Why does man need a code of values?


Laure

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I submit that any standard that admits such a wide range of behaviour, right through to its opposite is not much of a standard. Imagine if I set a standard like "thou shall not steal" but then in the next breath said "stealing is also ok." This is effectively what Rand is doing by admitting suicide is morally acceptable.

To get round this, in her essay on The Objectivist Ethics Rand simply equivocates . She starts out with "life" as in survival, which something like suicide obviously conflicts with; but then shifts her meaning to life as "man qua man", which is so vague one can blur out such problems. One simply needs to read the text to see this shift. Unfortunately this dilution, while saving her from such objections, does so at the price of destroying the usefulness of such a standard.

Daniel,

As a matter of fact, I did read the text many times long ago and I have started rereading it again recently. You oversimplify when you say that "man qua man" is a vague term. Rand spent a great deal of time explaining what she meant by human nature. (I find myself in disagreement with some of it for being incomplete, especially when she claimed otherwise, but that does not mean she does not address it.)

For instance, the biological foundation of ethics she gave in her opening essay in The Virtue of Selfishness is not only survival, but also the pleasure-pain mechanism. This, obviously, is included in her concept of "man qua man." There is a whole bunch of things like that. If you choose to ignore those things when you claim vagueness (and I am discussing Rand qua Rand), you are committing a classic case of the fallacy of the stolen concept. You are using a general concept, but pretending that the concepts on which it is based do not exist. The argument is something like this:

  1. Rand predicated her view of human nature on a series of observations, affirmations and deductions.
  2. Rand simplified all of these observations, affirmations and deductions to a single phrase: "man qua man."
  3. Other philosophers, in using the same phrase, mean different observations, affirmations and deductions, even among themselves.
  4. Rand's phrase does not include their view of human nature, but it should (for whatever reason).
  5. Rand's phrase is too vague to be useful.

Can you detect the fallacy here?

Rand's words, if they didn't mean what they do mean, actually would be too vague to be useful. This is the case when they are transposed by themselves, and only by themselves, to see if they work as the foundation of another philosopher's thinking. The fact is, however, that those words in Rand's writings are tied to a concept that is derived from a specific set of observations, affirmations and deductions.

So if you steal the concept and merely use the catchphrase for it in other contexts, yes it is vague. If you take the whole conceptual package, i.e., the integration, it is not vague at all. It actually collides with the meaning other philosophers give to it (if they ever used it).

I think it would be far, far clearer, if your purpose is to disagree with Rand, to contest her view of human nature than make a false observation about her writing. Claiming that she was vague about human nature is simply not true, but that is precisely what you do claim when you say that the phrase "man qua man" is vague.

Michael

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And while it may be vogue to be contrarian to what Ortho-Objectivists take as an axiom—the evil of Kant, that is, I merely take it down a few notches and realize after careful study and consideration, that the man’s philosophy has been disastrous.

. . .

All this can be acknowledged without being an Ortho-O’ist.

Victor,

I was not defending Kant's product, but his intentions when he undertook to produce it. His context was much different than ours today, where we look at him from hindsight. I am beginning to see that what I learned about his intentions might need revising. This does not mean that I defend the ideas he arrived at. But in a certain manner, he might have ultimately helped pave the way for the development of a reason-based philosophy by soundly putting reason on the table as equally important to faith. Back then, faith was more important, so even if Kant got the rest wrong and only provided grounds for a lot of fruitless and/or destructive ideas (and I am not going to say this is the case until I read him, but let's suppose this is the case), at least he got equality for reason as an issue important enough to be separate from faith. Hell, he even gave it its own world.

Many of the ideas we now take for granted were heresy back then. I think Rand would have been executed had she lived at that time and produced intellectual works.

Another issue. I am definitely not on a crusade to take down ortho-Objectivists when I discuss ideas. I even find the insinuation amusing. If and when I mention ortho-Objectivists in a discussion of ideas, it is to address their view of the ideas. Otherwise I literally do not think of them. I think of the ideas.

(I do think of them for their despicable cult-like behavior in persecuting people and other tribal practices, but that is another issue altogether.)

Michael

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Darrell:

>I don't know if there is a name for this kind of reasoning...

OK, so you're using a kind of reasoning that is not commonly recognised, but whatever it is, it is invalid by the standards of classical logic. If that's the case, however, I think you should probably avoid using the terminology of standard logic, as you did a few posts back when you said:

"Rand did indeed establish a valid logical relationship between fact and value."

Because that gives a misleading impression. In fact the relationship you are proposing is neither valid nor logical in any ordinary sense.

I'm not giving a misleading impression because the reasoning that I am using is logically valid. Perhaps we are having a misunderstanding over the terminology we are using.

On the one hand, you seem to be stating things like, the logic is bivalent, which means that every statement is either true or false. But, there are many statements in English that are neither true nor false. For example, "This statement is false."

You asserted (or Ellen asserted) that the form of reasoning should be syllogistic in nature. Yet, how does one justify the procedure of mathematical induction on that basis? Is it considered to, "deductively valid?" And how does one justify the rules of logic themselves?

Well, first of all, the statement "existence exists" seems to me to be a straightforward piece of logic, with nothing very special about it. The problem is, as you correctly state, is that the term "existence" can be made to mean pretty much whatever you like. (As Stephen Boydstun once reminded us, Bertrand Russell offered this axiom to the British idealist Bradley, who found nothing to object to in it!) But as a piece of logic it is unremarkable. I do not see how Rand can be said to be making any kind of special claim with it.

This phrase should not be vague. It refers to those things that exist apart from and including consciousness. We just had this discussion on another thread. It implies (in Objectivist usage) that something exists apart from consciousness. If you think that is unremarkable, that is fine, but I don't see how such a conclusion can be deductively justified.

>However, I have argued that life is the only possible value that a rational human can possess as his ultimate value. Therefore, by process of elimination, it is his ultimate value and standard by which all other values must be measured.

If you have not argued deductively, how have you argued? (Incidentally, "a process of elimination" is a standard logical deductive process).

Fine. Then I have argued deductively. But, life is not instrumental to any other value, so the method of argument that I have used is to consider all possible standards and eliminate all those that lead to irrationality and/or higher odds of death. That leaves life as the only possible standard.

I am beginning to understand Victor's complaint about chewing the fat around the edges. You have not addressed my major arguments in any way, shape or form. You are simply trying to trap me in some contrived inconsistency.

Darrell

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Here is the whole crux of ethics: choice.

I have a few thoughts right now and hopefully I will elaborate further. If they seem a bit rambling, that is the nature of thinking as you go along.

We are doing is/ought on another thread, but I cannot deal with this issue without at least alluding to it. If I understand the issue correctly so far (and I admit I have not been able to do the reading on Hume, Popper, etc., just yet), the whole problem seems to be how to take choice out of volition. And the answer, of course is that you can't.

Ethics by definition is about choosing values according to a code and ethics only pertains to living beings with a rational capacity. A lower animal has no ethics (although it has values). But there is another element. A living being with a rational conceptual faculty—by definition—also has volition.

You can logically derive standards (for both cardinal and ordinal measurement), but you cannot logically derive the choice in applying them. Volition, like existence, identity, etc., is part of the given. It is merely identified. It is axiomatic. It is not logically derived. It is accepted through the impossibility of imagining it not existing while using it at the same time.

This is what makes including an big honking IF in the middle of any moral statement a necessity. This implication derives from the definition. Only a faculty with volition has the possibility of exercising an IF. A proper moral code ALWAYS includes the statement:

"If you want this result, you will do that."

This is basically what "should" or "ought" mean. There is no way to remove this statement without stepping outside of ethics altogether. It is like removing discrimination from definitions or numbers from mathematics.

Michael,

What you are stating here is not true. I apologize for not commenting earlier, but I have been trying to lead a horse to water.

As I have pointed out in numerous places, the ultimate value does not require an "if." If it did, it would not be the ultimate value. The ultimate value cannot depend upon an antecedent value.

By the way, I should point out that grounding an ethical system in subjective desires is not the end of the story. That is, a person can state that he did something because he wanted to do it. But, why did he want it? He can say he did it to make himself happy. But, why should he want to be happy? Simply trying to ground an ethical system in desires does not cut off the infinite regress and is therefore not a valid justification for an ethical system.

To address your point more directly, the problem is not, "how to take choice out of volition." As I pointed out in post #164, there may be a difference between the values that a person actually holds and the values that are objectively best for that person. A person has no choice about what is objectively best for him or her, but he does have a choice about whether to accept those values as his own or not.

So, here is a moral statement without an "if": You ought to value your life.

Or, if you prefer: You ought to value your life because you are a living, thinking being.

Darrell

Edited by Darrell Hougen
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The problem with "Life is the ultimate standard of value" isn't that it's circular (it may well be, but this naysayer at least has not argued this as such). The problem is that it is more or less useless as a standard, as it is so vague almost any course of action can be rationalised to fit such a standard. I offer, as before, the following example: Objectivists consider suicide - i.e. death - to be morally acceptable as a course of action. Yet this is quite the opposite of "life."

I submit that any standard that admits such a wide range of behaviour, right through to its opposite is not much of a standard. Imagine if I set a standard like "thou shall not steal" but then in the next breath said "stealing is also ok." This is effectively what Rand is doing by admitting suicide is morally acceptable.

You keep harping on this suicide thing, but the fact is that according to Objectivism, suicide is almost never OK... just like stealing is almost never OK. Rules have exceptions; that doesn't make them bad rules.

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The problem with "Life is the ultimate standard of value" isn't that it's circular (it may well be, but this naysayer at least has not argued this as such). The problem is that it is more or less useless as a standard, as it is so vague almost any course of action can be rationalised to fit such a standard. I offer, as before, the following example: Objectivists consider suicide - i.e. death - to be morally acceptable as a course of action. Yet this is quite the opposite of "life."

I submit that any standard that admits such a wide range of behaviour, right through to its opposite is not much of a standard. Imagine if I set a standard like "thou shall not steal" but then in the next breath said "stealing is also ok." This is effectively what Rand is doing by admitting suicide is morally acceptable.

I would like to know the context of Rand's statements on suicide, but let me give you my take on the issue. Suicide is never justified by the Objectivist ethics. At worst, the Objectivist ethics is indifferent to the issue and it is only indifferent in extreme circumstances, circumstances in which life as a thinking being is basically impossible anyway. So, for a person dying of cancer in the last stages of life, racked by so much pain that thinking is basically impossible and so weak that no goal or value can be ever be achieved again, the Objectivist ethics would be indifferent to the choice that person decided to make.

This is just another one of those annoying side issues that opponents of Objectivism like to dredge up. It is one of those marginal issues that is not integral to the philosophy itself because it involves situations in which life is about to be snuffed out and there isn't much that anyone can do about it, no matter how heroic the efforts.

It is like the issue of emergencies. Emergencies are not the normal condition of human existence, so even if Objectivism were to fall completely on its face in emergency situations, which it doesn't, it would be of almost no interest to the construction of a proper ethics which handles the myriad of realistic everyday situations with which people are faced.

Darrell

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If we agree that volition is to be included, let's call deriving or deducing "ought" from "is" something like "compelled volition." As Rand did not formally build anything in her philosophy on the "compelled volition" principle, maintaining free will as a cornerstone throughout the entire philosophy, this is another reason I think she meant the passage in the manner I stated and not as simply deduced.

Deriving "ought" from "is" is not the same as deriving "shall" from "is." You ought to do something if it is good for you. That doesn't mean you must do it. Just because you ought to eat your peas, doesn't mean you will eat your peas. "Ought," is a term used to express moral rightness. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ought It is not a term used to express compulsion. So, there is no conflict between the notion that "ought" can be derived from "is" and the notion that man has volition.

Darrell

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(I know of no philosopher who's literally said what she wrote, that there's NO relation.)
This is the BIG issue with Rand to me. Rand accused "those philosophers" (whoever they are, and I am at a loss to find them) of claiming that there is no relation at all between "is" and "ought." If people were complaining about this with Rand, I would have no problem with that. Her remark was simply out of line. Chalk up another one that needs to be disregarded (which I don't find all that serious in appreciating Rand's work).

I'm not sure about this particular issue, but having had a look at Philosophy, Who Needs It? recently, I would not be surprised if Rand had such things in her Objectivist horror file. Some of the comments that she quotes are much worse than what is being asserted here.

Darrell

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Darrell seems to argue there are two human 'states of mind', if you like, that govern our choices: being 'rational' and being 'irrational'. Made from the "rational" state, he seems to be saying, our decisions all must be rational ie:backed by logically sound arguments, and also honed by the lessons of experience. . From the "irrational" state we are not bound by any such requirements - we can arrive at our decisions any way we choose, through intuition, emotion, imagination, faith etc.

This is clear enough as far as it goes, but this then raises the problem of how these two 'states of mind' come to be in the first place. How does one come to be 'rational', or 'irrational'? To say they are merely states "chosen" by the individual is to miss the point, for obviously we are looking for why such a choice is made in the first place. To say, as Darrell seemed to be saying at first (his position seems to be less clear in later posts), that the choice to be rational must be a rational one, is to accidentally commit a logical error; for it means that only rational people can make the choice to be rational, and this is a circularity! The flip side of this is that it appears that the situation is likewise for the irrationalist - they obviously cannot decide to be rational on a rational basis, as this would mean they were not really irrationalists in the first place!

You're assuming a deterministic universe, a priori, and thereby excluding the concept of volition. To ask why a particular decision is made is to assume a deterministic cause. The point of volition is that it is not deterministic. A rational person can choose to be irrational and vice versa simply as a matter of course. It is not always possible to find a logical explanation for a particular choice. If it were, volition would not exist.

By the way, you are oversimplifying my position somewhat. A person isn't necessarily fully rational or completely irrational. A person might be a good scientist and follow the rules of logic most of the time, yet base his morality on religion or whim. And, even if he bases it on religion, he might take the fact that his Christian religion places a high value on life as a starting point and reason logically from there on. In this case, his views on most subjects might be almost indistinguishable from those of an Objectivist. Such a person would be highly rational, but not fully so.

Faced with this dilemma, the problem then is often driven down to a level of mere genetic determinism: some people are simply born rational - perhaps, using a Randian version of rationality, like the conveniently sui generis Howard Roark - and others are not. This is a potentially nasty turn in a number of respects, however, first and foremost because it totally destroys any any moral claim to rationality - because if you are simply born this way, you had no choice in the matter, therefore you cannot claim any moral credit for it! Obviously the other nasty turn is that if you define 'rationality' as the sole criterion of humanity, you will effectively start defining irrational people as "subhuman" - and that they are born that way, like dumb animals, so they have as much moral or ethical value as a cow or sheep. This is a slippery slope indeed.

This is indeed a slippery slope, and it is entered upon my not according volition to humans.

Darrell

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A man who practiced no morality would be a man whose behavior was guided by no rules at all. Our immoral man’s brain, say, is perhaps connected to a random number generator. But such a man, if he were mortal, would die. This is evidence that the connection between factual and normative statements is MAN’S LIFE. Man needs morality to live. But just any moral system will NOT do it.

Yes, this is the essential point that is not being addressed.

Darrell

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It is like the issue of emergencies. Emergencies are not the normal condition of human existence, so even if Objectivism were to fall completely on its face in emergency situations, which it doesn't, it would be of almost no interest to the construction of a proper ethics which handles the myriad of realistic everyday situations with which people are faced.

Darrell

This always strikes me as funny. Either ethics are objective or they are not. There cannot be middle ground. But now, if the situation is such, 'proper' ethics are malleable? Emergency? Who says? How is 'emergency' determined? It's arbitrary.

Isn't it a continuum? A glass of water may quench a mild thirst, or save a life, or anywhere in between. Where does 'emergency' start, end? Arbitrary.

The bottom line is that you're simply admitting that Objectivist ethics are only partially valid. It's like saying a math equation (an objective example) is kinda, sorta, correct sometimes.

How can you have Objective ethics, but only sometimes? Hmmm....

Bob

Edited by Bob_Mac
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As has been pointed out, one can survive as a parasite, a looter or moocher. One can survive by just drifting. What you need to show is the connection between ‘man’s life’, ie human life in general – the ‘is’ -- and the sort of life you wish to promote – the ‘ought’. You have not yet done so.

I already dispensed with this argument in post #94.

Darrell

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The bottom line is that you're simply admitting that Objectivist ethics are only partially valid. It's like saying a math equation (an objective example) is kinda, sorta, correct sometimes.

No I'm not. Go back and read what I wrote. The Objectivist ethics are perfectly valid in emergencies and non-emergencies.

But, let's consider something more concrete. Would you say that mathematics is invalid because you can't divide by zero? Would you say that numerical analysis is invalid because operations become ill conditioned when equations are nearly linearly dependent?

What I'm saying is that it is easy to trip people up by trying to pose problems that are near the boundaries of what is possible. For example, if you pose a problem in which it is nearly impossible to live, no matter what you do, it is easy to confuse people. Yes, there is a continuum of situations, but there are also singular points around which the solution is ill conditioned. The singular points represent a set of measure zero of situations that will never obtain in practice, so succeeding in tripping up people by posing such problems doesn't really prove anything.

Darrell

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The bottom line is that you're simply admitting that Objectivist ethics are only partially valid. It's like saying a math equation (an objective example) is kinda, sorta, correct sometimes.

No I'm not. Go back and read what I wrote.

Darrell

OK.

You wrote:

"The fact that man's life is his proper standard of value is an objective fact which can be ascertained on the basis of his nature as a human being. "

That statement is absolutely demonstrably false in the face of all evidence after about 1948 or so. It is does not make any sense at all for me to continue to discuss anything with someone so out of touch with reality.

Actually, I take that back. Darwin got it long before then.

Bob

Edited by Bob_Mac
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Darrell, post 188 is brilliant! :)

Bob, if Rand's ethics is demonstrably false, how come nobody can demonstrate it false? Either it's true, or you really suck at argumentation. Probably both.

Thanks Laure. Post #190 wasn't half bad either. I need you to rescue me now and then.

Darrell

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As I have pointed out in numerous places, the ultimate value does not require an "if." If it did, it would not be the ultimate value. The ultimate value cannot depend upon an antecedent value.

Which shows that there can be no such thing as an "ultimate value", it is a contradictio in terminis. That something is a necessary condition for making decisions, for example being alive, does not imply that it is an "ultimate value".

A person has no choice about what is objectively best for him or her

There is no such thing as an "objectively best for him". Take for example what I'd call "Achilles' choice" (a variant would be "Hercules' choice"): does the person want a short but intense life, full of risks or a long and quiet life? Who determines what is best? It is a subjective choice.

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It is like the issue of emergencies. Emergencies are not the normal condition of human existence, so even if Objectivism were to fall completely on its face in emergency situations, which it doesn't, it would be of almost no interest to the construction of a proper ethics which handles the myriad of realistic everyday situations with which people are faced.

Rand's ideas about emergencies are a typical cop-out. It is especially in such situations that an ethics theory is to be tested. Don't forget that what we, living in wealth, comfort and peace in our western world at this moment, consider to be emergencies, is and has been in the course of the centuries the normal situation for millions of people. During the 2nd world war my mother has spent several years in a Japanese POW camp. The stories she told me made crystal clear that in such situations you really learn what the morality of your co-prisoners is. What use is an ethics theory that dismisses such situations as "not normal"? It's a fair-weather ethics.

Edited by Dragonfly
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Bob, if Rand's ethics is demonstrably false, how come nobody can demonstrate it false? Either it's true, or you really suck at argumentation. Probably both.

We've extensively demonstrated that it is false and I haven't seen any valid counterargument except unsupported assertions. But we're not the only ones. Check for example the books by Nyquist and Ryan. Or even the rather Rand-friendly The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand by Den Uyl and Rasmussen: the contributions of King and Mack clearly show the holes in Rand's argument.

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Darrell:

>I'm not giving a misleading impression because the reasoning that I am using is logically valid. Perhaps we are having a misunderstanding over the terminology we are using.

No, this is not a terminological misunderstanding. You are simply alternating between appealing to standard deductive logic, then denying you are appealing to it when logic's conclusions don't suit you. To add confusion, while you deny you're using standard logic, you nonetheless use standard logical terms like "logically valid". This gives, as I have pointed out, an entirely false impression.

You have been flip-flopping on this since the beginning. You don't seem to realise that you are doing this, but it is easy to demonstrate:

>Darrell:#164

I believe that it is possible to use logical means to ascertain ethical principles from facts, but those logical means must include reasoning methods other than deduction. (emphasis mine)

So here you are appealing to alleged "reasoning methods" other than deduction. But in the next breath you say:

>Darrell:#165

Rand did indeed establish a valid logical relationship between fact and value...

But Darrell, now you are borrowing the terminology of deductive logic ("valid logical relationship") but not, apparently, deductive logic itself! You are, you claim, using some other kind of reasoning..but you never say what it is or how it works.

>Darrell#167

I don't know if there is a name for this kind of reasoning...

In fact, this supposed "method" is rather mysterious. It doesn't even have a name, apparently! The only hint you give us is that you use a "process of elimination" to get to your conclusions.

But as I then point out to you, a process of elimination is deductive!

Faced with this, you then reverse your previous position - again.

>Darrel: #178

Fine. Then I have argued deductively.

I'm sorry, but by this stage you are giving the strong impression that you don't know what you are arguing. This impression is strongly reinforced by the following comments:

>Darrell: #178

Yet, how does one justify the procedure of mathematical induction on that basis? Is it considered to, "deductively valid?"

To which the answer is YES! Of course it is. Mathematics is deductive! 'Mathematical induction' has nothing to do with inductive reasoning, or the problem of induction. This is apparently another basic confusion on your part. I refer you to the Wikipedia article on the subject

"Mathematical induction should not be misconstrued as a form of inductive reasoning..."

Ok? Now, inconsistent as your preceding comments are, I am still somewhat suprised to find you reaching this point:

>Darrell #178: And how does one justify the rules of logic themselves?

Darrell, I have challenged the standard logic of your argument, - that is, the classical deductive logic Objectivists are supposed to accept. You have responded by clearly claiming your conclusions are not based on this logic (then oddly confessing that they are) You now seem to be asking me to justify logic itself.

Thus when I demonstrate that your argument is illogical - that your conclusion exceeds your premises - your final response appears to be "well, then, justify logic itself!"

This does seem to be a rather a stretch, don't you think?

>I am beginning to understand Victor's complaint about chewing the fat around the edges. You have not addressed my major arguments in any way, shape or form. You are simply trying to trap me in some contrived inconsistency.

I repeat: your major arguments are demonstrably illogical, and you have even admitted this is the case by appealing to unspecified "other means of reasoning". If you think that showing your major arguments to be illogical is "chewing the fat around the edges" then I have no idea what you'd consider a serious objection!

I am certainly no expert in logic, but your argument seems quite plainly in error. It is no "trap". All it means is that if you are going to adopt logic as your method, you have to live with its conclusions. If you dispute that my criticisms are correct, I am happy to perhaps get your arguments sent to an independent logical authority for their opinion, at my cost. Would you agree to that?

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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Darrell and Laure,

Values are Objective. Values, like concepts, are neither intrinsic nor subjective, but objective. Values (such as objects and actions) are good to man and for the sake of reaching specific goals, the most fundamental of which is the sustenance of an individual's own life. Thus, it has been argued, the conscious choice to live precedes and underlies the need of morality.* Regarding “ultimate ends” and “Life as the standard of ethics”, I am preparing arguments that will establish the Objectivist position on ethics. (Or is this wishful thinking?) :aww:

For now, I want to suggest that any communication gaps between parties lies in two opposing—and more fundamental than ethics—approaches. Objectivity versus intrinsicim and subjectivism. Both intrinsicism and subjectivism reject the notion of objective values for the same reasons that they reject the notion of objective concepts. Intrinsicism divorces "the good" from reason, alleging that "the good" is an intrinsic property of external objects or actions. Subjectivism divorces "the good" from reality, claiming that "the good" is whatever a person (or group of persons) says it is. Thus, neither philosophy provides a real-world, practical code of morality.* Ayn Rand's ethical system does.

And while our philosophical opponents enjoy poking holes in Rand’s philosophy, they offer no positive hypothesis to the question of ethics. Not even their arguments are new, but they are being presented with a “hold page one for this little gem” arrogance that belies their argument. In the end, both subjectivism and Intrinsicism pit human beings against objectivity and thus against their own well-being. I will post some arguments soon enough. Consider this post a preface. :turned:

-Victor

(Note from MSK:

* Phrases plagiarized from Luke Setzer. See here.

The plagiarized passages are identified in bold and linked to their detection and disclosure. The post is left up out of respect to the posters on this thread, so as not to make hash out of their discussion. OL extends its deepest apologies to Luke Setzer.)

Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly
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Victor:

>For now, I want to suggest that any communication gaps between parties lies in two opposing—and more fundamental than ethics—approaches. Objectivity versus intrinsicim and subjectivism.

I alternatively suggest that the 'communication gaps' between parties come down to basic logic, and are thus in fact objectively decidable.

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Victor:

>For now, I want to suggest that any communication gaps between parties lies in two opposing—and more fundamental than ethics—approaches. Objectivity versus intrinsicim and subjectivism.

I alternatively suggest that the 'communication gaps' between parties come down to basic logic, and are thus in fact objectively decidable.

Daniel,

Speaking of logic, do you agree with the basic table of logic formulation I posted a few threads back? Do you know which one I mean? Let's fill some gaps in communications.

-Victor

Edited by Victor Pross
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Daniel,

You wrote: The problem with "Life is the ultimate standard of value" isn't that it's circular (it may well be, but this naysayer at least has not argued this as such). The problem is that it is more or less useless as a standard, as it is so vague almost any course of action can be rationalized to fit such a standard. [EMPHAISIS MINE].

But this question comes to mind: would any “rationalized course of action” succeed in maintaining life? THAT is the question. (By the way, If you pluck one part of the Objectivist ethics while ignoring other fractions and parts therein--all of which make the total, you end up arguing with a straw man). Let's take another normative science, for example: The standard of medicine is to prevent illness and/or to maintain health. Would you argue that the standard of medicine is so vague and that any course of action can be rationalized to fit such a standard?

Objectivism, as you know, advocates egoism: this is the principle that each person's primary moral obligation is his own well-being. Egoism, it must be stressed, is simply the corollary of individual human life as the moral standard. This view opposes the ethical tradition of altruism, the notion that a person's primary moral obligation is to serve some entity other than himself, such as God or society, at the sacrifice of his own welfare.*

I have argued that Objectivist egoism explicitly champions long-term, rational self-interest and should not be confused with subjectivist egoism, which through the centuries has advocated short-term, irrational self-interest through hedonism, irresponsibility, context-dropping, and plundering.* The standard of ethics is life, but not any ethics will succeed at this. Rationality is one starting point—and Objectivism identifies interconnected virtues required to practice the overall virtue of rationality. This is not an exhaustive list, but it’s a good start:

1. Independence. Integrity as Loyalty to Rational Principles.**

2. Honesty as the Rejection of Unreality.**

3. Justice as Rationality in the Evaluation of Men.**

4. Productiveness as the Adjustment of Nature to Man. Pride as Moral Ambitiousness**

5. The Initiation of Physical Force as Evil.**

But I am still to answer the question of “life as the standard” and “suicide”—but I wanted to address your quote as seen above.

-Victor

(Note from MSK:

* Phrases plagiarized from Luke Setzer.

** Phrases plagiarized from Leonard Peikoff.

See here. The plagiarized passages are identified in bold and linked to their detection and disclosure. The post is left up out of respect to the posters on this thread, so as not to make hash out of their discussion. OL extends its deepest apologies to Luke Setzer and Leonard Peikoff.)

Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly
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As I have pointed out in numerous places, the ultimate value does not require an "if." If it did, it would not be the ultimate value. The ultimate value cannot depend upon an antecedent value.
Which shows that there can be no such thing as an "ultimate value", it is a contradictio in terminis. That something is a necessary condition for making decisions, for example being alive, does not imply that it is an "ultimate value".
A person has no choice about what is objectively best for him or her

There is no such thing as an "objectively best for him". Take for example what I'd call "Achilles' choice" (a variant would be "Hercules' choice"): does the person want a short but intense life, full of risks or a long and quiet life? Who determines what is best? It is a subjective choice.

Dragonfly,

Thank you for addressing the problem directly.

I will not address your first objection because I have addressed it at length already and I dislike repeating myself. Your second objection sets up a false choice. People in the real world are not faced with the kinds of choices that Achilles and Hercules must make.

Let's deal with Hercules first. If Hercules follows the path of Virtue, he will gain lasting fame and nobility, the love of friends, honor, strength, confidence, etc. If he follows the path of Vice, he will supposedly gain riches, luxury, indulgence, pleasure, etc. However, in the real world, a sloth rarely gains such things. If he is born rich, he may already have them, but he would be unlikely to keep them if he were slothful. So, it is easy to choose Virtue over Vice.

Now, in the case of Achilles, the choice is to go to war or not. Now, generally speaking, when one goes to war, one does not intend to die. That may be the result, but that is not the guaranteed end. So, unless Achilles knows that he will surely die, we must look at what he stands to gain by joining the battle. If he joins, he will gain fame, honor and respect. Values that will stand him in good stead once the battle is over. Yes, he risks death by joining the battle, but failure to do so could be harmful to his life as well. He wouldn't be respected and might even be reviled. It is even possible that his side would lose the battle and he would lose everything of value to him.

That is not to say that he should definitely go. Sometimes people are faced with difficult choices that involve the analysis of unknown factors, like whether one will continue to live or not. But, the simple fact that some choices are difficult, does not invalidate the Objectivist ethics.

As to this notion that one person may want a short but intense life while another might want a long quiet life, that is a problem of the subjectivist, not the Objectivist. It is a problem that arises from standards such as trying to maximize one's happiness over a lifetime. Then, the question becomes, is it better to obtain a lot of pleasure (or enjoyment) in a short period of time or a little bit over a long period of time? This type of thinking is anathema to Objectivism. Objectivism seeks to maintain life.

For example, consider a person trying to decide whether to engage in rock climbing. A person should ask himself whether there is anything to be gained by such activity. For an adult to persist in rock climbing is probably improper because he is endangering his life while gaining nothing. That is not to say that an Objectivist would avoid all risk taking. Children engage in risky behavior as a way of pushing the envelope on their own abilities. But, once it becomes clear what a person's abilities are in a particular area and what the value is of such abilities to a person's life, it makes little sense to continue to engage in the activity. There are, of course, other reasons for such activities. I am just illustrating the kind of reasoning involved.

Darrell

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