Is there really such a concept as "Existence"?


Roger Bissell

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As for the concept of "the universe" or "Existence," I agree that the standard Randian treatment is not adequate. And I confess that I completely glossed over the problem in my comments, and I would now like to take the opportunity to share some thoughts I have developed over the past 10 years.

It is standard in epistemology (and not just by Objectivists) to claim that we can only form concepts of universals, such as man or red or rationality -- and not of particulars, such as Ayn Rand or Mars or the color of my automobile.

Since particulars include not only individual particulars such as Ayn Rand, but also collectives of particulars, such as the U.S. Congress or Existence (the universe), this would mean that there cannot be a concept of Existence or the universe.

Rand claims that the units of Existence are all the things that ever existed, do now exist, and will exist in the future. This is not correct.

Existence or the universe is a "sum total," a collective, comprising all those things as individuals. Not as units, but as members of the sum total.

Rand was apparently confusing "Existence" with "existent." The units of "existent" are all those things she said were units of "Existence."

There ~is~ a way we can treat speak intelligibly of the units of "Existence," but only if we first figure out a way to get beyond this sum total of particulars and identify a ~group~ of such sum totals.

We can do this by expanding the idea of what a concept is to include not only universals, but also particulars. In other words, metaphorically, we acknowledge that our "file folder" for Ayn Rand at time 1, time 2, time 3, etc. works very much like a conceptual file folder -- enough so that the concept of "Ayn Rand" makes sense, at least by analogy. The units of the concept "Ayn Rand" would, of course, be Ayn Rand at time 1, time 2, time 3, etc.

Similarly, we can look at the universe or Existence with the aid of a file folder. Following Rand, we can see that Existence always (i.e., at any point in time) has a past, present, and future. It is ~partititioned~ into three temporal parts. And that partitition contains different particular individuals in each of the three sections at each point in time. Which gives us a way to treat the universe at each of these different points of time as units of the concept "the universe" or "Existence."

But ~only~ if we can treat individual particulars and collectives (sum totals) of particulars in this way can we toss around the concept of "Existence" or "the universe." If "Ayn Rand" is not a concept, then neither is "the universe" or "Existence." (Though "existent", which is a universal not a particular, is still a concept. And Rand's chapter on axiomatic concepts should be re-written or at least re-read with that in mind.)

REB

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Roger,

Existence is. The past is gone and the future has yet to arrive. More precisely, its future is always with us for there is actually no present. What we perceive as the present is already devolving into and is the future. But since the present as a concept seems to make more sense there is cognitive virtue in using it. Please consider that a true present would require the temperature of absolute zero--the absence of movement.

--Brant

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Since particulars include not only individual particulars such as Ayn Rand, but also collectives of particulars, such as the U.S. Congress or Existence (the universe), this would mean that there cannot be a concept of Existence or the universe.

Rand claims that the units of Existence are all the things that ever existed, do now exist, and will exist in the future. This is not correct.

Existence or the universe is a "sum total," a collective, comprising all those things as individuals. Not as units, but as members of the sum total.

Rand was apparently confusing "Existence" with "existent." The units of "existent" are all those things she said were units of "Existence."

There ~is~ a way we can treat speak intelligibly of the units of "Existence," but only if we first figure out a way to get beyond this sum total of particulars and identify a ~group~ of such sum totals.

We can do this by expanding the idea of what a concept is to include not only universals, but also particulars. In other words, metaphorically, we acknowledge that our "file folder" for Ayn Rand at time 1, time 2, time 3, etc. works very much like a conceptual file folder -- enough so that the concept of "Ayn Rand" makes sense, at least by analogy. The units of the concept "Ayn Rand" would, of course, be Ayn Rand at time 1, time 2, time 3, etc.

REB

You might find the following interesting:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Semantics

The inventor of General Semantics, Alfred Korzybski (1879–1950), use time subscripts to coordinatize and disambiguate both general and particular terms.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Here are some initial thoughts, Roger.

Wouldn't anyone who had acquired a concept of what a concept is, or of what an abstraction is, necessarily also have to have acquired a concept of what a particular is? I mean, whatever the level of sophistication and whatever the degree of its articulateness, wouldn't having a concept of concepts entail a coordinate concept of particulars?

Before that second level of having a concept of concepts, there must be, of course, just the having of concepts. At this first level, could one have concepts covering some particular (say, the floor) or some group of particulars (say, the balls scattered on the floor) in which one has no concept of them as particulars? It seems more natural to think that ones earliest concepts are held degenerately as between particulars and the abstraction covering them. That is, having a concept of the particulars would, at this most elementary level, be no different than having a concept of the particulars as particulars.

Another initial thought is of some of the work in §IV. "Abstraction" of my 1990 essay Capturing Concepts in OBJECTIVITY (V1N1). In that section, I first summarize Rand's measurement-omission theory of concepts of particulars falling under comparative similarity groups. I then continue:

Common nouns are the first conceptual words we learn, and they evidently cue us to think of similarity groups. We have another way of grouping things: by spatial-temporal contiguity or neighborhood. Kitchen items and things to take along on vacation are concepts of such groups. These are thematic concepts. They are truly concepts but should be distinguished from taxonomic concepts. The former are grounded in proximities; the latter in similarities of forms and functions. . . .

Children as young as fourteen months form thematic as well as taxonomic categories. Adults, too, organize their knowledge of the world thematically as well as taxonomically. These perspectives are mutually supporting.

The relation of being a part of is a type of thematic relation and is especially important. Part-whole relations are given in perception along with similarity relations. We learn to form powerful semantic networks from is a part of and is a kind of. "A pear is a kind of fruit which is a part of a tree which is a kind of plant which (with others) is a part of the biosphere." Parts are natural units of form and natural units of function. Grouping objects according to perceptually salient common parts may engender the child's transition from classifications (of artifacts, procedures, and biological kinds) according to appearances to classifications according to functions. Moreover, conceiving of things as systems would surely be impossible without a prior grasp of part-whole relations; similarity relations are not sufficient.

Psychologists and philosophers have given much more attention to the role of similarity in concept formation and organization than to the role of thematic relations. Similarity is the wellspring of conceptual thought. We should note, however, that Rand, for one, was not oblivious to the influence of thematic relations:

"The distinguishing characteristics of furniture are a specified range of functions in a specified place . . . . The concept furniture involves a relationship to another concept . . . which has to be grasped before one can grasp the meaning of furniture: the concept habitation." (ITOE 22-23; see also 264-67)

I have removed all the references to the psychological literature that support the various statements in this text. For those, see the original at www.objectivity-archive.com.

I would anticipate that a concept of particulars as particulars will need to contrast them against not only abstractions over them respecting similarity groups in which they fall, but against abstractions over them respecting thematic relations in which they stand. Those relations would be proximity relations such as spatial and temporal relations, as well as part-whole relations.

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  • 6 months later...

In my view concepts are a natural resultant of a specific kind of mental activity. When an idea is validated to have occurred in response to a certain physical experience – a concept exists. The concept is the relationship which has been validated to exist between the idea and the physical experience responsible for it. Note: If the idea cannot be validated it is called a theory, illusion or hallucination; depending on its origination.

Prior to its conceptual ability the human brain formed sensual or mental associations with the physical aspects of reality. The existence of these mental associations were often symbolized by sounds and/or gestures. As the human mind advanced in its ability to form ideas it began to name its symbols; this is where words came into being. Then as mans mind began to identify cause and affect relationships between what mentally exists and what physically exists concepts came into being. The first concepts are direct resultants of reality and include things as: Water, tree, baby, wind, etc. Then when man began to conceptualize his relationships words such as: marriage, legal, country, etc. where created.

By this view - Concepts of science are more often theoretical than conceptual simply because the linkage of the idea to reality has not yet been validated. When it is validated it then becomes conceptual.

The total body of concepts when taken as a whole is called intelligence.

By this view religious concepts are summarily cast out and become either illusionary or hallucinary.

The total body of religious ideas when taken as a whole is called ignorance when illusionary and insanity when hallucinary. I haven't been able to differentiate between the two except to say hallucination has no known cause where illusion can usually be traced to a purposeful lie; or at least a mistaken identity.

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  • 1 year later...
Here are some initial thoughts, Roger.

Wouldn't anyone who had acquired a concept of what a concept is, or of what an abstraction is, necessarily also have to have acquired a concept of what a particular is? I mean, whatever the level of sophistication and whatever the degree of its articulateness, wouldn't having a concept of concepts entail a coordinate concept of particulars?

Before that second level of having a concept of concepts, there must be, of course, just the having of concepts. At this first level, could one have concepts covering some particular (say, the floor) or some group of particulars (say, the balls scattered on the floor) in which one has no concept of them as particulars? It seems more natural to think that ones earliest concepts are held degenerately as between particulars and the abstraction covering them. That is, having a concept of the particulars would, at this most elementary level, be no different than having a concept of the particulars as particulars.

Another initial thought is of some of the work in §IV. "Abstraction" of my 1990 essay Capturing Concepts in OBJECTIVITY (V1N1). In that section, I first summarize Rand's measurement-omission theory of concepts of particulars falling under comparative similarity groups. I then continue:

Common nouns are the first conceptual words we learn, and they evidently cue us to think of similarity groups. We have another way of grouping things: by spatial-temporal contiguity or neighborhood. Kitchen items and things to take along on vacation are concepts of such groups. These are thematic concepts. They are truly concepts but should be distinguished from taxonomic concepts. The former are grounded in proximities; the latter in similarities of forms and functions. . . .

Children as young as fourteen months form thematic as well as taxonomic categories. Adults, too, organize their knowledge of the world thematically as well as taxonomically. These perspectives are mutually supporting.

The relation of being a part of is a type of thematic relation and is especially important. Part-whole relations are given in perception along with similarity relations. We learn to form powerful semantic networks from is a part of and is a kind of. "A pear is a kind of fruit which is a part of a tree which is a kind of plant which (with others) is a part of the biosphere." Parts are natural units of form and natural units of function. Grouping objects according to perceptually salient common parts may engender the child's transition from classifications (of artifacts, procedures, and biological kinds) according to appearances to classifications according to functions. Moreover, conceiving of things as systems would surely be impossible without a prior grasp of part-whole relations; similarity relations are not sufficient.

Psychologists and philosophers have given much more attention to the role of similarity in concept formation and organization than to the role of thematic relations. Similarity is the wellspring of conceptual thought. We should note, however, that Rand, for one, was not oblivious to the influence of thematic relations:

"The distinguishing characteristics of furniture are a specified range of functions in a specified place . . . . The concept furniture involves a relationship to another concept . . . which has to be grasped before one can grasp the meaning of furniture: the concept habitation." (ITOE 22-23; see also 264-67)

I have removed all the references to the psychological literature that support the various statements in this text. For those, see the original at www.objectivity-archive.com.

I would anticipate that a concept of particulars as particulars will need to contrast them against not only abstractions over them respecting similarity groups in which they fall, but against abstractions over them respecting thematic relations in which they stand. Those relations would be proximity relations such as spatial and temporal relations, as well as part-whole relations.

Stephen, what you call "thematic relations" is a useful idea to remember during the last phase of integrating the more abstract concepts, the phase of reduction, that is, to remember to follow these relations recursively to bedrock reality.

More relevantly, I also agree that "abstraction" and "particular" may be regarded as coordinate concepts, as is the correlative pair "concept" and "concrete." But I take your point, in reply to Roger's, from a slightly different perspective. I gather from it the following: The present classification is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive; the referents to one cannot be confused with those of the other, and the "standard epistemology" (as Roger calls it) is correct: We don't form concepts from single particulars, be they Ayn Rand, Mars, or a sheen of a car.

Roger's effort to partition Ayn Rand the individual-particular into open-ended time slices so as to become units to be subsumed in the metaphorical "Ayn Rand" file folder, cannot work because the measurement of psychological time is the very quantitative relationship that is already abstracted and retained by the few known axiomatic concepts. (ITOE 56-57) Roger's theory would in effect explode the number of axiomatic concepts to correspond to every individual particular in existence.

However, the issue that Roger is addressing is a legitimate one: how to deal with universals and particulars uniformly at the next level of cognition, namely, at the propositional level. When difficulties do arise at a more complex level, one should question the validity of its underlying levels. In the present case, the underlying level, the distinction between abstractness and concreteness, is bedrock epistemology. In which case, by modus tollens, one should identify and question the nature of the difficulty at the more complex level. And indeed, I think here is where Roger is mistaken.

The question Roger asks, "Is there really such a concept as 'Existence'?" is a really good question, and I agree with his first answer: No. The universe, too, isn't a concept, and neither is Ayn Rand.

But Roger wants to make them into concepts. Why? So he can deal with them uniformly in logical statements. This then is the core issue. Must logical statements, following traditional doctrinal logic, be regimented only into four neatly cornered forms? Given the evident validity of bedrock epistemology, it would have to be, no.

By the Aristotelian guidelines of a what-logic, Roger certainly has valid reasons to be against the regnant relating-logic and to deprecate the Fregian-Russellian syntax of atomic and molecular statements. But a recourse to traditional scholastic/Port-Royal logic is just as mistaken. I am even tempted to call the attempt rationalism! (Sorry, Roger. I got hit with this label too from Will Thomas, so I empathize.)

The key problem must be resolved at the propositional level, not to be retrofitted at the conceptual level, which is what Roger's proposal is about. David Kelley, presumably reading H. W. B. Joseph's, identified the same issue as follows: Subject terms and predicate terms serve different functions in a proposition. Traditional logicians, taking the rationalist interpretation of Aristotle's Prior Analytics, treat them identically, hence their theory of term distribution. Kelley carefully writes:

A categorical proposition can be regarded as an assertion about the relations among classes. ... Every categorical proposition says that a certain relationship exists between two classes. ... Is the proposition "New York is a large city" universal or particular [proposition]? It isn't either, really, because "New York" does not name a class; it names a particular, individual city. ... The mark of a singular proposition is that the subject term is a name, pronoun, or phrase standing for a single object. ... These propositions have traditionally been treated as universal...

Notice his distancing himself from traditionalists.

The solution in my view is to return to the Aristotelian position before the traditionalist error, which aggravated the modernist reaction. Aristotle in P. A. names another method of inference, ekthesis [pdf], which relies on the setting up of a singular proposition as a mediated premise. The Objectivist logic, or any new science of logic, therefore needs to acknowledge the separate category of singular propositions from general propositions against traditionalists, but without agreeing with modernists about atomic and molecular facts being the ontological furniture of the world.

It is on this new basis that I take the modernists' side on the issue of existential import in the other thread.

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Related:

Predication

A Border Dispute: The Place of Logic in Psychology

John Macnamara (MIT 1986)

From the jacket flap:

A Border Dispute integrates the latest work in logic and semantics into a theory of language learning and presents six examples of how that theory revolutionizes cognitive psychology. Macnamara's thesis is set against the background of a fresh analysis of the psychologism debate of the 19th century, which led to the current standoff between logic and psychology. The book presents psychologism through the writings of John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant and its rejection by Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl. It then works out the general thesis that logic ideally presents a competence theory for part of human reasoning and explains how logical intuition is grounded in properties of the mind.

“The next six chapters present examples that illustrate the relevance of logic to psychology. These problems are all in the semantics of child language (the learning of proper names, personal pronouns, sortals or common nouns, quantifiers, and the truth-functional connectives) and reflect Macnamara's rich background in developmental psychology, particularly child language—a field, he points out, that embraces all of cognition. Technical problems raised by but not included in the examples in the main part of the text are dealt with in a separate chapter. The book concludes by describing laws in cognitive psychology, or the type of science made possible by Macnamara's new theory.” (Emphasis added.)

This book is out of print, but can be purchased used or checked from the library.

I employed the work of Macnamara in both “Capturing Concepts” (1990) and “Universals and Measurement” (2004).

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  • 5 months later...

There are things that exist which cannot be influenced and altered by personal preferences. All natural laws comes to mind. This realm is called objective.

There are thoughts, ideas, feelings, calculation, valuations, etc., which would not exist except for mind. This realm is called subjective.

But "existence exists", imo this often repeated Rand utterance does not make sense, is a floating abstraction.

One may say a human individual exists, a tree exists, the law of gravity exists, but to say "existence exists"

is to string together two words where neither object nor subject is supplied to give the phrase definitive meaning.

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There are things that exist which cannot be influenced and altered by personal preferences. All natural laws comes to mind. This realm is called objective.

There are thoughts, ideas, feelings, calculation, valuations, etc., which would not exist except for mind. This realm is called subjective.

But "existence exists", imo this often repeated Rand utterance does not make sense, is a floating abstraction.

One may say a human individual exists, a tree exists, the law of gravity exists, but to say "existence exists"

is to string together two words where neither object nor subject is supplied to give the phrase definitive meaning.

Called subjective by subjectivists.

Existence exists is merely an axiomatic expression of the most basic axiom of all and the redundancy just tells us that's all there is--that outside existence is nothing at all. There is no existence that does not exist. Dwelling on the obviousness of it all is a silly waste of time. Even Rand got on with it--everything else, but not outside of that context.

--Brant

Edited by Brant Gaede
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There are things that exist which cannot be influenced and altered by personal preferences. All natural laws comes to mind. This realm is called objective.

There are thoughts, ideas, feelings, calculation, valuations, etc., which would not exist except for mind. This realm is called subjective.

But "existence exists", imo this often repeated Rand utterance does not make sense, is a floating abstraction.

One may say a human individual exists, a tree exists, the law of gravity exists, but to say "existence exists"

is to string together two words where neither object nor subject is supplied to give the phrase definitive meaning.

Called subjective by subjectivists.

Existence exists is merely an axiomatic expression of the most basic axiom of all and the redundancy just tells us that's all there is--that outside existence is nothing at all. There is no existence that does not exist. Dwelling on the obviousness of it all is a silly waste of time. Even Rand got on with it--everything else, but not outside of that context.

"Called subjective by subjectivists." (Brant)

The usual strawman argument. Those who point out the difference between subjective and objective are dismissed as 'subjectivists'. You seem to have accepted Rand's premises without checking them.

"The subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional." (Rand) (“Art and Moral Treason,” The Romantic Manifesto, 150).

Rand is incapable of a sine ira et studio approach to a term. Instead she arbitrarily labels every subjective phenomenon as "irrational", "blindly emotional", in short, as worthless, even damaging.

Why she is doing this becomes clear when you consider her premises.

She needs to justify her Objectivism as the "correct" philosophy.

The opposite of "objective" is "subjective".

No what is easier than to take "subjective" as the 'negative' term in oder to make appear "objective" as 'positive' in a shining light?

An enemy is created the "Subjectivsts". The bad guys, so to spek

The heroes fighting the enemy are the "Objectivists". The good guys, so to speak.

In her magnum opus AS, the good guys triumph over the bad guys after long fight.

Ayn Rand's philospohy is neither sophisticated nor difficult to understand; it is actually based on simple, subjective valuing in black and white.

"Existence exists is merely an axiomatic expression of the most basic axiom of all and the redundancy just tells us that's all there is--that outside existence is nothing at all.

There is no existence that does not exist. Dwelling on the obviousness of it all is a silly waste of time. Even Rand got on with it--everything else, but not outside of that context." (Brant)

But aren't you just ignoring the argument revealing "existence exists" as a meaningless, floating abstraction while repeating the fallacy that has just been refuted?

"Existence exists" is both syntactically and semantically as nonsensical as e. g. "Love loves" or "Hunger hungers".

Imo it is as nonsenseical as "anti-conceptual thinking". For can anyone think of a person (with a normally developed brain) not thinking in concepts?

As for axiom, it is just an idea that is generally believed to be true without assurance as to whether the axiom is true or false.

Per Rand, an axiom is "a statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others, whether any particular speaker chooses to identify it or not. An axiom is a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it."(AR)

But if an axiom identifies the base of knowledge yet is not subject to proof or disproof, then is this not saying that nothing is subject to proof or disproof? What's left except "I believe?"

Edited by Xray
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No what is easier than to take "subjective" as the 'negative' term in oder to make appear "objective" as 'positive' in a shining light?

This is a good example of the pot calling the kettle black. Regarding Xray, what is easier than taking "subjective" as a "positive" term in order to make "objective" appear ridiculous?

However, Xray's grammar and spelling -- three errors in the above sentence, even after editing -- does outshine her "thinking". The following is one such example:

As for axiom, it is just an idea that is generally believed to be true without assurance as to whether the axiom is true or false.

This is obviously dead wrong. For example, compare it to here.

Edited by Merlin Jetton
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Per Rand, an axiom is "a statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others, whether any particular speaker chooses to identify it or not. An axiom is a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it."(AR)

This is something Royce and Korzybski pointed out and while I find Rand's statement rather confusing I believe it refers to something quite similar as this;(emphasis mine)

In concluding the foregoing remarks, I must explain one more general

consideration. This concerns an extremely profound structural psycho-logical

discovery, made by Prof. Royce,1 which underlies any and all semantic problems of

human 'mentality'. Royce, although a 'philosopher', was a lover of mathematics and

was much interested in the problems of order. He was trying to reformulate 'logic'

in terms of order. We had already encountered the inherent circularity in the

structure of human knowledge, which admittedly is semantically disconcerting if not

faced boldly. But, when recognized, this circularity is not only not vicious, but even

adds to the interest and beauty of life and makes science more interesting. Besides,

the structure of human knowledge is such that there are activities of man which are

not only circular but also 'absolute', or 'necessary'. Whatever we do, we cannot get

away from them—a fact of serious semantic importance. Except from Royce and a

few of his students, these problems have as yet received little attention.

Royce shows that there are certain activities which we reinstate and verify

through the very fact of attempting to assume that these forms of activity do not

exist, or that these laws are not valid. If any one attempts to say that there are no

classes whatsoever in his world, he thereby inevitably classifies. If any one denies

the existence of relations, and, in particular, a semantic relation between affirmation

and denial, or affirms that 'yes' and 'no' have one meaning, in that breath he affirms

and denies. He makes a difference between 'yes' and 'no', and emphatically asserts

relational equivalence even in denying the difference between 'yes' and 'no'. To use

Royce's own remarkable words: 'In brief, whatever actions are such, whatever types

of action are such, whatever results of activity, whatever conceptual constructions

are such, that the very act of getting rid of them, or of thinking them away, logically

implies their presence, are known to us indeed both empirically and pragmatically

(since we note their presence and learn of them through action); but they are also

absolute. And any account which succeeds in telling what they are has absolute

truth. Such truth is a "construction"or "creation", for activity determines its nature.

It is "found", for we observe it when we act.'

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If you explicitly reject axioms you'll still have to implicitly accept them or reject that you exist and that reality exists. Then you'll have to affirm what you deny anyway. The rest is insanity. What Xray does at the base is demand the primacy of epistemology and replaces metaphysics with epistemology then spends the rest of her intellectual energy contradicting herself with objective facts and subjective values. She is demanding we abandon our subjective value preferences which we call "objective" and call them "subjective" for no other reason that our unilateral disarmament--literally and figuratively--and throw open the gates of Vienna to those who demand death or conversion.

--Brant

Edited by Brant Gaede
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I say that the expression "existence exists" is confusing and not necessary. I think it is equivalent to saying 'existence' is meaningful or 'existence' has a definite meaning, without having to go into that any further. In other words, let's agree that we know what it means 'to exist' and leave it at that.

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No what is easier than to take "subjective" as the 'negative' term in oder to make appear "objective" as 'positive' in a shining light?

This is a good example of the pot calling the kettle black. Regarding Xray, what is easier than taking "subjective" as a "positive" term in order to make "objective" appear ridiculous?

I haven't seen anyone taking "subjective" as a positive term. But "objective" is certainly used by Objectivists as a positive term, as it suggests that what they think has a universal validity, they can prove it all! As Nathaniel Branden said "The hell you can!" It's trying to borrow the prestige of science with its objective methods to propagate your own subjective morality and values.

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I haven't seen anyone taking "subjective" as a positive term. But "objective" is certainly used by Objectivists as a positive term, as it suggests that what they think has a universal validity, they can prove it all! As Nathaniel Branden said "The hell you can!" It's trying to borrow the prestige of science with its objective methods to propagate your own subjective morality and values.

In science the only thing that can be proved is the incorrectness of an hypothesis. Positives cannot be proved scientifically, negatives sometimes can. I leave it as an exercise to show why.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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I say that the expression "existence exists" is confusing and not necessary. I think it is equivalent to saying 'existence' is meaningful or 'existence' has a definite meaning, without having to go into that any further. In other words, let's agree that we know what it means 'to exist' and leave it at that.

Reasoning off of axiomatic premises is the basis of individualism and the Objectivist ethics and in turn the ideal political structure. It is also the only objective absolutism in Objectivism as there is more to a person than his basic individualism. Man is a social animal, afterall. What that in turn means has hardly been investigated by Objectivist adherents. To say capitalism gives us a certain type of possible social existence only touches on the ideal political structure for an individual. It does not inform all the myriad details of his life.

--Brant

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This is a good example of the pot calling the kettle black. Regarding Xray, what is easier than taking "subjective" as a "positive" term in order to make "objective" appear ridiculous?

You have not understood what it is about. With objective /subjective, there exists no opposition in terms of positive/negative or vice versa.

Not only did Ayn Rand construct a false opposition (objective = positive vs. subjective = negative), she also believed that her personal subjective values were objective - another fallacy.

However, Xray's grammar and spelling -- three errors in the above sentence, even after editing -- does outshine her "thinking".

I'm no native speaker and admittedly sloppy in my typing and correcting, but if you are so keen on studying errors in syntax/semantics, then how about taking a look at Rand's "Existence exists" and tell me whether that is correct?

Translated into German, it is "Die Existenz existiert". Sounds as absurd.

Per Rand, an axiom is "a statement that identifies the base of knowledge"

Could you give an example of a statement that identifies the base of knowledge?

(P.S. no guarantee as always for overlooked typos on my part. ;))

Edited by Xray
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To say capitalism gives us a certain type of possible social existence only touches on the ideal political structure for an individual.

This is an example where one's subjectively preferred ideologoy is presented as "ideal political structure" (for all).

The reason why it is so difficult to identify the notion of objective value as fallacy lies in the fact that the illusion of objective value is being indoctrinated in humans from the cradle on. (Religious doctrine, "belief" in certain political systems, "objective morality" etc.

Edited by Xray
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You have not understood what it is about. With objective /subjective, there exists no opposition in terms of positive/negative or vice versa.

Not only did Ayn Rand construct a false opposition (objective = positive vs. subjective = negative), she also believed that her personal subjective values were objective - another fallacy.

Ayn Rand made no such opposition; you did. If you believe she did, then prove it. Cite her own words and where she explicitly made such an opposition.

Per Rand, an axiom is "a statement that identifies the base of knowledge"

Could you give an example of a statement that identifies the base of knowledge?

Yes, after you show me that you know what an axiom is and admit to me that your description of axiom in post #10 is dead wrong.

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You have not understood what it is about. With objective /subjective, there exists no opposition in terms of positive/negative or vice versa.

Not only did Ayn Rand construct a false opposition (objective = positive vs. subjective = negative), she also believed that her personal subjective values were objective - another fallacy.

Ayn Rand made no such opposition; you did. If you believe she did, then prove it. Cite her own words and where she explicitly made such an opposition.

Of course she made this opposition. I'm surprised that you don't seem to remember her own words listed in my # 10 post (a post which you have read since you quoted from it).

So to refresh your memory, (in bold type this time):

"The subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional." ("Art and Moral Treason", The Romantic Manifesto, p. 150)." (Ayn Rand)

Xray: Per Rand, an axiom is "a statement that identifies the base of knowledge". Could you give an example of a statement that identifies the base of knowledge?

Merlin: Yes, after you show me that you know what an axiom is and admit to me that your description of axiom in post # 10 is dead wrong.

It was your claim that my description was wrong. Merely linking to Wikipedia articles offering a plethora of stuff on axioms does not do your job of pointing out alleged error and explaining why you think it is an error.

Edited by Xray
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"The subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional." ("Art and Moral Treason", The Romantic Manifesto, p. 150)." (Ayn Rand)

You attempt fails. The quote does not contain "positive", "negative", or "objective". Your opposition is merely another example of your barrage of distortions of what Rand said. Your opposition is not based on fact, but merely your subjectivism showing.

It was your claim that my description was wrong. Merely linking to Wikipedia articles offering a plethora of stuff on axioms does not do your job of pointing out alleged error and explaining why you think it is an error.

The first paragraph at Wikipedia suffices to show your description is obviously wrong.

In traditional logic, an axiom or postulate is a proposition that is not proved or demonstrated but considered to be either self-evident, or subject to necessary decision. Therefore, its truth is taken for granted, and serves as a starting point for deducing and inferring other (theory dependent) truths.
As for axiom, it is just an idea that is generally believed to be true without assurance as to whether the axiom is true or false.

Your assertion is wrong in several ways:

1. 'just an idea' vs. proposition

2. 'generally believed' vs. self-evident

3. 'generally believed' vs. 'taken for granted'

4. 'without assurance' vs. self-evident

5. 'without assurance' vs. 'taken for granted'

6. It says nothing about being a starting point for deducing and inferring other truths.

7. It says nothing about logic.

"Existence exists" is both syntactically and semantically as nonsensical as e. g. "Love loves" or "Hunger hungers".

It is your analogy that is nonsense. The analogs are "a lover loves" and "a hungry person hungers".

In my opinion "Existence exists" is equivalent to Parmenides' "What is, is."

So what is true necessarily or self-evidently, so that one cannot deny it without falling into logical contradiction? The most basic, necessary or self-evident truth from which Parmenides deduces other, corollary truths is that "It is" (estin). What he means by "It is" is that "What is, is," which is an application of the what philosophers call the principle of identity: something is what it is. (source)
Edited by Merlin Jetton
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"Existence exists" is both syntactically and semantically as nonsensical as e. g. "Love loves" or "Hunger hungers".

It is your analogy that is nonsense. The analogs are "a lover loves" and "a hungry person hungers".

No, because 'lover' and 'person' are refer to finite entities, as as opposed to "existence", which is merely the noun form of the verb "to exist". Like (a) value is the noun form of "to value".

In my opinion "Existence exists" is equivalent to Parmenides' "What is, is."

Yes I suppose that's how Rand meant it. As a tautology (or is it a pleonasm here?), but chose a strange grammar form to express it.

Imo it would have have been far clearer if she had simply stated "What exists, exists".

Edited by Xray
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"Existence" is the conceptual whole of all that exists. All that actually exists is only in all the particulars. In that sense "man" exists conceptually but only men (AND WOMEN!!) in metaphysical actuality. As an epistemologist it seems strange Xray would wage this war against concepts by metaphysical references. In any case I don't think it is important for I don't think she's going to say existence doesn't exist. Is she?sad.gif

--Brant

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No, because 'lover' and 'person' are refer to finite entities, as as opposed to "existence", which is merely the noun form of the verb "to exist". Like (a) value is the noun form of "to value".

I don't buy it. In my opinion "existence" is equivalent to "all existents." So "existence exists" is analogous to "all lovers love".

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