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We will henceforth call the Objectivist process of observational-integrative generalisation "induction," and the standard version "Hume's problem of enumerative generalisation", or just "Hume's problem."

Let's see if this helps. (I'll return to the issue tomorrow)

Call the Objectivist version $induction. Why let the Objectivists hijack a word that has been around for 300 years?

Induction has meant, for hundreds of years, generalization from enumeration of specific instances. It goes back to Francis Bacon, at least.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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[....] To help clarity, I will simply offer to adopt Roger and Leonard's terminology for the rest of the discussion.

We will henceforth call the Objectivist process of observational-integrative generalisation "induction," and the standard version "Hume's problem of enumerative generalisation", or just "Hume's problem."

Let's see if this helps. (I'll return to the issue tomorrow)

I join Bob in hoping you don't do that, at least not the first half of it. Calling the standard version "Hume's problem of enumerative generalisation," or for short "Hume's gneralisation problem" (I'd add the adjective so as not to imply it was the only problem posed by Hume) is fine and clarifying. But if you call the O'ist process just "induction," then I think this continues the risk of confusion since it would be hard for those of us who well know what the traditional meaning and the traditional problem are to have to keep reminding ourselves "induction" in this discussion doesn't mean what it generally means but something specialized to Objectivist lingo. Sure, one can stipulate any meaning one wants for any term, but some stipulations result in making tracking a subject difficult.

(Also, a 2nd point: I don't think the Objectivist re-formulation gets rid of the traditional problem; I think this problem still lurks, since there's still the question of when you have enough relevant evidence to conclude your generalization holds within the specified constraints, as well as how you know what the parameters of "relevance" for the case under discussion are. The reason scientific laws are often mistakenly thought of as examples of generalizations arrived at by traditional induction is because the logical positivists did think those laws summarized repeated observations and were confirmed, verified, by continued observations, so this still left the issue, when do you know if you've made enough observations?, just as Rand herself described the problem in the Epistemology workshops. Seems to me Peikoff's version, as described by Roger, faces that same question.)

Ellen

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There is an idea that is being sneaked in that is simply false. The idea is that Hume's use of induction is the only one and that the co-called Objectivist version is something specific to Objectivism.

I hate to say it, folks, (no I don't) but a simply Google search (induction definition) explodes that idea. It does not stand. I just did the search and looked at several sources. I saw the Hume meaning. I saw the co-called Objectivist meaning. And I saw a hell of a lot more (induction is a word used in many disciplines and contexts).

Apparently, in logic, the so-called Objectivist meaning has been around quite some time. As it is more general than Hume's meaning, Hume's meaning can even be considered as a category of that broader meaning.

Michael

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There is an idea that is being sneaked in that is simply false. The idea is that Hume's use of induction is the only one and that the co-called Objectivist version is something specific to Objectivism.

No, Michael, the idea "that Hume's use of induction is the only one" isn't being sneaked in or even suggested. And Hume himself didn't have the term "induction." The Objectivist version, however (precisely, Leonard Peikoff's version; it isn't something Rand proposed), is specific to Objectivism since it's entwined with the Objectivist theory of concepts, though I'm still not clear exactly how.

I hate to say it, folks, (no I don't) but a simply Google search (induction definition) explodes that idea. It does not stand. I just did the search and looked at several sources. I saw the Hume meaning. I saw the co-called Objectivist meaning. And I saw a hell of a lot more (induction is a word used in many disciplines and contexts).

Of course "induction" is a word used in many disciplines and contexts, some of them having zero to do with the type of context we're talking about here -- "induction" into the Army, for instance, has zero to do with the problem of induction. The Latin root means "lead into"; the word is used for a variety of meanings. I'm curious as to what you think the Objectivist meaning is, since the meaning you've given yourself at least a couple times (I've by no means read all your posts on the subject, but I recall twice where you gave a particular definition) is your own definition, not Leonard Peikoff's. THE problem of induction, however, is how one can establish a universally quantified statement from particular instances. And I daresay that that is exactly the problem which Leonard Peikoff thinks he's solved. I did hear one of the lectures (and part of another, but that part was his attempt to explain some physics). Sure sounded to me like he thought he'd solved the traditional problem.

Ellen

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Ba'al:

Call the Objectivist version $induction. Why let the Objectivists hijack a word that has been around for 300 years?

I see your point, Bob and Ellen, but this is an Objectivist forum, so I don't mind the change of terminology. Plus, the way this plays out is, I think, actually quite straightforward once you remove this merely verbal issue. It means we can (hopefully) stay out of some obvious cul-de-sacs. So I'll rock with it for a bit, see how we go.

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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The Objectivist version, however (precisely, Leonard Peikoff's version; it isn't something Rand proposed), is specific to Objectivism since it's entwined with the Objectivist theory of concepts, though I'm still not clear exactly how.

Ellen,

That is interesting. You don't know how it is entwined with the Objectivist theory of concepts, but you know it is "specific to Objectivism." What do you hold the Objectivist version of induction to be? Peikoff has some differences with Rand, but from what I know, his concept (version) of induction is not one of them.

THE problem of induction, however, is how one can establish a universally quantified statement from particular instances.

Easy. Concept formation. That suits the problem as you just now stated it to a tee. We keep going over this.

(It doesn't suit Kant too well with his analytic "a priori proposition," but that is another issue. All concepts can be validated by constantly observing new instances of them in reality, not just validated by reference to prior knowledge, thus they actually do involve experience. Also, one cannot even have this "prior knowledge" without having observed some "particular instances," and that includes internal observations of other concepts within certain contexts. One did not gain this "prior knowledge" from being omniscient.)

The whole problem is when one wants the concept or proposition to determine the experience of facts, and not accept that the experience of facts is what determines concepts and propositions. THE real problem of induction that I keep encountering from Hume on up (at least, what I have read of this) is called forecasting the future. This is used constantly to show the unreliability of induction.

But when we get to deduction, we find that there is the same problem: "how one can establish a universally quantized statement from particular instances." Falsifiability is based on the fact that deduction can't forecast the future. The real difference validity-wise is that with deduction, some word game rules are followed. (Not in Objectivist thought, though, since deduction sits on the law of identity, and that applies to things that exist.)

Experience-wise, both induction and deduction are valid forms of handling information about reality. Each does its own thing with the sensory input and integrations, but both, with restrictions, can be used to arrive at a "universally quantized statement from particular instances."

Michael

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The Objectivist version, however (precisely, Leonard Peikoff's version; it isn't something Rand proposed), is specific to Objectivism since it's entwined with the Objectivist theory of concepts, though I'm still not clear exactly how.

Ellen,

That is interesting. You don't know how it is entwined with the Objectivist theory of concepts, but you know it is "specific to Objectivism." What do you hold the Objectivist version of induction to be?

The Objectivist theory of concepts is specific to Objectivism; Rand considered it central to the rest of her system. I don't know the details of how Leonard Peikoff thinks induction is entwined with the Objectivist theory of concepts. I've been trying to find that out. It's possible I've missed some posts of Roger's. There are a great many posts on this thread and I haven't had time to read all of them. I don't think Roger answered my post #126.

There, I wrote in part:

In regard to the point 2 you listed:

2. Induction begins with first-level, self-evidence generalizations to which all other generalizations must be ultimately reduced.

Am I correct in thinking that [LP is] making the claim that we perceive causal connection? That was my understanding of his claim in a statement I've given a couple times, which I take to be his key contention relating concept formation and induction.

A generalization is no more than the perception of cause and effect conceptualized. [....] Induction is measurement-ommission applied to causal connection.

I still don't know if this passage does state Peikoff's "key contention relating concept formation and induction." Roger's description -- note, he said "first-level, self-evidence generalizations" -- sounds to me as if the passage quoted is the key contention. But I await advisement.

(I'll continue in a separate post.)

Ellen

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The Objectivist version, however (precisely, Leonard Peikoff's version; it isn't something Rand proposed), is specific to Objectivism since it's entwined with the Objectivist theory of concepts, though I'm still not clear exactly how.

Ellen,

That is interesting. You don't know how it is entwined with the Objectivist theory of concepts, but you know it is "specific to Objectivism." What do you hold the Objectivist version of induction to be? Peikoff has some differences with Rand, but from what I know, his concept (version) of induction is not one of them.

The first part is addressed in the post above. In regard to Peikoff's version of induction, what I actually wrote is "it isn't something Rand proposed." What Rand might have thought about Peikoff's views might be interesting to speculate about. I don't have quite enough information about exactly what Peikoff's views are to make more than a tentative guess. The tentative guess is that she would have thought he's talking out of school.

I'll quote in full the passage from the Epistemology Workshops in which AR has an exchange with "Prof. M" about the issue of scientific laws and induction.

Prof. M isn't happy with the way he framed the questions, hasn't been happy with the way he framed them since the day on which the exchange occurred. (I know this because Prof. M is Larry.)

Her answers, however, are something that Peikoff would have to go some distance to address if he's claiming one can arrive at inductive certainty. See especially her first reply and the first paragraph of her second reply. (The second paragraph of the second reply reveals lack of knowledge of the specifics about ether, but I think that can be overlooked in the context of the general point she's making.)

Notice she says that she hasn't worked on the subject "enough to even begin to formulate it." Thus my statement that Peikoff's version "isn't something Rand proposed."

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology

Mentor Expanded Second Edition, 1990

Appendix: Copyright © 1990 by Estate of Ayn Rand

pp. 301-04

Prof. M: Would you consider the following method of confirming a scientific principle to be valid? One formulates the principle being guided by one's knowledge of fact. Using the principle, one next deduces how entities under certain conditions should act. Then, if one observes such action and, within the context of one's knowledge can account for it only by the principle which predicted it, it follows that the principle has been confirmed. In summary, one induces the principle, deduces its consequences, and if only that principle is known to give rise to those consequences, which in turn exist, then the principle is confirmed as a contextual absolute.

AR: This is outside the province of my book; this is the theory of induction. But within this context, I would say, no, this would not be the right procedure, and there is a danger of a very, very grave error here. Because if you follow the procedure you outline here, and you make certain predictions on the basis of a hypothesis, and the entities do act accordingly, you conclude that you can hold as a contextual absolute that it was your hypothesis that was operating and that it is therefore true. You are assuming an omniscience that contextual knowledge cannot permit. Because since you are not omniscient, within the context of your knowledge you cannot say that your particular hypothesis was the only possible cause of the entities acting the way you predicted. You would have to say this offers great confirmation of your hypothesis, but it still remains a hypothesis and cannot be taken as knowledge. Why? Because so many other possibilities are involved. And I don't mean unknown or unknowable factors--I mean that it would be impossible, for any complex principle of science that you are trying to establish, to eliminate, even within your own context of knowledge, all the other possibilities.

What I would question is this part of the procedure: "if only that principle is known to give rise to those consequences"--that's the mistake of arrested knowledge, right there.

Prof. M: Even though it is relative to what you know at that time?

AR: Even though it's at that time and it's your full context of knowledge. Because you cannot conclude that something which is not fully known to you can be produced only by one hypothesized factor. On the basis of that same context of knowledge, any number of hypotheses could be constructed. Which is why we need hypotheses. If it were otherwise, then your hypothesis to begin with would almost have to be a certainty.

Historically, some dreadful errors have resulted from that method. One of them is the denial of the existence of ether. I don't mean that ether necessarily exists; I mean the process by which they denied it, was of this type. They predicted something with an artificial absolute or ultimatum delivered to nature--if light bends in a certain way (or something on that order), then it proves that space is a vacuum. It certainly does not, and I am no physicist, I am just an epistemologist. You cannot arbitrarily restrict the facts of nature to your current level of knowledge. In other words, you cannot take the context of your knowledge, as if reality were confined only to that which you know, and deliver ultimatums, saying, "If my hypothesis predicts correctly, then it is only my hypothesis that can be true."

Prof. M: Take the example of Newton's theory of universal gravitation. He said that if the theory is true, then the planets will exhibit elliptical orbits with the sun at one of the foci. Now it is found in astronomy that the planets do follow that path. So what can one say then about Newton's theory? Is it a possible explanation? Is it correct, or what?

AR: After it has been verified by a great many observations, not merely the verification of one prediction, then at a certain time one can accept it as fact. But taking your example as an illustration of what you are asking, if the sole validation for Newton's principle was that it predicted that orbits will be elliptical, and then we observed that they are elliptical--that wouldn't be sufficient proof. Epistemologically, it wouldn't be enough. You would have to have other observations, from different aspects of the same issue, which all support this hypothesis. [Historically, Newton validated his theory by means of a great many observations of widely differing phenomena. {My note: the insert is the editors'.}]

Prof. M: The question is: when does one stop? When does one decide that enough confirming evidence exists? Is that in the province of the issue of induction?

AR: Yes. That's the big question of induction. Which I couldn't begin to discuss - because (a) I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it, and (b ) it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process in that field.

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OK, so at last I get a moment to refer back to Roger's crucial post. It is important for two reasons. Firstly because it clears up a long-standing verbal confusion, and secondly, beneath the verbal smoke, it highlights two areas of surprising agreement:

Roger:

Hume is not even talking about the same thing that Peikoff and I are.

"Hume's problem" is over what Roger calls "enumerative generalisation"; the fact that you can't validly go from X swans are white -> All swans are white.

Roger and Peikoff, on the other hand, are talking about "induction" in the Objectivist sense - a process of observational-integrative generalisation. Details of this are sketchy to non-Objectivists; however they claim it is completely different from "enumerative generalisation," so we should take them at their word.

Hence we now have a fundamental and highly unproductive confusion cleared up.

Roger:

We are saying that enumerative generalization is NOT induction. Nor is it deduction. Nor therefore is it "deductively valid."

Now to me this is the first point of striking agreement, which I will repeat despite risking incensing Roger ( I think he got annoyed previously only because the confusion over the term "induction" was muddying the waters, and he didn't see this himself).

Roger and Peikoff are saying "enumerative generalization" is not deductively valid.

Now, with the terms corrected, we see clearly that this is also Hume's view.

Thus, Roger and Peikoff and Hume all agree on this key point at least. The difference is that while Hume clung to "enumerative generalisation" despite its deductive invalidity, Roger and Peikoff replace it with "observational-integrative generalisation",* or "induction." (We should note however that their "induction" is no more deductively valid than Hume's, but that they argue that it doesn't need to be)

The second point of agreement is also important, if slightly harder to see. It lies in the practical consequences of each theory.

The practical consequence of Hume's criticism of "enumerative generalisation" is that no matter how many experiences we have, we'll never have enough make an infallible universal law. We are not omniscient; there is always the possibility new facts and events outside of our experience will disprove our theory. Thus, a "universal law" is an abstract ideal we can almost certainly never achieve, although we can do our best to try to attain it.

Similarly, the practical consequence of Roger and Peikoff's "observational-integrative generalisation" is that no matter how many experiences we have, we'll never arrive at an infallible universal law either. It also holds that we are not omniscient; there is always the possibility new facts and events outside of our experience will disprove our theory. Thus, also for the Objectivist camp, a "universal law" is also an abstract ideal that we can almost certainly never achieve.

It is hard to deny that this is a pretty close position. However, philosophers are only to clever at making mountains out of molehills. Perhaps it is time to wheel out one of my favourite warnings, from Freud, about the dangers of the "narcissism of minor difference."

The remaining difference between the two sides on this (other than some terms, that is**) is indeed minor, and seems to be merely psychological; that is, in the attitude to the situation. The Objectivists seem to view the ideal of a comprehensive universal law as a kind of Platonic siren, luring unwitting explorers into the oblivion of impossibility, and to be therefore shunned and anathematised. My own view is less negative. I tend to see an ideal like a universal law as a mighty goal to be aimed at; the hardest, highest and fewest of all pursuits, something that a man, if sufficiently brilliant, determined, and insanely lucky might just against all odds get within his grasp. The rub is this: For the privilege of the very possibility of this, the price he pays is that he never quite knows for sure that he has it.

I say it's worth it.

Roger:

You want an apology? All right. You didn't "put words in my mouth," so I'm sorry for saying that.

Thank you.

Roger:

What I am still incensed about, though, is your continual attempts to lump me and Peikoff in with Hume, saying that "we all agree" that "induction is not deductively valid."

I hope you see my point clearly now with much of the verbal smoke blown away.

*BTW this seems to be another way of saying "concept formation." Is there any major difference? If not, why not throw away the term "induction" altogether then?

**For example, the Objectivists call this state of affairs "certainty" and even "absolute certainty", whereas everyone else calls it "uncertainty." This is the converse of the previous problem with "induction" where we had the same word for two different situations. Here we have two words, and opposites at that, for the same underlying situation. However, as the situation with "induction" demonstrates, the confusion is merely verbal and no deeper.

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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THE problem of induction, however, is how one can establish a universally quantized statement from particular instances.

Easy. Concept formation. That suits the problem as you just now stated it to a tee. We keep going over this.

Well...you might have kept going over it, but I've kept skipping your explanations on the subject, not wanting to get into the issue of concept formation unless I have some time to do that. With a little bit of luck, I might have a little time to start this weekend.

The O'ist theory of concepts is the "800 pound elephant" here, since Peikoff (near as I'm able to ascertain) does think that the O'ist theory of concepts provides the solution to the problem of induction. I not only think there isn't a solution (i.e., that there's no way you can be sure you have your factual universals correct), I think the O'ist theory of concepts is mostly wrong. Not a subject to be tackled in a minute.

Most of the further comments you wrote I can't make sense of. I'll adress just this one point:

Falsifiability is based on the fact that deduction can't forecast the future.

Deduction makes no claims to forecast the future, only claims about the logical relationship of propositions.

Ellen

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The O'ist theory of concepts is the "800 pound elephant" here, since Peikoff (near as I'm able to ascertain) does think that the O'ist theory of concepts provides the solution to the problem of induction. I not only think there isn't a solution (i.e., that there's no way you can be sure you have your factual universals correct), I think the O'ist theory of concepts is mostly wrong. Not a subject to be tackled in a minute.

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The O'ists themselve say concepts are "open ended". At the very least it mains that concepts are open toi revision. Example: A child sees only largish dogs and forms the concept "dog" from his experience. What does he do when he sees the Taco Belle ™ dog, which is more like a rat or a weasel than a self respecting dog such as a Great Dane or a German Shepherd. He has to recalibrate or reformulate his -idea- of what a dog is. Just an anecdote here: I live in a retirement community and I see the codgers and gaffers out walking these bizarre little mutts. Some of them are ridiculously tiny, smaller than large rats. So I often stop and ask them what is at the end of their leash. I usually get an indignant response -- that is my dawg! How dare I question what it is they are walking.

In the case of a universally quantified (not quantized) proposition derived from a set of examples, the outlier or exceptional instance falsifies the generalization. Good bye. It is explode, contradicted, destroyed. That is one of the differences between enumerated inductions and $concept-formation. Both start with sets of examples but what they end up with is quite different. An outlier or exception cause a -concept- to be extended or modified, not discarded (usually).

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited by BaalChatzaf
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Ellen says that I have not replied to her question in this post. I have highlighted it, as well as another point on which I want to comment for (possible) clarification...

Roger,

Does Peikoff give a definition of what he means by "induction"? [Edit: He gives a statement which sounds like a definition in the quote from him below. However, I'm not seeing how that definition would produce reflections on the kinds of scientific issues hinted at in your post.] From what you describe in your post #115, it sounds to me as if what he's talking about is what I'd call theory formation and testing rather than the traditional meaning of making a universally quantized statement (an "all") statement on the basis of a group of uniform observations (I've observed X number, all of which have had a particular quality).

In regard to the point 2 you listed:

2. Induction begins with first-level, self-evidence generalizations to which all other generalizations must be ultimately reduced.

Am I correct in thinking that he's making the claim that we perceive causal connection? That was my understanding of his claim in a statement I've given a couple times, which I take to be his key contention relating concept formation and induction.

A generalization is no more than the perception of cause and effect conceptualized. [....] Induction is measurement-ommission applied to causal connection.

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1. Peikoff's model of induction is very much like "theory formation and testing." He stresses that generalization must always be supplemented with further observation and integration, even if that amounts not to a quest for constant observation of a specific kind of phenomenon, but instead simply being open to experience and data that does not integrate with the generalization, so that a wider context has been revealed, leading to a possible need to expand or revise the generalization. As said numerous times, it is not enumerative generalization, which is invalid. (Lucky guesses notwithstanding.)

2. Yes, causality is a perceptual (i.e., perceivable) phenomenon. If a roll a ball across the floor, I perceive that the ball is rolling and I perceive that I made the ball roll. Something's making something happen is (often, anyway) every bit as perceivable as something's happening.

REB

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2. Yes, causality is a perceptual (i.e., perceivable) phenomenon. If a roll a ball across the floor, I perceive that the ball is rolling and I perceive that I made the ball roll. Something's making something happen is (often, anyway) every bit as perceivable as something's happening.

REB

No. No. You -inferred- the cause. You did not see (i.e. perceive) what (if anything) initiated the motion. All you perceived was something in motion. You ought to distinguish between what you witnessed and what you concluded. In a court of law, a conclusion stated by a witness concerning what is being questioned, is not admissible. A good attorney will object to the conclusion and claim it is not a -fact- that is witnessed.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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~ Apparently, Mill (you know: the one ignored in all this) meant something, well, a bit 'different' from Hume also: to wit...

J. S. Mill --- on Induction

...we ARE talking a bit more than mere 'enumeration' (aka simplistic mere 'generalizing') here; indeed way more than "Since 'X' deductions are error-free...so far, then the next 'X+1'th deduction will be also (or, 'swans' and 'white', if you wish.)" --- In short, Hume is not the 'last word' , nor the most common, (especially in hard science) re the term 'induction' (mathematical or empirical.)

~ Though arguing in terms of groups, there seems a kinship, to me, in Mill's views on induction with O'ism's, though his focus is more for science-specialists than 'concept-formation' per se (especially in psychological development) of any/every one who attempts thinking.

LLAP

J:D

Edited by John Dailey
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~ Apparently, Mill (you know: the one ignored in all this) meant something a bit different from Hume also: to wit...

J. S. Mill --- on Induction

...we ARE talking a bit more than mere 'enumeration' (aka simplistic mere 'generalizing') here; indeed way more than "Since 'X' deductions are error-free...so far, then the next 'X+1'th deduction will be also (or 'swans' if you wish.)"

~ Though arguing in terms of groups, there seems a kinship, to me, in his views on induction with O'ism's, though the focus is more for science-specialists than 'concept-formation' per se (especially in psychological development) of any/every one who attempts thinking.

LLAP

J:D

In the case of concept formation, the end product (the concept) is not set in stone. If there are variants to the original examples experienced,. the concept is usually revised, not abandoned or rejected. That is why we are able to handle little Taco Belle ™ dogs in the same conceptual category as Great Danes, Greyhounds, and German Shepherds. Concepts are flexible. Universally qunatified statements are either true or false.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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~ Apparently, Mill (you know: the one ignored in all this) meant something a bit different from Hume also: to wit...

J. S. Mill --- on Induction

...we ARE talking a bit more than mere 'enumeration' (aka simplistic mere 'generalizing') here; indeed way more than "Since 'X' deductions are error-free...so far, then the next 'X+1'th deduction will be also (or 'swans' if you wish.)"

~ Though arguing in terms of groups, there seems a kinship, to me, in his views on induction with O'ism's, though the focus is more for science-specialists than 'concept-formation' per se (especially in psychological development) of any/every one who attempts thinking.

LLAP

J:D

In the case of concept formation, the end product (the concept) is not set in stone. If there are variants to the original examples experienced,. the concept is usually revised, not abandoned or rejected. That is why we are able to handle little Taco Belle ™ dogs in the same conceptual category as Great Danes, Greyhounds, and German Shepherds. Concepts are flexible. Universally qunatified statements are either true or false.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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David Hume wasn't always such a sceptic about induction. Indeed, he described three of (so-called) Mill's methods before Mill did. See Bk I, Part III, Sec. XV of his Treatise of Human Nature - Rules by which to judge of causes and effects. He described there the method of agreement, the method of difference, and the method of concomitant variations.

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In the case of a universally quantified (not quantized) proposition [...].

Yech. Miswrite. I fixed it in my post #304 but can't fix it in Michael's (post #306) quote from that post.

===

Roger,

Thanks for the reply (post #312).

===

Michael,

Re your post #318, precisely who is it you think was trying to sneak anything in? I wish if you think someone is being dishonest, you would name who and quote chapter and verse instead of making vague accusations.

Ellen

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Baal:

~ No one said that the end product of concept formation was set in stone (least of all any 'open-ended' concept "O-ist"). Relevence of this point of yours is...?

Merlin:

~ He wasn't? Thanx for that tid. Interesting. Will check it out. Uh, so?

~ 2nd question: what do you mean by 'so-called' re Mill's methods? They weren't actually methods, or, that Hume covered 3 of them?

~ 3rd question: why don't we refer to them as "Hume's methods (with Mill's 'supplements' "?

DB:

~ Yes, you did. However, you didn't elaborate. Now, I'm more confused than ever about Hume (or, as most perceive him): He 'remained' an inductivist, whilst being a sceptic about 'causality'? Or, like Plato, did he have 2nd thoughts about the latter in later life which I missed? Would you elucidate a bit more on this...especially what sense the combo makes?

LLAP

J:D

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DB:

~ Fwiw, given our usual disagreements, I think you exemplarily clarified how the term 'induction' was used by Hume (and is accepted by too many as the 'only' acceptable meaning of it), and how Peikoff et al defined their use of it in their discussions/analyses of it.

~ Hate to say this :sick: , but...good :super: post.

LLAP

J:D

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DB:

~ Fwiw, given our usual disagreements, I think you exemplarily clarified how the term 'induction' was used by Hume [...].

I also applaud Daniel's clarificatory post, now appearing as the start of a separate thread here.

Just keeping the history of usage straight, however (Daniel didn't say otherwsie than this and in at least one of his posts, though I forget which, specifically said this).

Hume didn't use the term "induction" himself, although what's called "the problem of induction" has come to be called "Hume's problem."

See:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/#Hum

"The term 'induction' does not appear in Hume's account."

He used the description "causal inference."

Ellen

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Edited by Ellen Stuttle
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