Rand's gender hierarchy

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

But I'm interested in the primary source: Rand's own words.

Xray,

It's a shame you are rarely interested in Rand's meanings of her words.

You mostly graft Xray-speak meanings on them.

That's a premise you never check.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

Can a sentient human being discover how to live a moral life?

The answer is of course: no, and Xray gave the correct explanation, namely that "how to live a moral life" is a subjective notion, which you cannot "discover", only absorb from the environment you're born in and where you grow up. The only thing you can discover is that there is no such thing as universal morals and that you can choose morals different from those you grew up with if they appeal to you.

[Selene]

Can a sentient human being discover how to live a moral life?

The answer is of course: no, and Xray gave the correct explanation, namely that "how to live a moral life" is a subjective notion, which you cannot "discover", only absorb from the environment you're born in and where you grow up. The only thing you can discover is that there is no such thing as universal morals and that you can choose morals different from those you grew up with if they appeal to you.

Thank you Dragonfly. You answered the question.

xray did not.

Adam

[jeffrey smith]

Jeff,

If I look at a ball and say my definition of it includes being round, that is not a "stance." I know this is a predominantly a style detail, but there is a cognitive and a normative vocabulary. The time to use the cognitive terms is during identification, logic, etc. The time to use the normative terms is during discussions of value, especially the exercise of volition.

The problem here is that Objectivism has a habit of using terms in ways that are specific to Objectivism. "Sacrifice" is a good example. For ready reference, here's N. Branden's definition in one of the essays he contributed to The Virtue of Selfishness ("Mental Health versus Mysticism"): "the surrender of a higher value in favor of a lower value or a nonvalue". Now turn to Webster's definition (I'm using the Seventh New Collegiate); the closest it comes to this is part 3a: "destruction or surrender of something for the sake of something else". Nothing in the Webster's suggests that the thing destroyed or surrendered is a higher value (or a lower value, for that matter) than the thing for the sake of which it was destroyed or surrendered. And in fact, most people, if queried on their usage of the word, would state that the thing that is sacrificed will always be perceived to be of lesser value than the thing for which it was sacrificed. "Joe sacrificed his chance to go fishing with his friends so he could help his son with his math homework." Most people would assume that Joe valued his son's potential success in school more than he valued fishing with his friends. An Objectivist would, I assume, say that "sacrificed" is the wrong word to use in that situation, unless Joe actually valued fishing more, but opted to help his son because of societal pressure (or another reason) to be "a good parent". But the difference is crucial: when you used the word "sacrifice" in your earlier comments, you meant the Objectivist definition, and not the general definition--which means you were importing your values into the term.

I believe it would be a good idea for you to read ITOE. I think many of your doubts are addressed there. Maybe they will not be resolved (I have several of my own, although they are not yours), but at least you will see how oversimplified your statements above are.

Did you read OPAR by Peikoff, or did you just skim it? If you just skimmed it, you have my sympathy. But if you read it, then you know he got many things right in presenting Rand's ideas. (He peppered in some of his own stuff, although he says he didn't, but that is another discussion.) There is one thing he did present clearly. A concept in Objectivism includes identification, classification based on similarities and differences, and commensurability.

(btw - You keep spelling Peikoff as Piekoff, so here is as good a place as any to mention it. But fear not! It's a common mistake.)

Been a few years since I read both books (and I did read OPAR, even if it was written by a man who doesn't know how to spell his own name *) so a re-reading is probably due.

If you had absorbed this, you would see that your remarks above eliminate all of it and you are leveling all meanings to be merely opinions that are accepted over time. In other words, on the level of fundamentals, reason is out the door and tradition rules.

I'm hardly doing that. My statement of the problem here is simply this: that Objectivism's development of morality is not the outcome of reasoning based on the facts of reality, but on reasoning based on the acceptance of something that is a fundamental value. More strongly put, it is not possible to deduce a morality based on the facts of reality considered pristine and pure: you must start off with a fundamental value that produces the others. But the facts of reality will never point you to such a fundamental value. "Life is the ultimate value", Rand says (or something similar)--but there's nothing in the universe that makes that a rationally irrefutable choice; she was merely stating her choice of fundamental value.

On meaning per se, you object to terms having specific meanings in Objectivism instead of the meanings given in System A, System B or System C (which, incidentally bear critical differences between themselves). Let's turn this around and ask, how would you present a philosophical system without defining terms, but instead using meanings from other systems at random?

Likewise, what is your reasoning that other systems get to have meanings for their terms, but Objectivism does not?

And even more critically, how do you induce and deduce (not simply deduce) principles from reality without specific meanings for your terms?

Michael

That's not an accurate statement of my criticism. I'm saying that Objectivism has a habit of defining terms in ways that differ crucially from the common usage, but refusing to acknowledge that the definitions are specific to Objectivism--whereas I think it should stick to the common usage as much as possible, and flag the differing usages when it feels it has to use them. I'm sure Andy Roddick doesn't use love to mean zero in any context that does not relate to tennis. At the very least, it would prevent misunderstanding by those who aren't fluent in Objectivese. And it would prevent unforced errors. I'm quite happy to let Objectivism have its special meanings, but it needs to recognize that they are special meanings, and not the common ones found in the dictionary, and not use those special meanings when they are not appropriate to the context--and flag those special usages when it does use them--and above all, be aware that those special usages often imply value judgments that the common usage does not imply (as in the case of "sacrifice"). Thus, when you talked about sacrifices brought about by other moralities, what you really said was merely "results that I think are negative based on my values".

Jeffrey

*Although since a lot of people make a similar mistake with my first name (gives a significant look ) I suppose I should be more careful...

[Selene]

Jeffrey:

Precisely why we define terms.

Therefore, since you know this why is it a problem?

Have not many of the more passionate arguments here at OL have been about differences in definitions.

Adam

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Jeff,

Rand is dead. She gave clear meanings to her terms. There is no way to change that now.

The real problem when some people wrongly approach Objectivism is that you tell them what the meaning of word X is, you point to Rand's texts and explanations, and they continue as if this were not true (and often claim she was contradicting herself, did not know what she was talking about, yada yada yada). One of the first things Rand did in almost all her nonfiction was define her terms. It is silly to ignore this.

Your argument about common terms did not convince me, especially since all dictionaries present more than one meaning as common usage, and this usually goes to 4 or 5 definitions.

About sacrifice, since this seems to bother you, the Objectivist meaning is clear. I agree there were some stubborn semantics in the early days of Objectivism (even Nathaniel Branden once said to sacrifice a lower value for a higher one is not a sacrifice, but a gain, since reality would not let you have both). But that is no reason to claim that Objectivists are not aware of (or do not accept) the common meaning within the proper context. They do. Even fundamentalists.

The problem highlighted by Rand is that the line between the common usage of sacrifice and actually sacrificing a higher value for a lower one is a very thin line indeed. Scoundrels and power-mongers of all sorts have used this thin line for good old fashioned bait-and-switch throughout history to keep people in line and them in their exploiting racket.

If a person ever tells you that this bait-and-switch does not exist, that no one ever wants you to sacrifice a higher value for a lower one, don't walk away. Run. That person is interested in collecting sacrifices, not making them. And his eye is on you.

We need to go deeper into your claim that "it is not possible to deduce a morality based on the facts of reality." I am not sure what you mean. Fundamental values are not deduced. Just like any fact, they are observed (with emphasis on causality), and only then induced and deduced.

Your statement of the Objectivist view that "life is the ultimate value" (or similar) shows that you have missed a critical point. Life simply exists. It is not an intrinsic fundamental value. What would it be a value to? The being would have to be alive, thus defined by life. Dead or non-living things don't value anything.

In Objectivism, life is a standard of value. Life is the starting point. Values only have meaning to living beings. Valuing is something living beings do.

That is a lot different than what you are claiming.

Michael

[Matus1976]

The problem here is that Objectivism has a habit of using terms in ways that are specific to Objectivism. "Sacrifice" is a good example. For ready reference, here's N. Branden's definition in one of the essays he contributed to The Virtue of Selfishness ("Mental Health versus Mysticism"): "the surrender of a higher value in favor of a lower value or a nonvalue". Now turn to Webster's definition (I'm using the Seventh New Collegiate); the closest it comes to this is part 3a: "destruction or surrender of something for the sake of something else"

Wow Jeff! Really! Objectivism uses terms in ways that are different than the norm! Oh my god, you've found the one fatal flaw of Objectism! Wow! Guess I'll just be burning my copy of Atlas shrugged and wipping out Das Kaptical...

The Fact that Rand took some words and used them in a different AND VERY SPECIFIC way, was obvious and very intentional, and the reason was because the hi-jacking of those words is a manifestation of corrupt and malicious philosophical systems and, since words are the only way which we can express ideas, necessarily subjugate the very ideas so critical to human understanding (identification and categorization are critical components of conceptual integration)

Given that, can you think of any reason why it might be bad if society takes the idea of giving up something of a lesser value in order to gain something of a higher value and uses the exact same word (hence, idea) to describe that as someone who gives up something of a higher value in order to gain something of a lesser value? Is it, perhaps, because they want to hide the moral distinction between the two? To sneak the later into the grouping of the former, to elevate 'sacrifice' as something that is always good, and sneak in there horrible things which hurt you but benefit someone else under this label that seems to mean something good. Rand was trying to reclaim these words to rightfully recognize particular aspects. Why do we even use the term sacrifice to mean 'giving up something lesser for something greater' when what we are actually doing is rationally prioritizing values

Look to dictionary.com

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sacrifice

We have infact both meanings present

3. the surrender or destruction of something prized or desirable for the sake of something considered as having a higher or more pressing claim.

5. a loss incurred in selling something below its value.

Tell me, do you think in a rational language, that a word ought to mean both one things AND IT'S DIRECT OPPOSITE?

Lets look at it’s origin and change in usage over time. More from Dictionary.com

Origin:

1225–75 sacrificium, equiv. to sacri- (comb. form of sacer holy) + -fic-, comb. form of facere to make

[Middle English, from Old French, from Latin sacrificium : sacer, sacred; see sacred + facere, to make; see dhē- in Indo-European roots.]

sac'ri•fic'er n.

Here we see sacrifice is “to make holy”

“Sense of "something given up for the sake of another" is first recorded 1592”

“Baseball sense first attested 1880. The verb is first recorded c.1290”

So in 1250 Sacrifice meant “to make holy”, by 1592 sacrifice as giving up something for the sake of another is first recorded. By

My nifty Oxford Universal Dictionary, which traces changes in definitions over time, shows that in 1697 that sacrifice was used to mean

“A person or thing that falls into the power of an enemy or destructive agency” it notes, amusingly, that this is “Now rare”,

The next definition, dated 1844 reads

“a loss incurred in selling something below its value”

Wikipiedia’s entry on “Sacrifice” says this

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sacrifice

“Sacrifice (from a Middle English verb meaning "to make sacred", from Old French, from Latin sacrificium: sacr, "sacred" + facere, "to make") is commonly known as the practice of offering food, objects (typically valuables), or the lives of animals or people to the gods as an act of propitiation or worship. The term is also used metaphorically to describe selfless good deeds for others or a short term loss in return for a greater gain, such as in a game of chess.

Recently it has also come into use as meaning doing without something or giving something up.

Now why would the word for making something sacred, and for getting a greater gain, suddenly start being used to mean going without and giving up? Is it, perhaps, that the notion of altruism has so permeated the philosophical foundations of culture that the notion of going without (giving things up) is now considered holy Who might encourage such a change in definition? Who benefits from such a change? And why would a word being used to mean giving something less up for something more start to be used to mean a victim then be used to mean giving up something more for less?

Edited July 29, 2009 by Matus1976

[jeffrey smith]

Jeff,

Rand is dead. She gave clear meanings to her terms. There is no way to change that now.

I have no problem with what Rand did. It's what Objectivists do now that bothers me. And I think that the difference between Objectivist definition and common definitions is often great enough to cause problems.

However that's a side issue. (And I picked on "sacrifice" simply because it was already used in this thread.)

The problem highlighted by Rand is that the line between the common usage of sacrifice and actually sacrificing a higher value for a lower one is a very thin line indeed. Scoundrels and power-mongers of all sorts have used this thin line for good old fashioned bait-and-switch throughout history to keep people in line and them in their exploiting racket.

If a person ever tells you that this bait-and-switch does not exist, that no one ever wants you to sacrifice a higher value for a lower one, don't walk away. Run. That person is interested in collecting sacrifices, not making them. And his eye is on you.

Well, there's at least one thing about which I completely agree with you.

We need to go deeper into your claim that "it is not possible to deduce a morality based on the facts of reality." I am not sure what you mean. Fundamental values are not deduced. Just like any fact, they are observed (with emphasis on causality), and only then induced and deduced.

I disagree with that last sentence. Fundamental values are chosen, and almost always express the individual's "sense of life" (you'll note I have no problem with that Randian phrase). It's impossible to have a value without a mind to evaluate it--without a mind to give it worth. Values are inherently subjective. It's impossible to observe a value. You can only observe things and actions. If you like the result of an action, you value it. But that's your subjective valuation. There's nothing in the universe that can justify saying "this is good" and "this is bad" outside of the human mind's own choices.

Your statement of the Objectivist view that "life is the ultimate value" (or similar) shows that you have missed a critical point. Life simply exists. It is not an intrinsic fundamental value. What would it be a value to? The being would have to be alive, thus defined by life. Dead or non-living things don't value anything.

In Objectivism, life is a standard of value. Life is the starting point. Values only have meaning to living beings. Valuing is something living beings do.

Yes and no. I seem to be misremembering a sentence I saw in VOS while looking up Branden's definition of sacrifice.

But to the larger point--I would say what you call "standard of value" is really just another term for "fundamental value". And perhaps I'm guilty of some verbal imprecision here, because when I referred to life I really meant "the state of being alive".

BTW, while flipping through VOS and failing to find the original statement I misremembered as "life is the ultimate value" I found the passage in Objectivist Ethics in which Rand defines the concept of "man's life". So I withdraw my strictures about vagueness in relation to the definition of that term.

[tjohnson]

In science we often create new technical terms for phenomena that was previously unknown. The word "sacrifice" would not be considered suitable as a technical term because it has so many meanings already. Even the word "concept" is extremely vague.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Jeff,

In Objectivism, all living things have values. Value has a precise definition in Objectivism and you are not using it.

No problem if you disagree. Merely understand that value means something very specific. From "The Objectivist Ethics" in VOS, p. 16.

"Value" is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. The concept "value" is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible.

I quote from Galt's speech: "There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms. The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that faces a constant alternative: the issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies; its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of existence. It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible. It is only to a living entity that things can be good or evil."

While looking for a quick copy/paste fix, I saw a delightful entry on Wikipedia that pretty much touches on the essentials. We could argue over this word or that, but the issue is laid out pretty well (and even addresses the epistemological preach-mess that Xray has been crusading about):

Objectivist theory of value

The Objectivist theory of value is the ethical theory of value held by Objectivists, as propounded by the founder of Objectivism, Ayn Rand.[1] Rand held that the best expression of the Objectivist approach to values was presented in "The Objectivist Ethics."[2]

Theory of value

Ayn Rand explains in her work Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal that the Objectivist theory of value holds the following:

Reality exists independently of perception:

Reality exists independent of human perception. If humans did not exist, reality would still exist. Reality has some properties that cannot be changed; but humans can observe, learn and know what these properties are. These properties are said to be intrinsic to reality.

Humans have unique needs:

By virtue of being alive, humans have needs, which may be unique to each individual. Humans do not exist outside of reality, and have wants and needs to continue living. Some needs may be universal, like water; some needs may be individual, like hearing aids. Needs are subjective because they may change from individual to individual.

Value is an objective relationship:

Consider the following example of a caveman in need of meat:

• The caveman has a need for fresh meat.
  
• The caveman observes that a rock falling on an animal kills it.
  
• After many such observations, the fact that a rock has the property "kills animals", becomes part of the caveman's knowledge of reality.
  
• Because of this knowledge, rocks become valuable to the caveman as a tool for getting fresh meat.

The value of the rock as being able to kill animals, requires both the intrinsic and the subjective to be present:

• The intrinsic property of the rock of being both hard and heavy have to be present. A piece of pumice will not work.
  
• The subjective need for meat has to be present. A hard and heavy rock will be of no value to a vegetarian (although the rock may be of value as a grindstone to such a person).

Therefore value is not a quality contained solely in the object, or solely in the mind of the human, but is a relationship between the intrinsic facts of reality, and the subjective needs of humans. The value is said to be objective because for one particular human, under one particular set of circumstances, the value of an object will always be the same to that human.

Necessity of value

In "The Objectivist Ethics," Rand begins her description of the Objectivist theory of value by arguing in favour of the necessity of value,[3] explicitly stating the importance of opening with the question 'Why does man need a code of values?' and rejecting the immediate question of 'What particular values should man accept?'[4] She argues, quoting John Galt, the Randian hero in Atlas Shrugged,[5] that actions can only have value to living entities, and that it is the ability of living entities to hold goals that allows them to have value.[6]

The best-known of the statements on this subject holds:[1]

"An

ultimate value

is that final goal or end to which all lesser goals are the means — and it sets the standard by which all lesser goals are

evaluated

. An organism's life is its

standard of value

: that which furthers its life is the

good

, that which threatens it is the

evil

.[6]"

Rand considers life to be metaphysically removed from other values, as it is not a value by choice, but a value by its nature.[1] Rand thus continues to claim to have solved the 'is-ought problem' posed by David Hume,[7] writing, "The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the relation between 'is' and 'ought'."[8] Hence, Rand determines, an objective system of morality is both possible and necessary.[7]

Rand argues that this necessity is pressed by the greater potential of humans to conceptualise, and the inability of humans to rely entirely on instinct.[9] She compares the distinction in this respect between humans and animals as similar to the distinction between animals and plants; she argues that plants rely on stimuli and are incapable of instinct, just as animals rely on instinct and are incapable of conceptualisation.[10] Rand holds that it is the faculty of reason and the process of thinking that allow humans to survive by analogy.[11] Humans have no instinctive precepts (unlike the plant), yet constrained by the necessity to hold life as the standard of value, and so must use their reason to determine the values that best advance their ultimate standard of value: life.[12]

Aesthetics

In Objectivism, aesthetics are seen as a "recreation of reality according to [the artist]'s values".[13] The worth of art stems from the Randian interpretation of the questions 'what could be' and 'what ought to be'.[13] The fundamental Objectivist belief in the objectivity of reality demands that art 'could be' possible, whilst Objectivist value theory dictates that the art be a representation of the best of all possibilities, with what is 'best' being derived from the values of the artist.[13] The worth and beauty of the art is then assessed according to the values of the beholder.[14] As such, Rand describes Objectivist aesthetics, as expression of value, as being consistent with the romantic realist school of art.[15]

Footnotes

1. a b c Rasmussen, Douglas (28 December 1990) (PDF). "Ayn Rand on Obligation and Value." Libertarian Alliance. ISBN 1-85637-120-4. http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/philn/philn025.pdf. Retrieved on 2007-08-25.

2. Rand (2005c), p. 107

3. Rand (2005b), p. 13

4. Rand (2005b), p. 14

5. Rand (2005b), p. 16

6. a b Rand (2005b), p. 17

7. a b O'Neil, Patrick M. (April 1983). "Ayn Rand and the Is-Ought Problem". The Journal of Libertarian Studies VII (1): pp. 81–99. http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/7_1/7_1_4.pdf?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1. Retrieved on 2007-08-26.

8. Rand (2005b), p. 18

9. Rand (2005b), pp. 19–20

10. Rand (2005b), pp. 19

11. Rand (2005b), p. 22

12. Rand (2005b), pp. 23–4

13. a b c Rand (2005c), p. 181

14. Rand (2005c), p. 227

15. Rand (2005a), pp. 104–5

References

* Rand, Ayn (2005a). The Romantic Manifesto. New York: New American Library. ISBN 0-451-14916-5.

* Rand, Ayn (2005b). The Virtue of Selfishness. New York: New American Library. ISBN 0-451-16393-1.

* Rand, Ayn (2005c). Robert Mayhew. ed. Ayn Rand Answers. New York: New American Library. ISBN 0-451-21665-2.

* Smith, Tara (2000). Viable Values. A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-847-69761-4.

This should provide pretty good food for thought. As least, if you (or anyone) wish to disagree with Rand, or probe the meaning of her terms, the prerequisite is getting what Rand meant right. This summary should help.

Michael

[merjet]

As to what sentient human beings can discover - they can discover by doing comparisons that universal morals don't exist. So, given the wide gamut of moral values - how is "a" moral life supposed to look like?

The only thing you can discover is that there is no such thing as universal morals and that you can choose morals different from those you grew up with if they appeal to you.

"Universal" does not mean "objective". It's not even a synonym.

Xray,

You have insisted that all values are subjective and there is no such thing as an objective value. Do you hold the same for rational values? Are some values more rational (or irrational) than others? Or do you believe that using "rational" or "irrational" as an adjective for "values" is a category error, too?

That's all my questions for now. I invite others who agree with Xray to respond as well.

Incidentally, I did a search on The Objectivist Research CD-ROM for "objective values." There was one hit! Searching for "rational values" gave 21 hits! (That would include some duplicates that I didn't weed out, since some parts of the text are excerpts from other parts.) So, Xray and others who agree with her, let's hear your attacks on rational values.

Edited July 29, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[Guyau]

The posts of Michael Kelly (#331) and Michael Dickey (#332) are helpful additions (see previous a, b). Michael Dickey, I do not understand what is being said by the 1844 definition. Is the usage of sacrifice with that meaning archaic, not used today? That definition of sacrifice was “a loss incurred in selling something below its value.” Do you know what sort of business situation was being talked about here? Was it like the sacrifice-fly in baseball. Was it selling a product for below its going price in order to bring customers into ones store, where they may purchase other products that will yield an overall profit? Or selling at a loss for a while to drive a competitor who cannot sustain such losses out of business? Or would sacrifice in this sense have been applied to a situation in which one sells at some loss in the expectation that selling later would be at an even greater loss?

[tjohnson]

Jeff,

In Objectivism, all living things have values. Value has a precise definition in Objectivism and you are not using it.

No problem if you disagree. Merely understand that value means something very specific. From "The Objectivist Ethics" in VOS, p. 16.

"Value" is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. The concept "value" is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible.

I quote from Galt's speech: "There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms. The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that faces a constant alternative: the issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies; its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of existence. It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible. It is only to a living entity that things can be good or evil."

OK, so it takes living things to value something. The problem is that living things don't always value what is "good" for them to keep living. They often either do things they know are bad for them or they are unable to adapt to changing conditions and so perish. Humans don't always know what is good or bad for them - that's an ongoing debate. Are you saying that once it has been established by science that something is bad for you then it is irrational or immoral to continue to do that?

[Jonathan]

"Universal" does not mean "objective". It's not even a synonym.

I'd be interested in hearing precise Objectivist definitions of "objective" and "subjective," and examples of which types of thoughts and opinions are objective and which are subjective. I think that borderline examples would be the most helpful. I've often found that the terms seem to end up being practically interchangeable or meaningless in discussions with Objectivists -- it seems that any opinion that a self-declared Objectivist has is "objective," and any contrary opinion is "subjective."

I've seen some Objectivists claim that their emotions are objective, where others claim that Rand believed that emotions cannot be objective. Which is the truth -- which represents the actual Objectivist position?

In my primary area of interest, art, Objectivists reject certain art forms because they are said to be "subjective" or "non-objective," yet they accept other art forms despite admitting that they are also "subjective" (or at least that they're currently subjective, but allegedly on the verge of becoming objective). Is objectivity in art a requirement according to Objectivism, or not? Could someone give me examples of purely objective evaluations of art -- judgments which are not contaminated in any way by subjectivity -- and explain why I should value such a method of evaluation when it can't currently be applied to music and other art forms, yet I can get deep aesthetic satisfaction from them anyway (just as Rand did)?

J

Edited July 29, 2009 by Jonathan

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Are you saying that once it has been established by science that something is bad for you then it is irrational or immoral to continue to do that?

GS,

If you are using only the fundamental standard of life, yes. The rub happens when more than one element enters the picture.

To name a few such elements, there are other standards, there are special situations that provide a complicated context, and there are even different facts to look at (as hinted by Xray's atypical, thus astonishing, moment of lucidity when she enumerated several different facts involved in perceiving optical illusions).

Here is a good example of what I am talking about. A smoker has terminal lung cancer that he contracted from smoking (proven medically) and has a short time left to live. Should he continue smoking until he dies even though smoking was the source of his fatal disease, or should he suffer withdrawal symptoms with what remains of his life?

There are several critical standards one can use here (life, happiness, pain, etc.), several contexts to consider (including family life), and several facts to look at.

Michael

[Selene]

Folks:

I think we are arriving at some really important distinctions that we can all benefit from being able to make.

Jonathan: I have never been in agreement with Rand and Objectivism orthodoxy on art, aesthetics from the beginning of my immersion in the philosophy in the early 1960's.

Michael, GS, Merlin, Matus and Stephen: We are definitely honing in on what I consider an important refining and understanding of terms that tend to have a subjective life of their own.

Excellent discussion that is finally refining itself.

Adam

[tjohnson]

There are several critical standards one can use here (life, happiness, pain, etc.), several contexts to consider (including family life), and several facts to look at.

Yes, there are many things to consider, I agree. What I am wondering is does objectivism give one the tools consider all these factors, because, at present, it doesn't appear so to me.

[merjet]

I'd be interested in hearing precise Objectivist definitions of "objective" and "subjective," and examples of which types of thoughts and opinions are objective and which are subjective.

In the Ayn Rand Lexicon there are entries for "Objectivity" and "Objective Theory of Values", but not "objective" per se. So Rand probably used "objective" the way it is generally used and defined in a dictionary.

She used the phrase "objective laws" several times and that obviously has a somewhat different meaning such as "without bias or prejudice."

In OPAR Peikoff writes:

People often speak of "objective reality." In this usage, which is harmless, "objective" means "independent of consciousness." The actual purpose of the concept, however, is to be found not in metaphysics, but in epistemology. Strictly speaking, existents are not objective; they simply are. It is minds, and specifically conceptual processes, that are objective—or nonobjective.

There is an entry in the Lexicon for "Subjectivism", but not "subjective". It's clear that Rand often used the term pejoratively, e.g. the "subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional" (Obj. News. Vol. 4 No. 3). She didn't use it the way economists do (and Xray does) and wrote critical marginalia in books by Ludwig von Mises where he used "subjective".

Edited July 29, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Jonathan,

Here are some things from Rand to the question of what objective and subjective mean in Objectivism. (Edit: My post crossed with Merlin's.)

From The Objectivist Newsletter, Feb. 1965, 7, “Who Is the Final Authority in Ethics?” (online here):

Objectivity is both a metaphysical and an epistemological concept. It pertains to the relationship of consciousness to existence. Metaphysically, it is the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any perceiver’s consciousness. Epistemologically, it is the recognition of the fact that a perceiver’s (man’s) consciousness must acquire knowledge of reality by certain means (reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic). This means that although reality is immutable and, in any given context, only one answer is true, the truth is not automatically available to a human consciousness and can be obtained only by a certain mental process which is required of every man who seeks knowledge—that there is no substitute for this process, no escape from the responsibility for it, no shortcuts, no special revelations to privileged observers—and that there can be no such thing as a final “authority” in matters pertaining to human knowledge. Metaphysically, the only authority is reality; epistemologically—one’s own mind. The first is the ultimate arbiter of the second.

The concept of objectivity contains the reason why the question “Who decides what is right or wrong?” is wrong. Nobody “decides.” Nature does not decide—it merely is; man does not decide, in issues of knowledge, he merely observes that which is. When it comes to applying his knowledge, man decides what he chooses to do, according to what he has learned, remembering that the basic principle of rational action in all aspects of human existence, is: “Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.” This means that man does not create reality and can achieve his values only by making his decisions consonant with the facts of reality.

From Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, "Axiomatic Concepts," p 57 (online here)

It is axiomatic concepts that identify the precondition of knowledge: the distinction between existence and consciousness, between reality and the awareness of reality, between the object and the subject of cognition. Axiomatic concepts are the foundation of objectivity.

(There are a couple of other quotes Binswanger included in the Lexicon on objectivity, but the ideas contained in them have been used as grounds for later distortions by people in Rand-land, especially Peikoff in "Fact and Value" and in his discussion of the arbitrary, so there is no way to look at them without discussing the distortions.)

Notice Rand's comment below on how human beings deal with each other when "objective" is not the standard of cognition. From Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, "What Is Capitalism?", pp. 21-22:

There are, in essence, three schools of thought on the nature of the good: the intrinsic, the subjective, and the objective. The intrinsic theory holds that the good is inherent in certain things or actions as such, regardless of their context and consequences, regardless of any benefit or injury they may cause to the actors and subjects involved. It is a theory that divorces the concept of "good" from beneficiaries, and the concept of "value" from valuer and purpose—claiming that the good is good in, by, and of itself.

The subjectivist theory holds that the good bears no relation to the facts of reality, that it is the product of a man's consciousness, created by his feelings, desires, "intuitions," or whims, and that it is merely an "arbitrary postulate" or an "emotional commitment."

The intrinsic theory holds that the good resides in some sort of reality, independent of man's consciousness; the subjectivist theory holds that the good resides in man's consciousness, independent of reality.

The objective theory holds that the good is neither an attribute of "things in themselves" nor of man's emotional states, but an evaluation of the facts of reality by man's consciousness according to a rational standard of value. (Rational, in this context, means: derived from the facts of reality and validated by a process of reason.) The objective theory holds that the good is an aspect of reality in relation to man—and that it must be discovered, not invented, by man. Fundamental to an objective theory of values is the question: Of value to whom and for what? An objective theory does not permit context-dropping or "concept-stealing"; it does not permit the separation of "value" from "purpose," of the good from beneficiaries, and of man's actions from reason.

. . .

(pp. 22-23)

Reason is the only means of communication among men, and an objectively perceivable reality is their only common frame of reference; when these are invalidated (i.e., held to be irrelevant) in the field of morality, force becomes men's only way of dealing with one another.

One meaning for "subjective" given by Rand is "arbitrary." I wonder how Peikoff resolved his "without cognitive content" description of arbitrary with Rand's "products of man's consciousness" for subjective, which Rand uses as a synonym for arbitrary. (Only Robert Campbell knows... ) ITOE, "Definitions," p. 43:

This does not mean that conceptualization is a subjective process or that the content of concepts depends on an individual's subjective (i.e., arbitrary) choice.

In the following, as also given in the quote above from CUI, Rand does not consider "subjective" to be the opposite of "objective." Something like "dividing reality" would be closer to the idea of an opposite, and she further divides that into "subjective" (ideas claimed to be knowledge, but divorced from reality) and "intrinsic" (ideas claimed to be knowledge, but divorced from the mind). ITOE, "Definitions," pp. 52-53:

Now refer to the four historical schools of thought on the issue of concepts, which I listed in the foreword to this work—and observe that the dichotomy of "intrinsic or subjective" has played havoc with this issue, as it has with every issue involving the relationship of consciousness to existence.

The extreme realist (Platonist) and the moderate realist (Aristotelian) schools of thought regard the referents of concepts as intrinsic, i.e., as "universals" inherent in things (either as archetypes or as metaphysical essences), as special existents unrelated to man's consciousness—to be perceived by man directly, like any other kind of concrete existents, but perceived by some non-sensory or extra-sensory means.

The nominalist and the conceptualist schools regard concepts as subjective, i.e., as products of man's consciousness, unrelated to the facts of reality, as mere "names" or notions arbitrarily assigned to arbitrary groupings of concretes on the ground of vague, inexplicable resemblances.

The extreme realist school attempts, in effect, to preserve the primacy of existence (of reality) by dispensing with consciousness—i.e., by converting concepts into concrete existents and reducing consciousness to the perceptual level, i.e., to the automatic function of grasping percepts (by supernatural means, since no such percepts exist).

The extreme nominalist (contemporary) school attempts to establish the primacy of consciousness by dispensing with existence (with reality)—i.e., by denying the status of existents even to concretes and converting concepts into conglomerates of fantasy, constructed out of the debris of other, lesser fantasies, such as words without referents or incantations of sounds corresponding to nothing in an unknowable reality.

Rand also makes a difference between metaphysically subjective (without cause) and epistemologically subjective (cause unknown). The Romanic Manifesto, "Art and Cognition," pp. 55-56:

At present, our understanding of music is confined to the gathering of material, i.e., to the level of descriptive observations. Until it is brought to the stage of conceptualization, we have to treat musical tastes or preferences as a subjective matter—not in the metaphysical, but in the epistemological sense; i.e., not in the sense that these preferences are, in fact, causeless and arbitrary, but in the sense that we do not know their cause. No one, therefore, can claim the objective superiority of his choices over the choices of others. Where no objective proof is available, it's every man for himself—and only for himself.

Heh. Look at the following meaning. How does Xray's "all values are subjective" sound through that prism? The Romanic Manifesto, " Art and Moral Treason," p. 150:

... the subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional.

I think it is fair to say that Rand used the word "objective" to mean ideas where the mind and reality correspond, and the word "subjective" (and "intrinsic") to mean ideas where the mind is divorced from reality by definition.

There are several manners in which this is ascertained (observation, axiomatic concepts, etc.), but that is for another discussion.

Enough for one post. (Whew!)

Michael

[Xray]

I've encountered one man online who considered himself an Objectivist but at the same time considered the existence of God to be logically provable. (As I recall, his "proof" was a version of the cosmological proof (the First Cause proof), and failed in the same way that all such proofs must fail.)

LOL - this would make Rand turn in her grave if she knew her own philosophy would one day be used by people to prove the existence of god.

Edited July 29, 2009 by Xray

[Guyau]

Jonathan, here is a little more.

−Objectivity−

Rand’s most elementary sense of the concept objective is the sense of ordinary parlance. This is the sense she talks of when explaining why she has chosen Objectivism as the name of her philosophy. She credits Aristotle as the first to correctly define “the basic principle of a rational view of existence and of man’s consciousness: that there is only one reality, the one man perceives—that it exists as an objective absolute (which means: independently of the consciousness, the wishes, or the feelings of any perceiver)” [FNI 22].

In 1965 Rand published two refinements of her concept of objectivity. Early in the year, she wrote:

Objectivity is both a metaphysical and an epistemological concept. It pertains to the relationship of consciousness to existence. Metaphysically, it is the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any perceiver’s consciousness. Epistemologically, it is the recognition of the fact that a perceiver’s (man’s) consciousness must acquire knowledge of reality by certain means (reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic). (FAE 18)

Later that year, Rand refined her concept of objectivity further. In the context of discussing objectivity in moral values, she observed that

There are, in essence, three schools of thought on the nature of the good: the intrinsic, the subjective, and the objective. The intrinsic theory holds that the good is inherent in certain things or actions as such, . . . regardless of a benefit or injury they cause to the actors and subjects involved.

The subjectivist theory holds that the good bears no relation to the facts of reality, that it is a product of a man’s consciousness, created by his feelings.

The intrinsic theory holds that the good resides in some sort of reality, independent of man’s consciousness; the subjectivist theory holds that the good resides in man’s consciousness, independent of reality.

The objective theory holds that the good is neither an attribute of “things in themselves” nor of man’s emotional states, but an evaluation of the facts of reality by man’s consciousness according to a rational standard of value. . . . The objective theory holds that the good is an aspect of reality in relation to man. (WC 21–22)

By the following year, it was clear that Rand envisioned a broadened role for the intrinsicist-subjectivist-objectivist way of locating her philosophic theories in relation to others. She applied the tripartition to the theory of concepts and universals. Concepts, for Rand, can be objective and should be objective. Such concepts are “produced by man’s consciousness in accordance with the facts of reality, as mental integrations of factual data computed by man—as products of a cognitive method of classification whose processes must be formed by man, but whose content is dictated by reality” [ITOE 54]. Rand’s conception of concepts (and definitions and essence and . . .) and her conception of the good can be rightly characterized as (i) objective with Rand’s metaphysical-epistemological faces of the objective relation and, at the same time, as (ii) objective within Rand’s intrinsicist-subjectivist-objectivist tripartition.

To say that I am having a subjective experience just now as I listen to Shostakovich #10 is not in any way critical; that says only that there are activities going on in the subject. For me to say that Josiah Willard Gibbs is the greatest American physicist so far, and to be sincere, not merely blustering, is subjective in a way that should be reined in. For there is a shadow crossing my mind, casting a little doubt on my assertion. If I am unwilling to turn and see what that doubt is about, this is poor process. Turning to the doubt, I realize there are many American physicists, since the time of Gibbs, whose contributions I do not know. I'm in weak position, objectively speaking, to claim to know who has been the greatest American physicist so far.

[Xray]

Heh. Look at the following meaning. How does Xray's "all values are subjective" sound through that prism?

The Romanic Manifesto, " Art and Moral Treason," p. 150:

... the subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional.

Let's xray that Randian prism and do the test by a very simple example:

I value lentils over oysters.

Is my subjective choice arbitrary: Yes.

But is it "irrational"? No. What would be "irrational" about that preference?

Or blindly emotional? No. I'm not exactly enthusiastic about lentils - just happen to prefer them to oysters.

It looks like Rand threw together a certain assortment of terms with the goal of disvaluing the term "subjective". Since she has a love affair with the term "objective", it looks like subjective is seen negatively by her.

Now let's switch from a banal dish of lentils to another choice, a choice which has had far more serious consequences for those involved in the choice: Debbie Rowe choosing a hefty sum of money from Michael Jackson in exchange for her children. Actually she agreed to sell them to Jackson before they were even born.

Was her subjective choice arbitrary: yes.

Was it irrational? I'm interested in your answer first Michael before giving mine.

Was Rowe's subjective choice blindly emotional? Same as above. What do you think, Michael?

For per Rand's prism, if the choice was not irrational, and not blindly emotional, then it was rational and would have gotten her okay since everything rational was deemed "good" in her universe.

The Jackson trade btw is also an excellent example to illustrate that EVERY sacrifice is actually a trade in which a believed lesser value is exchanged for a believed higher value. There is NO exception to that principle, none whatsoever. Rand's idea of sacrifice is another fallacy of her philosopy.

Name me any sacrifice Michael and I'll demonstrate it. But I don't want to jump ahead and will await your replies to my two questions first. TIA.

Edited July 30, 2009 by Xray

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Let's xray that Randian prism and do the test by a very simple example:

I value lentils over oysters...

Xray,

Oops.

Just by the start of the example, you show you don't have a clue about what Rand meant here.

Michael

[merjet]

The Jackson trade btw is also an excellent example to illustrate that EVERY sacrifice is actually a trade in which a believed lesser value is excanged for a believed higher value. There is NO exception to that principle, none whatsoever. Rand's idea of sacrifice is another fallacy of her philosopy.

Name me any sacrifice Michael and I'll demonstrate it.

Human sacrifice has been practiced at various times and places in history. Victims were ritually killed in a manner that was supposed to please or appease gods, spirits or whatever. Do you really believe all the victims were exchanging a lesser value for a higher value?

The fallacy is yours. You fail to see or refuse to recognize that when Rand said "sacrifice" she meant in her view. If the perpetrators in the last paragraph believed they were exchanging a lesser value (the victim) for a higher value (pleasing or appeasing), that is completely irrelevant to Rand's value judgment. So please try to demonstrate to us, Xray, that every victim was trading a lower value for a higher value.

If a drug addict spends money on dope to get high feels he is exchanging a lower value for a higher value (the dope), that also is completely irrelevant to Rand's value judgment.

Edited July 29, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[tjohnson]

Jonathan,

Here are some things from Rand to the question of what objective and subjective mean in Objectivism. (Edit: My post crossed with Merlin's.)

From The Objectivist Newsletter, Feb. 1965, 7, "Who Is the Final Authority in Ethics?" (online here):

Objectivity is both a metaphysical and an epistemological concept. It pertains to the relationship of consciousness to existence. Metaphysically, it is the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any perceiver's consciousness. Epistemologically, it is the recognition of the fact that a perceiver's (man's) consciousness must acquire knowledge of reality by certain means (reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic). This means that although reality is immutable and, in any given context, only one answer is true, the truth is not automatically available to a human consciousness and can be obtained only by a certain mental process which is required of every man who seeks knowledge—that there is no substitute for this process, no escape from the responsibility for it, no shortcuts, no special revelations to privileged observers—and that there can be no such thing as a final "authority" in matters pertaining to human knowledge. Metaphysically, the only authority is reality; epistemologically—one's own mind. The first is the ultimate arbiter of the second.

If Rand were restricting this analysis to the activities of science then I could agree with her (although I find the wording quite awkward). But how this discussion can be connected to ethics or economics is beyond me. Ethics and economics are not natural sciences (if they are sciences at all) - they are about man-made phenomena and so they are not "immutable", as we consider physical reality to be.