. I took her recent adaption of my "Accidental Skeptic" phrase, which she amended to include "Scientific", to indicate, if anything, a growing similarity in our readings of Rand on this issue, despite our differing attitudes. Of course we are not identical in our positions, nor do I claim that she got the idea from me. I bring this up only to show that I'm hardly relying on Ellen to put this contention forward.

According to your argument, Rand's epistemology, because it rejects infallibility as a criterion of knowledge, is implicitly skeptical.

This is not my "argument." Just because I point out that your description of Rand's epistemology is compatible with skepticism doesn't mean your description is my argument.

My argument can be made from a number of directions. First, and most simply, that adding "contextual" to terms like "certainty" or "absolute certainty" is just adding a qualifier that effectively neutralises the relevant term. This makes it not so much an epistemological innovation overcoming the traditional skeptical view that all our knowledge is uncertain as merely double-talk, allowing the speaker to present themselves as presenting an alternative to skepticism whilst in fact embracing it sotto voce. If "contextual certainty" merely means what we know to be true today may turn out to be false tomorrow, this seems to be merely playing with words for a misleading effect - the equivalent of selling "contextually fresh" fish.

Second, I think if we approach it along Ellen's lines we end up in the same destination: that is, roughly, if all our knowledge rests on definitions, and all definitions are hypotheses, and all hypotheses are inherently uncertain, it seems to me that one is forced to conclude that all our knowledge rests on the inherently uncertain.

Now if this isn't fully compatible with the skeptical attitude, I don't know what is.

Of course I don't think for a moment Rand was out to endorse skepticism. When Fred Seddon summarised the intent of her epistemology as "I may know p, but p may be false" - he seemed to me to be either mistaken or revisionist or both. (Oh, by the way, that's another person both highly knowledgeable of, and highly sympathetic to Rand who's come up with skeptical implications from her thought. How very ignorant of him...;-)). I think she was after foundations just the same as so many before her. But she didn't find what she thought she had.

You're a philosophic hack.

Well, there is no doubt that I am a complete philosophic ignoramus compared to yourself. I am a businessman who left school at 17 with no tertiary qualifications. I have a strictly amateur interest in philosophy, and what little I know is self-taught. I am certainly no Professor, and have never pretended otherwise. We have a small but vocal collection of Objectivists here in my hometown of New Zealand - some of whom I'm personally friendly with - and over the years as I've argued with them in bars, cafes, and online I've developed a view as to what I think is wrong with Rand's philosophy. As a matter of fact, I think that though fresh eyes I see that much of what Rand thought were philosophical solutions turn out to be merely verbal ones. Familiarity is not immersion. Immersion makes things harder to see. Ever since I was a kid, I've always liked taking things apart and then putting them back together to see why they worked, or perhaps didn't work. I've also found Karl Popper's philosophy contains a handy toolkit for this kind of thing in an intellectual sense. Now, I may be entirely wrong on this contention of mine; but if I'm even half-right, and Ellen 3/4 right, there are some interesting consequences.

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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MSK, learn to read.

Daniel,

Learn to read, yourself. That was a quip. And I was baiting you.

(Surely you know what bating is, don't you? :) )

Anyway, here it is:

I tend to agree with this, while Ellen makes the "scientific skepticism" distinction. But it's not a detail I care to quibble over for now.

And if it turned out that her ethics were, beneath a layer of double-talk, fundamentally indistinguishable from Christian ethics despite her pronouncements to the contrary, then she'd be an Accidental Christian too.

See?

Not precise word-wise, but definitely there.

Or would you have me believe that YOU believe that RAND's ethics are not "beneath a layer of double-talk"?

If not, let's hear it: "I, Daniel Barnes, judge Ayn Rand's ethical writings to be crystal clear."

Heh.

Michael

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Well, that's as well as may be, but at least you can't accuse Ellen of coming up with such a theory purely as a result of her ignorance of, and bias against, Objectivism.

Ellen doesn't have a bug up her butt about Rand, and she actually knows a lot about Rand's ideas. You fail in both respects.

Let's see now. When Ellen, who is undoubtedly more familiar than me with Rand and Objectivism, calls her a "accidental scientific skeptic" you don't feel the sudden need to unleash a tirade of personal abuse, or denounce this theory as a tale told by an idiot.

This is because she's basically sympathetic to Rand. So apparently when she says such outrageous things you merely say this is "wrong" and then proceed to look out the window.

Whereas after I, being basically unsympathetic to Rand, call Rand an "accidental skeptic" - the deluge!

Likewise, when I suggest Rand is basically an "essentialist", you claim that I must inhabit some kind of "alternate universe" and that this is evidence of my astounding ignorance etc etc.

Yet when Ellen agrees with me that Rand is basically an "essentialist", you again suddenly decide to look out the window.

I offer this not to use Ellen's views to justify mine, but only to illustrate the striking difference in your reaction when two similar positions are put forward by two people with different motivations. Further, not only is the position similar, but from what Ellen has said so far it seems I would almost entirely agree with her argument, with my main difference being that she does not go quite far enough with it.

I can't help but conclude on this basis that you are for some reason more concerned with supposed personal motivations than the arguments that are being put forward. For this reason I seriously doubt there is much more that I can discuss with you, but I will push forward nevertheless for a while.

You have made a career, or at least a hobby, out of Rand-bashing. I may have forgotten something, but I don't recall anything favorable about Rand that you have ever said. You are even affiliated with an anti-Rand website. This makes me wonder what the hell you are doing on a Randian list. If Rand's ideas are so worthless, if she was so totally incompetent as a philosopher, then why are you wasting time on her?

In any case, Ellen has made a serious effort over many years to understand Rand, so when Ellen voices an objection I take her seriously, however much I may disagree. You, in contrast, take a shotgun approach, scattering every objection that occurs to you, no matter how ill-founded, for the purpose of showing how incompetent Rand was. You will even cite some Randroid from another list to illustrate how ignorant Randians supposedly are about science.

The upshot of all this, as you have made abundantly clear, is to show how confused, careless, and mistaken Rand was about virtually everything under the sun. She arbitrarily redefined words, she contradicted herself, she didn't understand the implications of her own theories -- and on, and on, and on. It's a wonder that your Rand could walk and chew gum and the same time.

This, in a nutshell, is why I treat many of your criticisms with contempt. To make matters worse, you do all this with a phony air of authority, as if you actually know what you are talking about. After dubbing Rand an "essentialist," for example, you posted a comment stating that nominalism and essentialism are the only two alternatives. This is a first-rate howler, for "conceptualism" -- as we find, for example, in Locke -- is another major school of thought.

Rand was not a nominalist, and she was not an essentialist; she was a conceptualist.

Now, Ellen is very familiar with Rand's epistemology, so when she calls Rand an "essentialist," I assume she means that Rand did have a theory of essential characteristics that are determined by what Rand called "cognitive necessity." In other words, contrary to some other posters, Rand did not believe that definitions are arbitrary.

In contrast, I have no reason to believe that you know jack-shit about Rand theory of essential characteristics. You have a vague notion that she had some theory about essential characteristics, and that's enough for you to dub her an "essentialist." You throw this term around with the same carelessness that you use the term "skeptic."

I would be willing to give you the benefit of the doubt if you ever showed a willingness to do the same with regard to Rand. But you don't, so I won't.

In fact, someone else might actually find it rather interesting that someone who is extremely knowledgeable and sympathetic about Rand, and someone who is admittedly less knowledgeable, yet unsympathetic to Rand, might end up with a very similar position based on their reading of Rand's work. But that would mean a somewhat more adult attitude than you're currently displaying.

In previous posts, you made two statements that were clearly erroneous. The first was that, according to Rand, "it is the philosopher's job to tell scientists what their terms mean." The second had to do with your failure to understand Rand's distinction between "fact" and "truth."

Did you acknowledge that you made a mistake in either case? No, of course not -- that is not your style when in comes to Rand. You merely ignored the errors and pushed on to additional assertions, some of which were obviously wrong as well.

This is your S.O.P., and there is nothing "adult" about it. When you stop swinging your rattle at everything that flies by, and when you begin to display some balance and intellectual fairness in your judgments about Rand, then I will treat you like an adult.

So in short, it might be time for a bit fewer assertions of your intellectual superiority, and a bit more evidence of it.

This has nothing to do with "intellectual superiority." It has to do with your slipshod criticisms of Rand, and especially with your presumptuous remarks about how you have repeatedly demonstrated how careless and confused she was. I actually agree with a few of your criticisms, but, as you once remarked (I think it was you) about Rand, even a broken clock is right twice a day.

ITOE is a remarkable monograph by any standard. I know of no comparable work in the history of philosophy that covers so many major issues in epistemology in such a succinct manner. I have my own disagreements here and there, but I cannot help marvel at the mind that produced it. It is brimming with valuable insights.

Ghs

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Second, I think if we approach it along Ellen's lines we end up in the same destination: that is, roughly, if all our knowledge rests on definitions, and all definitions are hypotheses, and all hypotheses are inherently uncertain, it seems to me that one is forced to conclude that all our knowledge rests on the inherently uncertain.

You sure do wrench out of context and fly off with that one sentence in ITOE about the truth and falsity of all our conclusions resting on the truth or falsity of our definitions. Put the statement in different words: To the extent we don't have our concepts correctly categorized and interrelated, we're going to come to incorrect conclusions in our reasoning using those concepts.

As to all our knowledge resting on the inherently uncertain, there's no uncertainty about there being a world which we perceive. "Existence exists and man exists knowing it," I think is the quote.

As to our definitions, our context of knowledge might expand, and we might err in categorization, and there is the feature of Rand's idea of "essential" characteristic(s) that she includes causal knowledge (the characteristic(s) on which metaphysically the greatest number of others depend -- I think she's overrequired there). We need to keep checking to ascertain if our definitions are adequate to our current knowledge. They're always to be questioned. This hardly means that you can't be certain that tables are tables and dogs are dogs, etc.

Unless you're a solipsist or something. DF says it's possible consistently to be a solipsist. I'm with Aristotle: If one is seriously proposing this, one might as well be a vegetable.

And Popper did not doubt that there really is a world out there, in which there really are regularities. Or at least that's what he said in the passage I posted from Unended Quest.

Ellen

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Well, that's as well as may be, but at least you can't accuse Ellen of coming up with such a theory purely as a result of her ignorance of, and bias against, Objectivism.

Ellen doesn't have a bug up her butt about Rand, and she actually knows a lot about Rand's ideas. You fail in both respects.

Let's see now. When Ellen, who is undoubtedly more familiar than me with Rand and Objectivism, calls her a "accidental scientific skeptic" you don't feel the sudden need to unleash a tirade of personal abuse, or denounce this theory as a tale told by an idiot.

This is because she's basically sympathetic to Rand. So apparently when she says such outrageous things you merely say this is "wrong" and then proceed to look out the window.

Whereas after I, being basically unsympathetic to Rand, call Rand an "accidental skeptic" - the deluge!

Likewise, when I suggest Rand is basically an "essentialist", you claim that I must inhabit some kind of "alternate universe" and that this is evidence of my astounding ignorance etc etc.

Yet when Ellen agrees with me that Rand is basically an "essentialist", you again suddenly decide to look out the window.

I offer this not to use Ellen's views to justify mine, but only to illustrate the striking difference in your reaction when two similar positions are put forward by two people with different motivations. Further, not only is the position similar, but from what Ellen has said so far it seems I would almost entirely agree with her argument, with my main difference being that she does not go quite far enough with it.

I can't help but conclude on this basis that you are for some reason more concerned with supposed personal motivations than the arguments that are being put forward. For this reason I seriously doubt there is much more that I can discuss with you, but I will push forward nevertheless for a while.

You have made a career, or at least a hobby, out of Rand-bashing. I may have forgotten something, but I don't recall anything favorable about Rand that you have ever said. You are even affiliated with an anti-Rand website. This makes me wonder what the hell you are doing on a Randian list. If Rand's ideas are so worthless, if she was so totally incompetent as a philosopher, then why are you wasting time on her?

In any case, Ellen has made a serious effort over many years to understand Rand, so when Ellen voices an objection I take her seriously, however much I may disagree. You, in contrast, take a shotgun approach, scattering every objection that occurs to you, no matter how ill-founded, for the purpose of showing how incompetent Rand was. You will even cite some Randroid from another list to illustrate how ignorant Randians supposedly are about science.

The upshot of all this, as you have made abundantly clear, is to show how confused, careless, and mistaken Rand was about virtually everything under the sun. She arbitrarily redefined words, she contradicted herself, she didn't understand the implications of her own theories -- and on, and on, and on. It's a wonder that your Rand could walk and chew gum and the same time.

This, in a nutshell, is why I treat many of your criticisms with contempt. To make matters worse, you do all this with a phony air of authority, as if you actually know what you are talking about. After dubbing Rand an "essentialist," for example, you posted a comment stating that nominalism and essentialism are the only two alternatives. This is a first-rate howler, for "conceptualism" -- as we find, for example, in Locke -- is another major school of thought.

Rand was not a nominalist, and she was not an essentialist; she was a conceptualist.

Now, Ellen is very familiar with Rand's epistemology, so when she calls Rand an "essentialist," I assume she means that Rand did have a theory of essential characteristics that are determined by what Rand called "cognitive necessity." In other words, contrary to some other posters, Rand did not believe that definitions are arbitrary.

In contrast, I have no reason to believe that you know jack-shit about Rand theory of essential characteristics. You have a vague notion that she had some theory about essential characteristics, and that's enough for you to dub her an "essentialist." You throw this term around with the same carelessness that you use the term "skeptic."

I would be willing to give you the benefit of the doubt if you ever showed a willingness to do the same with regard to Rand. But you don't, so I won't.

In fact, someone else might actually find it rather interesting that someone who is extremely knowledgeable and sympathetic about Rand, and someone who is admittedly less knowledgeable, yet unsympathetic to Rand, might end up with a very similar position based on their reading of Rand's work. But that would mean a somewhat more adult attitude than you're currently displaying.

In previous posts, you made two statements that were clearly erroneous. The first was that, according to Rand, "it is the philosopher's job to tell scientists what their terms mean." The second had to do with your failure to understand Rand's distinction between "fact" and "truth."

Did you acknowledge that you made a mistake in either case? No, of course not -- that is not your style when in comes to Rand. You merely ignored the errors and pushed on to additional assertions, some of which were obviously wrong as well.

This is your S.O.P., and there is nothing "adult" about it. When you stop swinging your rattle at everything that flies by, and when you begin to display some balance and intellectual fairness in your judgments about Rand, then I will treat you like an adult.

So in short, it might be time for a bit fewer assertions of your intellectual superiority, and a bit more evidence of it.

This has nothing to do with "intellectual superiority." It has to do with your slipshod criticisms of Rand, and especially with your presumptuous remarks about how you have repeatedly demonstrated how careless and confused she was. I actually agree with a few of your criticisms, but, as you once remarked (I think it was you) about Rand, even a broken clock is right twice a day.

ITOE is a remarkable monograph by any standard. I know of no comparable work in the history of philosophy that covers so many major issues in epistemology in such a succinct manner. I have my own disagreements here and there, but I cannot help marvel at the mind that produced it. It is brimming with valuable insights.

Ghs

That was a pleasure to read, George.

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Rand was not a nominalist, and she was not an essentialist; she was a conceptualist.

I'd like to know why you say that. Rand said that she wasn't a conceptualist, so maybe you think she misunderstood what a conceptualist is.

On the other hand, she said that she adopts Aristotle's method of definition by essential characteristics, only with the (admittedly significant) difference that she considers essential characteristics epistemological not metaphysical. But then she includes a metaphysical factor in establishing the essential characteristic -- not of course something that's intuited, as with Aristotle, instead something arrived at by investigation, nonetheless something metaphysical.

Ellen

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I first put forward the idea that Rand's theory of contextual certainty* entailed an unwittingly skeptical outcome several years ago. I have had a reasonable amount of general correspondence both on and offline with Ellen over the years and I do not recall her directly calling Rand a skeptic - accidental, scientific, or otherwise. I took her recent adaption of my "Accidental Skeptic" phrase, which she amended to include "Scientific", to indicate, if anything, a growing similarity in our readings of Rand on this issue, despite our differing attitudes. Of course we are not identical in our positions, nor do I claim that she got the idea from me.

I've said in earlier discussions on this board -- and lengthily in one of them -- that "contextual certainty" amounts to "scientific skepticism" by a different name. It's not new in my views. Neither of us got it from the other.

Ellen

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This, in a nutshell, is why I treat many of your criticisms with contempt. To make matters worse, you do all this with a phony air of authority, as if you actually know what you are talking about. After dubbing Rand an "essentialist," for example, you posted a comment stating that nominalism and essentialism are the only two alternatives. This is a first-rate howler, for "conceptualism" -- as we find, for example, in Locke -- is another major school of thought.

Goodness, now you can't even read. Here's the comment you're referring to. I refer to "two different theories"; I don't say there are "only two alternatives".

And what am I actually referring to with this remark about "two different theories"? Why, in fact it's this and this post by Ellen, where we are discussing - wait for it - nominalism and essentialism, particularly that of Karl Popper. These are the two different theories we're discussing. We're not even discussing conceptualism.

Duh! So the howler is yours. How embarrassing, not to mention amusing. But of course I won't get an apology - you just will continue to leap about, shaking your cap and bells.

In contrast, I have no reason to believe that you know jack-shit about Rand theory of essential characteristics. You have a vague notion that she had some theory about essential characteristics, and that's enough for you to dub her an "essentialist." You throw this term around with the same carelessness that you use the term "skeptic."

Actually, all this shows is you know jack-shit about my line of criticism. Actually, my argument comes from Popper's criticism of the Aristotelian essentialist theory of definitions found in his Open Society, Chapter 11, and the logical problems associated with the idea that precisely defining one's terms is of the utmost importance. Rand, like the Scholastics, picked idea this up from Aristotle, but I think it causes the same problems for her philosophy that it did for the Scholastics. So my criticism is of Rand's adoption of methodological essentialism, and has been all along - a point I am not sure Ellen has quite clicked with.

So it's quite clear you don't know what the hell I'm even arguing on this particular issue. Go read either that chapter, or the adaption of it, Two Kinds of Definitions in Popper Selections, if you want to get a clue - which is itself a pretty unwarranted assumption given your egregious performance to date.

Oh, and incidentally far from just "throwing around" any old criticism, I've actually pursued this and a few other lines consistently for a long time now. I consider them fundamental to Objectivism's lack of visible output in the 50 years since Atlas Shrugged. But don't let that stop you from saying it anyway.

In previous posts, you made two statements that were clearly erroneous. The first was that, according to Rand, "it is the philosopher's job to tell scientists what their terms mean." The second had to do with your failure to understand Rand's distinction between "fact" and "truth."

Did you acknowledge that you made a mistake in either case? No, of course not -- that is not your style when in comes to Rand. You merely ignored the errors and pushed on to additional assertions, some of which were obviously wrong as well.

As a matter of fact I rather politely explained my interpretation of the first here. The second was a remark to MSK that you have interpreted in your comically and perpetually outraged way. (I can't be bothered looking it up, but as I recall as usual it didn't mean what you thought it meant.)

ITOE is a remarkable monograph by any standard. I know of no comparable work in the history of philosophy that covers so many major issues in epistemology in such a succinct manner. I have my own disagreements here and there, but I cannot help marvel at the mind that produced it. It is brimming with valuable insights.

I couldn't disagree more. The ITOE seems to me to be a bill of goods, largely relying on word-games to bluff its way through. But oh well... time will tell. If you want know what I consider a work of genius in epistemology, it's this.

And not just cos Ken Hopf says so....;-)

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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I agree that "We believe that p but p may turn out to be false" is a better formulation. Sometimes "We have strong, including very strong, reason to believe that p but p may turn out to be false."

I don't like the formulation using "know," which Fred Seddon used and Daniel has adopted as expressing the point. I'd reserve "know" for cases in which we in fact do know, and there are many such cases -- but not ever about ultimate scientific laws. The idea that we could know that we have the correct ultimate scientific laws is contradictory, since we'd have to be here after everything is over to check the final results, and if we were here, everything wouldn't be over. DF argues contradictoriness on the basis of non-omniscience, but I don't think that that argument is as strong, since *of course* we aren't omniscient, omniscience being a nonsensical idea, an invalid concept to begin with.

That in fact makes my argument very strong. The certainty with which we know that man isn't omniscient is the certainty with which we know that we never can be certain that p, as the existence of a counterexample would lead to a contradiction (reductio ad absurdum).

No, the non-omniscient argument pulls in a nonsensical standard, a standard which has no relationship to knowledge anyway, so it doesn't actually tell you anything about the possibility of certainty.

Ellen

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This is a continuation of my previous post. I typed the following very quickly, so there may be more typos than usual.

According to your argument, Rand's epistemology, because it rejects infallibility as a criterion of knowledge, is implicitly skeptical.

This is not my "argument." Just because I point out that your description of Rand's epistemology is compatible with skepticism doesn't mean your description is my argument.

My argument can be made from a number of directions. First, and most simply, that adding "contextual" to terms like "certainty" or "absolute certainty" is just adding a qualifier that effectively neutralises the relevant term. This makes it not so much an epistemological innovation overcoming the traditional skeptical view that all our knowledge is uncertain as merely double-talk, allowing the speaker to present themselves as presenting an alternative to skepticism whilst in fact embracing it sotto voce. If "contextual certainty" merely means what we know to be true today may turn out to be false tomorrow, this seems to be merely playing with words for a misleading effect - the equivalent of selling "contextually fresh" fish.

First you say that I mischaracterized your argument. Then you go on to argue that human fallibility renders all knowledge claims uncertain. This is precisely the argument I attributed to you. It is the fact of fallibility that underlies what you characterize as "the traditional skeptical view that all our knowledge is uncertain." And this was the argument that I dealt with in the post that included a passage from ATCAG, with quotations from Austin and Hamlyn. .

I have no idea where you got the notion that "certainty" can only signify the theoretical impossibility of error. Some rationalists, such as Descartes, did believe this, but many empiricists did not. Moreover, some rationalists distinguished between theoretical certainty and "moral" -- or what today we would call "practical" -- certainty.

I don't have the patience to cover the same ground that I have covered before, so I will again quote a passage from ATCAG which summarizes Rand's approach:

Here we must note the main source of confusion in the skeptical approach: the equation of knowledge and certainty with infallibility. When the skeptic claims that every knowledge claim should be doubted because man if capable of making mistakes, he is simply pointing out the obvious: that man is a fallible being. No one, not even the most resolute anti-skeptic, will deny the point that man is fallible. (We must wonder, though, how the skeptic arrived at this knowledge. Is he certain that man is fallible?)

The skeptic fails to realize that it is precisely man's fallibility that generates the need for a science of knowledge. If man were infallible -- if all knowledge were given to him without the slightest possibility of error -- then the need for epistemological guidelines with which to verify ideas, with which to sort the true from the false, would not arise. Man requires a method to minimize the possibility of error, and this is the function of epistemology. A science of knowledge enables us to discriminate between justified and unjustified beliefs; and since the beliefs of an infallible being would not stand in need of verification, he could have no use for epistemological standards. Where infallibility is involved, concepts such as truth, falsity, certainty and uncertainty are stripped of any possible application.

Consider the basic argument of the skeptic. We have seen that fallibility gives rise to epistemological guidelines used to distinguish truth from falsity, certainty from uncertainty, and so forth. The skeptic, however, starts from the same premise -- that man is fallible -- and uses it to argue that man can never achieve truth and certainty. It is because man is capable of error that he must distinguish truth from falsehood, certainty from doubt. "But," argues the skeptic, "it is because man is capable of error that he can never attain truth and certainty."

The skeptic thus turns epistemology on its head by using the foundation for a science of knowledge -- human fallibility -- as a weapon to argue, in effect, that a science of knowledge is impossible to man.

Even if the universal skeptic could consistently adhere to his position (which he cannot), his victory would be an empty one. His claim that man cannot acquire knowledge and certainty reduces to the claim that man is fallible -- and this tells us nothing new, except that the skeptic prefers to use epistemological terms while totally ignoring their context.

Since man is not infallible, any concepts of "knowledge" or "certainty" that require infallibility are, for that very reason, inapplicable to man and totally irrelevant to human epistemology. Even if the skeptical position made sense, it would fail to tell us anything concerning human knowledge and human certainty -- which removes it from the realm of serious consideration.

The following discussion of Francis Bacon (from Chapter 7 of Why Atheism?) is a bit long, but it illustrates the same theme from a historical perspective. Specifically, it highlights how rationalists and empiricists differed in their approaches to certainty. I don't discuss Rand here, but it is clear that she falls in the empiricist camp.

Although Bacon and Descartes both rejected the epistemological skepticism of Montaigne and other fideists (according to whom we must rely on faith to attain a certainty that reason is unable to provide), their approaches to this problem were significantly different. Bacon, unlike Descartes, does not attempt to overthrow skepticism with a definitive theoretical refutation; he does not employ the Cartesian method of systematic doubt in an effort to establish an infallible criterion of knowledge, such as the intuitive grasp of clear and distinct ideas. Rather than employ this kind of shortcut, Bacon plots a course to certainty that must be traveled step-by-step, and he insists that we must sometimes traverse the same ground over and over again in order to check our bearings. Certainty, in other words, does not reveal itself to reason in a flash of insight, but is instead an elusive ideal that reason may attain to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the circumstances.

As Bacon sees the matter, the skeptical argument that we can never achieve certainty amounts to little more than a pretentious bit of futile and self-defeating dogmatism. The skeptic, having proclaimed that infallible certainty is unattainable, never tries to attain it, because he knows that man is a fallible being for whom error looms as an ever-present possibility. To this objection Bacon responds, in effect, “So what? If you define ‘certainty’ in a way that requires infallibility, then the skeptical argument, though valid on its own terms, has no relevance whatever to fallible human beings." Thus, rather than blocking the path to knowledge with an arbitrary and unrealistic definition of “certainty,” we should recognize at the outset that the quest for knowledge is beset with difficulties, and then, through a process of trial and error, we should see whether these difficulties can be overcome.

“Our method and that of the skeptics agree in some respects at first setting out, but differ most widely, and are completely opposed to each other in their conclusions; for they roundly assert that nothing can be known; we, that but a small part of nature can be known, by the present method; their next step, however, is to destroy the authority of the senses and understanding, whilst we invent and supply them with assistance.”

As part of his attack on skepticism, Bacon distinguishes between two kinds of doubt, viz., “particular and total.” Particular doubt -- i.e., doubt that arises in a specific context in regard to a particular knowledge claim – is useful both as a spur to inquiry and as an antidote to the proliferation of error (as when a false conclusion is inferred from a premise which has not been sufficiently justified.). Total doubt, in contrast, is the universal doubt of skepticism, and this is what Bacon regards as a rather cowardly surrender to the difficulties of attaining knowledge.

Skeptics often pointed to the diversity of philosophic opinions as proof that knowledge is unattainable, but Bacon was unconvinced. Nature is infinitely more complex than the mind of man, so the same essential truth may be expressed in different ways by different thinkers. Scientific knowledge, cumulative and open-ended, progresses as one scientist improves upon the contributions of his predecessors. The human intellect is not an infallible instrument – far from it – but to say that an instrument can sometimes fail is not to say that it must necessarily fail in every case. Just as the human hand could not construct architectural wonders without the aid of external tools, so the human intellect cannot attain certainty without the aid of objective methods to test and validate our knowledge claims.

“The unassisted hand and the understanding left to itself possess but little power. Effects are produced by the means of instruments and helps, which the understanding requires no less than the hand; and as instruments either promote or regulate the motion of the hand, so those that are applied to the mind prompt or protect the understanding.”

The skeptic who denies that we can ever attain certainty is like a person who, after observing the limited power of the naked hand, declares that man will never be able to build a cathedral. The skeptic, trapped in a sophistical web of his own making, perpetually whines about the obstacles to knowledge. Bacon suggests that the time of the philosopher would be better spent in devising methods – cognitive instruments, in effect -- that would enable us to overcome those selfsame obstacles.

Thus, if Bacon’s stress on the inherent fallibility of reason does not land him in skepticism, this is because he rejects infallibility as a criterion of certainty. Certainty is something we achieve through sustained mental effort, a laborious and systematic process of trial and error, not something that is revealed to us in a flash of infallible insight. This is not to say that reason cannot arrive at its own certainties, such as the laws of logical inference, but these are a means rather than an end. These are cognitive instruments that must be coordinated, refined, and fashioned by the philosopher-scientist so as to serve as a reliable method in his investigation of nature.

According to Bacon, therefore, certainty is achieved piecemeal through the investigation of particular knowledge claims, not wholesale though a process of deductive reasoning based on clear and distinct ideas. Our ideas, if they are to generate useful knowledge, must be framed according to our experience of nature; and this experience, if it is to be reliable, must be subjected to objective methods of verification.

According to your standard, Bacon would also qualify as a skeptic, even if only an "accidental" one, even though he specifically set out to refute skepticism within a fallibility framework. You need to give this subject a lot more thought. There was a very good reason why Rand stressed contextualism. The fact that you don't have a clue what it was doesn't mean that she was confused or playing with words.

It is not true that Rand's contextualism "merely means what we know to be true today may turn out to be false tomorrow." The fact that you would seriously offer this caricature once again indicates that you have made no serious effort to understand what Rand was getting at.

Btw, since you are a Popper fan, you may be interested in this endnote that appears in the preceding discussion:

Sir Karl Popper and his followers have been among the most severe (and misleading) of Bacon’s critics. See, for example, Popper’s essay, “On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance,” in Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, rev. ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 12-18; and Hans Albert, Treatise on Critical Reason, trans. Mary Rorty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 30-8. For a much-needed corrective of the Popperian misunderstanding of Bacon, see Peter Urbach, Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science: An Account and a Reappraisal (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987). What makes Urbach’s account especially interesting is his listing of the many similarities between and Popper and Bacon, as we see in the parallel passages on pp. 86 ff.

Ghs

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It is not true that Rand's contextualism "merely means what we know to be true today may turn out to be false tomorrow." The fact that you would seriously offer this caricature once again indicates that you have made no serious effort to understand what Rand was getting at.

I don't think you know, or want to know, what I'm getting at.

PS: When I read passages like this from your book like this:

"The skeptic who denies that we can ever attain certainty is like a person who, after observing the limited power of the naked hand, declares that man will never be able to build a cathedral"

...I think that the fact that you would seriously offer this dire, Rand-lite caricature makes me wonder if, despite all your obviously learning, whether you've made a serious effort to understand what the likes of Popper were getting at.

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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Duh! So the howler is yours. How embarrassing, not to mention amusing. But of course I won't get an apology - you just will continue to leap about, shaking your cap and bells.

I apologize for misunderstanding the point of your remark. I eagerly await your apologies for your misunderstandings of Rand.

In contrast, I have no reason to believe that you know jack-shit about Rand theory of essential characteristics. You have a vague notion that she had some theory about essential characteristics, and that's enough for you to dub her an "essentialist." You throw this term around with the same carelessness that you use the term "skeptic."

Actually, all this shows is you know jack-shit about my line of criticism. Actually, my argument comes from Popper's criticism of the Aristotelian essentialist theory of definitions found in his Open Society, Chapter 11, and the logical problems associated with the idea that precisely defining one's terms is of the utmost importance. Rand, like the Scholastics, picked idea this up from Aristotle, but I think it causes the same problems for her philosophy that it did for the Scholastics. So my criticism is of Rand's adoption of methodological essentialism, and has been all along - a point I am not sure Ellen has quite clicked with.

I once taught a course based on Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies, and I spent a fair amount of time on his chapter that deals with definitions. It's very weak, one of the worst things Popper ever wrote -- almost as bad as his gibberish about piecemeal social engineering. Popper was very confused, you know, and he often didn't understand the implications of his own theories.

ITOE is a remarkable monograph by any standard. I know of no comparable work in the history of philosophy that covers so many major issues in epistemology in such a succinct manner. I have my own disagreements here and there, but I cannot help marvel at the mind that produced it. It is brimming with valuable insights.

I couldn't disagree more. The ITOE seems to me to be a bill of goods, largely relying on word-games to bluff its way through. But oh well... time will tell. If you want know what I consider a work of genius in epistemology, it's this.

And not just cos Ken Hopf says so....;-)

A bill of goods, eh? Surprise, surprise! My problem is this: Anyone who would dub as a work of genius Popper's theory about a Third World of knowledge, or "Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject," obviously cannot recognize a "bill of goods" when it is staring him in the face.

We briefly discussed Popper's Third World theory some time ago. I suggested that you start a thread on this subject and see how well it holds up. As I recall, you replied that you would consider the suggestion. As yet, however, you haven't been willing to stick your neck out.

Do you want to see how easy it is to apply the Barnesian style of criticism to any given philosopher? Okay, so start a thread on Popper, beginning with a summary of his Third World theory. I will make your criticisms of Rand look like a walk in the park.

Popper was very confused, you know.

Ghs

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It is not true that Rand's contextualism "merely means what we know to be true today may turn out to be false tomorrow." The fact that you would seriously offer this caricature once again indicates that you have made no serious effort to understand what Rand was getting at.

I don't think you know, or want to know, what I'm getting at.

PS: When I read passages like this from your book like this:

"The skeptic who denies that we can ever attain certainty is like a person who, after observing the limited power of the naked hand, declares that man will never be able to build a cathedral"

...I think that the fact that you would seriously offer this dire, Rand-lite caricature makes me wonder if, despite all your obviously learning, whether you've made a serious effort to understand what the likes of Popper were getting at.

The cathedral analogy was a close paraphrase of Bacon, who used this example. It's not necessarily an example I would use. Did you not notice that I was discussing Bacon's ideas?

Of course, I expect you to apologize for your misunderstanding of what I wrote, as I did when I misunderstood you. We will soon see if you are willing to practice what you preach.

I know very well what you are "getting at," and the material I posted recently about fallibilism is directly relevant to your point about skepticism. So do you ever plan on dealing with any of the issues I raised, or are you just going to bury your head in sand, hoping that no one will notice and while whining that are you misunderstood?

Ghs

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I once taught a course based on Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies, and I spent a fair amount of time on his chapter that deals with definitions. It's very weak, one of the worst things Popper ever wrote -- almost as bad as his gibberish about piecemeal social engineering. Popper was very confused, you know, and he often didn't understand the implications of his own theories.

Now I have no idea whether you're being serious.

But there's a simple way you can prove you are. Popper's arguments against the Aristotelian method, in that chapter and its lengthy notes, are primarily logical, and directly relevant to this thread. Just explain where his logic goes awry, and I'll take you seriously.

Incidentally, I actually think the next chapter, on Hegel, while very funny, is probably the weakest thing in the book.

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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The cathedral analogy was a close paraphrase of Bacon, who used this example. It's not necessarily an example I would use. Did you not notice that I was discussing Bacon's ideas?

Of course, I expect you to apologize for your misunderstanding of what I wrote, as I did when I misunderstood you. We will soon see if you are willing to practice what you preach.

Yes, I did notice that you were discussing Bacon's ideas. No, I did not misunderstand what you wrote.

However I will apologise anyway, specifically for calling it a "dire, Rand-lite caricature". That was unfair of me, and I regretted it once I wrote it. Thanks for the opportunity to apologise.

I know very well what you are "getting at," and the material I posted recently about fallibilism is directly relevant to your point about skepticism. So do you ever plan on dealing with any of the issues I raised, or are you just going to bury your head in sand, hoping that no one will notice and while whining that are you misunderstood?

My reply to you is simple, and rather like your comment to me about Bacon: if "contextual certainty" means Rand isn't a skeptic, then neither are Critical Rationalists!

But far from arguing over the meaning of words, which is boring, I am suddenly getting interested in your criticism of Popper's criticism. It would really rock a few CR forums if Popper turned out to be wrong on this particular dogma!...;-)

Destroy his arguments effectively and I will be only too happy to push your critique out to the Critical Rationalist community.

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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Popper was very confused, you know, and he often didn't understand the implications of his own theories.

There is no doubt that Popper was sometimes very confused, and often didn't understand the full implications of his own theories.

He even said so himself sometimes, so this is hardly a very cutting criticism or something a typical Popper fan is unlikely to acknowledge.

Funnily enough, I don't remember Rand making too many remarks of this type however.

And I wish I could say the same thing about a typical Rand fan.

We briefly discussed Popper's Third World theory some time ago. I suggested that you start a thread on this subject and see how well it holds up. As I recall, you replied that you would consider the suggestion. As yet, however, you haven't been willing to stick your neck out.

As I'm about to get a taste of the quality of your Popper criticism, we'll soon see if a Three Worlds thread is going to be a waste of both of our times or not.

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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