Branden vs. Peikoff on Forgiveness


Dennis Hardin

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Nathaniel Branden and Leonard Peikoff on the topic of Forgiveness:

Let's suppose a person has done something that he or she knows to be wrong, immoral, unjust, or unreasonable: instead of acknowledging the wrong, instead of simply regretting the action and then seeking, compassionately, to understand why the action was taken and asking where was I coming from? and what need was I trying in my own twisted way to satisfy? — instead of asking such questions, the person is encouraged to brand the behavior as evil and is given no useful advice on where to go from there. You don't teach people to be moral by teaching them self-contempt as a virtue.

. . .Errors of knowledge may be forgiven, [Rand] says, but not errors of morality. Even if what people are doing is wrong, even if errors of morality are involved, even if what people are doing is irrational, you do not lead people to virtue by contempt. You do not make people better by telling them they are despicable. It just doesn't work. It doesn't work when religion tries it and it doesn't work when objectivism tries it.

The great, glaring gap in just about all ethical systems of which I have knowledge, even when many of the particular values and virtues they advocate may be laudable, is the absence of a technology to assist people in getting there, an effective means for acquiring these values and virtues, a realistic path people can follow. That is the great missing step in most religions and philosophies. And this is where psychology comes in: One of the tasks of psychology is to provide a technology for facilitating the process of becoming a rational, moral human being.

You can tell people that it's a virtue to be rational, productive, or just, but, if they have not already arrived at that stage of awareness and development on their own, objectivism does not tell them how to get there. It does tell you you're rotten if you fail to get there.

Benefits and Hazards of the Philosophy of Ayn Rand

And then there is Peikoff. . .

Question: What does it it mean to forgive, and how does one get there?

I looked up “forgiving” in the dictionary and here is what it says: to grant free pardon for an offense. In other words, someone did something wrong, and you take the attitude that well, it's in the past, I have no negative feelings. As far as I am concerned, morally it didn't happen. I certainly think that for lesser things, this is possible. As long as it doesn't imply something evil in the person and it's not something major. For example, someone told me a secret and I inadvertently told the wrong person. The person was annoyed but they let it go. They decided it wasn't deliberate. It wasn’t a major thing and the person didn't think I was evil. So I asked the person if they would forgive me and they said yes.

But if we are talking about a big event and especially something that involves evil, then to forgive is to give a license to evil. The idea of forgiving your enemy is possible only if you want to sacrifice your values. If you think life is worth throwing away, which is what the Christians did when they started preaching that. One of the worst evils of Christianity is this idea of forgive your enemy. To turn the other cheek is a license to corruption. It makes a virtue of sanctioning evil. You can't have a more corrupt morality than that. That's what I think about the Sermon on the Mount. It amounts to: don't judge evil and don't protest what it does to the good. You can't beat that for moral corruption. The Bible has more things in it that are more corrupt than just about anything else. Or as corrupt for sure as anywhere else.

Some might argue that it is wrong to deal with other people as if one is a psychologist, and therefore Peikoff’s position is correct. It is not your place to teach people how to be moral. There is some validity to that position, at least in the context of people you don’t care about. But look again at the question that was posed: What does it it mean to forgive, and how does one get there? The questioner obviously wants to know if there is a way for a person to earn forgiveness. Branden says yes—if you care about the person, you try to understand where they were coming from, and then help them to see that what they did was immoral, because very often they do not see it.

You do not have to be a psychologist to show someone you care about why what they did was wrong, and then give them a chance to earn redemption by correcting their behavior.

Peikoff’s answer to the question “how does one do it?” is that you don’t. He clearly implies that, when it comes to evil, there is no such thing as forgiveness or redemption. To forgive is to sanction and encourage corruption. Banish the person to social Siberia. Period. End of story.

Then Peikoff wonders why more people don’t flock to the Objectivist cause, and blames “tolerationists” like Branden for subverting the concept of objective moral judgment.

Could there be a more vivid way of illustrating the stark contrast between "open" and "closed" Objectivism?

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The issue of forgiveness is a complicated one.

Branden is right about something; Objectivism in its current state doesn't necessarily have much in the way of a psychological technology to promote self-development. It doesn't spend too much time discussing how to acquire and improve morality.

This actually plugs into one of the things I dislike about Rand's heroes; you never see how they acquired their character traits. Objectivism may support Tablula Rasa, but Roark especially gives off "born this way" vibes; that he just was innately individualist.

This does give a very strong impression (especially given Rand's passionate moral rhetoric) that these heroes are the ideal, and you must be some rotten collectivist with a sewer-for-a-soul if you fail to be exactly like them.

Let me be clear; the content of Objectivism does not endorse this conclusion (I actually think the philosophy strongly disagrees with this conclusion), but the style with which Rand delivered her philosophy (her rhetoric as well as her writing) can strongly lead someone to think that Objectivism leads to it.

This creates a severe problem when we look at the intellectual context of the current Western culture. The most influential moral philosophy in Western culture has been, undoubtedly, Christianity. The Christian narrative forms the basic framework by which the majority of people view moral problems.

And what is the centerpiece of this framework?

Forgiveness and redemption for various transgressions.

Speaking from a purely philosophical angle, I don't believe that forgiveness and redemption are primary issues of moral philosophy. For an issue to be primary, it must be a response to a core fact about the human condition. If forgiveness and redemption are primary issues of moral philosophy, this means that "we are sinners" has to be a primary fact about the human condition. Since I reject original sin/the fall of man or any other variety of "frailty and failure are the centerpiece of the human condition," then I don't see forgiveness and redemption as important philosophical issues.

Because Objectivist morality (properly understood) is based on affirming rather than denying human nature, it sees success and flourishing (the product of virtue) as natural. Failure/frailty/patheticness isn't man's natural state but rather an aberration... success/strength/worthiness is the centerpiece of the human condition, the most authentically human experience.

But that's from a purely philosophical perspective, and unfortunately we live in a civilization where most people's moral framework still comes from the Christian tradition. And, even more unfortunately, many people seem to approach Objectivist morality as if it were an analog of Christian morality.

Think about it... Christian morality begins by giving you a person (Jesus) as a Platonic ideal, and damning you for not being able to live up to it, and then demanding confession and similar rituals to ensure correct orthodoxy.

From what I know, if you substitute "Jesus" with either "John Galt" or "Ayn Rand," the above sentence would be a pretty accurate description of the cultlike subgroups of the Objectivist movement, including the NBI days as well.

I do think that Objectivism does need to focus on creating some sort of psychological techology that would enable moral self-development. But is the issue of forgiveness really something that needs to be focused on?

Whilst I do believe the issue should be discussed, I don't think it should be a primary focus. Instead, I think the primary focus needs to be on thoroughly uprooting any remnants of Christian-esque thought patterns amongst Objectivists. We Objectivists quite correctly claim that our philosophy spits in the face of multiple millennia of moral thought; we would do well to remember that old habits die hard. Most people, when they think of morality, see it in terms of servitude, sacrifice, punishment, confessing their own unworthiness, atonement and redemption. As such, for them, forgiveness is a core moral issue.

An Objectivist discussion of forgiveness will certainly help people that still have Christian-esque memes floating around in their head. Or at the very least make the philosophy more palatable for someone learning about it for the first time.

But in some respects, this may be treating the symptom rather than the underlying disease. Instead of teaching people how to temporarily relieve guilt, shouldn't we tell them that by Objectivist standards they (most likely) have nothing to be guilty of? Finding out one was always innocent is far better than absolution.

But this would not work for those people that have, in fact, committed acts that would be transgressions under Objectivist morality. And when dealing with those people, a discussion of forgiveness is certainly something Objectivists need to have.

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Some might argue that it is wrong to deal with other people as if one is a psychologist, and therefore Peikoff’s position is correct. It is not your place to teach people how to be moral. There is some validity to that position, at least in the context of people you don’t care about. But look again at the question that was posed: What does it it mean to forgive, and how does one get there? The questioner obviously wants to know if there is a way for a person to earn forgiveness. Branden says yes—if you care about the person, you try to understand where they were coming from, and then help them to see that what they did was immoral, because very often they do not see it.

You do not have to be a psychologist to show someone you care about why what they did was wrong, and then give them a chance to earn redemption by correcting their behavior.

Peikoff’s answer to the question “how does one do it?” is that you don’t. He clearly implies that, when it comes to evil, there is no such thing as forgiveness or redemption. To forgive is to sanction and encourage corruption. Banish the person to social Siberia. Period. End of story.

Then Peikoff wonders why more people don’t flock to the Objectivist cause, and blames “tolerationists” like Branden for subverting the concept of objective moral judgment.

Could there be a more vivid way of illustrating the stark contrast between "open" and "closed" Objectivism?

I wouldn't jump to such a conclusion based on the quotes. Consider a felony. For that I much prefer the Peikoff quote.

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The Branden and Peikoff quotes may not be so incompatible as they appear at first. You'll notice that Branden does not use the word "forgive" except in a quote from Rand. He's asking: what do you do to change course after you've acknowledged the wrongness of some act or habit? On a generous interpretation of Peikoff, we can take him to be saying that we should always acknowledge that a past act was wrong. I can imagine saying (or thinking), yes, you were wrong to commit robberies, but now you that you've put it behind you I can judge you as you are, not as you were.

Whatever the technology may turn out to be, I should think it would require acknowledging the evils in one's past,giving them up and not deceiving oneself about this; I think they'd agree on this.

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Andrew, thanks for your reflections in #2. Concerning your third paragraph, I wanted to nod, but would like to add that in my most recent reading of Fountainhead, a couple of years ago, I found that Roark is much more complex and sensitive than our typical memories of him. He was actually the most fully self-aware character. He was also quite sensitive to the mixed characters of his friend Gail and his friendly acquaintance Peter, and to the souls of Mallory and Dominique.

Rand has Roark commit a minor moral error repeatedly. He finally realizes his mistake and fesses up to himself and to Peter that he is now in a fix that brings a punishment to him for that root error. That error was his helping Peter by doing work for him and letting Peter take the credit. Roark is finally reformed in that respect. Not only that. He is redeemed, and he is held up as morally perfect. I don’t think this is just an inconsistency on Rand’s part. It is something about her conception of the psyche (and moral character) that simply has not been drawn out by her or by expositors of her philosophy, so far as I know.

Dennis, good topic. I wanted to add that Peikoff expresses more thoughts about forgiveness in his ’76 lectures The Philosophy of Objectivism, which make it into OPAR on page 89. Branden’s views on forgiveness in the ’60’s lectures Basic Principles of Objectivism are on pages 195, 218, 285-286, 295-296, 298, 326, 403, 427, 473, 491, 498-500, 547 of Vision.

But I also wanted to ask you a question. Do you think it is possible, sensible, and beneficial to oneself to silently forgive someone for a wrong they did to you, even though they do not think what they did was wrong? It has not seemed possible to me, though I gather some religions promote such a thing. Actually, come to think of it, I did once forgive someone for a hurt, maybe not a wrong morally. But it was when she had died. It was totally spontaneous, totally without prior reflection. I was the first to pass by her coffin after the service. I looked into her face, and surprise: I forgave her. I kissed her forehead, and that was all over.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

PS

Peter, concerning #12, below, we're square.

~~~~

I have noticed that the kind of restoration that comes to Roark suggests a dynamic conception of moral perfection, one that parallels the concept of health. Sometimes loss of health is temporary, sometimes not. Rand would have been familiar with that parallel from Plato, at least, when writing Fountainhead (cf.).

~~~~

Some Rand:

PLAYBOY: The heroine of Atlas Shrugged was, in your words, "completely incapable of experiencing a feeling of fundamental guilt." Is any system of morality possible without guilt?

RAND: The important word in the statement you quoted is "fundamental." Fundamental guilt does not mean the ability to judge one's own actions and regret a wrong action, if one commits it. Fundamental guilt means that man is evil and guilty by nature.

PLAYBOY: You mean original sin?

RAND: Exactly. It is the concept of original sin that my heroine, or I, or any Objectivist, is incapable of accepting or of ever experiencing emotionally. It is the concept of original sin that negates morality. If man is guilty by nature, he has no choice about it. If he has no choice, the issue does not belong in the field of morality. Morality pertains only to the sphere of man's free will -- only to those actions which are open to his choice. To consider man guilty by nature is a contradiction in terms. My heroine would be capable of experiencing guilt about a specific action. Only, being a woman of high moral stature and self-esteem, she would see to it that she never earned any guilt by her actions. She would act in a totally moral manner and, therefore, would not accept an unearned guilt.

. . .

The virtue pride corresponds with the value self-esteem, corresponds as necessary means to end (OE 25). Pride is the process of achieving self-esteem by thinking for oneself (AS 1057), by "unbreached rationality" (AS 1059), "by never accepting any code of irrational virtues impossible to practice and by never failing to practice the virtues one knows to be rational—by never accepting an unearned guilt and never earning any, or, if one has earned it, never leaving it uncorrected" (OE 27).

. . .

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This thread is in the realm of cartoon philosophy, so I will try my hand at The Elbonian code of conduct. Principles matter – pass moral judgment, yet, don’t always express your contempt out loud. Live and let live, as concerns unintended consequences, unless it is a relative, then think long term. A fox never smells his own den so don’t think others don’t smell your silent farts. Karma, as a concept is mumbo jumbo but payback emanates from your good and bad deeds. So, do good deeds to increase your chances of being the recipient of good deeds. This thread makes me also think of that Robert Frost quote: “Home is where when you have to go there, they have to let you in.”

Peter Taylor

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<...>

. . .Errors of knowledge may be forgiven, [Rand] says, but not errors of morality. Even if what people are doing is wrong, even if errors of morality are involved, even if what people are doing is irrational, you do not lead people to virtue by contempt. You do not make people better by telling them they are despicable. It just doesn't work. It doesn't work when religion tries it and it doesn't work when objectivism tries it.

http://www.nathaniel.../ayn/ayn03.html

And wouldn't the rule (I'm almost tempted to say 'commandment') that errors of morality may not be forgiven also contradict the idea of individualism?

Suppose someone holds the position: "No one can prescribe to me what kind of errors I may forgive or not, since this goes against the idea of individualism." (?)

Also problematic in this context is the term "error". "Errors of morality" may not be forgiven, Rand says. But can't all errors be traced back to a lack of knowledge? Since we humans are fallible beings, committing all kinds of errors is part of the conditio humana.

And what about forgiving oneself? Not being allowed to forgive oneself on any "error of morality" - doesn't this open the path to a guilt-ridden existence?

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Andrew, thanks for your reflections in #2. Concerning your third paragraph, I wanted to nod, but would like to add that in my most recent reading of Fountainhead, a couple of years ago, I found that Roark is much more complex and sensitive than our typical memories of him. He was actually the most fully self-aware character. He was also quite sensitive to the mixed characters of his friend Gail and his friendly acquaintance Peter, and to the souls of Mallory and Dominique.

Rand has Roark commit a minor moral error repeatedly. He finally realizes his mistake and fesses up to himself and to Peter that he is now in a fix that brings a punishment to him for that root error. That error was his helping Peter by doing work for him and letting Peter take the credit. Roark is finally reformed in that respect. Not only that. He is redeemed, and he is held up as morally perfect. I don’t think this is just an inconsistency on Rand’s part. It is something about her conception of the psyche (and moral character) that simply has not been drawn out by her or by expositors of her philosophy, so far as I know.

Dennis, good topic. I wanted to add that Peikoff expresses more thoughts about forgiveness in his ’76 lectures The Philosophy of Objectivism, which make it into OPAR on page 89. Branden’s views on forgiveness in the ’60’s lectures Basic Principles of Objectivism are on pages 195, 218, 285-286, 295-296, 298, 326, 403, 427, 473, 491, 498-500, 547 of Vision.

But I also wanted to ask you a question. Do you think it is possible, sensible, and beneficial to oneself to silently forgive someone for a wrong they did to you, even though they do not think what they did was wrong? It has not seemed possible to me, though I gather some religions promote such a thing. Actually, come to think of it, I did once forgive someone for a hurt, maybe not a wrong morally. But it was when she had died. It was totally spontaneous, totally without prior reflection. I was the first to pass by her coffin after the service. I looked into her face, and surprise: I forgave her. I kissed her forehead, and that was all over.

Interesting thoughts on Roark, and one of the reasons he has always been--by far--my favorite Rand hero.

I actually think there is a connection to Shakespeare in the point you make, something about the role of introspection as described by Harold Bloom, but I fear I lack the chops to make the connection make any sense to others at the present time.

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I'm going to go out on a limb here, but bear with me. I think the people who resist a knee-jerk will be rewarded. Maybe not agree with me, but this topic does need to be thought through carefully for anyone who wants to be at peace with himself.

I hold to the triune brain concept as an oversimplified but extremely useful model. This means (1) the reptilian brain, which basically makes you move toward or away from something, (2) the mid-brain (or neomammalian brain) which deals with emotions, especially social ones, and (3) the neocortex, which deals with all forms of cognition, language, math, etc.

Interconnected with all three is the prefrontal neocortex, which is where our basic awareness, volition and willpower are processed. This is where we do our rational thinking. But it consumes an inordinate quantity of glucose (compared to the rest of the body) and tires at times just like every other organic thing in the universe.

This means that all three brains in the triune brain model are mostly working in unconscious mode--outside of our immediate awareness. Since our immediate awareness can go on the blink, the implication is that there are times when the brain will run 100% on autopilot, even when we are awake.

I hold that, during these times, we tend to do things that are at odds with our stated reason-chosen morality--especially when our chosen values get too confining for the rest of the brain to grok.

A good book that discusses cognitive biases in a highly entertaining way for the general public, for instance, is You Are Not So Smart by David McRaney. Here is his blog if you want a taste of how he presents a few. (I don't agree with some of his conclusions, but most of them are perfectly aligned with the neuroscience and psychology I have been reading elsewhere.)

I believe if you make the tragic mistake of trying to take full responsibility in a "rational morality"-like manner for the way your unconscious works, you are in for one hell of an unending guilt trip and depression. And if you do not see this in others, at least to some extent, you become an overly-judgmental asshole who is mostly unfair. What's worse, you become inaccurate in your judgments.

This is where I believe forgiveness comes in. When you know (in full awareness) you've done something wrong and you realize you were not fully aware when you did it, although you were partially aware, you can work on fixing it. But you need to have a process by which you don't fall into paralyzing guilt.

Enter forgiveness.

Before I continue, here is what I mean by "not fully aware." Our minds get hijacked into trances a gazillion times a day. We are only aware of one after we come out of it, not before and not during. Most of this is for really small times (like with fleeting thoughts or images), but sometimes it is for longer spans.

Here is an example of the longest--going to sleep. If you held a button and had to push it right at the moment you fall asleep, could you? Of course not. But you know you were asleep when you wake up.

How about when you get engrossed in a movie or TV show? Can you push that button right at the moment when you "enter" the world of the story? Nope once again. Or how about listening to a lecture and going off on a daydream? Can you push the button the moment the daydream starts? Nope. Your awareness is hijacked at these moments and you only know it once you come out of it.

How many times have you done something awful and then wondered, "What the hell was I thinking? I've got to do something about that." I don't know anyone who has not had this experience, and had it often I might add.

I fully believe that morality exists precisely because of this "Achilles heel" of the mind (to use Blair Warren's expression--he's the guy I first got this notion from) and our cognitive biases. Morality allows us not only to act according to a chosen code of values, it allows us to correct and train our minds so we can form good subconscious habits.

But this training is like any other skill. Just because you become a master at, say, playing the piano, this does not exempt you from weariness, flubbing on occasion or being distracted by something more enticing. (This last really gets a master pissed off at himself.)

Ditto for a rationally chosen moral code.

You can train your mind by choice and practice to adhere to a rational code, even when your mind's natural unconscious biases goes in a different direction. But sometimes you just mess up. That's in the nature of learning skills. However, the more you practice in full focus, the better you get.

Notice that I don't call this state of the mind "original sin" or a defect. There are evolutionary speculations (and others) about why cognitive biases exist, but I will leave that to another discussion. The fact is that they are in place for good reasons that work in very limited contexts, but don't work elsewhere. When an automatic biased urge surges in a context where it does not work, you often get mighty intense temptation. If your awareness or willpower are exhausted at that moment, you get transgression.

Now to forgiveness. When a person has chosen to be a good-guy, but acts like a bad-guy, then realizes the crap he has done and tries to fix it, this, to me, is a prime candidate for forgiveness and atonement. He needs to let go of feelings about the bad act--even when it looks like he did it on purpose to some extent against his chosen morals--and move on. Otherwise he will sabotage his awareness with guilt and garbage he can't do anything about. This will keep his rational awareness and volition from working to avoid repeating the lapse.

If a person has no conscious intention of fixing something wrong he did, though, this person is a jerk and does not deserve forgiveness.

(I don't want to discuss how forgiveness works with punishment right here except to say that you often have to have some kind of punishment as atonement. But then it's over for the dude who is honestly correcting himself. He settled the account, so to speak. So shunning him, condemning him as evil and all that other judgmental stuff is not fair according to my standard.)

Since value judgments involve emotions, and both condemnation and forgiveness are value judgments, it is equally good for the forgiver as for the forgiven when it happens in the manner I said and you just move on. When you forgive someone, you let go of the resentment and bitterness that come with condemnation. Resentment can eat you alive. It can give you ulcers, make you lose sleep and all kinds of bad things. When it finally turns into unbalanced hatred, I suspect it turns into cancer and other serious diseases.

And here is a trap. Often, when you treat someone badly who is truly trying to get better, you know underneath that you are not being one of the good guys--that you are being an asshole. You just know it even as you tell yourself you are practicing justice. And this makes you feel guilty. Refusing to forgive that person makes you--the wronged person--feel guilty even though you were the victim. Maybe it shouldn't according to a rational morality, but that's the way our minds work.

Nobody who is a good guy gets satisfaction out of punishing another good guy. We have mirror neurons and they will not stop working just because we think they shouldn't.

A sense of fairness (which, believe it or not, shows up on fMRI scans of the limbic system) allows us to feel OK when punishing a bad guy. Now this is true justice on an emotional level. I'm speculating, but on the other end, I believe you would actually feel guilty if you forgave a bad guy who has no intention on getting better.

And this leads to self-forgiveness. If you know you screwed up morally, the healthiest attitude you can possibly adopt is to forgive yourself, make some kind of atonement and demand of yourself not to do that again. Just let go of the guilt. You can literally think, "That was my brain being an asshole again." :smile:

This is not a cop-put for appeasing wrongdoing, especially repeat offenders. If you can't get better and you are truly trying, maybe you're addressing the wrong problem. And who knows? Maybe you are lying to yourself.

Obviously there are a lot of contexts we encounter, so my idea is not a rigid rule to apply to all situations sight unseen. There are countless complicated borderline situations I can imagine just sitting here and typing where some serious thinking needs to be done.

The thing is, which should predominate in judging bad actions, psychology (including neuroscience) or morality? Understanding or punishment? Another chance or condemnation? I claim you have to weigh both seriously and the context and nature of the people involved will dictate what is appropriate.

I said at the start that I was going to go out on a limb. That's for another post and it refers to a method I believe bears looking at.

But I have an aside first. For those who consider turning the other cheek to mean one thing only--moral disarmament, I suggest reading Jay Haley or Donald Capps on the power tactics of Jesus. Turning the other cheek is the only effective alternative you've got if you still want to win when you are outgunned (like Jesus was in the society he lived in). You shame your attacker into giving up. (Even wolves do it.) Of course, this only works some of the time, not all of the time. :smile:

Michael

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Andrew, thanks for your reflections in #2.

My pleasure. Glad you enjoyed them.

Concerning your third paragraph, I wanted to nod, but would like to add that in my most recent reading of Fountainhead, a couple of years ago, I found that Roark is much more complex and sensitive than our typical memories of him. He was actually the most fully self-aware character. He was also quite sensitive to the mixed characters of his friend Gail and his friendly acquaintance Peter, and to the souls of Mallory and Dominique.

Rand has Roark commit a minor moral error repeatedly. He finally realizes his mistake and fesses up to himself and to Peter that he is now in a fix that brings a punishment to him for that root error. That error was his helping Peter by doing work for him and letting Peter take the credit. Roark is finally reformed in that respect. Not only that. He is redeemed, and he is held up as morally perfect. I don’t think this is just an inconsistency on Rand’s part. It is something about her conception of the psyche (and moral character) that simply has not been drawn out by her or by expositors of her philosophy, so far as I know.

I haven't re-read Fountainhead in a while. I think the point you make (Roark letting himself be exploited) is interesting, especially since the same flaw is obviously present in Dagny Taggart (who Rand described as a gender-flip of Roark) and Rand goes on about the flaw in The Speech.

That said, I've always thought that there was a risk in reading Rand's fiction too literally for philosophical clarification; her writing style tends towards idealization and the like. Plus, I suspect she hadn't fully developed all the technical aspects of her thought at the time she wrote The Fountainhead. Actually, I suspect she hadn't fully developed all the technical stuff even as she was writing Atlas Shrugged.

You're right that Roark isn't insensitive or emotionless. What I was trying to point out in my reflections is that we never see any process by which he acquired his basic temperment and principles. Speaking from experience, people with similar temperments to Roark typically acquire them through a particularly confrontational, painful process of individuation against a hostile social backdrop (I think this was true of Rand herself too).

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There is some real fine cogitating going on in this thread. I hope to return to the topic, but here are my own Coatesian cogitations, following closely on previously noted points, addressing Stephen and StudioD mostly with my questions here.

Are the two men speaking of the same thing? Moreover, are the two giving advice to a judge, prosecutor, victim or malefactor?

Peikoff cites a dictionary, Branden supplies the context.

  • LP: I looked up “forgiving” in the dictionary and here is what it says: to grant free pardon for an offense.

  • NB: Let's suppose a person has done something that he or she knows to be wrong, immoral, unjust, or unreasonable: instead of acknowledging the wrong, instead of simply regretting the action and then seeking, compassionately, to understand why the action was taken and asking where was I coming from? and what need was I trying in my own twisted way to satisfy? — instead of asking such questions, the person is encouraged to brand the behavior as evil and is given no useful advice on where to go from there.

I referred to Dictionary.com and Merriam-Webster online. Each gave a strangely different take.

FORGIVING

  • LP: to grant free pardon for an offense
  • MW: willing or able to forgive; allowing room for error or weakness <designed to be a forgiving tennis racquet>; eg, a person with a forgiving nature; First Known Use 1623
  • Dict: disposed to forgive; indicating forgiveness. eg, a forgiving soul; a forgiving smile. | tolerant; eg. The mountain is not forgiving of inexperienced climbers.

Peikoff most likely looked up forgive, not forgiving the adjective, which means tending to forgive.

FORGIVE

  • MW: stop feeling angry or resentful toward (someone) for an offense, flaw, or mistake, other synonyms for remit -
  • Dict: grant pardon for or remission of (an offense, debt, etc.); absolve | to give up all claim on account of; remit (a debt, obligation, etc.) | to grant pardon to (a person) | to cease to feel resentment against: to forgive one's enemies | to cancel an indebtedness or liability of, eg, to forgive the interest owed on a loan | to pardon an offense or an offender | to cease to feel resentment against (an offender) : pardon <forgive one's enemies>

Peikoff seems seized of the verb Forgive as simply pardon, a forgiveness granted only by an injured party. His operating connotation includes in its remit the sometime synonyms Excuse - - Absolve ... if not Condone

Contrasting statements of Peikoff and Branden highlight the non-intersecting arguments, examples and conclusions. They have not identified a common problem. Where their words do intersect, as at Evul, the two seem to be traveling in different directions and considering two different edges of a larger moral problem I would call accuracy in judgement. Yes, a rational/moral calculation.

I see a problem here in identification, and a Peikoff giving reliance to a default classification of Evul a classification that must extend to the personal realm, although not mentioned even in passing: self-forgiveness. It could be that Peikoff fails to consider the 'action of grace' by which we forgive ourselves and lessen personal distress, or that his moral axe falls only in from a judge's perspective, never as a defendant (this to my eyes is a dangerous self-deception. One ought include the perspective of self to fully render a social/moral problem).

Here I alternate Branden and Peikoff to show more sharply how their interests in judgement and forgiveness contrast.

  • NB: You don't teach people to be moral by teaching them self-contempt as a virtue.
  • LP: someone did something wrong, and you take the attitude that well, it's in the past, I have no negative feelings, morally it didn't happen. This is possible. As long as it doesn't imply something evil in the person and it's not something major.
  • NB: . .Errors of knowledge may be forgiven, [Rand] says, but not errors of morality. Even if what people are doing is wrong, even if errors of morality are involved, even if what people are doing is irrational, you do not lead people to virtue by contempt.
  • LP: Eg, Bob told me a secret and I inadvertently told Harry. Bob was annoyed but he let it go. He decided it wasn't deliberate. It wasn’t , not a major thing and Bob didn't think I was evil. So I asked Bob if him would forgive me and he said yes.
  • NB: You do not make people better by telling them they are despicable. It just doesn't work.
  • LP: But ... something that involves evil, then to forgive is to give a license to evil.
  • NB: The great, glaring gap ... is the absence of a technology to assist people in getting there, an effective means for acquiring these values and virtues, a realistic path people can follow.
  • LP: The idea of forgiving your enemy is possible only if you want to sacrifice your values.
  • NB: One of the tasks of psychology is to provide a technology for facilitating the process of becoming a rational, moral human being.
  • LP: If you think life is worth throwing away, which is what the Christians did when they started preaching that.
  • NB: [Objectivism] does tell you you're rotten if you fail to get there.
  • LP: One of the worst evils of Christianity is this idea of forgive your enemy. To turn the other cheek is a license to corruption. It makes a virtue of sanctioning evil. You can't have a more corrupt morality than that.

In examples of forgiving and non-forgiving, the gulf is broad. Branden's example is singular, a man (perhaps himself, perhaps an objective-ish Everyman, every human who has failed, self-deceived, falled short of moral perfection. What can this human do for himself, Branden seems to be asking.

Peikoff's examples are sorted into one offence of spilling a small secret, and asking forgiveness for this wrong action. Not a hint of immorality or breach is given. In the other examples the dial turns hard to maximum evil, evil so evil it does not even need to be fully described.

Branden says it is too easy to label oneself a moral failure or as Evul, wheras Peikoff seems to enjoy slapping the label on others.

Now, if we consider the personal ramifications, if we read over their conversation above and consider that each is speaking to the other about Branden's deception of Ayn Rand or his efforts after redemption. ...

... or if we consider a Branden pleading with a Peikoff to do no more damage to young students of Objectivism (like McCaskey?) or to open up fresh Objectivish psychological investigations.

In my reading of Branden is always the break with Rand, and with Peikoff, too, this central betrayal. One day this will mean less unto vanishing and we will compare and contrast what they said in the context of their lives.

But, me, I am a Big Tenter.

What does it it mean to forgive, and how does one get there?
to grant free pardon for an offense
?

Edited by william.scherk
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I apologize to Stephen Boydstun. My last letter was crass following his heartfelt missive.

Studiodecadent wrote:

Speaking from experience, people with similar temperaments to Roark typically acquire them through a particularly confrontational, painful process of individuation against a hostile social backdrop (I think this was true of Rand herself too).

end quote

Very insightful. I have speculated that Howard’s driven behavior might be diagnosed in a “savant” fashion by psychiatrists. I liked Gary Cooper’s acting as he ‘settled’ into the role in a positive way until he owned it. Someone once said Howard seemed like a highly intelligent person who was raised by a withdrawn, slightly supportive mother and a drunken father. I am not sure of that though I would like to hear someone with a psychological background discuss it. I know Our Barbara of the Holy Grail has touched upon the subject of “psychologically being like Howard Roark and John Galt,” and of course, Nathaniel Branden has written about the benefits and hazards of being an Objectivist.

As an aside, William Sherk Biblically wrote:

In my reading of Branden is always the break with Rand, and with Peikoff, too, this central betrayal. One day this will mean less unto vanishing and we will compare and contrast what they said in the context of their lives.

end quote

When I was in Korea, with the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Seventh Infantry Division Artillery I visited Camp Saint Barbara, named after the lovely lady mentioned below from The Female Catholic Saints site. How apropos.

Patron U.S. Army Field Artillery

Barbara lived in the 4th century and brought up as a heathen. A tyrannical father, Dioscorus, had kept her jealously secluded in a lonely tower which he had built for that purpose. Here, in her forced solitude, she gave herself to prayer and study, and contrived to receive instruction and Baptism in secret by a Christian priest.

Barbara resisted her father's wish that she marry. Then on one occasion, during her father's absence, Barbara had three windows inserted into a bathhouse her father was constructing. Her purpose was thereby to honor the Trinity.

Dioscorus was enraged by her action and by her conversion. So he himself denounced her before the civil tribunal. She was horribly tortured, and at last was beheaded. Her own father, merciless to the last, acted as her executioner. God, however, speedily punished her persecutors. While her soul was being borne by angels to Paradise, a flash of lightning struck Dioscorus, and he was hurried before the judgment seat of God.

The life of St. Barbara is a vivid reminder that there can be much anger in our world and in our lives. Being in touch with God's presence in a very special way can do much toward relieving ourselves of our tendency to allow anger to control us. We should pray often against a sudden and unprovided death; and, above all, that we may be strengthened by the Holy Viaticum (Last Sacraments) against the dangers of our last hour.

Peter Taylor

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You can forgive from the context of self interest which has to be Objectivism. And to forgive doesn't mean to forgive everything that presents itself for forgiveness. Ultimately one forgives to end the effect of the offense to the extent possible ending one's own victimhood to the extent possible. Not to forgive is social capital punishment, a form of banishment.

--Brant

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What does it it mean to forgive, and how does one get there? to grant free pardon for an offense?

You can forgive from the context of self interest which has to be Objectivism. And to forgive doesn't mean to forgive everything that presents itself for forgiveness. Ultimately one forgives to end the effect of the offense to the extent possible ending one's own victimhood to the extent possible. Not to forgive is social capital punishment, a form of banishment.

It has to be Objectivism?

Otherwise, yeah. Pardon is not the same as forgive. And self-forgiveness is part of understanding the difference between errors of knowledge and (when you did bad). Can an amoral monster forgive himself? He does not need to, since he does not feel wrong. Can society 'forgive' or can an executive 'forgive' on our behalf?

Sometimes they have to. Here in badlands socialistic canuckistan we stopped hanging 60 years ago. That doesn't mean there weren't some guys that got falsely imprisoned. Though their necks did not snap, they got done in for years. When they finally got out, you know they had a dollar figure in mind for their experiences. A real pardon from our government inevitably costs big money. It is best to get it right the first time, especially where you kill killers.

When you know (in full awareness) you've done something wrong and you realize you were not fully aware when you did it, although you were partially aware, you can work on fixing it. But you need to have a process by which you don't fall into paralyzing guilt.

[...]

(I don't want to discuss how forgiveness works with punishment right here except to say that you often have to have some kind of punishment as atonement. But then it's over for the dude who is honestly correcting himself. He settled the account, so to speak. So shunning him, condemning him as evil and all that other judgmental stuff is not fair according to my standard.)

[...]

When you forgive someone, you let go of the resentment and bitterness that come with condemnation. Resentment can eat you alive. It can give you ulcers, make you lose sleep and all kinds of bad things.

[...]

Turning the other cheek is the only effective alternative you've got if you still want to win when you are outgunned (like Jesus was in the society he lived in). You shame your attacker into giving up. (Even wolves do it.) Of course, this only works some of the time, not all of the time.

Your last point is about submission. The next last about nursing a self-grievance. The second cautioned against the cruelty of shunning he who has atoned or been punished to the fullest extent of the law (or social code), the first cautioned against racking guilt.

Guilt does seem to call for atonement, amends, fines, punishment, whether directed by self or other. Ultimately a social infraction costs less than high treason on the scale of crime and punishment. But atonement, although deeply embedded in christian/jewish/muslim religion and ceremony, is again human. It is that which guilt impels you too, once understood as guilt. I hear you objecting to a harsh and unbalanced self-sentence of guilt, a self-hounding or self-denigrating dead-end. Nursing this kind of self-sentence is not healthy. And if once in a while one must submit to the social order, it is only for that moment or hour. As for shunning, I too consider it a cruelty, especially when practiced by religious sects.

Do you think it is possible, sensible, and beneficial to oneself to silently forgive someone for a wrong they did to you, even though they do not think what they did was wrong? It has not seemed possible to me, though I gather some religions promote such a thing. Actually, come to think of it, I did once forgive someone for a hurt, maybe not a wrong morally. But it was when she had died. It was totally spontaneous, totally without prior reflection. I was the first to pass by her coffin after the service. I looked into her face, and surprise: I forgave her. I kissed her forehead, and that was all over.

If that stubborn dead person in our lives never admitted to an error, no, those kinds of grave personal breaches must wait. I recall my mother stubbornly hating her dead father every morning with coffee before work, in a slow seizure of unforgiving morning after morning. I reasoned with her that giving up her mental time to going over the long list of charges was not going to serve any useful purpose, only make her feel angry, anguished at injustice, distressed.

I sold it to her that forgiveness is most importantly for oneself, that she would vanquish the crime by living free of its distressing effects on her. By not giving up the time to the criminal in thought, one weaned off the anguish. By reaching a little bit for forgiveness, one might turn the corner on a haunting, and no longer feel the angry injured ghosts in our minds. I mostly convinced myself at the same time, of course, which has been salutary. I only fail to forgive gross malice and thoughtlessness, that that verges on sociopathy and lack of empathy for human suffering.

"Errors of morality" may not be forgiven, Rand says. But can't all errors be traced back to a lack of knowledge? Since we humans are fallible beings, committing all kinds of errors is part of the conditio humana.

And what about forgiving oneself? Not being allowed to forgive oneself on any "error of morality" - doesn't this open the path to a guilt-ridden existence?

Michael raises this point effectively. I believe in a civil, secular version of atonement, and generally let my conscience be my guide. Opening one's heart often lets it flush out its burdens and its clots, and also invites a corollary unburdening in the other hearts involved.

I try to choose the right time for an apology. An apology followed by forgiving is a wonderful human thing ...

Edited by william.scherk
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Brant wrote:

By saying it "has to be Objectivism" I didn't want to imply "only Objectivism."

end quote

I had not thought of it like that Brant. We have Objectivist truisms, Christian Truisms, “Confucius Says,” truisms etc., and all philosophies and theologies embrace the Golden Rule so The Golden Rule transcends and is universal. Are there objective, human, psychological truisms that are scientific and true based on what we now know? Would the truism need to promote humanity’s evolutionary longevity?

It was bowling night so we had our granddaughter over. My wife got her a computerized game about letters and numbers. She sat on the couch for an hour punching in the answers and saying, “I did that. I gave the number,” in her high pitched voice. But she was wrong most times, and the computer was unforgiving and it frustrated Elizabeth who is 27 months old.

And so to bed.

Peter Taylor

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I was going to go out on my limb and present the forgiveness method I mentioned, but it's too late and that requires a proper presentation.

I do want to make this comment, though. I have seen a preoccupation in O-Land with using forgiveness as a whip for punishing others. When a person feels guilty and has done something wrong, he seeks to correct it if he is a moral person.

This is when the finger-wagging starts, the "But I don't think of you," the "So-and-so is, unfortunately, an immoral person," and all the rest. In other words, I see people withholding forgiveness--out loud and with a megaphone--precisely because they know (or suspect or hope) it will make the repentant transgressor feel rotten. The more miserable the better. They always say (with pompous airs) that they are only committed to justice and otherwise have no interest in the transgressor, but the people I have seen doing this get way too much smug satisfaction for me to believe that justice is the only thing operating in their souls.

If you want a great example of the attempt to withhold forgiveness as punishment in the spirit I presented above, go no farther than PARC and the PARC discussions. The Internet is full of these closet sadists.

This is not a good use of forgiveness, nor is it a proper practice for developing a good character.

Choices come with consequences. Even a little amount of sadism will reflect a long ways in the echo-chamber of the subconscious and surge up into action in the most inconvenient times imaginable.

I wonder how many truly happy families there are among the most vocal moral condemnation junkies.

Michael

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I was going to go out on my limb and present the forgiveness method I mentioned, but it's too late and that requires a proper presentation.

I do want to make this comment, though. I have seen a preoccupation in O-Land with using forgiveness as a whip for punishing others. When a person feels guilty and has done something wrong, he seeks to correct it if he is a moral person.

This is when the finger-wagging starts, the "But I don't think of you," the "So-and-so is, unfortunately, an immoral person," and all the rest. In other words, I see people withholding forgiveness--out loud and with a megaphone--precisely because they know (or suspect or hope) it will make the repentant transgressor feel rotten. The more miserable the better. They always say (with pompous airs) that they are only committed to justice and otherwise have no interest in the transgressor, but the people I have seen doing this get way too much smug satisfaction for me to believe that justice is the only thing operating in their souls.

If you want a great example of the attempt to withhold forgiveness as punishment in the spirit I presented above, go no farther than PARC and the PARC discussions. The Internet is full of these closet sadists.

This is not a good use of forgiveness, nor is it a proper practice for developing a good character.

Choices come with consequences. Even a little amount of sadism will reflect a long ways in the echo-chamber of the subconscious and surge up into action in the most inconvenient times imaginable.

I wonder how many truly happy families there are among the most vocal moral condemnation junkies.

Michael

Peikoff merely continues Rand's moral terrorism of judge and expect to be judged. They really mean judge and expect to be condemned if you aren't extremely careful.

--Brant

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Are the two men speaking of the same thing? Moreover, are the two giving advice to a judge, prosecutor, victim or malefactor?

Peikoff seems seized of the verb Forgive as simply pardon, a forgiveness granted only by an injured party. His operating connotation includes in its remit the sometime synonyms Excuse - - Absolve ... if not Condone

I see a problem here in identification, and a Peikoff giving reliance to a default classification of Evul a classification that must extend to the personal realm, although not mentioned even in passing: self-forgiveness. It could be that Peikoff fails to consider the 'action of grace' by which we forgive ourselves and lessen personal distress, or that his moral axe falls only in from a judge's perspective, never as a defendant (this to my eyes is a dangerous self-deception. One ought include the perspective of self to fully render a social/moral problem).

Branden says it is too easy to label oneself a moral failure or as Evul, wheras Peikoff seems to enjoy slapping the label on others.

Now, if we consider the personal ramifications, if we read over their conversation above and consider that each is speaking to the other about Branden's deception of Ayn Rand or his efforts after redemption. ...

In my reading of Branden is always the break with Rand, and with Peikoff, too, this central betrayal. One day this will mean less unto vanishing and we will compare and contrast what they said in the context of their lives.

Emphasis Added

A very, very insightful post. You're absolutely right... Peikoff's entire perspective on "forgiveness" seems to implicitly operate exclusively from the perspective of himself as the Righteous Moral Judge, Jury and Executioner.

It really shows how much he relishes this role of being the "Pope of Objectivism."

Lenny fancies himself as a Philosopher King. This much is obvious.

The differential focus of LP vs. NB is also interesting in this; Branden's primary goal is to increase the amount of good, and Peikoff's is to punish the evil. Branden: "how do we help people improve themselves?" Peikoff: "when should we condemn?"

In my earlier post, I argued that "forgiveness" is not a key moral fact because doing/being evil is not the heart of the human condition.

Peikoff's central focus on condemnation, however, seems to indicate that Peikoff (probably implicitly) believes that the core task of morality is condemnation.

What does this indicate about Peikoff's view of the human condition? What does he see as the core fact about the human condition which our moral concepts develop as a response to?

Branden's focus indicates a belief that striving for greatness is natural and noble for human beings. A benevolent perspective, clearly within the Enlightenment tradition we Objectivists belong to.

Peikoff's focus on condemnation seems to place moral error as a central component of the human condition. Not an occasional lapse or abberation from the typical, but as the normal human state. This is precisely what I was talking about when I said how most people still have Christian-like moral tropes stuck in their brain.... Peikoff seems to be perfectly fine with the (implicit, in his case) attitude that man is "fallen" and deserves punishment... hence why he tends to speak from the perspective of the punisher.

I do want to make this comment, though. I have seen a preoccupation in O-Land with using forgiveness as a whip for punishing others. When a person feels guilty and has done something wrong, he seeks to correct it if he is a moral person.

This is when the finger-wagging starts, the "But I don't think of you," the "So-and-so is, unfortunately, an immoral person," and all the rest. In other words, I see people withholding forgiveness--out loud and with a megaphone--precisely because they know (or suspect or hope) it will make the repentant transgressor feel rotten. The more miserable the better. They always say (with pompous airs) that they are only committed to justice and otherwise have no interest in the transgressor, but the people I have seen doing this get way too much smug satisfaction for me to believe that justice is the only thing operating in their souls.

I agree, and I've made similar observation. There's clearly a large number of Moral Narcissists amongst the orthodox Objectivists... this whole complex of getting off over feeling so morally superior to other people.

Hence the ritualistic condemnations and the constant social-politicking.

Ironic that so many nominal Objectivists are total second-handers who's entire concept of "good" boils down to "More Objectivist Than Thou."

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Dennis, good topic. I wanted to add that Peikoff expresses more thoughts about forgiveness in his ’76 lectures The Philosophy of Objectivism, which make it into OPAR on page 289.

Thanks, Stephen. Here is what Peikoff says in OPAR. . .

Just as a man's character traits must be given a deserved response, so must a change in his traits. If a good man turns bad, one acknowledges reality by reversing one's former estimate of him. The same applies if a bad man turns good. Just as love must be earned, so must condemnation – and forgiveness.

Forgiveness in moral issues is earned, if the guilty party makes restitution to his victim, assuming this is applicable; and then demonstrates objectively, through word and deed, that he understands the roots of his moral breach, has reformed his character, and will not commit such wrong again. Forgiveness is unearned, if the guilty party wants the victim simply to forget (evade) the breach and forgive without cause – or if he offers as cause nothing but protestations of atonement, which the victim is expected to accept on faith. In regard to minor moral lapses, it is not difficult for a man to demonstrate the necessary understanding and reform. If the vice is sizable, however, such demonstration is no easy matter; in many cases, it is impossible. When a man commits an evil like a major robbery or deception, to say nothing of worse crimes, it is difficult even to know what evidence would be required to convince others of his reform. This problem is one of the many penalties of vice, and it is the responsibility not of the good, but of the evil to solve it; assuming, what is seldom if ever the case, that moral reform is what the evil man is seeking.

Forgiveness, which is legitimate when earned, must be distinguished from mercy. If justice is the policy of identifying a man's desserts and acting accordingly, mercy is the policy of identifying them, then not acting accordingly: lessening the appropriate punishment in a negative case or failing to impose any punishment. Mercy substitutes for justice a dose of the undeserved and does so in the name of pity; the pity is not for the innocent among men or the good, but for the perpetrators of evil. The innocent man (or the truly reformed wrongdoer) asks for justice, not mercy. He wants what is coming to him.

OPAR, p. 289

This is a major improvement over Peikoff’s response to the questioner in my opening post. (Rather than consulting a dictionary, Pope Lenny might want to re-read OPAR.) Here, he at least acknowledges that forgiveness can be earned in the case of some “moral offenses,” even “sizable” ones. Again, however, he seems to deny the very possibility of atonement in the case of many immoral behaviors—e.g., a major robbery or deception. I could understand murder, but robbery and deception? Those two are clearly redeemable. He had to include deception, of course, in case anyone might have imagined that the Great Satan—Nathaniel Branden—could ever redeem himself. (I had to laugh when I saw that. Peikoff can never be accused of ‘objectivity’ when it comes to the Brandens.)

Even so, the superior insight contained in Branden’s remarks with respect to the technology of implementing a moral code—and the implications for atonement--can only be measured in light years. Peikoff obviously thinks this a non-issue for the good people of the world. As he sees it, the ‘responsibility’ for solving it apparently rests with the “bad people.” Of course, Branden not only raised this issue, he largely answered it in his books, particularly The Six Pillars of Self-Esteem.

Thanks very much to all those who recognized the importance of this issue and offered thoughtful contributions—Stephen, Andrew, X-ray, Michael, William, Brant, Reidy, David. Much food for thought here. Hopefully I will find more time for follow-up soon. Alas, there is only so much time in the day.

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Peikoff's central focus on condemnation, however, seems to indicate that Peikoff (probably implicitly) believes that the core task of morality is condemnation.

What does this indicate about Peikoff's view of the human condition? What does he see as the core fact about the human condition which our moral concepts develop as a response to?

Branden's focus indicates a belief that striving for greatness is natural and noble for human beings. A benevolent perspective, clearly within the Enlightenment tradition we Objectivists belong to.

Peikoff's focus on condemnation seems to place moral error as a central component of the human condition. Not an occasional lapse or abberation from the typical, but as the normal human state. This is precisely what I was talking about when I said how most people still have Christian-like moral tropes stuck in their brain.... Peikoff seems to be perfectly fine with the (implicit, in his case) attitude that man is "fallen" and deserves punishment... hence why he tends to speak from the perspective of the punisher.

Excellent points, Andrew. I couldn't possibly agree more.

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Peikoff's central focus on condemnation, however, seems to indicate that Peikoff (probably implicitly) believes that the core task of morality is condemnation.

What does this indicate about Peikoff's view of the human condition? What does he see as the core fact about the human condition which our moral concepts develop as a response to?

Branden's focus indicates a belief that striving for greatness is natural and noble for human beings. A benevolent perspective, clearly within the Enlightenment tradition we Objectivists belong to.

Peikoff's focus on condemnation seems to place moral error as a central component of the human condition. Not an occasional lapse or abberation from the typical, but as the normal human state. This is precisely what I was talking about when I said how most people still have Christian-like moral tropes stuck in their brain.... Peikoff seems to be perfectly fine with the (implicit, in his case) attitude that man is "fallen" and deserves punishment... hence why he tends to speak from the perspective of the punisher.

Excellent points, Andrew. I couldn't possibly agree more.

Add one more agreement with the modification that in Peikoff's internal tropes, I would add "Judeo-Christian-like" to modify your point.

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Peikoff's central focus on condemnation, however, seems to indicate that Peikoff (probably implicitly) believes that the core task of morality is condemnation.

What does this indicate about Peikoff's view of the human condition? What does he see as the core fact about the human condition which our moral concepts develop as a response to?

Branden's focus indicates a belief that striving for greatness is natural and noble for human beings. A benevolent perspective, clearly within the Enlightenment tradition we Objectivists belong to.

Peikoff's focus on condemnation seems to place moral error as a central component of the human condition. Not an occasional lapse or abberation from the typical, but as the normal human state. This is precisely what I was talking about when I said how most people still have Christian-like moral tropes stuck in their brain.... Peikoff seems to be perfectly fine with the (implicit, in his case) attitude that man is "fallen" and deserves punishment... hence why he tends to speak from the perspective of the punisher.

Excellent points, Andrew. I couldn't possibly agree more.

Add one more agreement with the modification that in Peikoff's internal tropes, I would add "Judeo-Christian-like" to modify your point.

Dennis and Adam,

Thank you.

Also, to Adam, I deliberately avoided specifying Judeo-Christian because the Jewish moral tradition is quite different from the Christian one, from what little I know about it. Additionally, I simply don't know very much about Jewish philosophy at all and as such I naturally shy away from commenting about it. Plus, conservatives package-dealing "Judeo-Christian" really puts me off the term, especially since the Evangelicals package-deal the religions in one breath, and then have their little Apocalypse fantasy which involves the conversion or destruction of all Jews.

I did contemplate putting the Judeo in there because I know Peikoff was born and raised Jewish. But I decided to play it safe, and avoid making anything that could be interpreted as making commentary about a religious/philosophical/intellectual tradition I know little about.

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Peikoff's central focus on condemnation, however, seems to indicate that Peikoff (probably implicitly) believes that the core task of morality is condemnation.

What does this indicate about Peikoff's view of the human condition? What does he see as the core fact about the human condition which our moral concepts develop as a response to?

Branden's focus indicates a belief that striving for greatness is natural and noble for human beings. A benevolent perspective, clearly within the Enlightenment tradition we Objectivists belong to.

Peikoff's focus on condemnation seems to place moral error as a central component of the human condition. Not an occasional lapse or abberation from the typical, but as the normal human state. This is precisely what I was talking about when I said how most people still have Christian-like moral tropes stuck in their brain.... Peikoff seems to be perfectly fine with the (implicit, in his case) attitude that man is "fallen" and deserves punishment... hence why he tends to speak from the perspective of the punisher.

Excellent points, Andrew. I couldn't possibly agree more.

Add one more agreement with the modification that in Peikoff's internal tropes, I would add "Judeo-Christian-like" to modify your point.

Dennis and Adam,

Thank you.

Also, to Adam, I deliberately avoided specifying Judeo-Christian because the Jewish moral tradition is quite different from the Christian one, from what little I know about it. Additionally, I simply don't know very much about Jewish philosophy at all and as such I naturally shy away from commenting about it. Plus, conservatives package-dealing "Judeo-Christian" really puts me off the term, especially since the Evangelicals package-deal the religions in one breath, and then have their little Apocalypse fantasy which involves the conversion or destruction of all Jews.

I did contemplate putting the Judeo in there because I know Peikoff was born and raised Jewish. But I decided to play it safe, and avoid making anything that could be interpreted as making commentary about a religious/philosophical/intellectual tradition I know little about.

Andrew:

LOL. Well being born and raised in NY City, being in the "special" class that skipped a year, being taken for "Jewish" by Jewish teachers because I was in that class and having "passed for Jewish" by changing my name to get into the pants of Jewish girls and getting past their parents bigotry, trust me -

Jewish guilt is well known.

"Rabbi David Wolpe of Sinai Temple in Los Angeles offers a defense of guilt.

Facing up to the hurt we cause others with cruel speech or callous acts, and to our myriad failures to meet the marks God sets for living a true and good life, "makes forgiveness meaningful, not merely a catchphrase," Wolpe says."

'Catholic guilt,' 'Jewish guilt' not just a joke, it's essential http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-09-11-guilt14ONLINE_ST_N.htm

Guilt gets a bad rap as a relentless joke: Catholic guilt. Jewish guilt. Mormon guilt. Even Lutherans have guilt, or, some say, guilt envy. We dub our trivial naughtiness "guilty pleasures" to put a little frosting on those thorns of conscience.

But as Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement nears (it begins at sunset Friday), experts say guilt is not passé, it's essential — and probably inescapable.

Adam

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. . .

In my earlier post, I argued that "forgiveness" is not a key moral fact because doing/being evil is not the heart of the human condition.

Peikoff's central focus on condemnation, however, seems to indicate that Peikoff (probably implicitly) believes that the core task of morality is condemnation.

Rand, Peikoff, and Branden, not one of them ever projected evil as the heart of the human condition. They uniformly and repeatedly proclaimed the contrary. There is nothing that Peikoff, Rand, or Branden ever wrote or publicly said that "seems to indicate" that the core task of morality is condemnation. Rather, they all always integrated the facets of morality under the view that the purpose of morality is teach one to enjoy oneself and live.

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PS

Andrew, concerning something in #10, Roark's error was not a case of "letting himself be expoited." It was the error of being a cohort with Peter in a misrepresentation to third parties. It started when they were in school together. Rand has Roark do some of Peter's work in school and on into their careers to show her ideal man as (like virtuous man in Plato's dialogues) in love with something which is sufficient to him even though he will receive no credit or money for the achievement. In the grand final case of misrepresentation, the case of Cortlandt, the rouse is uncovered, and Roark realizes that all the way back to school, he never should have been a confederate with Peter or anyone in this way.

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