Reconsidering Rand's Ethics

[BaalChatzaf]

Fine. If you are programmed to believe that you are programmed to believe certain things, I will not attempt to argue with you. Both of you Bob's begin with the premise that Rand's ethics is wrong, and then assert pseudo-scientifc nonsense to support your views. Maybe you are programmed to do this, but I suspect the problem is better described as rationalization on the part of each of you as individual organisms, rather than as a result of the sequence of nucleotides on your 21st chromosomes.

Actually I agree with Rand's ethics (for the most part). Where I fault here was predicating her ethics an a thermodynamically unsound principle. Here characterization of life and life process as self sustained and self generated is thermodynamic nonsense.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[merjet]

Actually I agree with Rand's ethics (for the most part). Where I fault here was predicating her ethics an a thermodynamically unsound principle. Here characterization of life and life process as self sustained and self generated is thermodynamic nonsense.

It's only nonsense if you assume that you and Rand mean the same thing by "self sustained and self generated". It's obvious that is false.

Edited February 11, 2011 by Merlin Jetton

[Ellen Stuttle]

The bottom line is that neither the facts of genetics nor the second law of thermodynamics pose any problem for Rand's individualistic ethics.

No way. If man is in any way "programmed" to act in his genetic interest, and not just personal, then this will significantly alter how he will act, especially wrt kin. Your dismissal doesn't fly.

Bob

The issue of the second law of thermodynamics is Bob Kolker misreading Rand.

(Btw, according to the report of someone whom I knew to be an excellently accurate reporter -- J. Roger Lee, who died several years ago and thus can't currently confirm this -- Rand once at a discussion gathering where J. Roger was present chewed Leonard Peikoff out for calling "Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action" a *definition* of "life." She said it was a characterization and that a proper definition was the business of biologists.)

However, she nowhere discusses how to get volition out of deterministic physics -- and that is a huge problem she shared with anyone else who thinks genuine alternatives exist and also thinks that humans are entities made of matter.

Regarding the ethical issue, Bob Mac, you accept Rand's metaethics and merely disagree with her over what the "Is" is -- plus you add the kicker that biology legitimates passing laws to require what you believe follows from the biological "Is." Your challenge is over whose idea of biology is correct, not over the logic of the argument. Ironically.

(I think the "selfish gene" theory is correct in placing the focus of evolution. But not that any "Ought" follows from this "Is." A conditional is required in between -- if you want to achieve X, then, given "Is," here's what you "Ought" to do. "Altruistic" proclivities provide no more basis from which to dictate ethics than does the need of some humans acting rationally in order for any humans to survive provide such a basis.)

Question: Are you a determinist, or do you think that real alternatives exist? I'm not sure what your views are on that issue.

Ellen

[BaalChatzaf]

(I think the "selfish gene" theory is correct in placing the focus of evolution. But not that any "Ought" follows from this "Is." A conditional is required in between -- if you want to achieve X, then, given "Is," here's what you "Ought" to do. "Altruistic" proclivities provide no more basis from which to dictate ethics than does the need of some humans acting rationally in order for any humans to survive provide such a basis.)

My lady! We are on precisely the same page here. If you are ever in town I would love to take you to dinner and have a few hours discussion with you.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Xray]

(I think the "selfish gene" theory is correct in placing the focus of evolution. But not that any "Ought" follows from this "Is." A conditional is required in between -- if you want to achieve X, then, given "Is," here's what you "Ought" to do. "Altruistic" proclivities provide no more basis from which to dictate ethics than does the need of some humans acting rationally in order for any humans to survive provide such a basis.)

But "ought to" does not apply in all those cases where there is no alternative.

For "ought to" suggests that there exists an alternative.

But if e. g. you want to climb Mount Everest, you must be adequately equipped. You won't achieve X if you are not.

The same goes for biological conditions. You must breathe if you want to survive.

Therefore A fish "ought" not to live in water if it is to survive - it must live in water.

"Altruistic" proclivities provide no more basis from which to dictate ethics than does the need of some humans acting rationally in order for any humans to survive provide such a basis.)

What then does provide the basis for an ethics?

And given that selfishness is already biologically hardwired in us humans - isn't it unnecessary to declare it as a virtue?

Isn't a "virtue" something one achieves through conscious effort, an effort which often goes against our natural impulses? But as for selfishness - it requires no effort at all, does it. Reining in one's impulses on the contrary does require effort.

I'm constantly confronted with this in my work as a teacher of very young children.

The same goes for "pride". Every kid knows that feeling. It is not anyhting they have to learn.

But Ayn Rand grew up in unfavorable conditions where she and her family been denied so so much, where it was conveyed to them from a dictatorial regime that they had nothing to be proud of. Imo that's where Rand's ethics is rooted: in her early life experience of social oppression and deprivation.

Edited February 12, 2011 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

For "ought to" suggests that there exists an alternative.

But if e. g. you want to climb Mount Everest, you must be adequately equipped. You won't achieve X if you are not.

The same goes for biological conditions. You must breathe if you want to survive.

Therefore A fish "ought" not to live in water if it is to survive - it must live in water.

The Mt E. example is no good. There "ought" fits. You maybe could rewrite it so it does work as your example, however, just don't end up with a tautology. You can climb E. buck naked, for a short while. With light clothes and shoes you'd get a little farther. Etc. Experiment.

Beathing is not an alternative, you will breathe. And a fish will live in water.

All this is-ought business is if you want something you ought to do this or ought to do that and hope that what you think you ought to do is what you really should do. When you bump into something you rethink the proposition, if you can, like climbing E. naked, although if you're that stupid thinking never happened to begin with. You ought to think, you think?

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

Beathing is not an alternative, you will breathe. And a fish will live in water.

or it will die. There are always alternatives.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

What then does provide the basis for an ethics?

And given that selfishness is already biologically hardwired in us humans - isn't it unnecessary to declare it as a virtue?

Isn't a "virtue" something one achieves through conscious effort, an effort which often goes against our natural impulses? But as for selfishness - it requires no effort at all, does it. Reining in one's impulses on the contrary does require effort.

I'm constantly confronted with this in my work as a teacher of very young children.

The same goes for "pride". Every kid knows that feeling. It is not anyhting they have to learn.

But Ayn Rand grew up in unfavorable conditions where she and her family been denied so so much, where it was conveyed to them from a dictatorial regime that they had nothing to be proud of. Imo that's where Rand's ethics is rooted: in her early life experience of social oppression and deprivation.

The basis for ethics is the big, conceptually functioning human brain and the myriad choices it has to deal with with its rational faculty, mostly in a social context which ultimately devolves into politics, and all of these concern multiple feedback loops. More than your idea of selfishness is hardwired into the human brain and everyone is different in one respect and everyone is the same--a human same--in another. The use of altruism politically is to control people. You cannot do that by appealing to their selfishness except indirectly by keeping the public feeding troughs full of games (football!!) and slop. No, you appeal to their "better" nature--altruistic nature--and that is the ring in their noses political (and religious) figures use to lead them around with. Even a mother or father might do that with their children. It's all about control; it's all about ruling. That's why Rand published a book call "The Virtue of Selfishness" which wasn't really about that as a virtue, but a polemical-rhetorical assault on a corrupt, inappropriately controlling culture. The definition she gave inside was completely wrong and jejune--not of a dictionary as she claimed. Some anarchical libertarians took the title and ran with it, though, embracing "greed" as logically derived for their masculine strivings. Women generally didn't make that mistake.

Pure, attractive selfishness is love best expressed by Romeo and his girlfriend. Works for teenagers. Ten years later, not so good, for there's more to life than a perpetual honeymoon and all consuming passion and adults embrace life more generally for their minds and possibilities have expanded.

So, a morality of rational self interest is to protect one from making inferior choices, especially apropos one's happiness, and to help provide a free social existence.

--Brant

[kiaer.ts]

I think the "selfish gene" theory is correct in placing the focus [on] evolution.

That is correct in the same way that saying that Marxist-Leninist theory is correct in placing the focus on the importance of who owns the means of production. Selfish gene theory stated in any strong form is either false, or merely recapitulates prior theory.

For example, if selfish gene theory is taken as holding that genes act to maximize their own frequency within a population, this is blatantly false. Multi-celled organisms generally carry two copies of each gene. For instance, in an example oversimplified for convenience, eye color can be explained as the result of which copies one has of the eye color gene. The homozygous state of having two copies of the brown variant produces brown eyes. The homozygous state of having two copies of the blue variant produces blue eyes. And the heterozygous state of having one copy each of the brown and blue genes results in green eyes. In the example of sickle cell anemia, it turns out that the heterozygous state of having one sickle cell gene and one normal gene is superior (see Heterozygote Advantage) because individuals with that phenotype are resistant to malaria but do not suffer anemia. Those who carry two non-sickle cell copies of the gene are very susceptible to and suffer high morbidity from malaria. Those who carry two copies of the sickle cell gene suffer crippling bouts of anemic attacks and tend to die by age twenty without reproducing. Neither the sickle cell nor non-sickle cell variant of the gene maximizes its own frequency. In this case, it is the resistant but non-anemic phenotype which is maximized.

If selfish gene theory is taken as explaining such things as eusociality in insects like bees and ants, again, it is false. In humans, children of the same parents share (assuming their parents share no genes in common) ) fifty percent of their genes. Each inherits half of their mother's genes and half of their fathers genes, which are shuffled in the production of egg and sperm, the sex cells each carrying a randomly selected one half of the parents' genes. In this case, the children's own offspring will on average carry one quarter of their genes in common with their aunts and uncles. That is, your nephew will carry half of your sister's genes, half of which she shares with you. So, biologically, your own children are as related to you as your parents or siblings, since they all share one half of your gene compliment, but nephews and nieces share only one quarter of your gene compliment. In the case of identical twins, this is different. Identical twins share all genes in common. And your nephew born to your identical twin would be just as closely related to you as your own child, sharing one half of your genes, not just one quarter.

But sex determination and fertilization in bees works differently. Female bees care two copies of every gene, just like humans. But male bees develop from unfertilized eggs, and hence carry only one copy of each gene. That means that rather than the sperm that they produce having a random half selection of two copies of their genes, their are all exactly identical. That means that when a drone and a queen mate, they produce offspring that share half of their mother's genes in common, but all of their fathers genes, making them not 1/2 related as in humans, but 3/4 related. They are sisters on their mother side and identical twins on their father's side. While any bee is thus 3/4 related to her own sister, she is still only 1/2 related to her own daughter, since her daughter receives one half of her genes, assuming the male is unrelated. This result is remarkable - bees are more closely related to their own sisters than their own mothers or offspring. Hence, they should be more willing to risk their lives for their sisters than for their own offspring. But none of this is the result of the possession of any altruism gene. The phenomenon results not from any specific selfish gene, but from the organism's entire genome.

In neither example is there some selfish gene producing these results at the expense of the remainder of the organism's own genes. The fallacy results from an equivocation. In the case of selfish gene theory, the good of the gene is defined as reproduction, while the good of the organism is defined not as reproduction, but as personal survival. It is based on the hidden false assumption that standard evolutionary theory views personal survival as the end of evolution. Selfish gene theory as such is an improper correction to a non-existent straw man.

Edited February 12, 2011 by Ted Keer

[kiaer.ts]

However, she nowhere discusses how to get volition out of deterministic physics -- and that is a huge problem she shared with anyone else who thinks genuine alternatives exist and also thinks that humans are entities made of matter.

This is only a problem if one makes one or both of two mistakes - either in denying that you are your body, or in treating the freedom of the will as a (meta)physical, rather than as a moral issue.

First, let us define volition. Volition is not merely the ability to act in response to an external stimulus. Nor is it the ability to act when some alternative is imaginable. It is the ability to act when external stimuli and circumstances do not rise to the level of sufficiently and necessarily determining a course of action.

Simple organisms react to stimuli in a determined manner. Plants grow toward the light automatically, microorganisms automatically swim toward a chemical gradient indicating a food source and away from a chemical gradient indicating a threat. Higher organisms, however, face much more subtle alternatives and stimuli. Being hungry, a lion may set off in search of prey based not on the sight or smell of food, which may be entirely absent from his present field of view, but based on the internal stimulus of hunger and the internal memory of past experiences of satisfying that hunger. The memory and the hunger are entirely internal. Further, the lion may be faced with the options of various locales for a hunt, the water hole, or the edge of the forest, and he may have different possible paths by which to reach each of those locales. Nothing physically external to him will either force him to initiate action nor will external forces constrain him to any particular goal or path. Volition is the ability of a conscious being to initiate goal-oriented action without external imperative or constraint determining its actions.

The objection may be raised that the lion is forced by his hunger or by past experience to act. But the hunger and the past experience are not present external forces or entities like the wind or gravity or the bars of a cage. They are states of his own body. It is incoherent to draw a distinction between the lion and the lion's body, and to complain that the lion's body is deciding, not the lion. Note that whatever be the case, whether actions at the sub-atomic level are either "determined" i.e., the in principle predictable results of prior events, or are truly random in some deep sense, the lion is still its own body, regardless of any latent Cartesian dualist misconceptions on our part. To say that I have decided is to say that my body has decided.

Given that volition, or will, is simply a neurobiological faculty of higher animals, what then is freedom of the will? Freedom of the will is not properly a (meta)physical concept. The notion that it is is based on the hidden (ultimately religious) assumption that an individual is not its own body. Freedom of the will is properly a politico-moral concept, which arises in the context of assigning responsibility to an organism for its actions.

We assert that an organism does not act freely under two circumstances. The first is action under either threat of or under actual physical force. That a chained man is not free to act requires no explanation. We also say that a man has not acted freely when he acts under threat. This is obviously a moral issue. When we say that a man who is forced to give up his ATM PIN at gunpoint is not acting of his free will we are not really denying that an act of volition is involved on his part to move his lips and speak the code. Rather, we are saying that moral blame for the action is assigned to another will, that of the criminal who is the prime mover and who constrains his victim.

The other case where we speak of an individual not acting of his free will is in the case of insanity or some other organic disturbance which makes us find it unhelpful to treat a person as a deliberate moral agent. In the case of a killer who was suffering hallucinations being declared "not guilty" due to insanity we are not saying that it was not he who committed the act, or that he is not his body, but that his body is in an unhealthy state where rational deliberation and persuasion are not possible, and hence where punishment would be uneffective. Humans are complicated entities which can malfunction. It has been argued that it might be better in such cases to declare a person guilty by reason of insanity, rather than innocent. In any case, that the faculty of volition may become so impaired that it is not helpful politically and morally to attribute free will to an agent in no way poses a problem for the theory of the will as a faculty of a higher organism to act on its own accord in the face of subdeterminative external circumstances.

Edited February 12, 2011 by Ted Keer

[Xray]

Beathing is not an alternative, you will breathe. And a fish will live in water.

or it will die. There are always alternatives.

Ba'al Chatzaf

But there is no alternative of choice here, and that's what an ethics discussion is about.

When it comes to biological issues, you e. g. cannot 'choose' to survive without being supplied with oxygen.

Edited February 12, 2011 by Xray

[BaalChatzaf]

But there is no alternative of choice here, and that's what an ethics discussion is about.

When it comes to biological issues, you e. g. cannot 'choose' to survive without being supplied with oxygen.

That is the case, but one can always chose not to be supplied with oxygen.

Ba'al Chafatz

[Ellen Stuttle]

(I think the "selfish gene" theory is correct in placing the focus of evolution. But not that any "Ought" follows from this "Is." A conditional is required in between -- if you want to achieve X, then, given "Is," here's what you "Ought" to do. "Altruistic" proclivities provide no more basis from which to dictate ethics than does the need of some humans acting rationally in order for any humans to survive provide such a basis.)

My lady! We are on precisely the same page here. If you are ever in town I would love to take you to dinner and have a few hours discussion with you.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I figure that would be fun. Or if you ever get up to these parts (Hartford, CT, area).

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

[...] given that selfishness is already biologically hardwired in us humans [...].

Oh, no, it isn't. Exactly one of the issues "selfish gene" theory was developed to address: Why the widespread biological behaviors which confer benefit on *other* organisms at risk to the behaving organism, how to square such behaviors with Darwinian theory?

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

I think the "selfish gene" theory is correct in placing the focus [on] evolution.

Ted,

I haven't yet read details of your replies. I'm just noticing a few things on a quick skim.

The "of" in my post from which you quote wasn't a typo. "Selfish gene" theory proposes that the gene is the unit OF evolution.

Ellen

Add: The wording would have been clearer if I'd said "in its placement of the focus of evolution."

Edited February 13, 2011 by Ellen Stuttle

[bmacwilliam]

Regarding the ethical issue, Bob Mac, you accept Rand's metaethics and merely disagree with her over what the "Is" is -- plus you add the kicker that biology legitimates passing laws to require what you believe follows from the biological "Is." Your challenge is over whose idea of biology is correct, not over the logic of the argument. Ironically.

(I think the "selfish gene" theory is correct in placing the focus of evolution. But not that any "Ought" follows from this "Is." A conditional is required in between -- if you want to achieve X, then, given "Is," here's what you "Ought" to do. "Altruistic" proclivities provide no more basis from which to dictate ethics than does the need of some humans acting rationally in order for any humans to survive provide such a basis.)

Question: Are you a determinist, or do you think that real alternatives exist? I'm not sure what your views are on that issue.

Ellen

Really, I'm not sure either. But what I do know that the "is" that Rand uses is wrong, and if her logic is correct, her conclusion is wrong as well. To me, this seems rather obvious.

On the question of determinism, I just have one small - ok, large - problem and that is I do not know that the feeling of free will is not simply an illusion. This, to me at least, seems more troubling than the "brain in a vat problem" that for whatever reason seems easier to dismiss. Free will? I can't accept so easily. I do not firmly believe that we have no free will, but I remain unconvinced that we do.

Bob

[bmacwilliam]

.

Bob Mac, concerning #46,

“If you own a bottle of milk and give it to your starving child, it is not a sacrifice; if you give it to your neighbor’s child and let your own die, it is” (AS 1028).

Like Nietzsche before her, Rand presumed higher valuation of one’s own offspring over others to be the correct hierarchy (leaving aside when they get older and may prove bad seed). Those two thinkers seem to just take it as part of the normal constitution of a parent, and Rand seems to see the high priority of caring for one’s children as simply part of trueness to one’s own constitution, to one’s self.

As far as helping others more generally by devoting time, effort, or money to their uses instead of to one’s own, it would not necessarily amount to living for the sake of others. I mean it would not necessarily be answering the question “For what are you living?” with the answer: for service to others. Do you agree with Rand that that answer is an incorrect ideal (of behavior) for all people?

The last part of your post is food for much thought, but to address the above.

"Do you agree with Rand that that answer is an incorrect ideal (of behavior) for all people?"

Yes, I do agree. But I disagree that the choices are 1)Selfish or 2)Altruistic as ideals. I think it is very clear that each man should find his own balance and that it is vanishingly unlikely that either extreme is an appropriate ideal for anyone.

I think it's very clear that a rather miserable existence lies at both ends. Rand either knew this or she didn't.

She either knew this, or was so emotionally abnormal that she didn't know this. Neither situation leaves me with a favourable view of her for reasons that again seem rather obvious no?

Bob

[Guyau]

Bob, concerning #67:

A Rejection of Egoism

. . .

Kraut argues that philosophy can help answer “What is good?” but it cannot help answer “Whose good should I be serving?” (WGW 39–65, 208–13, 255–57). He argues that there are many proper answers to that second question, so an ethical theory that purports a uniquely correct answer to it must have gone wrong. The answer that one should always promote one’s own good is incorrect by overgeneralization. He recognizes that there are circumstances in which there is no one’s good besides one’s own that one should promote, but those circumstances are not typical. Contrary to Kraut, I think . . . . promotion of the good of other persons can be directly for their sake, yet one can be holding in an integrated way to the overarching good for oneself, the overarching primary good of one’s own life and happiness.

One does stand in a special normative relation to oneself. Mature and healthy individuals are constituted—and Kraut also takes this for true—so as to love themselves, to take care of themselves, and to act for their own benefit. But Kraut allows for the possibility, when one has reached adulthood, of properly turning one’s life into a purely instrumental value serving the good of definite others (WGW 48–53). This extreme possibility is not cashed out in terms of a real-world circumstance in which it would be proper. I think, as Rand thought, that such an agent would not be self-harmonious, so, would not be flourishing.

. . .

Truth of Will and Value

. . .

Rand stands against “the kind of ‘Nietzschean egoists’. . . who believe that any action, regardless of its nature, is good if it is intended for one’s own benefit” (VS x). Intended self-benefit is necessary but not sufficient for that which is morally right in Rand’s rational egoism (on insufficiency see further Branden 1962a; 1962b; Rand 1974).

I should pause over the necessity of intended self-benefit for correct values. Not all of one’s potential selves are worth benefitting. Among those who are, Rand maintains that only potential selves whose every value is intended to benefit themselves hold entirely correct values. “Concern with his own interests is the essence of a moral existence, and . . . man must be the beneficiary of his own moral actions. / The actor must always be the beneficiary of his action” (VS ix–x; also OE 46–47).

One is a beneficiary in ways other than by one’s resulting positive feelings, because one is a self that is not only feelings. Man’s self is “‘that entity that is his consciousness. To think, to feel, to judge, to act are functions of the ego’” (HR XVIII 737). It is the self—one’s soul—that has thoughts, meaning, will, values, desires, and feeling (GW II 454).

Roark loves the buildings he designs not only because of the positive responses they elicit in him. Dagny loves diesel-electric locomotives and the minds that create them not only because of the positive responses they elicit in her. It is not plausible that when she finds that man at the end of the rails, the one for whom she has longed since her youth, she will love him only because of the positive responses he evokes in her.

There is, however, a thread of subjectivity in Rand’s conception of value and love and normative selfishness that is puckering up the fabric. In my judgment, that thread is unnecessary and should be removed. Speaking metaphorically, the solemnity of looking at the sky does not come only from the uplift of one’s head (HR V 598). In extreme desire for another person, the other does not recede in importance compared to the desire (GW IX 539). A rational desire to help someone in need is animated not only by “your own selfish pleasure in the value of his person and struggle” (AS 1060, emphasis added). Rather, it is enough for rational egoism that, by design, no actions be contrary self-benefit (of a self worth benefitting). The requirement that all actions should intend primarily self-benefit should be dropped. In this way, one can love persons simply for the particular ends-in-themselves that they are.

The man who dynamited Cortlandt rises, takes the oath, and stands before the court audience. “Roark stood before each of them as each man stands in the innocence of his own mind. But Roark stood like that before a hostile crowd—and they knew suddenly that no hatred was possible to him. For the flash of an instant, they grasped the manner of his consciousness. Each asked himself: do I need anyone’s approval?—does it matter?—am I tied? And for that instant, each man was free—free enough to feel benevolence for every other man in the room” (HR XVIII 736).

Rand takes benevolence to be people’s natural state when they are not constrained by law or morality to take basic direction from others rather than from themselves and to benefit others rather than themselves. David Kelley has added to Rand’s ethics by reckoning the ways in which benevolence is in one’s self-interest and arguing that the virtue of productivity has a cohort virtue in benevolence towards others (1996). In Kelley’s view, although benevolence is not an obligation by way of respecting the rights of others, it is an obligation to oneself. I think only some occasions of right benevolence are morally required; other occasions are morally permitted, but not required, not an obligation. Be that as it may, my dissent registered to Rand’s account of rational egoism applies to Kelley’s as well. Both of them correctly recognize that genuine benevolent responsiveness is not educed primarily by motives of self-sacrifice. Both are wrong in not recognizing that the genuine, innocent response of benevolence is also not educed primarily by motives of self-benefit.

Q: “Why am I here?”

A: “To love and serve God and my fellow man.”

When I was growing up in the middle of the last century, that was the teaching in our home and church. That was the regular culture. Never did I hear the God part contradicted until I went to college. Never did I hear the fellow-man part contradicted until a friend gave me Fountainhead and Atlas for reading outside of classes.

The people who held to that Q & A as doctrine were not horrible people. They were in error. Rand’s errors in ethical theory were less extreme, in my view. I don’t think her a horrible person for getting those things wrong. (Prof. Kraut is not a horrible person for his errors either.)

[kiaer.ts]

I think the "selfish gene" theory is correct in placing the focus [on] evolution.

Ted,

I haven't yet read details of your replies. I'm just noticing a few things on a quick skim.

The "of" in my post from which you quote wasn't a typo. "Selfish gene" theory proposes that the gene is the unit OF evolution.

Ellen

Add: The wording would have been clearer if I'd said "in its placement of the focus of evolution."

Okay, you mean the focus on the gene level is correct, I assume? It is, of course, true that evolution results in the change of gene frequencies, and that evolution cannot be understood without an understanding of genetics. But this has been known in detail since the modern evolutionary synthesis of the 1930's. The fact that traits which are fatal to the organism can spread so long as they result in successful reproduction of the organism's bloodline has also long been known and mathematically explained. The problem with Dawkins lies in his oversimplified claims and metaphysical overreach.

To put it in terms even Bob Kolker can understand, Dawkins' theoretical work results in (1) no new mathematical formulations and (2) no unique verifiable predictions. He is a fine writer, a great popularizer, and a provocative thinker. But so far as a scientific innovator his theoretical work is either false or banal.

If you are going to respond to my two posts, I am interested in hearing your response to my arguments on the freedom of the will:

However, she nowhere discusses how to get volition out of deterministic physics -- and that is a huge problem she shared with anyone else who thinks genuine alternatives exist and also thinks that humans are entities made of matter.

This is only a problem if one makes one or both of two mistakes - either in denying that you are your body, or in treating the freedom of the will as a (meta)physical, rather than as a moral issue.

First, let us define volition. Volition is not merely the ability to act in response to an external stimulus. Nor is it the ability to act when some alternative is imaginable. It is the ability to act when external stimuli and circumstances do not rise to the level of sufficiently and necessarily determining a course of action.

Simple organisms react to stimuli in a determined manner. Plants grow toward the light automatically, microorganisms automatically swim toward a chemical gradient indicating a food source and away from a chemical gradient indicating a threat. Higher organisms, however, face much more subtle alternatives and stimuli. Being hungry, a lion may set off in search of prey based not on the sight or smell of food, which may be entirely absent from his present field of view, but based on the internal stimulus of hunger and the internal memory of past experiences of satisfying that hunger. The memory and the hunger are entirely internal. Further, the lion may be faced with the options of various locales for a hunt, the water hole, or the edge of the forest, and he may have different possible paths by which to reach each of those locales. Nothing physically external to him will either force him to initiate action nor will external forces constrain him to any particular goal or path. Volition is the ability of a conscious being to initiate goal-oriented action without external imperative or constraint determining its actions.

The objection may be raised that the lion is forced by his hunger or by past experience to act. But the hunger and the past experience are not present external forces or entities like the wind or gravity or the bars of a cage. They are states of his own body. It is incoherent to draw a distinction between the lion and the lion's body, and to complain that the lion's body is deciding, not the lion. Note that whatever be the case, whether actions at the sub-atomic level are either "determined" i.e., the in principle predictable results of prior events, or are truly random in some deep sense, the lion is still its own body, regardless of any latent Cartesian dualist misconceptions on our part. To say that I have decided is to say that my body has decided.

Given that volition, or will, is simply a neurobiological faculty of higher animals, what then is freedom of the will? Freedom of the will is not properly a (meta)physical concept. The notion that it is is based on the hidden (ultimately religious) assumption that an individual is not its own body. Freedom of the will is properly a politico-moral concept, which arises in the context of assigning responsibility to an organism for its actions.

We assert that an organism does not act freely under two circumstances. The first is action under either threat of or under actual physical force. That a chained man is not free to act requires no explanation. We also say that a man has not acted freely when he acts under threat. This is obviously a moral issue. When we say that a man who is forced to give up his ATM PIN at gunpoint is not acting of his free will we are not really denying that an act of volition is involved on his part to move his lips and speak the code. Rather, we are saying that moral blame for the action is assigned to another will, that of the criminal who is the prime mover and who constrains his victim.

The other case where we speak of an individual not acting of his free will is in the case of insanity or some other organic disturbance which makes us find it unhelpful to treat a person as a deliberate moral agent. In the case of a killer who was suffering hallucinations being declared "not guilty" due to insanity we are not saying that it was not he who committed the act, or that he is not his body, but that his body is in an unhealthy state where rational deliberation and persuasion are not possible, and hence where punishment would be uneffective. Humans are complicated entities which can malfunction. It has been argued that it might be better in such cases to declare a person guilty by reason of insanity, rather than innocent. In any case, that the faculty of volition may become so impaired that it is not helpful politically and morally to attribute free will to an agent in no way poses a problem for the theory of the will as a faculty of a higher organism to act on its own accord in the face of subdeterminative external circumstances.

Edited February 14, 2011 by Ted Keer

[Xray]

[...] given that selfishness is already biologically hardwired in us humans [...].

Oh, no, it isn't. Exactly one of the issues "selfish gene" theory was developed to address: Why the widespread biological behaviors which confer benefit on *other* organisms at risk to the behaving organism, how to square such behaviors with Darwinian theory?

Ellen

If selfishness were not biologically hardwired in us humans, how could we survive for one single day?

Even if the the "behaving organism" of a human individual runs risks in certain cases, the actions still can be traced back to selfishness (I'd prefer to call it self-interest) because it sounds more neutral) as the driving force.

Could you provide examples where you think this is not the case?

But there is no alternative of choice here, and that's what an ethics discussion is about.

When it comes to biological issues, you e. g. cannot 'choose' to survive without being supplied with oxygen.

That is the case, but one can always chose not to be supplied with oxygen.

In that case one would value non-existence over existence.

Given this choice we humans have, doesn't this call into question an ethical principle which poses "man's life" as the ultimate value?

Q: “Why am I here?”

A: “To love and serve God and my fellow man.”

When I was growing up in the middle of the last century, that was the teaching in our home and church. That was the regular culture. Never did I hear the God part contradicted until I went to college. Never did I hear the fellow-man part contradicted until a friend gave me Fountainhead and Atlas for reading outside of classes.

I too grew up in the same type of Christian culture, but since it also said 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.', I seem to have focused more on the "yourself", and left out the "serve God" part. Somehow I never cared much about religion, despite all the indoctrination.

The people who held to that Q & A as doctrine were not horrible people. They were in error. Rand’s errors in ethical theory were less extreme, in my view. I don’t think her a horrible person for getting those things wrong.

Imo Rand's errors in her ethical theory can partly be explained with the difficulty she had in feeling empathy.

Edited February 15, 2011 by Xray

[merjet]

If selfishness were not biologically hardwired in us humans, how could we survive for one single day?

Can you comprehend most of the time? It seems you believe the alternatives are never and always, those being mutually exclusive and exhaustive.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Ted,

I'll return to your evaluation of Dawkins if I can. I think you give his contribution both historically and intellectually unfair short shrift.

However, since you expressed particular interest "in hearing [my] response to [your] arguments on the freedom of the will" (post #69), I'll respond first to your discussion on that subject.

I wrote:

However, [Rand] nowhere discusses how to get volition out of deterministic physics -- and that is a huge problem she shared with anyone else who thinks genuine alternatives exist and also thinks that humans are entities made of matter.

You reply:

[i've added unscoring.]

This is only a problem if one makes one or both of two mistakes - either in denying that you are your body, or in treating the freedom of the will as a (meta)physical, rather than as a moral issue.

First, let us define volition. Volition is not merely the ability to act in response to an external stimulus. Nor is it the ability to act when some alternative is imaginable. It is the ability to act when external stimuli and circumstances do not rise to the level of sufficiently and necessarily determining a course of action.

The problem is whether there are any such circumstances as ones in which the state of a physical entity at a given instant *doesn't* "rise to the level of sufficiently and necessarily determining a course of action." Unless you want to resort to quantum indeterminacy as providing an escape route permitting non-sufficient-and-necessary determining conditions *,

* ~~ which route you apparently don't want to rely on, since you write:

[...] whether actions at the sub-atomic level are either "determined" i.e., the in principle predictable results of prior events, or are truly random in some deep sense, the lion is still its own body [...].

~~~

where do you propose to get such circumstances from modern physics? You simply declare that a breach of the causal chain exists with "higher organisms":

[....] Nothing physically external to [the lion] will either force him to initiate action nor will external forces constrain him to any particular goal or path. Volition is the ability of a conscious being to initiate goal-oriented action without external imperative or constraint determining its actions.

The objection may be raised that the lion is forced by his hunger or by past experience to act. But the hunger and the past experience are not present external forces or entities like the wind or gravity or the bars of a cage. They are states of his own body.

Which result from what? Uniquely determining prior states or not? I don't see that you avoid this problem in saying that

"[your] body has decided"

and in asserting that

"volition, or will, is simply a neurobiological faculty of higher animals [...].

I share objection to the idea of "freedom" of the will -- i.e., to the term "free will." I haven't used that term myself except enclosed in scare quotes (unless I goof and forget to use the scare quotes) for a long, long while -- longer than however far back I learned of Locke's arguments, which are similar to yours, against the term. But I don't agree with your conclusion:

[underscore and insert added]

In any case, that the faculty of volition may become so impaired that it is not helpful politically and morally to attribute free will to an agent in no way poses a problem for the theory of the will as a faculty of a higher organism to act on its own accord in the face of subdeterminative external circumstances.

The issue is whether or not there are "subdeterminative" circumstances of any sort, whether "external" or "internal" or combinatorially. The only wiggle room modern physics leaves for "subdeterminative" circumstances is quantum inderminacy. But I think all this would provide is occasional fluky actions, not deliberately directed action. Besides, there's the problem of decoherence in the physical mileau of the brain.

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

If selfishness were not biologically hardwired in us humans, how could we survive for one single day?

Um, for one example, a very obvious example, do you consider sexual desire "hardwired in us humans"? Where's the survival advantage for the individual organism in seeking a sexual partner?

Xray, I think you start from a presupposition and use whatever terminology seems to you to support your presupposition and that you haven't a clue what "hardwiring" of the brain would mean in brain structure or how "hardwiring" would evolve. (I don't use the "hardwiring" metaphor unless I'm speaking carelessly or, as in this case, posing a taunting comment. I think it's a pernicious metaphor which is in fashion at this time and unfortunately is used even by biologists and neurologists who ought to know better, but which won't remain in use as better knowledge of brain evolution is acquired.)

Ellen

[bmacwilliam]

Imo Rand's errors in her ethical theory can partly be explained with the difficulty she had in feeling empathy.

Perhaps you are right about this. To me, the other possibility is that she needed her ethics to lead to her politics which was actually the most important piece to her. She worked backwards from her political stance but didn't admit as much. Or, like you say, she was emotionally retarded. Probably both.

Bob

[merjet]

Xray, I think you start from a presupposition and use whatever terminology seems to you to support your presupposition and that you haven't a clue what "hardwiring" of the brain would mean in brain structure or how "hardwiring" would evolve. (I don't use the "hardwiring" metaphor unless I'm speaking carelessly or, as in this case, posing a taunting comment. I think it's a pernicious metaphor which is in fashion at this time and unfortunately is used even by biologists and neurologists who ought to know better, but which won't remain in use as better knowledge of brain evolution is acquired.)

Bingo. Do you think Xray knows anything about neuroplasticity? "Hardwired" implies or suggests no changes or alternatives.