Why does man need a code of values?


Laure

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Victor: “Living beings, and only living beings, have values (goals)

…Values may be means to an end

... Life is an ultimate end, the only ‘end in itself’...

life is the only phenomenon that is an end itself: a value…"”

Hmm: values are goals; values are means; life is an end; life is also a value. So life is both a means and an end. A clear demonstration of the question-begging nature of the argument.

“Man cannot survive by any random means… He ‘is’ because he does what he ‘ought.’”

So are you arguing that man should exist in survival mode? Or by “is” do you mean something more than survival?

Your argument would be easier to follow if your summary clearly distinguished between life in general (plant, animal, human), human survival and the life of man qua man. And if you were to do so, you would no doubt uncover the is-ought gap.

Brendan

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Your argument would be easier to follow if your summary clearly distinguished between life in general (plant, animal, human), human survival and the life of man qua man. And if you were to do so, you would no doubt uncover the is-ought gap.

Brendan

Brenden,

Man’s ability to conceptualize—mentally to abstract, isolate and integrate observed particulars—enables him in terms of principles, to project the long-range consequences his actions.* Volition means that man is the initiator of thought and action.*

Because man is free to choose his actions, because he is not biologically programmed to act in a give manner—he requires a code of values—a system of principles—to direct his choices. Man’s volitional nature necessitates that he chose to think and act in order to survive.*

This is the crux of ethics, and this is, basically, why I keep relentlessly returning to the issue of life. Man faces alternative and he is free to choose among them---if he conceptualizes his choice to think in terms of a purpose. A value preference necessarily implies a goal or end—that being: the object, process or state that is valued.

You said: "Your argument would be easier to follow if your summary clearly distinguished between life in general (plant, animal, human), human survival and the life of man qua man. And if you were to do so, you would no doubt uncover the is-ought gap."

If I understand you correctly, I would say this: It is not enough for a person to know only the abstract role of principles in human survival—in some “abstract way”: one must be able to determine concretely, within the context of one’s own life, how to achieve the values required for one’s physical and mental well-being. Life is a discrete process. So I don’t mean “man’s life” as some collective noun—no, I mean individual life—your life, my life, etc. Human life.

As a predictive principle, a standard, as it were, directs a man’s choices, thus providing a link between action and the acquisition of desired values. Therefore, a rational morality is one that recognizes the crucial role of standards in human survival, a morality based on a man’s need to achieve values consonant with his nature (a volitional being).

I have been trying to illustrate the motivational link between rational ethics and human actions for the goal-directed final outcome: survival.

-Victor

edit:

You ask: So are you arguing that man should exist in survival mode? Or by “is” do you mean something more than survival?

-I'm not sure I understand what you are asking here.

(Note from MSK:

* Phrases plagiarized from George H. Smith, Atheism: the Case Against God. See here (and here for corrected text and source details). The plagiarized passages are identified in bold and linked to the corrected text. The post is left up out of respect to the posters on this thread, so as not to make hash out of their discussion. OL extends its deepest apologies to George H. Smith.)

Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly
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Victor

>That men’s interests clash and the need for conflict resolution is more in the realm of politics, the realm of the law courts.

Not at all. Any ethical question you like is the result of a clash of interests or values etc. Should a man cheat on his wife? is an ethical question, as obviously we have a clash of interests. But one could scarcely call it political - of course tho it could become so, and even become a legal question.

> A lone man on a deserted island would have no need for politics, but his need for a morality (a certain moral code—not just anyone) would not be greater in this situation.

Well, I think what is generally called "character" eg: courage, imagination, persistence, optimism would come into play here. Sometimes these are codified; sometimes not. Certainly "good" and "evil" moral acts would have little to to with anything on a desert island. As the movie 'Castaway' shows us, on a desert island, true evil is loneliness, or a toothache!

>If you take the question of morality in the manner applied above, the need does become clearer and urgently needed. If this lone man simply acted in any random manner, he would not be an “is” for too long.

So morality = any non-random act? That narrows it down :blink:

>If, however, you ascribe to the altruists ethics (or whatever else) you will not see my point at all.

For convenience, and because the words are often used interchangeably, shall we just stick to ethics as a code relating to other people, and morals as a code relating to the self?

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SHE is the one who used the word "determines," in exactly the paragraph which has been quoted and quoted and in a sentence which you quoted in the post you linked:

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do."

Maybe if I write the "determines" all in caps...

"The fact that a living entity is, DETERMINES what it ought to do."

That is where the "determines" is entering the picture: from her. And I've explained at length the academic context of the time, which I don't think she was so ignorant as not to have been aware of. (If she had been that ignorant, why would she have said anything addressing "those philosophers" at all?) I've also explained that the relationship "those philosophers" were talking about was an entailment relation, not just any relation.

Ellen,

LOLOLOL... You are right. All I can say is that I was just finishing a long and extremely irritating piece of writing and was still in a daze as I took a break to write that. I would delete that damn post of mine, but that would not be honest. I dood it, so I gots ta takes it.

About context, I agree that she must have had some knowledge of the context, especially the fact that the existence of God was seen as a given. I do not agree with her interpretation, however, and this disagreement has only recently started in my thinking. I might be wrong, but it has been slowly dawning on me as I read that Rand got it backwards about the intention of Hume and Kant. Instead of trying to save religion from reason, maybe they were trying to save reason from religion. They knew what religion without reason was capable of in social terms and they were witnessing the wonderful things the use of reason was doing.

This does not mean I agree with their conclusions and that Rand was wrong to question them, but it certainly puts them in a new light. They were not evil champions of faith and nihilism. They were quite daring champions of reason at that time. The alternative to new thinking about reason was the Bible and the whole structure of religion and state. They carved out an intellectual niche where reason could operate, but not violate religious doctrine, thus a practitioner of reason could avoid persecution for blasphemy. Atheism certainly did result in some very unpleasant experiences for atheists at that time.

As to "those philosophers," I have no doubt that she was talking in a general direction toward Hume. I stated that I had no idea of who "those philosophers" were according to her terms because according to her terms (technically speaking), there are none. Her statement was rhetoric. Understood as rhetoric and not precision of thought, it is clear she was dismissing Hume & Co. Understood precisely, I think I am justified for my own rhetorical expression of perplexity.

As to the meaning of Rand's rhetoric, I think her statement (based on the rest of her writing and definitions) was simply meant to mean something like, "So much for the is/ought problem that is nothing but mental masturbation. In the form "those philosophers" presented it, this so-called problem has nothing to do with reality or cognition." (Obviously her vocabulary would have been different had she gone on to explain like that... :) )

Regarding "entailment," I am not sure I understand your point. Do you mean something like the following point I made above to Daniel about is/ought?

The relation one establishes with the other is complete dependency for any possibility of action. All "oughts" completely depend on the "is's" in order for action to be performed. No "is" depends on any "ought" except for one: the agent himself. And this goes beyond what "ought" usually means, except it is volitional. The agent has to think ("ought to think") in order to correctly make a concept of an actual existent. The agent can choose not to engage his rational faculty as an act of will (after maturity, of course). That's what makes this an "ought" and not an automatic "is" like instinctual or involuntary behavior (heartbeat, sleep cycles, etc.).

"Is" and "ought" is a relation of codependency, not derivation. Frankly, qua concept, one cannot exist without the other if you include the existence of the agent in the very act of thinking as part of the whole situation.

In a relation of codependency, I agree that there is entailment. One entails the other like with axiomatic concepts. I usually say they are like different facets of the same gemstone. You can look at them separately, but you cannot remove a facet from a gemstone and have a stand-alone facet. You need the rest of the gemstone for the concept of facet to have any meaning at all. And I fully agree with you that none of this is language Rand would have liked or used.

Or do you mean something different with entailment?

I just had a small thought about Rand's choice of language. Frankly, the change in language and jargon from her normal writing to what she did in ITOE is quite a shocker to a newbie. All of a sudden, her style grew a whole bunch of brand new 50 dollar words and forms of using them. This is not my impression alone, either. I have read many accounts of Objectivists and Objectivism-friendly people who are completely perplexed by ITOE.

Michael

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A value preference necessarily implies a goal or end—that being: the object, process or state that is valued.

In your previous post you said values must lead to some ultimate end. Therefore, one could assume that values are the means that lead to the ultimate end.

But your quote from Rand says this: “Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action."

Rand is saying here that life is both an end in itself and also a value. You say that values “…must lead to some ultimate end”. So who is right? Is a value a means or an end?

Brendan

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I have been trying to illustrate the motivational link between rational ethics and human actions for the goal-directed final outcome: survival.

As has been pointed out, one can survive as a parasite, a looter or moocher. One can survive by just drifting. What you need to show is the connection between ‘man’s life’, ie human life in general – the ‘is’ -- and the sort of life you wish to promote – the ‘ought’. You have not yet done so.

Despite your claim that ‘man’s life’ is not a collective noun, if it is going to function as a standard, it must apply to all men. Since Rand claims that a concept refers to all its entities and their attributes, ‘man’s life’ clearly refers to the lives of all men. But not all of these lives measure up to the Randian standard. Therefore, she must mean something more specific than the lives of all men.

Rand’s answer, as I understand it, is that ‘man’s life’ refers to a certain type of life, one that exhibits the Objectivist virtues. But in opting for that certain type of life, she severs her ‘is’ from her ‘ought’, because the concept ‘man’ now no longer refers to all men.

Brendan

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As has been pointed out, one can survive as a parasite, a looter or moocher.

... but not without depending on other men who are not living as parasites, looters, or moochers. Human survival depends on human rationality. This being the case, whose rationality is it most logical to depend on? Your own, or somebody else's? Also, I don't agree that rationality is only for superior people. Everyone can practice it to the extent of their ability.

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Take the situation of the typical starving college student. The student may be faced with difficult choices between, for example, continuing to be a student full time and sometimes going hungry, working part time and taking longer to finish college, quitting college and working full time, or, like the main character in Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, murdering the lady next door and taking her money.
Come on, Darrell: it's more to the point, and more realistic, to say that he might simply kick back and be lazy. And that would be just as objectively wrong.

That works too. I just used the example that came to mind.

Darrell

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Darrell:

>You've got it backwards. If an ethical system is necessarily subjective, then it is impossible for a person's decisions or actions to carry any ethical weight. That is, if there are no right or wrong answers, if there are no decisions that are objectively better than any others, then ethics is irrelevant to the choices a person makes.

No, you're merely asserting a case that you then deny in the next breath, which is very odd. That is: one moment you agree that the combination of objective facts and objective logic is insufficient to derive an ethical system - that you cannot logically derive decisions from facts, which obviously includes ethical decisions - then the next minute you try to say that this is not the case. I'm not sure what your point is here. In fact, I think it is you who have the argument entirely backwards - if people did not have their own subjective goals, feelings, values, or emotions, it would not matter in the least how you treated them! There would be no need for ethics in the first place.

First, I have NEVER stated that, "the combination of objective facts and objective logic is insufficient to derive an ethical system." I don't know where you arrived at that conclusion, but that is not and never has been my position. My position, and that of Objectivists, is that objective facts and logic are sufficient to arrive at an ethical system.

Second, the subject of morality is not primarily about how one person treats another. It is about an individual's goals and values. I made that abundantly clear in post #98 and other people have made the point too on this thread and on the previous one.

Third, you are confusing personal goals with subjectivist ethics. Although a personal goal might be called a subjective goal (under one meaning of the word "subjective"), it need not be subjective in the ethical/philosophical sense. Here is the explanation of ethical subjectivism given in the Wikipedia (under the heading, Ethical Subjectivism): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectivism

Ethical subjectivism is the meta-ethical belief that ethical sentences reduce to factual statements about the attitudes and/or conventions of individual people. An ethical subjectivist might propose, for example, that what it means for something to be morally right is just for it to be approved of. (This can lead to the belief that different things are right according to each idiosyncratic moral outlook.) Another kind of ethical subjectivist might define "good" as "that which I desire". Ethical subjectivism is a narrower(individual instead of group) form of 'moral relativism'.

Now, every person has his or her own personal goals, and if everyone were rational, his standard of value would be his own life. That is an objective standard held by an individual person. If his goal was to enjoy himself, that would be a subjective personal standard because it is based on his emotions rather than on facts.

Now, back in post #98, I stated:

In the Objectivist view, your personal self interest in served by treating other people in an ethical manner. That is because other rational individuals are viewed as being more valuable to you acting as free and independent persons than they would be as slaves or prey.

Therefore, Objectivism provides an objective (fact based) reason for behaving in an ethical manner towards others. But, that is not an ethical primary. It is a consequence of the relationship of other rational people to your own objectively rational goals or values. Your need for morality doesn't depend upon the existence of other people. The manner in which you treat other people is a consequence of your moral code. The value that you place on other people is a consequence of the value that you place on yourself.

Just to illustrate the point: Suicidal people are very dangerous. Why? Because they don't value themselves. If they did, they wouldn't be contemplating suicide. Now, because they don't value themselves, they don't value other people either. If you don't place a positive value on your own life, it is impossible to rationally place a positive value on the lives of others. That is why suicidal people sometimes strike out and kill other people before killing themselves.

Darrell

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My example is, I think, much better, because it shows that moral choices are essentially not between competing logical chains, but between thinking and wilfully not doing so.

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Darrell:

>First, I have NEVER stated that, "the combination of objective facts and objective logic is insufficient to derive an ethical system." I don't know where you arrived at that conclusion, but that is not and never has been my position. My position, and that of Objectivists, is that objective facts and logic are sufficient to arrive at an ethical system.

Now this is not very clear once again, because in your reply you've changed the wording at a crucial point:

Apparently you disagree that "the combination of objective facts and objective logic is insufficient to derive an ethical system" (emphasis mine)

Instead you say that that "objective facts and logic are sufficient to arrive at an ethical system."

Was this accidental? Did you mean "derive" (i.e. logically) instead of "arrive at"? If so, this would seem to fly in the face of your earlier comments agreeing that decisions cannot be logically derived from facts (which of course must logically include ethical decisions).

This can only mean that facts+logic cannot equal ethical decisions (and as a result, a logically valid ethical system). They are insufficient.

If you did not mean "derive", then what do you mean by "arrive at"?

Sorry to belabour this point, but it's a very important clarification.

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As has been pointed out, one can survive as a parasite, a looter or moocher.

... but not without depending on other men who are not living as parasites, looters, or moochers. Human survival depends on human rationality. This being the case, whose rationality is it most logical to depend on? Your own, or somebody else's? Also, I don't agree that rationality is only for superior people. Everyone can practice it to the extent of their ability.

Hi Laure

Human survival depends as much on the distinctively human traits of imagination and empathy as it does on rationality. And sometimes it makes very logical and practical sense to depend on someone else’s rationality. When I visit my doctor, I’m very much in his hands, in more ways that one.

I didn’t say rationality is for superior people. My point about the term ‘man’s life’ was that according to Objectivist epistemology, a concept refers to all its entities and their attributes.

In which case, ‘man’s life’ means the lives of all men. But when it comes to ethics, Rand switches the meaning to ‘the life of the ideal man’. Hence, her epistemology is inconsistent with her ethics and is another reason for the is-ought failure. This is a major problem for a philosophy that claims to be integrated from top to toe.

Brendan

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Darrell:

>She did solve the problem. It is not necessary to derive decisions from facts in order to base ethics on facts.

Once again, the vagueness of your reply seems to simply fall into agreement with my argument. When you somehow "base" ethics on facts, yet can't logically derive them, how is this any different from what I am saying: that decisions are influenced by, or constrained by, or stimulated by facts (and logic, as it happens) - but are not reducible to objective facts and logic.

As I've been saying all along - if this is your position, we fundamentally agree! I'm happy to use your loose terminology, like "base", or "arrive at" instead of my own "influenced by" etc. And if this is all Rand is saying, then I agree with her too. It is all much of a muchness once we are not talking about logical determinaton.

But obviously where we disagree is of course there has never been never any problem as to whether decisions are kinda sorta somehow vaguely "based" on facts and logic! Rand's "solution", if this is it, is to a non-problem, just as Ellen and I and other have argued all along. She has solved a non-problem of the ages! :)

(Of course, I don't believe for a moment that this non-problem is the one Rand is referring to in her essay. I believe Rand's defenders are mistaken here. Ellen argues very convincingly that Rand does, in fact, believe she has established a valid logical relation between fact and decision - why else does she refer to the "other philosophers" who've failed? Why does she think one can be "determined" from the other? As Ellen points out, are people saying that Rand is that ignorant?)

>Not all decisions or alternatives are questions of value.

Now here's another point of disagreement, perhaps, in that it seems to me Rand's system does entail that all decisions or alternatives are questions of value (even if she may have said different at various points - she often issued contradictory statements). They are all choices, after all. Look at her "sense of life" theory of aesthetics, for example. But perhaps another thread.

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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Darrell:

>First, I have NEVER stated that, "the combination of objective facts and objective logic is insufficient to derive an ethical system." I don't know where you arrived at that conclusion, but that is not and never has been my position. My position, and that of Objectivists, is that objective facts and logic are sufficient to arrive at an ethical system.

Now this is not very clear once again, because in your reply you've changed the wording at a crucial point:

Apparently you disagree that "the combination of objective facts and objective logic is insufficient to derive an ethical system" (emphasis mine)

Instead you say that that "objective facts and logic are sufficient to arrive at an ethical system."

Was this accidental? Did you mean "derive" (i.e. logically) instead of "arrive at"? If so, this would seem to fly in the face of your earlier comments agreeing that decisions cannot be logically derived from facts (which of course must logically include ethical decisions).

This can only mean that facts+logic cannot equal ethical decisions (and as a result, a logically valid ethical system). They are insufficient.

If you did not mean "derive", then what do you mean by "arrive at"?

Sorry to belabour this point, but it's a very important clarification.

Daniel,

I purposefully avoided use of the word, "derive," because it seems to be somewhat ambiguous. That is, "derive," could mean, "deductively derive," or it could be used in a broader sense. I have used it in the broader sense, but you seem to be using it in the narrow sense of, "deductively derive," so I chose to avoid using the word in this case.

I believe that it is possible to use logical means to ascertain ethical principles from facts, but those logical means must include reasoning methods other than deduction. I think I have made that point abundantly clear, but I guess it doesn't hurt to repeat it here so that we can make sure we all understand each other.

Another point of misunderstanding appears to be between values and decisions, or between objective and subjective (personal) values. Objective values are the values that a person should hold, while subjective values are the values that a person actually does hold. It is like the distinction between natural rights and legal rights. Natural rights are the rights that a person has by virtue of his nature as a human being. Legal rights are the rights that he holds under the law.

The decision that a person makes is a consequence of the values that he actually, personally, holds. The values that he actually holds are a consequence of the choices he makes and so are his decisions. His objective values are not the result of his choices. They are the values that he should hold, based upon his nature. Objective values are objective because they can be derived from objective facts.

The fact that man's life is his proper standard of value is an objective fact which can be ascertained on the basis of his nature as a human being. Whether he actually chooses to hold his life as his standard of value is his choice. Whether it is objectively his highest value is not his choice. His only choice is whether to accept or evade the fact that his life is his ultimate value.

The same can be said of all subordinate values. At any one time, some things are objectively of more value to a person than others. But, it is always a personal choice whether to pursue things of higher value in favor of things of lower value or not. In that sense, decisions are not derived from facts. Decisions are personal choices. But the correctness of those decisions is not a personal choice.

If you were taking a math test, you might know the right answer to a question but choose to mark the wrong answer. If the question was, "2 + 2 = ?", you could choose to write "5," but that would not be the right answer. There is an objectively right answer, namely, "4." But you can choose not to select it. So, your decision is not determined by the rules of mathematics. But, the correct answer is.

Darrell

Edited by Darrell Hougen
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Ellen argues very convincingly that Rand does, in fact, believe she has established a valid logical relation between fact and decision ...

Rand did indeed establish a valid logical relationship between fact and value. (Here, the term "value" refers to objective value, not subjective or chosen value.) But, the relationship she has established is not deductive. Deduction is not the only valid form of logic. That is, deduction is not the only valid (non-contradictory) means of identifying the facts of reality.

Darrell

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Darrell:

>I purposefully avoided use of the word, "derive," because it seems to be somewhat ambiguous. That is, "derive," could mean, "deductively derive," or it could be used in a broader sense. I have used it in the broader sense, but you seem to be using it in the narrow sense of, "deductively derive," so I chose to avoid using the word in this case.

Ok, I thought so. Thank you for clarifying this.

>I believe that it is possible to use logical means to ascertain ethical principles from facts, but those logical means must include reasoning methods other than deduction.

Well, this is perhaps the nub of the disagreement, right here. What other "logical means" which is there which is not standard classical deductive logic? Deductive logic I thought we all, Objectivists included, accepted.

Can you be more specific? What other "logic" are you referring to? So-called "inductive" logic? This is well-known to be deductively false, for the reasons I've outlined, (which are also known as the problem/s of induction). If you accept the validity of deductive logic, you cannot also accept so-called "inductive" logic as being valid without contradiction. Surely you cannot be taking this position?

If you mean neither inductive nor deductive logic, then...what? "Fuzzy logic, with "degrees" of truth, rather than the classical "either/or"? Doesn't seem like a very Randian approach, but hey, I'd be open to discussing that. Is that what you mean?

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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>I believe that it is possible to use logical means to ascertain ethical principles from facts, but those logical means must include reasoning methods other than deduction.

Well, this is perhaps the nub of the disagreement, right here. What other "logical means" which is there which is not standard classical deductive logic? Deductive logic I thought we all, Objectivists included, accepted.

Can you be more specific? What other "logic" are you referring to? So-called "inductive" logic? This is well-known to be deductively false, for the reasons I've outlined, (which are also known as the problem/s of induction). If you accept the validity of deductive logic, you cannot also accept so-called "inductive" logic as being valid without contradiction. Surely you cannot be taking this position?

If you mean neither inductive nor deductive logic, then...what? "Fuzzy logic, with "degrees" of truth, rather than the classical "either/or"? Doesn't seem like a very Randian approach, but hey, I'd be open to discussing that. Is that what you mean?

I don't know if there is a name for this kind of reasoning, but, for example, the kind of argument that Rand uses to justify the statement that existence exists. The fact that existence exists is implicit in all knowledge. One cannot argue against existence without invoking existence. So, by process of elimination, existence must exist. However, there is no possible deductive argument for existence.

The problem with using deduction is that you have to start with a set of premises and argue to a conclusion. There is no way to discuss the premises themselves. They are off limits. That is why existence is viewed as axiomatic. Similarly, it is impossible to argue deductively for one's standard of value because the ultimate goal is not instrumental to achieving an even more ultimate goal. However, I have argued that life is the only possible value that a rational human can possess as his ultimate value. Therefore, by process of elimination, it is his ultimate value and standard by which all other values must be measured.

Darrell

Edited by Darrell Hougen
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Darrell:

>I don't know if there is a name for this kind of reasoning...

OK, so you're using a kind of reasoning that is not commonly recognised, but whatever it is, it is invalid by the standards of classical logic. If that's the case, however, I think you should probably avoid using the terminology of standard logic, as you did a few posts back when you said:

"Rand did indeed establish a valid logical relationship between fact and value."

Because that gives a misleading impression. In fact the relationship you are proposing is neither valid nor logical in any ordinary sense.

>but, for example, the kind of argument that Rand uses to justify the statement that existence exists. The fact that existence exists is implicit in all knowledge. One cannot argue against existence without invoking existence. So, by process of elimination, existence must exist. However, there is no possible deductive argument for existence.

Well, first of all, the statement "existence exists" seems to me to be a straightforward piece of logic, with nothing very special about it. The problem is, as you correctly state, is that the term "existence" can be made to mean pretty much whatever you like. (As Stephen Boydstun once reminded us, Bertrand Russell offered this axiom to the British idealist Bradley, who found nothing to object to in it!) But as a piece of logic it is unremarkable. I do not see how Rand can be said to be making any kind of special claim with it.

>However, I have argued that life is the only possible value that a rational human can possess as his ultimate value. Therefore, by process of elimination, it is his ultimate value and standard by which all other values must be measured.

If you have not argued deductively, how have you argued? (Incidentally, "a process of elimination" is a standard logical deductive process). Using this unnamed method of reasoning, I suppose you might answer. At which point I suppose I must withdraw, as you are appealing to a special rational method which, despite giving you conclusions which are invalid according to standard logic, you still intend to accept. As I, on the other hand, have made a commitment to use the rules of standard logic in my arguments, we are probably at a point where we can't go much further. Nonetheless I think this has been a most interesting discussion, and has definitely been been a productive debate.

regards

Daniel

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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I don't know if there is a name for this kind of reasoning, but, for example, the kind of argument that Rand uses to justify the statement that existence exists. The fact that existence exists is implicit in all knowledge. One cannot argue against existence without invoking existence. So, by process of elimination, existence must exist. However, there is no possible deductive argument for existence.

Darrell, you're on the right track. Your statement here parallels the fact that the concept of 'value' presupposes the concept of 'life', so that you can't really talk about values without implicitly assuming that life is the ultimate value. I don't think you can call "Life is the ultimate standard of value" an axiom, but it's close to being an axiom. The naysayers will call it circular reasoning, but to me, the circularity is necessary and the premise makes sense. Now I'm gonna have to re-read Intro. to Objectivist Epistemology to figure out how to word this better. It has been an interesting discussion, and has deepened my admiration for what I see as the rock-solid logic of Rand's arguments.

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As has been pointed out, one can survive as a parasite, a looter or moocher.

... but not without depending on other men who are not living as parasites, looters, or moochers. Human survival depends on human rationality. This being the case, whose rationality is it most logical to depend on? Your own, or somebody else's? Also, I don't agree that rationality is only for superior people. Everyone can practice it to the extent of their ability.

Hi Laure

Human survival depends as much on the distinctively human traits of imagination and empathy as it does on rationality. And sometimes it makes very logical and practical sense to depend on someone else’s rationality. When I visit my doctor, I’m very much in his hands, in more ways that one.

I didn’t say rationality is for superior people. My point about the term ‘man’s life’ was that according to Objectivist epistemology, a concept refers to all its entities and their attributes.

In which case, ‘man’s life’ means the lives of all men. But when it comes to ethics, Rand switches the meaning to ‘the life of the ideal man’. Hence, her epistemology is inconsistent with her ethics and is another reason for the is-ought failure. This is a major problem for a philosophy that claims to be integrated from top to toe.

Brendan

Brendan,

You say..." ‘man’s life’ means the lives of all men. But when it comes to ethics, Rand switches the meaning to ‘the life of the ideal man’."

That's not true.

-Victor

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Laure:

>I don't think you can call "Life is the ultimate standard of value" an axiom, but it's close to being an axiom. The naysayers will call it circular reasoning, but to me, the circularity is necessary and the premise makes sense.

Hi Laure

The problem with "Life is the ultimate standard of value" isn't that it's circular (it may well be, but this naysayer at least has not argued this as such). The problem is that it is more or less useless as a standard, as it is so vague almost any course of action can be rationalised to fit such a standard. I offer, as before, the following example: Objectivists consider suicide - i.e. death - to be morally acceptable as a course of action. Yet this is quite the opposite of "life."

I submit that any standard that admits such a wide range of behaviour, right through to its opposite is not much of a standard. Imagine if I set a standard like "thou shall not steal" but then in the next breath said "stealing is also ok." This is effectively what Rand is doing by admitting suicide is morally acceptable.

To get round this, in her essay on The Objectivist Ethics Rand simply equivocates . She starts out with "life" as in survival, which something like suicide obviously conflicts with; but then shifts her meaning to life as "man qua man", which is so vague one can blur out such problems. One simply needs to read the text to see this shift. Unfortunately this dilution, while saving her from such objections, does so at the price of destroying the usefulness of such a standard.

>Now I'm gonna have to re-read Intro. to Objectivist Epistemology to figure out how to word this better. It has been an interesting discussion, and has deepened my admiration for what I see as the rock-solid logic of Rand's arguments.

Clearly Rand's logic is not even close to "rock-solid" by accepted standards. To counter this objection, Darrell has posited that there is some alternative method of reasoning that validates her thinking other than logic, but so far I have not seen much evidence of it.

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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MSK: I might be wrong, but it has been slowly dawning on me as I read that Rand got it backwards about the intention of Hume and Kant. Instead of trying to save religion from reason, maybe they were trying to save reason from religion. They knew what religion without reason was capable of in social terms and they were witnessing the wonderful things the use of reason was doing.

Michael,

Kant is often taken to be an Enlightenment thinker, a champion of reason, but it’s just not true. (And there are non-Objectivist “experts” who would acknowledge this, if you feel that Ridpath’s extensive analysis is suspect) And while it may be vogue to be contrarian to what Ortho-Objectivists take as an axiom—the evil of Kant, that is, I merely take it down a few notches and realize after careful study and consideration, that the man’s philosophy has been disastrous. As a matter of fact, truely disasterous. In order to come up with such a system, Kant had to have seen the truth on many matters, and meticulously turned away from it at every point. He degraded the term "reason" trying to contest it while pretending to uphold it with complex verbiage---and his stated purpose in philosophy was to save altruism (especially of the Christian variety) from Enlightenment influences, and he pioneered the most systematic ethics of altruism that had ever been concocted.

Unlike Kantian rationalism, Objectivism maintains that you should be *reasonable* but not because it's reasonable--as in for its own sake, (and that’s where Kant proceeded, as was the case with his moral system) but because it's the only way for you to survive. All this can be acknowledged without being an Ortho-O’ist. :cool: But it would make for an interesting forum discussion. Not here.

-Victor

Edited by Victor Pross
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The problem with "Life is the ultimate standard of value" isn't that it's circular (it may well be, but this naysayer at least has not argued this as such). The problem is that it is more or less useless as a standard, as it is so vague almost any course of action can be rationalised to fit such a standard. I offer, as before, the following example: Objectivists consider suicide - i.e. death - to be morally acceptable as a course of action. Yet this is quite the opposite of "life."

I submit that any standard that admits such a wide range of behaviour, right through to its opposite is not much of a standard. Imagine if I set a standard like "thou shall not steal" but then in the next breath said "stealing is also ok." This is effectively what Rand is doing by admitting suicide is morally acceptable.

Daniel,

OY! (smacking my head now) You’re thinking here is fraught with errors, and it is clear to me that you are not well-versed in Objectivism at all. The more I read your posts, the more I realize that you are either well-versed in it and nevertheless toss up erroneous statements about Rand’s ethics to see if your philosophical opponents are well versed or not—or you simply are not well-versed yourself. :shocked:

-Victor

Edited by Victor Pross
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Victor:

>OY! (smacking my head now) You’re thinking here is fraught with errors, and it is clear to me that you are not well-versed in Objectivism at all. The more I read your posts, the more I realize that you are either well-versed in it and nevertheless toss up erroneous statements about Rand’s ethics to see if your philosophical opponents are well versed or not—or you simply are not well-versed yourself.

OY! You say my thinking is "fraught with errors" and that I am "not well versed in Objectivism at all."

Yet you give no examples from my post of my alleged "errors", nor evidence that I am not well-versed in the subject. This is not to say there are no errors in what I write, or that I am a world authority on Objectivism. But if you are going to make such assertions, you might at least front up with some evidence to back them up.

So watcha got?

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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Victor:

>OY! (smacking my head now) You’re thinking here is fraught with errors, and it is clear to me that you are not well-versed in Objectivism at all. The more I read your posts, the more I realize that you are either well-versed in it and nevertheless toss up erroneous statements about Rand’s ethics to see if your philosophical opponents are well versed or not—or you simply are not well-versed yourself.

OY! You say my thinking is "fraught with errors" and that I am "not well versed in Objectivism at all."

Yet you give no examples from my post of my alleged "errors", nor evidence that I am not well-versed in the subject. This is not to say there are no errors in what I write, or that I am a world authority on Objectivism. But if you are going to make such assertions, you might at least front up with some evidence to back them up.

So watcha got?

Daniel,

Oh, I agree. I'm thinking and writing my reasons, but had to spin off a little heat there. :turned:

Victor

edit: Those who deny [Aristotle’s] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Metaphysics

Edited by Victor Pross
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