Parsing Existence

[Ellen Stuttle]

How, within your framework, can you know our perceptions "are always incomplete"?

For example, our eyes only register a small band of the electromagnetic spectrum, all of which can carry structural information. This is true of all of our senses - they only have limited ranges.

But how do you know that? You are, are you not, making assertions about the nature of what's Out There, about, quoting you, "TWWAF => that which we abstract from." See your own earlier comments and examine "the electromagnetic spectrum" using the same approach you used in examining the statement "the earth IS round." Methinks you're hoist on the petard of your own thesis.

TWWAF => that which we abstract from

Obviously if we believe we evolved over a period of billions of years something (TWWAF) had to be here to evolve on but. as conscious humans, what we call 'objects' are actually abstractions from TWWAF. Animals do not know this, they think their abstractions are TWWAF and this is why Korzybski calls it 'copying animals with our nervous responses' if we believe our abstractions ARE the events outside us. Let's examine this statement "the earth IS round". This is shorthand for saying we have done some measurements on this thing called 'the earth' and have come to the conclusion that it is similar in shape to that of a sphere. The thing we call the earth does not have the property of 'roundness', we simply attribute this to it based on our measurements and mathematics. The earth is in fact NOT round, it may be roundISH or sort of round but it IS NOT simply round. This is completely general, whatever you say something is, it IS NOT.

In short, TWWAF exists independent of us but discrete objects require an observer. Perhaps if Rand means TWWAF by 'objective reality' I could agree but the statement "Something exists which one perceives" would have to be amended to "Something exists which one perceives FROM", for example.

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

I will make some guesses about her reasons [for negativity against Hayek].

1. Hayek argued that the basic problem with socialism is that it based on the false idea of "constructive rationalism," the belief that some men can rationally order society top-down via government. In doing so he argued against reason. It was an abuse of reason, but I suspect Rand did not approve of deprecating reason in any manner.

2. Hayek is known to have supported government-run welfare programs. Of course, it most likely was not near to the extent they exist today or that statists desire.

3. He was an economist who use the term subjective value.

Upon seeing that list, I've recalled George Smith writing about those reasons for her antipathy to Hayek, with special emphasis on her misunderstanding the idea of subjective value. Apparently, if I'm remembering right what George said, she reacted against the "subjective" but without understanding the economist's-usage context....

Ellen

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[Alfonso Jones]

Thanks much for the quotes from Hayek, Merlin (as well as for your contributions in general on these threads, and for other material you've linked -- e.g., your RoR post on "representation" and your material on "measurement" in relation to Rand's theories).

You're welcome.

I wonder if Rand ever read The Sensory Order. She was quite negative against Hayek, for reasons I'm unclear about, but I wonder how extensive an acquaintance she had with his work.

That's a good "wonder". I will make some guesses about her reasons.

1. Hayek argued that the basic problem with socialism is that it based on the false idea of "constructive rationalism," the belief that some men can rationally order society top-down via government. In doing so he argued against reason. It was an abuse of reason, but I suspect Rand did not approve of deprecating reason in any manner.

2. Hayek is known to have supported government-run welfare programs. Of course, it most likely was not near to the extent they exist today or that statists desire.

3. He was an economist who use the term subjective value.

On the Austrian term "subjective value," I quote from Thomas Taylor, in "An Introduction to Austrian Economics":

"The explanation of all economic activity that takes place in the market economy ultimately rests on the subjective theory of value. The value of various consumer goods and services does not reside objectively and intrinsically in the things themselves, apart from the individual who is making an evaluation. His valuation is a subjective matter that even he cannot reduce to objective terms or measurement. Valuation consists in preferring a particular increment of a thing over increments of alternative things available; the outcome of valuation is the ranking of definite quantities of various goods and services with which the individual is concerned for purposes of decision and action. Theory resorts to the hypothetical concept of the scale of values in seeking to explain and understand the nature of human valuations. The ranking of alternative ends is determined by the person's expectations of satisfaction from each specific choice faced by him at any moment of decision. He will invariably select the alternative that he believes will yield him the greatest satisfaction.

The subjectiveness of valuation rests in the nature of satisfaction--satisfaction is subjective and not open to numerical measurement. The extent to which a thing gives satisfaction is always personal. People derive satisfaction from different goods and services; that is, all people are not alike in terms of the types of things that please them. Experience also demonstrates that a person's preferences vary from time to time. His ranking of alternative choices may undergo a reshuffling at any given moment. His scale of values may also be altered by deletions or additions.

To relate the matter of valuation to the individual person is not to suggest that each individual is concerned only with the satisfaction of his own appetites and needs. A person may find satisfaction or relief in helping another person. Satisfaction can be and often is derived from the attainment of altruistic as well as "selfish" motives. But the point remains that regardless of the form the satisfaction is to take, each choice arises from subjective valuation on the part of the particular person who is doing the choosing. The uneasiness that he seeks to remove is in his own mind, whether such uneasiness pertains to an immediate problem of his own or to a problem faced by someone else. His choice stems from the preference that he has for the removal of a particular uneasiness over another problem to which he could devote his attention."

Alfonso

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Sorry folks,

An entity is not an abstraction. There is top-down organization in the universe, not just in our heads. We can abstract it because it exists.

I claim that the way we organize invariant quantities and symmetries into mental symbols correctly reflects Out There because In Here, since we are part of the same reality, we obey the same natural laws as Out There.

"As above, so below": the old theory -- and in some modern variants, still the basic theory -- of astrology. Oh, good; glad to see Objectivism a la Michael has so long-standing a lineage. Nothing new under the sun.

Ellen,

1. I have never supported astrology, yet you insinuate that I do.

2. I have never claimed that these two ideas are Objectivism. They are my own conclusions and I have never presented them as anything but my own conclusions, yet you insinuate that they are my version of Objectivism.

Your little post is smear and nothing more. There is nothing behind it. You would do James Valliant proud. At least you seemed to have learned from him. I don't recall you descending like this before.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

It is "élan vital", élan is masculine.

Noted. Fixed. Thanks. How did you do the "é"? (I copied from your post but don't know how to do it directly.)

I think you asked that before. In Windows you type <alt>130 (with the numeric keypad), but as far as I remember you don't use Windows. Another solution might be

é

Strange enough this automatically changes into é in my edit window, but remains visible as code in the preview window. Let's now look what it does when I submit this message: é...

Ah, it works! You can also preview a second time to make it visible, as the preview than copies the é in the edit window.

Oh shit, now the code has also been converted in the code window, while I edited this post. So here it comes again:

é

Damn! Again converted! Then I'll insert spaces: & # 2 3 3

Remove the spaces and you get the desired letter.

Edited October 29, 2007 by Dragonfly

[tjohnson]

But how do you know that? You are, are you not, making assertions about the nature of what's Out There, about, quoting you, "TWWAF => that which we abstract from." See your own earlier comments and examine "the electromagnetic spectrum" using the same approach you used in examining the statement "the earth IS round." Methinks you're hoist on the petard of your own thesis.

We know it because we have created instruments that DO register other ranges besides the ones we can sense. It's the same as with the structure of the earth, we take measurements with instruments and create symbolic "maps" of the structure we find.

[tjohnson]

Maybe Korzybski's own words would help;

As abstracting in many orders seems to be a general process found in all forms

of life, but particularly in humans, it is of importance to be clear on this subject and

to select a language of proper structure. As we know already, we use one term, say

‘apple’, for at least four entirely different entities; namely, (1) the event, or scientific

object, or the sub-microscopic physico-chemical processes, (2) the ordinary object

manufactured from the event by our lower nervous centres, (3) the psycho-logical

picture probably manufactured by the higher centres, and (4) the verbal definition of

the term. If we use a language of adjectives and subject-predicate forms pertaining

to ‘sense’ impressions, we are using a language which deals with entities inside our

skin and characteristics entirely non-existent in the outside world. Thus the events

outside our skin are neither cold nor warm, green nor red, sweet nor bitter. , but

these characteristics are manufactured by our nervous system inside our skins, as

responses only to different energy manifestations, physico-chemical processes, .

When we use such terms, we are dealing with characteristics which are absent in the

external world, and build up an anthropomorphic and delusional world non-similar

in structure to the world around us. Not so if we use a language of order, relations,

or structure, which can be applied to sub-microscopic events, to objective levels, to

semantic levels, and which can also be expressed in words. In using such language,

we deal with characteristics found or discovered on all levels which give us

structural data uniquely important for knowledge. The ordering on semantic levels

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Maybe Korzybski's own words would help;

As abstracting in many orders seems to be a general process found in all forms

of life, but particularly in humans, it is of importance to be clear on this subject and

to select a language of proper structure. As we know already, we use one term, say

‘apple’, for at least four entirely different entities; namely, (1) the event, or scientific

object, or the sub-microscopic physico-chemical processes, (2) the ordinary object

manufactured from the event by our lower nervous centres, (3) the psycho-logical

picture probably manufactured by the higher centres, and (4) the verbal definition of

the term. If we use a language of adjectives and subject-predicate forms pertaining

to ‘sense’ impressions, we are using a language which deals with entities inside our

skin and characteristics entirely non-existent in the outside world. Thus the events

outside our skin are neither cold nor warm, green nor red, sweet nor bitter. , but

these characteristics are manufactured by our nervous system inside our skins, as

responses only to different energy manifestations, physico-chemical processes, .

When we use such terms, we are dealing with characteristics which are absent in the

external world, and build up an anthropomorphic and delusional world non-similar

in structure to the world around us. Not so if we use a language of order, relations,

or structure, which can be applied to sub-microscopic events, to objective levels, to

semantic levels, and which can also be expressed in words. In using such language,

we deal with characteristics found or discovered on all levels which give us

structural data uniquely important for knowledge. The ordering on semantic levels

GS,

I agree that the symbol in the mind is not the thing Out There, but it represents the thing Out There from (1) sense organs capturing waves and particles emanating from that thing, then (2) these impulses being sorted, integrated, stored and discarded, thus creating new mental existents (the symbols).

I really do not like phrases like the following: "When we use such terms, we are dealing with characteristics which are absent in the external world, and build up an anthropomorphic and delusional world non-similar in structure to the world around us." Delusional? Why delusional? Are not value judgments, degrees and awareness of differences/similarities just as much a part of reality as external things? I am referring specifically to his examples: cold and warm, green and red, sweet and bitter.

Is a person being delusional because he integrates himself with his perceptions? In the list of 4 items, I did not see "what the event means to the observer." It is tempting to conclude that Korzybski is saying that if an event means something to a person and he adds this value to his description of it, he is being delusional. But I do not know enough to make that claim. I certainly cannot imagine that this is what he really means.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

I agree that the symbol in the mind is not the thing Out There, but it represents the thing Out There from (1) sense organs capturing waves and particles emanating from that thing, then (2) these impulses being sorted, integrated, stored and discarded, thus creating new mental existents (the symbols).

I really do not like phrases like the following: "When we use such terms, we are dealing with characteristics which are absent in the external world, and build up an anthropomorphic and delusional world non-similar in structure to the world around us." Delusional? Why delusional? Are not value judgments, degrees and awareness of differences/similarities just as much a part of reality as external things? I am referring specifically to his examples: cold and warm, green and red, sweet and bitter.

Is a person being delusional because he integrates himself with his perceptions? In the list of 4 items, I did not see "what the event means to the observer." It is tempting to conclude that Korzybski is saying that if an event means something to a person and he adds this value to his description of it, he is being delusional. But I do not know enough to make that claim. I certainly cannot imagine that this is what he really means.

Michael

Delusional is a poor word to use in this context, so I agree with that. However our internal abstractions and judgments are derivative and not primary. If humans disappeared their judgments and abstractions would also vanish, since a brain is required to maintain them. However the things to which the judgments etc. pertained might persist. Our judgments are less primary than the things judged. Facts first, judgments second. And not only second, but contingent. Our judgments might not be delusional at all, but they are contingent and ephemeral. Facts are absolute. Judgments are not. They might be right, they might be wrong, they might be true in one circumstance and false in another. Tricky things, judgments.

Another thing about judgments. They are not -determined- by facts, rather they are constrained by facts. Two perfectly reasonable people can behold the same finite set of facts and come to quite different conclusions (i.e. judgments). And they both can be wrong. That is because the judgments may require more facts than are given (under-determination). That is also why facts do not determine theories uniquely.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

If humans disappeared their judgments and abstractions would also vanish, since a brain is required to maintain them. However the things to which the judgments etc. pertained might persist.

(my bold)

Bob,

That's a mighty big might. The only things I can think of that would not persist if man disappeared are man-made things. Rand once wrote an essay on this distinction, "The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made." It is in Philosophy: Who Needs It (third essay).

One of the most common errors committed is for a person to treat a man-made thing as if it were metaphysical only, then make claims about how reality or man is limited more than they are.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

How did you do the "é"?

I think you asked that before. [Followed by instructions.]

What I asked before was how to do an umlaut. You explained a trick which worked doing an umlaut with a Mac. Unfortunately, I've misplaced the copy I made of your explanation.

And I didn't follow the instructions on how to do the é, but apparently I can do it just by copying from your post. Thus I shall try, this time, to remember where I'm saving the URL to find the post in case of need. ;-)

Thanks.

Ellen

___

Edited October 30, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Jonathan]

How did you do the "é"?

I think you asked that before. [Followed by instructions.]

What I asked before was how to do an umlaut. You explained a trick which worked doing an umlaut with a Mac. Unfortunately, I've misplaced the copy I made of your explanation.

And I didn't follow the instructions on how to do the é, but apparently I can do it just by copying from your post. Thus I shall try, this time, to remember where I'm saving the URL to find the post in case of need. ;-)

Thanks.

Ellen

___

On Mac, an "é" is produced by pressing option-e, releasing, and then hitting just the e key again. Option-u, release, and then u creates an umlaut. The same sequence works with other vowels.

Depending on the age of your Mac, you can also go to your "Edit" pull-down menu and select "Special Characters..." which opens a Character Palette, which should give you piles of options of letters, shapes and symbols (some of which may not be compatible with non-Mac systems). Double-clicking on any of the items will insert them into the text where your cursor is in any application that you're using to write your messages.

J

[Ellen Stuttle]

On Mac, an "é" is produced by pressing option-e, releasing, and then hitting just the e key again. Option-u, release, and then u creates an umlaut. The same sequence works with other vowels.

Depending on the age of your Mac, you can also go to your "Edit" pull-down menu and select "Special Characters..." which opens a Character Palette, which should give you piles of options of letters, shapes and symbols (some of which may not be compatible with non-Mac systems). Double-clicking on any of the items will insert them into the text where your cursor is in any application that you're using to write your messages.

J

é ü

é ü

Guess what? Both ways work. Things I didn't know about this lovely laptop I've (not long ago) acquired. My old Mac didn't have the "Special Characters" selection on the "Edit" menu, and I hadn't noticed that this one did. How very simple.

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

But how do you know that [that there exists an electromagnetic spectrum only a small band of which is registered by our eyes]? You are, are you not, making assertions about the nature of what's Out There, about, quoting you, "TWWAF => that which we abstract from." See your own earlier comments and examine "the electromagnetic spectrum" using the same approach you used in examining the statement "the earth IS round." Methinks you're hoist on the petard of your own thesis.

We know it because we have created instruments that DO register other ranges besides the ones we can sense. It's the same as with the structure of the earth, we take measurements with instruments and create symbolic "maps" of the structure we find.

But in the case of taking measurements of the earth and creating a symbolic "map," you wrote:

[...] what we call 'objects' are actually abstractions from TWWAF. [....] This is completely general, whatever you say something is, it IS NOT.

What I'm asking is why you would then say otherwise of the electromagnetic spectrum: why would you say you know what that IS, unlike in the case of "objects"? Aren't you in the same situation of abstracting as regards the electromagnetic spectrum as you're in as regards the shape of the earth?

I don't see that the passage you referred to from Korzybski (post #107) helps, since I have the same question about what's quoted: How can he claim to have access to the nature of "the event, or scientific object, or the sub-microscopic physico-chemical processes"? It seems to me that an assertion is being made about the ultimate nature of TWWAF, an assertion the truth of which, by the logic of your own thesis, can't be demonstrated. I think that instead you'd logically have to say, with Bob K. (post #109), "the things to which the judgments etc. pertained might persist" (my emphasis). I realize that you've said a number of times that you consider logic "useless." It's just that I was intrigued by the contrast between your general epistemological views and your apparent certainty about what TWWAF is.

Ellen

___

[BaalChatzaf]

" It's just that I was intrigued by the contrast between your general epistemological views and your apparent certainty about what TWWAF is.

Ellen

___

TWWAF = Whatever it is that is Out There. Our certainty of TWWAF is bandwidth limited, given that our senses are crude and (more importantly) the theories which enable us to infer stuff from our instruments are not uniquely determined by the finite set of facts we happen to have experienced. Our theories are inherently under determined so we should be somewhat modest about our claims of certainty. (NB: This is NOT radical skepticism, but rational caution)

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited October 30, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[tjohnson]

What I'm asking is why you would then say otherwise of the electromagnetic spectrum: why would you say you know what that IS, unlike in the case of "objects"? Aren't you in the same situation of abstracting as regards the electromagnetic spectrum as you're in as regards the shape of the earth?

I don't see that the passage you referred to from Korzybski (post #107) helps, since I have the same question about what's quoted: How can he claim to have access to the nature of "the event, or scientific object, or the sub-microscopic physico-chemical processes"? It seems to me that an assertion is being made about the ultimate nature of TWWAF, an assertion the truth of which, by the logic of your own thesis, can't be demonstrated. I think that instead you'd logically have to say, with Bob K. (post #109), "the things to which the judgments etc. pertained might persist" (my emphasis). I realize that you've said a number of times that you consider logic "useless." It's just that I was intrigued by the contrast between your general epistemological views and your apparent certainty about what TWWAF is.

LOL, I would never, ever say what TWWAF is! That would be heresy in GS Basically Korzybski is saying that subject-predicate language, like "grass is green" misrepresents the situation in which we find ourselves and we know this because of science.

[tjohnson]

I really do not like phrases like the following: "When we use such terms, we are dealing with characteristics which are absent in the external world, and build up an anthropomorphic and delusional world non-similar in structure to the world around us." Delusional? Why delusional? Are not value judgments, degrees and awareness of differences/similarities just as much a part of reality as external things? I am referring specifically to his examples: cold and warm, green and red, sweet and bitter.

Is a person being delusional because he integrates himself with his perceptions? In the list of 4 items, I did not see "what the event means to the observer." It is tempting to conclude that Korzybski is saying that if an event means something to a person and he adds this value to his description of it, he is being delusional. But I do not know enough to make that claim. I certainly cannot imagine that this is what he really means.

Here is a question; What is it Hitler and the Nazis believed that led them to murder millions of Jews? Could it have been something like "Jews are animals"? The subject-predicate linguistic form can indeed create a delusional world, in fact, it can lead to illusions and even hallucinations, in Korzybski's opinion, and I agree with him. GS is not merely epistemology, it is a theory of sanity, and Korzybski believed that the structure of our language effects our sanity.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

GS,

I do not think Hitler & Co. managed to get their racist agenda across because of imprecise language and I do not think the subject-predicate form is the root of delusions. There was a series of forces at work with German antisemitism. Propaganda (which is the area closest to the language aspect) made use of emotionally charged slogans, not simply cognitive differences. The base of those nationalistic emotions had a lot to do with one of the worst inflations in the history of mankind and the humiliation Germany suffered with the defeat of WWI and a host of other things that had nothing to do with subject-predicate form. They would have hated regardless of the form of language used.

Michael

[merjet]

I'm replying to post #107. My exposure to Korzybski is limited to what General Semanticist has posted on OL. My initial reactions have been similar to MSK and Ellen. I like Hayek's perspective in The Sensory Order much better.

In the excerpt in #107 Korzybski seems to posit two different worlds and a dichotomy between percepts and the external world. Note the loaded words: "entirely non-existent" and "delusional." But it all flips upon entering the physics lab.

In contrast Hayek writes about a physical order and a sensory order between which there isn't a one-one or complete correspondence. He uses "order", not "world". He doesn't claim 'no correspondence.' Our feelings of cold and warm are linked to external conditions. Green and red are linked to light wave frequency. Sweetness is linked to the amount of sugars present. And when we say that light exists outside the limited range of the electromagnetic spectrum that our eyes register, we rely on our eyes to read the instruments. We can't escape our means of perception and achieve what David Kelley calls a "diaphanous view" of reality. We can only live with what we have and make the best of it.

Here is another relevant quote from The Sensory Order:

1.12 Historically the concept of the 'real' has been formed in contradistinction to mere 'illusions' based on sense deceptions or other experiences of purely mental origin. There is, however, no fundamental difference between such corrections of one sense experience by others, as we employ, e.g., to discover an optical illusion, and the procedure employed by the physical sciences when they ascertain that two objects which may to all our senses appear to be alike do not behave in the same way in relation to others. To accept this latter test as the criterion for 'reality' would force us to regard the various constructs of physics as more 'real' than the things we can touch and see, or even to reserve the term 'reality' to something which by definition we can never fully know. [snip]

[BaalChatzaf]

1.12 Historically the concept of the 'real' has been formed in contradistinction to mere 'illusions' based on sense deceptions or other experiences of purely mental origin. There is, however, no fundamental difference between such corrections of one sense experience by others, as we employ, e.g., to discover an optical illusion, and the procedure employed by the physical sciences when they ascertain that two objects which may to all our senses appear to be alike do not behave in the same way in relation to others. To accept this latter test as the criterion for 'reality' would force us to regard the various constructs of physics as more 'real' than the things we can touch and see, or even to reserve the term 'reality' to something which by definition we can never fully know. [snip]

That is ontologically correct. What Is is Out There. What we experience is In Here. We believe the two are connected and related. The furniture of the cosmos consists of teeny tiny things we cannot perceive because our senses are band width limited. The real Reality of Physics are the invariants and the symmetries. We can only grasp them abstractly. Maybe if we had thousand pound brains and senses that were reliable to Planck Length we could sense Reality directly. But that is not how the way we are.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

I do not think Hitler & Co. managed to get their racist agenda across because of imprecise language and I do not think the subject-predicate form is the root of delusions. There was a series of forces at work with German antisemitism. Propaganda (which is the area closest to the language aspect) made use of emotionally charged slogans, not simply cognitive differences. The base of those nationalistic emotions had a lot to do with one of the worst inflations in the history of mankind and the humiliation Germany suffered with the defeat of WWI and a host of other things that had nothing to do with subject-predicate form. They would have hated regardless of the form of language used.

People don't usually round up other people and send them to gas chambers but people regularly round up cattle and send it to the slaughterhouse and think nothing of it. It does not seem the people responsible for the Holocaust conceived of Jews as other people, but rather as animals.

[tjohnson]

In contrast Hayek writes about a physical order and a sensory order between which there isn't a one-one or complete correspondence. He uses "order", not "world". He doesn't claim 'no correspondence.' Our feelings of cold and warm are linked to external conditions. Green and red are linked to light wave frequency. Sweetness is linked to the amount of sugars present. And when we say that light exists outside the limited range of the electromagnetic spectrum that our eyes register, we rely on our eyes to read the instruments. We can't escape our means of perception and achieve what David Kelley calls a "diaphanous view" of reality. We can only live with what we have and make the best of it.

Here is another relevant quote from The Sensory Order:

1.12 Historically the concept of the 'real' has been formed in contradistinction to mere 'illusions' based on sense deceptions or other experiences of purely mental origin. There is, however, no fundamental difference between such corrections of one sense experience by others, as we employ, e.g., to discover an optical illusion, and the procedure employed by the physical sciences when they ascertain that two objects which may to all our senses appear to be alike do not behave in the same way in relation to others. To accept this latter test as the criterion for 'reality' would force us to regard the various constructs of physics as more 'real' than the things we can touch and see, or even to reserve the term 'reality' to something which by definition we can never fully know. [snip]

I don't see much here that diverges from Korzybski's view. He said "grass is green" is structurally false to facts he didn't say there was no connection between wavelength and colour perceived. Where is this connection noted in the statement "grass is green"?

[Brant Gaede]

I do not think Hitler & Co. managed to get their racist agenda across because of imprecise language and I do not think the subject-predicate form is the root of delusions. There was a series of forces at work with German antisemitism. Propaganda (which is the area closest to the language aspect) made use of emotionally charged slogans, not simply cognitive differences. The base of those nationalistic emotions had a lot to do with one of the worst inflations in the history of mankind and the humiliation Germany suffered with the defeat of WWI and a host of other things that had nothing to do with subject-predicate form. They would have hated regardless of the form of language used.

People don't usually round up other people and send them to gas chambers but people regularly round up cattle and send it to the slaughterhouse and think nothing of it. It does not seem the people responsible for the Holocaust conceived of Jews as other people, but rather as animals.

The Jews were systematically dehumanized by the Nazis as "vermin" and such.

--Brant

[tjohnson]

The Jews were systematically dehumanized by the Nazis as "vermin" and such.

Yes, if you say it often enough you can get unsuspecting people to believe it and act on it. Korzybski's goal was to train people so they could not be so easily swayed by the structure of language and so not become deluded etc., ie. promote sanity.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

GS,

People round up animals and send them to the slaughterhouse so they can eat them. The people who do the rounding up also breed the animals on farms. The Germans killed Jews to exterminate the race from humanity. No breeding was involved nor anything else in your animal analogy. This had nothing to do with equating Jews with farm animals. This was pure hatred.

EDIT: To be fair, I think I see what Korzybski is driving at and it looks like a very good intention. I don't like this example for the reasons I have been giving. But I will think some on this idea. My gut is telling me he went too far in one direction (i.e., trying to be the only or main principle), that less would have been more (i.e., trying to be one part of the picture), but I need to read more of him first before I can form a definite opinion.

Michael