The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics

[Ellen Stuttle]

Ellen:

IIRC, you mentioned in a recent post that "Larry" was the question-asker "Prof M." in one of (or in all?) the Q&A sessions. Is it possible for you to ask Larry if the Q&A section in ITOE accurately renders the questions he asked and the answers aswers he received? TIA for your help.

As best both of us recall -- we talked a lot at the time about what was going on in the Workshops -- what he asked and what she answered are as written, maybe with some grammar corrections, but not changes of meaning. There might have been more than is included in the book.

Obviously, in general, there was quite a bit more than is included in the book. Each Workshop was multiple hours. As Harry Binswanger says in his Preface, a full transcript would have run to triple the length.

Judging from other comments you've made, you have the book, so you can read the Preface, wherein the editing policy is described. I have no reason to think that anything was done with the text other than what Harry Binswanger says was done with it. I'm aware of the extreme suspicion attached to material edited under ARI auspices. But I think that Rand's answers would be found to be reliable reports of what she said.

As Harry indicates, he compressed some of the questions. However, I don't think he compressed the ones recorded which Larry asked. Larry jotted down his questions during the session and wrote out full versions afterward himself while he still remembered details. He wasn't happy with his wording on the main one, and said so back then.

Ellen

[tjohnson]

Here are 3 definitions of 'man'.

1. Man is an animal with rationality

2. Man is an animal with the ability to pass knowledge from one generation to the next using complex symbolic schemes and various media

3. Man is an animal with rationality and wings

Possibly the first is more general and the second more specific in its description about how this "rationality" is used. Neither of these is incorrect but they are different and they lead to different points of view of, or concepts of man. But the 3rd one is just plain "incorrect" in the sense that there is no such thing.

[Ellen Stuttle]

[...] they lead to different points of view of, or concepts of man.

I agree with what you say in the post above, GS, except I'd change the wording of the part I quoted. "[P]oints of view," ok, but I'd say "conceptions" rather than "concepts," since I use Rand's meaning of "concept," which, as I explained in post #499, includes all knowledge about a category. I don't agree with Rand that there's only one correct definition for "man" in the current context of knowledge.

Ellen

Edited August 9, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[Brant Gaede]

A physical anthropologist would say man is the (primate) animal with upright posture and a unique foot. He wouldn't care about rationality and brain size qua definition though he would use the latter for species' evolutionary differentiation. He also wouldn't care about ability to speak save for same and that would relate to physical structure.

--Brant

Edited August 9, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Ellen Stuttle]

In Rand's theory, definitions change as man's knowledge changes for reasons of accuracy. Later versions are different, are more accurate, but they do not contradict earlier versions.

They can contradict earlier versions dramatically.

Just think of an inherent dynamic in language itself: the phenomenon of words changing their meaning.

When I started learning English as foreign language several decades ago, the definition of the term "gay" was 'cheerful'. The phrase "A group of gay people" meant 'a group of cheerful people'. In the course of time, "gay" then underwent a dramatic change of meaning, and on opening Longman's Dictionary of Contemporary English, the first entry regarding "gay" is its definition as 'sexually attracted to members of the same sex; homosexual.' The former definition of "gay" as 'cheerful' is still listed, but as 'old-fashioned'.

Today, one cannot use the term "gay" in the sense of 'cheerful' any longer without causing misunderstandings in communication.

That isn't an example. It's another confusion of words and concepts. The concept of a person with a same-sex sexual orientation hasn't changed. The word attached to the concept has changed.

Addressing Michael's point, Rand said that if the earlier definition is correctly formed, it isn't contradicted by later knowledge. I don't think that's always true, and "gravity" is a good case in point. I wouldn't say that Newton was using poor epistemology in the way he formed a definition of "gravity" as an attractive force acting at a distance. He had an incorrect theory but not bad method.

(The example Xray gave of two different meanings of "gravity" isn't pertinent to Rand's "contextually absolute.")

Ellen

[Dragonfly]

See the last two paragraphs of my post above re an "incorrect" definition. I'll repeat part of the last paragraph. Suppose someone defines "light" as "waves which travel via a mechanical ether." Are you going to say that this definition isn't incorrect?

No, as a definition it isn't incorrect, but it doesn't correspond to something in reality. Note that there is an ambiguity in the sentence "light consists of waves which travel via a mechanical ether": you can interpret this as a definition of light, but also as a statement about a characteristic of the concept "light" that already has been defined. In the first case it isn't incorrect, but doesn't have a representation in reality, in the second case it is incorrect, but then it's no longer a definition, but a statement about the properties of the already defined concept "light".

Regarding your claim that one first has to define a concept to have a concept

That's not what I said, the discussion was about the question whether a certain definition "matches" a concept. To answer that question you must first somehow define that concept, if only at the primitive level of a small child by pointing and saying "that thing" (and calling "that thing" an "ent" isn't incorrect, it's only not so useful for moving on in the world, therefore it can profit from learning generally accepted definitions).

[Dragonfly]

Here are 3 definitions of 'man'.

1. Man is an animal with rationality

2. Man is an animal with the ability to pass knowledge from one generation to the next using complex symbolic schemes and various media

3. Man is an animal with rationality and wings

Possibly the first is more general and the second more specific in its description about how this "rationality" is used. Neither of these is incorrect but they are different and they lead to different points of view of, or concepts of man. But the 3rd one is just plain "incorrect" in the sense that there is no such thing.

A unicorn is a horse with a horn on its forehead (and some other characteristics). Is that definition incorrect? After all, there is no such thing! So your definition 3 is not incorrect, it only doesn't correspond to an entity in real life (as far as we know, have we looked in the Andromeda galaxy yet?). Of course as a statement about the already defined concept "man" it would be incorrect, but then it's not a definition.

[tjohnson]

Here are 3 definitions of 'man'.

1. Man is an animal with rationality

2. Man is an animal with the ability to pass knowledge from one generation to the next using complex symbolic schemes and various media

3. Man is an animal with rationality and wings

Possibly the first is more general and the second more specific in its description about how this "rationality" is used. Neither of these is incorrect but they are different and they lead to different points of view of, or concepts of man. But the 3rd one is just plain "incorrect" in the sense that there is no such thing.

A unicorn is a horse with a horn on its forehead (and some other characteristics). Is that definition incorrect? After all, there is no such thing! So your definition 3 is not incorrect, it only doesn't correspond to an entity in real life (as far as we know, have we looked in the Andromeda galaxy yet?). Of course as a statement about the already defined concept "man" it would be incorrect, but then it's not a definition.

Personally, I don't think in terms of 'correct' vs. 'incorrect' definitions, I am only trying to understand what Rand was getting at.

[Ellen Stuttle]

1) Let's repeat: Nowhere, not in any of Rand's writings, does she refer to definitions as being merely hypotheses. After all, the word "hypothesis" implies something highly speculative, something merely possible, something that may or may not be true, something that is inherently uncertain.

Granted that nowhere (I know of) in Rand's writings does she use the word "hypotheses" about definitions. But ixnay on the "merely" and on the "highly speculative." You're using "hypotheses" with a more-iffy coloration, and a narrower implication, than I'm meaning it. I'm thinking of "hypotheses" as constant in the living of animalian life, a process of always testing the environment and adjusting action accordingly. Perceptual systems constantly test the environment. "What is it?" "What is it?" -- the question present in every instant of perceiving as well as of thinking. If you don't like "hypotheses," maybe "conjectures" will seem acceptable.

Can you really look me in the eye and try to tell me that if all our knowledge rests on definitions, and all definitions are hypotheses, Rand intended her argument to be that all our knowledge is hypothetical? That all our knowledge is uncertain? By making this claim you have effectively made Rand into an unadulterated epistemological skeptic. Now you must explain how your contention fits with the documented evidence to the contrary: that is, her plentiful screeds denouncing all forms of skepticism!

For one thing, you keep making of that sentence about all our knowledge resting on the truth or falsehood of our definitions an exaggerated, out-of-context claim. I posted the context leading up to it. She's saying that we have to have our definitions right to keep track of where we are in our landscape of concepts. See GS's posts about truth of definitions. He's getting it.

As to Rand's being an "epistemological skeptic," we've been over that before. Nothing new there. What Rand called "contextual certainty" is what I and you would call "scientific scepticism." I agree that Rand was an "Accidental" scientific sceptic.

-

2) But despite all this, in the spirit of debate let's bend over backwards and grant you that Rand indeed did intend to argue that "definitions are hypotheses".

Whether or not she intended to argue that "definitions are hypotheses," she did thus argue in her statements as to what an "essential" characteristic is -- epistemologically, she said, it explains the greatest number of other characteristics and metaphysically it's the characteristic on which the greatest number of others depend. Both of these are hypotheses needing testing to confirm for any given "essential" characteristic of any given concept, and are always subject to revision in the light of new knowledge. Now I don't really agree with her about the causal theory she's implying there. I'd revise that part. However, the implication is present in what she wrote of an entire theory of causation being needed to establish "essential" characteristics.

-

Re what you call the "counter-evidence" of her definitions of "selfishness" and "sacrifice," which I called "goofs," you ask, "Why are they goofs?" but then proceed to give an answer which isn't mine:

Because they are untestable propositions. They are true by definition, and by definition only, thus untestable as on that basis they cannot possibly be false.

Where I think she goofed with "selfishness" was in co-opting a word which has a long and strong history as a negative characteristic, thus almost inviting the sort of misunderstanding she's constantly gotten. I think she'd have been much better understood if for one thing she hadn't started her introduction to The Virtue of Selfishness (if she was going to use the term "selfishness" at all) with such a broadside, but instead had clamly, quietly, non-inflammatorily exhibited an awareness that the way the term is usually used, it's referring to a characteristic which she *didn't* extoll.

I think it's possible that she thought of the term's usual meaning as what she called an invalid concept. I never asked her if that's how she thought of it, and I don't know of anything on record where she was asked. Maybe there's something on the subject amongst the answers Robert Campbell transcribed, but I haven't seen it yet if so. I haven't yet read all those answers.

I think a case could be made that the typical meaning of "selfishness" *is* an invalid concept. How exactly does one specify "undue" concern for self "at the expense of others"? She might have presented an argument that she was proposing a valid concept to replace an invalid one. But VOS was published before ITOE, so she'd pretty much have had to explain her theory of concepts, which maybe she hadn't fully formulated at that point.

An alternate possibility would have been to use a different book title and just go with "rational self-interest" instead of stepping into the hornets' nest over the standard meaning of "selfishness."

Long and short, I think she made a tactical error there.

With "sacrifice," my suspicion is that she didn't know she was using the term upside-down to standard meaning (where it means giving up a value which is painful to give up for the sake of a higher value). She seems to have been thinking of what actually is happening with the doctrine of sacrifice, with the extolling of sacrifice as virtuous, as noble -- i.e., the giving up of something actually valuable to the person for the sake of a chimera, such as the "afterlife" or "the greater good." What she was focusing on was the preaching of renunciation of one's rational interests under the scourge of guilt. She was correctly diagnosing a vast evil, the morality of sacrifice, but she resulted in lots of confusion because of the discrepancy between her definition of "sacrifice" and standard usage.

I don't agree that her usages are "true [...] by definition only." She was identifying a real concept, only using a misleading word, with her meaning of "selfishness." And she was attacking a real moral doctrine -- and an anti-life one -- with her decrying of "sacrifice." Also she was speaking of the *actual* result, the renunciation of one's real values (which she called, as they should be in a pro-life morality, "higher" values) and not addressing the kicker in the doctrine, that the person is told the person *should* consider some other value higher than the real pro-life values.

Bottom line: She was right in what she was saying (in terms of a pro-life ethics), but she introduced unfortunate linguistic snarls because of the way she presented her case.

-

As to the identity or non between Rand's and Popper's epistemology -- see point #3 of your post #477 -- I think they are quite close. I've said so a number of times before. However, I don't think they're ultimately identical. For one thing, even as of Unended Quest Popper was conflating "terms" and "concepts." For another, I'm not sure if Popper found any place where truth rests. From the chart on pg. 19 of Unended Quest, it looks as if he didn't. I'm not familiar enough with Popper to be sure there.

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

Of course as a statement about the already defined concept "man" it would be incorrect, but then it's not a definition.

Of course it is, and that's the point, that it would be an incorrect definition of the creature "man."

Ellen

ADDENDUM: Re your post #506: Incurable case of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy.

Rest in peace.

Edited August 9, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[Daniel Barnes]

Granted that nowhere (I know of) in Rand's writings does she use the word "hypotheses" about definitions. But ixnay on the "merely" and on the "highly speculative." You're using "hypotheses" with a more-iffy coloration, and a narrower implication, than I'm meaning it.

Ellen, are hypotheses certain or uncertain?

[Dragonfly]

Of course as a statement about the already defined concept "man" it would be incorrect, but then it's not a definition.

Of course it is, and that's the point, that it would be an incorrect definition of the creature "man."

In this sentence either "man" has already been defined, then this cannot be a definition, only a description of the already defined concept, or this is a definition of "man", that cannot be wrong (as "man" has not yet been defined yet, this sentence gives the definition), you can only say that it doesn't correspond to the generally accepted definition of "man" or as far as we know to anything in reality (like unicorns or angels, which by the way do have wings). You cannot have your cake and eat it too.

ADDENDUM: Re your post #506: Incurable case of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy.

Of course it's incurable as there is an essential difference between analytic and synthetic statements.

[Ellen Stuttle]

You cannot have your cake and eat it too.

You mean like defining wrong definitions as ipso facto *not* definitions?

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

Ellen, are hypotheses certain or uncertain?

Daniel, have we not long ago established that "contextual certainty" doesn't mean "certainty" by any customary meaning of "certainty"? Hypotheses aren't "certain," in any usual connotation. Rand's "contextual certainly" comes down to being "scientific skepticism." (I get mixed up, btw, over whether to use "c" or "k".) Old ground, many times traveled. See the specifics of my lengthy replies.

Ellen

Edited August 10, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[Daniel Barnes]

Daniel, have we not long ago established that "contextual certainty" doesn't mean "certainty" by any customary meaning of "certainty"?

But that is just playing bait-and-switch with words. It allows Rand to brand her philosophy as "certain" - and does she ever! - whilst hiding a complete concession to the opposite in the fine print.

Try Amazing New Objectivist Certainty*! Guaranteed to get rid of nasty philosophic uncertainty and all its deleterious effects!

*Caution: Objectivism does not actually contain the ingredient normally known as "certainty".

Hypotheses aren't "certain," in any usual connotation. Rand's "contextual certainly" comes down to being "scientific skepticism."

Yes.

(I get mixed up, btw, over whether to use "c" or "k".)

I like the "k". It seems to be nicer aesthetically for some reason.

[Dragonfly]

You cannot have your cake and eat it too.

You mean like defining wrong definitions as ipso facto *not* definitions?

You keep confusing statements about already defined concepts with statements defining concepts. They may be expressed with exactly the same sentence, but the meaning is quite different. The first can be wrong, but are no definitions, the second can't be wrong, but may be inconvenient because they may deviate from common usage.

[Dragonfly]

I like the "k". It seems to be nicer aesthetically for some reason.

I am and have been a member of several skeptics organizations, and they all used the "k" in their names and publications.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

A unicorn is a horse with a horn on its forehead (and some other characteristics). Is that definition incorrect?

Dragonfly,

Actually it is an incorrect definition and you make it a straw man.

A unicorn is a mythological imaginary horse with a horn on its forehead.

You don't even need the other characteristics for that to be true in today's context of knowledge.

Leaving out "mythological" and "imaginary" is leaving out a fundamental part in identifying it.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Try Amazing New Objectivist Certainty*! Guaranteed to get rid of nasty philosophic uncertainty and all its deleterious effects!

*Caution: Objectivism does not actually contain the ingredient normally known as "certainty".

Dainel,

Like I said, boy do you have it bad for Rand.

You can deny it, but I always look at what people say and what they do to formulate my judgments of them.

When I see you do stuff like that, I know Rand's under your skin--all the way to the bone.

It's entertaining when it doesn't get tiresome (which it often does)...

But in this case, it's entertaining. I like seeing the fox who pretends to be above it have his own tail stuck in the trap he laughs at.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

A unicorn is a horse with a horn on its forehead (and some other characteristics). Is that definition incorrect?

Dragonfly,

Actually it is an incorrect definition and you make it a straw man.

A unicorn is a mythological imaginary horse with a horn on its forehead.

You don't even need the other characteristics for that to be true in today's context of knowledge.

Leaving out "mythological" and "imaginary" is leaving out a fundamental part in identifying it.

Michael

Suppose some biologist modifies the horse genome producing a horse with a single horn growing from the middle of its forehead. Which would be the case: the critter is a unicorn or alternatively the critter is not a unicorn. Is being imaginary part of the definition of a unicorn?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

Is being imaginary part of the definition of a unicorn?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Yes, until such time as there is a unicorn to observe.

[Dragonfly]

Actually it is an incorrect definition and you make it a straw man.

No, there is nothing incorrect in that definition. That we can expand the definition to include the fact that such an animal plays a role in mythology is not relevant. It just doesn't exist in reality - as far as we know. Perhaps we'll discover one day such an animal. Does the "incorrect" definition then suddenly become "correct"? Of course not, we've then only discovered that the set of entities conforming in reality to that definition is not empty, as we thought at first.

[tjohnson]

Actually it is an incorrect definition and you make it a straw man.

No, there is nothing incorrect in that definition. That we can expand the definition to include the fact that such an animal plays a role in mythology is not relevant. It just doesn't exist in reality - as far as we know. Perhaps we'll discover one day such an animal. Does the "incorrect" definition then suddenly become "correct"? Of course not, we've then only discovered that the set of entities conforming in reality to that definition is not empty, as we thought at first.

LOL, now we are getting into the realm of which characteristics are the defining ones. Is whether or not the thing is observable an important characteristic? Hmmm.

[Brant Gaede]

Definitions are valid if because of them we know what we are talking about. If we don't we blabber it out until we do or pull out knives and guns for mental compensation.

--Brant

a man is Brant

Edited August 10, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Suppose some biologist modifies the horse genome producing a horse with a single horn growing from the middle of its forehead. Which would be the case: the critter is a unicorn or alternatively the critter is not a unicorn. Is being imaginary part of the definition of a unicorn?

Bob,

In that case the context of knowledge changes and the qualifiers would no longer be fundamental. But they wouldn't go away for that context of knowledge like a contradiction does. Notice that there still would be unicorns as mythological and imaginary animals in mankind's history, and that they were only mythological and imaginary until the hypothetical change you imagined. So the definition--at the time it was used--is not contradicted.

The definition as used could only be contradicted if you transposed the future to the past and faulted them back then for not knowing what is to come. But time travel is not a metaphysical option--at least, not yet.

Since your imaginary implant has not happened, when i say "as used" as if it were in the past, I also have to mean today. So today, yes, there are only mythological and imaginary unicorns. No, the mythological and imaginary ones will not stop being mythological and imaginary if real ones become genetically engineered, and likewise the definition of the mythological and imaginary ones will not become invalidated.

Being mythological and imaginary is quite fundamental to a mythological and imaginary creature.

Michael