The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics

[George H. Smith]

btw - I believe Kan't transcendental nut gets cracked when we include our senses and mind as part of reality. They are not separate, I don't care if there is an "in here" and "out there." Perspective merely implies that someone is perceiving, not a separate metaphysical condition for reality per se (an "out there" that we can never "know"). Our senses and mind are made out of the same stuff as reality, thus they are fit to register and process correct knowledge of it--i.e., such registration and processing belong to the same reality that is being registered and processed.

In metaphysical terms, priority-wise we are a part of all of reality. We fall under it. All of reality is not part of us. Instead, it governs what we are.

If one presumes that the mind and knowledge somehow exist as a system outside of reality, that the mind and knowledge are on equal metaphysical footing as all of reality, this transcendental stuff--and even categorical imperatives--make a hell of a lot more sense. But that presumption is obviously false.

I don't think Kant would have disagreed with the fundamental point you are making here, though he might have put the matter somewhat differently.

Another point is that, from what little I have read of Kant, he dismissed the origin of concepts in his "a priori"stuff. Once you have a concept and it is defined, "a priori" can kick in. However, as experience is needed to get to that point, i.e., needed to formulate the concept and definition in the first place, it seems like a cop-out or shooting yourself in the foot to dismiss experience as not needed for "a priori" reasoning.

Kant did not disagree that some experience is needed for us to formulate a priori concepts. I am reluctant to say much more than this, however, because I don't know enough about the technical aspects of Kant's epistemology to take a definitive stand. But it is obvious that Kant was aware of the problem, since he opens his Introduction to Critique of Pure Reason by discussing it. Quoting Kant:

There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience? In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience.

But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. If our faculty of knowledge makes any such addition, it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it from the raw material, until with long practice of attention we have become skilled in separating it. (Trans. Norman Kemp Smith, pp. 41-42.)

Ghs

[bmacwilliam]

Kant did not disagree that some experience is needed for us to formulate a priori concepts. I am reluctant to say much more than this, however, because I don't know enough about the technical aspects of Kant's epistemology to take a definitive stand. But it is obvious that Kant was aware of the problem, since he opens his Introduction to Critique of Pure Reason by discussing it. Quoting Kant:

There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience? In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience.

But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. If our faculty of knowledge makes any such addition, it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it from the raw material, until with long practice of attention we have become skilled in separating it. (Trans. Norman Kemp Smith, pp. 41-42.)

Ghs

Thank you George for some great posts. It certainly makes sense to me that experience might be needed to get the cognitive wheels rolling before we can then move on to the abstract realms. So far I haven't disagreed with Kant. Gotta read more.

Bob

[merjet]

Good and interesting post, Dragonfly.

However, it seems very odd to me that an abstract model of reality a person builds based on his/her experiences is unknowable. That in effect says we don't know our own minds/abstractions at all.

This is illustrated by the fact that there exist many different "interpretations" of quantum mechanics that are completely different, but that lead to exactly the same formalism that allows us to make experimental predictions of unparallelled precision.

The same is true for probability. There are different philosophical interpretations (link) of what probability is, but those with different views agree on the math.

Edited July 16, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Xray]

Who says that a concept has to involve two or more similar concretes? Who is "they"?

A universal, a subset of concepts or ideas, does designate two or more things with something in common. The "problem of universals" is a long-standing topic in philosophy and the main topic of ITOE.

"Two or more things with something in common" refers to plain and simple categorizing in language. A chain of sounds refers to an object, and if there are more objects of the same type, the same chain of sounds is applied. What's the big deal? A three-year-old can accomplish this operation without effort.

Xray: Let's put the claim "that a concept has to involve two or more similar concretes" to the test: What are the two or more concretes of e. g. the concept "pride"?

Easy. Somebody on a safari says: "There is another pride of lions. It isn't the same pride we saw a while ago."

That was a witty one, MJ.

But kidding aside, you knew of course that I was referring to "pride" as the 'Objectivist virtue'. So what are the two or more similar concretes the concept "pride" involves?

Many Randites seem to believe that claiming that A=A implies that the claimer is a paragon of preciseness. A non-sequitur, for Rand's writings indicate that precisensess was not her strong suit.

When you read her alleged definition of such a simple category like 'table', you can easily easily see it is no definition of table since it does not sufficiently differentiate the category 'table' from the category 'shelf'.

"An adult definition of table would be: a man-made object consising of a flat, level surface and support(s), intended to support other smaller objects " (Rand, ITOE p. 12)

With Rand being unable to provide even a basic, primitive definition of the "concept" table, it is no surprise that her "particular measurements omitted" argument has no leg to stand on either. For there exist countless "concepts" where particular measurements play no role at all. Take the concept "butter" for example.

Edited July 16, 2010 by Xray

[merjet]

Who says that a concept has to involve two or more similar concretes? Who is "they"?

A universal, a subset of concepts or ideas, does designate two or more things with something in common. The "problem of universals" is a long-standing topic in philosophy and the main topic of ITOE.

"Two or more things with something in common" refers to plain and simple categorizing in language. A chain of sounds refers to an object, and if there are more objects of the same type, the same chain of sounds is applied. What's the big deal? A three-year-old can accomplish this operation without effort.

You need some learning about the history of philosophy. The big question is what justifies putting multiple things in the same category. You have provided no justification of any kind besides 'it is arbitrary'.

That was a witty one, MJ.

But kidding aside, you knew of course that I was referring to "pride" as the 'objectvist virtue'. So what are the two or more similar concretes the concept "pride" involves?

The answer is as easy and trivial as the one I gave. Figure it out yourself.

When you read her alleged definition of such a simple object as table, you can easily easily see it is no definition of table since it does not differentiate the category table from the category 'shelf'.

Quibble, quibble, quibble. It was an illustration. She wasn't making a dictionary. I think if she had used "legs" rather than "supports" it would have been fine. Edited July 16, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Well doesn't that dismiss an entire realm of mathematical knowledge and principles that are not connected to experience in any real way?

Bob,

There's a lot more I could say, but I'll start with one of my main premises, which apparently is different than yours.

In my world, thinking is an experience.

I experience it.

I don't know how you manage to think without experiencing it, but whatever...

Anyway, that's one of my main premises. If we can't agree on that part, there is no way we are going to agree on anything else.

Michael

[bmacwilliam]

Well doesn't that dismiss an entire realm of mathematical knowledge and principles that are not connected to experience in any real way?

Bob,

There's a lot more I could say, but I'll start with one of my main premises, which apparently is different than yours.

In my world, thinking is an experience.

I experience it.

I don't know how you manage to think without experiencing it, but whatever...

Anyway, that's one of my main premises. If we can't agree on that part, there is no way we are going to agree on anything else.

Michael

By "Experience" I mean external, sensory experience. I thought that much was obvious.

Bob

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience.

George,

Believe it or not, I have difficulty with this part. I need to read Kant to make sure, but I believe experience to him means the mind interacting with stuff outside the mind.

Here is my difficulty. The mind itself grows. I believe that there are some things we would call "knowledge" that develop irrespective of any outside contact by this knowledge simply growing into the mind through the process of maturation.

There are currently some experiments in neuroscience that are fascinating in this respect. Some of the ones I have been following deal with more normative abstractions than cognitive, but they are still "knowledge." For instance, it seem that there are certain universal values that are found in all civilizations, races, genders, ages, etc. We all respond more positively from our earliest memories to smooth skin, good teeth, and general symmetry than blemished skin, irregular teeth and lopsidedness.

Where did that knowledge come from? You can't see it in a newborn infant, but it develops over time in all children and it is present in all adults--unless something drastic or traumatic has made an individual adult change preference, but that remains unique to that particular individual. This "knowledge" has been backed up by many different experiments in all kinds of contexts, and even things like brain scans.

There are many more things of this nature that I am currently studying.

Back to Kant, I often get the impression that the concept of knowledge being discussed is something static in terms of the faculty that holds the knowledge (the mind or brain). It's like there is only one mental state and everything else changes around it, filling the mind with stuff from those changes--not from the actual changes of the mind.

To use a metaphor that I have used before, the branch is inherent in the acorn irrespective of experience. The only experience the acorn needs--anywhere on earth--for the branch to appear is just to grow. And what's more, it is impossible for the acorn to grow a foot or hand. It has to grow branches if it lives, and they will behave in a certain way (slowly moving towards sunlight as they develop, for instance). It cannot not grow branches.

By analogy, I believe there is some knowledge like this.

In Kant's view, if "experience" includes knowledge that appears automatically due to maturation of the mind itself, I will have no problem with his statement. If it is not a part of what he means, I get stuck right there.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

By "Experience" I mean external, sensory experience. I thought that much was obvious.

Bob,

Did you understand my previous post where I stated that the mind is made up of the same stuff as "external" reality?

I do not hold to the view that the mind is a separate reality. I hold that we all are part of the same reality.

In other words, in my view, it is impossible to have a mind where "external, sensory experience" is not fundamental to its existence. There is no "in here" and "out there" on a metaphysical level. There is only "in here" and "out there" to the agent perceiving reality. Thus, the stuff that goes on "in here" cannot be divorced on an existential level from "out there" since it's all the same stuff.

I reject the idea of a mind without experience and I reject excluding "experience" from the operations of the mind.

Like I said, if we cannot agree on this, we will not agree on what follows.

(btw - The issue in my post right above this one has some elements in common to the argument you present, but it is actually vastly different on a fundamental level.)

Michael

[bmacwilliam]

By "Experience" I mean external, sensory experience. I thought that much was obvious.

Bob,

Did you understand my previous post where I stated that the mind is made up of the same stuff as "external" reality?

I do not hold to the view that the mind is a separate reality. I hold that we all are part of the same reality.

In other words, in my view, it is impossible to have a mind where "external, sensory experience" is not fundamental to its existence. There is no "in here" and "out there" on a metaphysical level. There is only "in here" and "out there" to the agent perceiving reality. Thus, the stuff that goes on "in here" cannot be divorced on an existential level from "out there" since it's all the same stuff.

I reject the idea of a mind without experience and I reject excluding "experience" from the operations of the mind.

Like I said, if we cannot agree on this, we will not agree on what follows.

Michael

Well as far as I can tell, you've just defined "mind operations" as experience. Further discussion doesn't seem interesting. I don't see the point of what you're saying or where you agree or disagree with me.

I simply contend that some knowledge, like math, is separate and accessible without external sensory input. But also realize that we do need external input initially at least to develop our cognitive ability.

Bob

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Further discussion doesn't seem interesting. I don't see the point of what you're saying or where you agree or disagree with me.

Bob,

As I suspected.

We definitely disagree on a very deep level. You are going to have to try if you want to see where. If not, OK...

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Back to this thread's initial topic. I had heard that the Harriman book was promoted as containing groundbreaking new solutions to age-old philosophical problems. Was that total bullshit?

I haven't got this book yet myself but one hopes a book entitled "The Logical Leap", about a logical problem, will in fact include some logic.

If it doesn't, then it will almost certainly be more of the total bullshit to which we have become accustomed.

[George H. Smith]

Thank you George for some great posts. It certainly makes sense to me that experience might be needed to get the cognitive wheels rolling before we can then move on to the abstract realms. So far I haven't disagreed with Kant. Gotta read more.

Bob

Is motivating someone to read Kant a capital offense in Randland? I certainly hope not.

When I began to read Kant in my college years, I did so with the usual Randian prejudices. Consequently, he didn't make much sense to me, as I kept looking for his attacks on man's conceptual faculty but couldn't find any. I often skimmed through his books while looking for any passage that might support his title as the most evil man in the history of western civilization, and when I found so much as a single line that I didn't like, I marked it for future reference, figuring that everything would eventually add up.

Even then I sensed something was wrong, especially when I encountered Kant's writings on ethics and political theory. The moral autonomy of the individual is a key idea of his ethical theory -- his remarks on this topic can be positively inspiring -- and when I read how Kant developed this into a theory of individual rights, equal freedom, and limited government, I began to consider the possibility that Rand was wrong. Maybe Kant wasn't the most evil man in the history of western civilization, after all; maybe he only ranked 5th or 6th, or maybe he didn't even make the top 10 list. Something was clearly amiss.

Seeds of doubt, as we know, can grow quickly, and it was during the early 1970s, while I was writing ATCAG, that my opinion of Kant began to change dramatically. Several things were responsible for this change. During this period, I and a number of Objectivist-type philosophers were publishing frequently in Invictus (edited by Lou Rollins), which was one of the more interesting small zines of its day. (Other contributors included Jeff Riggenbach, Wendy McElroy, Doug Den Uyl, and Doug Rasmussen.)

Around the time that I published a two-part critique of Rand's theory of rights, the Randian philosopher Eric Mack published some articles in which he urged Objectivists to read Kant more sympathetically, claiming that some features of Kant's moral theory are quite valuable. I had a great deal of respect for Eric (I still do), and when someone I respect tells me something, I pay attention, especially when that person obviously knows a lot more about a subject than I do.

Another influence was John Hospers, whom I saw fairly often during those years. Hospers -- then the chairman of the USC philosophy department -- was the first mainstream philosopher to include discussions of Rand in an academic journal (he was the editor of The Personalist), and he had included a lengthy section on Rand's egoism in a later edition of Human Conduct, a popular introduction to ethics that was widely used in college classrooms.

I knew from my discussions with John that he didn't agree with some of Rand's epistemological theories; I recall that he was very critical of Peikoff's monograph on the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, for example. Hell, John didn't even like ATCAG, and though this bothered me to some degree, I tried not to take it personally.

Despite all this, John showed a respect for Objectivism that was highly unusual among academic philosophers, and this gave him some creds in my book. Moreover, then as now, I distinguished between differences in philosophical views and matters of historical fact. Hospers repeatedly said that Rand had virtually no understanding of Kant, and that he would flunk a philosophy student who mangled Kant's ideas to the extent Rand did. (John could get very sarcastic on this topic.) These criticisms irritated me at first and kicked-in my defensive mechanisms, because, however much I disagreed with Rand on some issues, I found it hard to believe that she could be so dramatically wrong about Kant. But these swift kicks to my Randian butt proved beneficial in the long run.

Ghs

[Philip Coates]

Kant is a notoriously difficult writer. It is certainly possible for Hospers, Mack, etc. to think he is saying something different from what Rand, Peikoff, and Hicks say he is. But this point - "Kant claimed that man’s speculative reason can only know phenomena and can never penetrate to the noumenon" [britannica, but commonly found elsewhere]- undercuts a lot of -- either his claims or his honest conviction, depending on how clever you think he is -- to be a defender of reason.

And the famous quote of his in Hicks' essay which I posted earlier strongly suggests the attempt to undercut or weaken reason to make room for faith was deliberate.

It has certainly been successful.

One mistake the Kant-defenders make is to take his claims to be a defender of 'reason' at face value.

It's really clever to claim to be a defender of 'reason' after you've castrated it at the most fundamental possible level.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

These criticisms irritated me at first and kicked-in my defensive mechanisms, because, however much I disagreed with Rand on some issues, I found it hard to believe that she could be so dramatically wrong about Kant. But these swift kicks to my Randian butt proved beneficial in the long run.

George,

There is nothing... nothing... greater or more noble than thinking for yourself.

Lots of folks on O-Land need to get over their preconceptions and read original sources. And not just look at original sources, either. Read them. You mentioned something I believe is very serious:

When I began to read Kant in my college years, I did so with the usual Randian prejudices... I often skimmed through his books while looking for any passage that might support his title as the most evil man in the history of western civilization, and when I found so much as a single line that I didn't like, I marked it for future reference, figuring that everything would eventually add up.

I remember the wonderful feeling of liberation I had when I first read Atlas Shrugged. I then remember this same feeling when I started reading important works without first looking through Objectivist literature to see if Rand or any of the top thinkers had anything to say.

You have seen what I think of Kant's ideas above. I have only been able to do that kind of thinking by letting go of Rand's "most evil man in history" scapegoating and reading passages from his works while trying to get at what he meant. Me, Michael, trying to get at what he meant. Not me trying to find passages that support my premasticated-by-Rand prejudices.

You might notice that I'm ambivalent on Kant so far. I simply don't know enough to honestly say more. But I will take my ambivalence over Rand's denunciations any day. My ambivalence comes from my own thinking. Her denunciations are something I read, and they concern bashing a person I have not examined properly, since I have not read his works.

Do I trust her opinion enough to adopt it without doing my own unbiased thinking? I used to. Not anymore.

Do I still agree with her on most of her most important ideas? Yup. I've looked at them from all kinds of angles and they passed muster, so they are not just her ideas any longer. In my life, they are my ideas.

I find it interesting that your views on Kant and Rand's knowledge of him--based on your own independent reading and thinking--is being characterized as an attack on Rand. Not just by Phil, either.

Talk about a bullshit choice: Either bear false witness to your own mind or be judged an enemy of Rand.

If that isn't argument from intimidation, I don't know what is.

Incidentally, from what I have read of your works, I think when history is written later on down the centuries, you will be seen as one of Rand's greatest defenders. I'm serious. When you keep it real and defend someone intelligently, but do not condone that person's excesses, you do honor to that person by applying the very best you have in your life to their work.

From what I have read so far, I doubt your critics will even garner a footnote...

Michael

[George H. Smith]

Kant is a notoriously difficult writer. It is certainly possible for Hospers, Mack, etc. to think he is saying something different from what Rand, Peikoff, and Hicks say he is.

Perhaps you should read Kant for yourself, thereby following his advice, "Have courage to make use of your own intellect!" This, Kant declared, was the motto of the Enlightenment -- you know, the same Enlightenment that Kant attacked, according to your "professional philosopher."

Only a truly irrational and evil person could say something like this, eh?

But this point - "Kant claimed that man’s speculative reason can only know phenomena and can never penetrate to the noumenon" [britannica, but commonly found elsewhere]- undercuts a lot of -- either his claims or his honest conviction, depending on how clever you think he is -- to be a defender of reason.

I have explained several times what Kant meant by the noumenal world. It is the world beyond the realm of "all possible experience." Kant didn't think we can reasonably talk about things that cannot possibly be experienced. But you do, apparently, so please tell us how such knowledge can be acquired. If you fail in your attempt, I will declare you a skeptic, denounce you as an enemy of reason, and place you on my short list of the most evil people in the history of western civilization.

And the famous quote of his in Hicks' essay which I posted earlier strongly suggests the attempt to undercut or weaken reason to make room for faith was deliberate.

I quoted the same line in ATCAG over 35 years ago, so I scarcely need to be reminded of it by Hicks or by you. So tell me, given your vast knowledge of Kant, how do you explain the title of his last major work, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone?

This is a prime instance where Objectivists should actually practice contextualism, rather than merely preach it. You need to know something about the religious controversies that were swirling around the University of Königsberg while Kant was a professor there.

Kant had strong deistic tendencies, and these could land him in a lot of trouble. He was forced to submit Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, part by part, to a censor in Berlin, who refused permission to publish Part Two on the grounds that it controverted the teachings of the Bible.

Kant, a severe critic of censorship, managed to evade this prohibition, and he published Religion in its entirety. As a result, in October, 1794, Kant received a personal communication from the king himself. It read, in part:

Our most high person has for a long time observed with great displeasure how you misuse your philosophy to undermine and debase many of the most important and fundamental doctrines of the Holy Scriptures and Christianity; how, namely, you have done this in your book, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, as well as in other smaller works. ...We demand of you a most conscientious answer and expect that in the future, towards the avoidance of our highest disfavor, you will give no such cause for offense, but rather, in accordance with your duty, employ your talents and authority so that our paternal purpose may be more and more attained. If you continue to resist, you may certainly expect unpleasant consequences to yourself. (My italics.)

As this incident illustrates, Kant's contemporaries did not view him as a friend of religion. This is a complicated story, but my general point is that 18th century deists sometimes wrote about religion in a roundabout way, so as to avoid potentially severe legal penalties. (A deistic professor at Königsberg had been fired before Kant wrote Religion, and he got off easy. Other deists throughout Europe suffered more serious consequences.)

I am not saying that Kant was insincere when he wrote about making room for faith, but such remarks need to be carefully considered in the broader context of other things that Kant wrote, as well as in the context of contemporary political conditions. As a Straussian might say, we need to read "between the lines" when discussing the religious controversies of the period. (I cover some of these issues in "Deism and the Assault on Revealed Religion," in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies.)

There are some excellent articles on Kant's religious views. I would recommend one, but I know you won't read it, so what's the point? You already know everything about Kant that you need to know or will ever know. And why cause that thimbleful of knowledge to overflow?

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

There are some excellent articles on Kant's religious views. I would recommend one, but I know you won't read it, so what's the point? You already know everything about Kant that you need to know or will ever know.

This is one of the great benefits of Objectivism: armed with a couple of easy-2-read novels, a slim volume of vague yet intellectual-sounding philosospeak, a few magic words like metaphysical, integrate and fundamentals, preferably italicised, and you now know everything you need to know about everything. You are Master of the Cosmos, the puzzles of the ages mere childish trivia in your eyes. Why would you give all that up to read some dumb book?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlsQIEIEeKA

Edited July 17, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Ellen Stuttle]

I have explained several times what Kant meant by the noumenal world. It is the world beyond the realm of "all possible experience." Kant didn't think we can reasonably talk about things that cannot possibly be experienced.

George, a question.

I preface by saying that I've only sporadically dipped into this thread, I haven't tracked the argument. However, what you state above is the conclusion I came to from reading some of Kant's works in the (translated) original back in 1964 or 1965 when I was taking a course on ethics with Henry Veatch at Northwestern.

As I understood Kant, he indeed was saying that knowledge of ultimate reality -- real reality -- is forever impossible, that the only way we can have confidence in what we know is because our minds impose it on real reality.

Do you disagree that this is a correct interpretation? If yes, maybe you could give links to a post or two or three in the above long thread explaining your disagreement.

I apologize for jumping into a discussion without having read the background. I'm just puzzled at what seems to me your agreement with the above-quoted statement.

Ellen

[Xray]

I said, "In this case, ordinal measurement is a matter of intensity, of more or less." Ordinal numbers are used to rank or grade on a scale, and there are different kinds of scales. No one -- certainly not Rand -- ever said that there is only one kind of ordinal measurement.

You should give these matters more than a nanosecond of thought before posting your profound objections.

Ghs

This answer does not address the root of Rand's error which is her belief that presenting a 'ranking' of terms connected with the idea of love constitues objective measurement.

Her making 'like' a subset of love adds to the the confusion.

She starts with #1 "like" and it ends in the culminating "romantic love".

The term romantic love itself is connotatively so loaded that it is impossible to classify it on any objective ranking scale because one's individual associations factor in.

For example, in Rand's view, the idea of romantic love included things like the sexual assault scene in TF and the copulation scene in the railroad tunnel in AS.

Another individual may dismiss romantic love as an illusion altogether and think of Flaubert's character Emmy Bovary who formed her idea of romantic love from reading romance novels as a young girl, and when reality turned out to clash with these illusions, it ended in a tragedy.

What Rand subjectively preferred does not make her ranking 'objective'. Others may rank "love of god", "love of animals", "love of science" highest.

Rand called the ordinal measurement "teleological measurement". What telos is to be achieved?

I suspect it goes in this direction: "Show me what your highest-ranking values are and I'll tell you if you qualify as a 'rational' being".

It don't believe Rand thought love could be measured as objectively as temperature, length, velocity, etc. On the other hand, I hold that ordinal measurement and teleological measurement are oxymorons. They are ways of quantifying, but not measuring. They lack a uniform and additive unit akin to inch, degrees Celsius, kilogram, etc. I give a more thorough explanation here.

Can you give an example of quantifying which does not include some form of measuring?

The big question is what justifies putting multiple things in the same category. You have provided no justification of any kind besides 'it is arbitrary'.

Feel free to name any philosopher who you think has made a convincing case of presenting his/her categories as 'objective' while being able to refute alternative categorizing as unjustified.

Categorizing works quite nicely in everyday life; it prevents us from looking for shoelaces in a bakery shop and limits chaos in kitchen in providing departments for kives, forks and spoons.

But categorizing is virtually limitless. To illustrate the principle, one could randomly categorize OLers in e. g. those who are from the US and thos who aren't, those who like cream and those who don't, dog owners and non-dog owners, theists and atheists, etc. etc.

In English, types of movement are categorized in different ways than in German. For example, we don't have a special term in German for what is categorized as "to nudge" in English.

Chinese medicine categorizes illnesses differently from Western medicine; it works with the concept "Chi" which does not exist in western medicine.

Xray So what are the two or more similar concretes the concept "pride" involves?

The answer is as easy and trivial as the one I gave. Figure it out yourself.

Classic case of evading the answer to a question.

Edited July 17, 2010 by Xray

[Philip Coates]

> As I understood Kant, he indeed was saying that knowledge of ultimate reality -- real reality -- is forever impossible, that the only way we can have confidence in what we know is because our minds impose it on real reality. Do you disagree that this is a correct interpretation? If yes, maybe you could give links to a post or two or three in the above long thread explaining your disagreement.

Reasonable request.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

(sigh)

Just when it starts looking like we can get into a useful discussion of ideas about Kant, here come the same old stale agendas.

What is important? Truth? Nah. It's claiming that Rand didn't know what she was talking about.

What is important? Truth? Nah. It's mocking Objectivists as sycophantic dummies.

This snooty crap is not better then the stuff it bashes. If fact, it's on the same level.

Why people use good minds to play the same record over and over--when it doesn't mean anything important and never will--I'll never know.

Michael

[Guyau]

As I understood Kant, he indeed was saying that knowledge of ultimate reality -- real reality -- is forever impossible, that the only way we can have confidence in what we know is because our minds impose it on real reality.

I am saying, then, that the intuition of external objects and the self-intuition of the mind both present these objects and the mind, in space and in time, as they affect our senses, i.e., as they appear. But I do not mean by this that these objects are a mere illusion. For when we deal with appearance, the objects, and indeed even the properties that we ascribe to them, are always regarded as something actually given—except that insofar as the object’s character depends only on the subject’s way of intuiting this given object in its relation to him, we do also distinguish this object as appearance from the same object as object in itself. Thus when I posit both bodies and my soul as being in accordance with the quality of space and time, as condition of their existence, I do indeed assert that this quality lies in my way of intuiting and not in those objects in themselves. But in asserting this I am not saying that the bodies merely seem to be outside me, or that my soul only seems to be given in self-consciousness. It would be my own fault if I turned into mere illusion what I ought to class with appearance.* (B69–70)

* The predicates of the appearance can be ascribed to the object itself in relation to our sense: e.g., to the rose, the red color or the scent. But what is mere illusion can never be ascribed as predicate to an object, precisely because illusion ascribes to the object taken by itself what belongs to it only in relation to the senses or in general to the subject—an example being the two handles initially ascribed to Saturn. If something is not to be met with at all in the object in itself, but is always to be met with in the object’s relation to the subject and is inseparable from the presentation of the object, then it is appearance. And thus the predicates of space and time are rightly ascribed to objects of the senses, as such; and in this there is no illusion. Illusion first arises if, by contrast, I ascribe the redness of the rose in itself, or the handles of Saturn, or extension to all external objects in themselves, without taking account of—and limiting my judgment to—a determinate relation of these objects to the subject.

Critique of Pure Reason – Werner Pluhar, translator

This passage is part of Kant’s effort in the second edition to set straight the error, by readers of the first edition, of taking his idealism to be like Berkeley’s. Kant does not see appearance, in his usage of the term, to be in any sort of conflict with things in themselves. Several years before the first critique, Lambert had challenged, in correspondence with Kant, calling such a world appearance rather than reality. I think it is erroneous to suppose, as Kant did, that there is any part of existence that is unknowable as it is in itself. Our avenues of discernment are abundant. So I concur with Rand when she wrote “‘Things as they are’ are things as perceived by your mind” (AS).

Your take-home, Ellen, was correct, provided we do not drift into thinking in addition that Kant's talk of the mind's contribution of the basic forms unifying sensory experience and the basic concepts underlying any conceptual understanding is a distorting illusion of what is there.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Regarding #173 (below)

Kant’s Peace Plan

Kant in Lutheranism Today

Conservative theology of Christianity is not coincident with Anglo-American political conservatism to the exclusion of their brethrens’ liberal political position, notwithstanding the long drumbeating to the contrary. Beware the ambiguity of such phrases as “conservative religious thinker.”

Edited July 17, 2010 by Stephen Boydstun

[Neil Parille]

George,

I've never read a conservative religious thinker who thought highly of Kant. So the standard Objectivist claim that Kant was trying to save religion from Enlightenment thought is misleading, even if true. (Misleading because it wasn't orthodox Lutheranism or Catholicism.)

Who is the Hicks you are talking about. John Hicks, the well-known pluralist?

-Neil Parille

[merjet]

Can you give an example of quantifying which does not include some form of measuring?

A few people in the audience stood and clapped.

Classic case of evading the answer to a question.

It's my subjective value that some questions are not worth answering more than once.

What makes it "classic"? I will judge any response less than 500 words and w/o repetition as inadequate.

Edited July 17, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[merjet]

Who is the Hicks you are talking about. John Hicks, the well-known pluralist?

Stephen Hicks. It was obvious from post #128 by the link.