Why does man need a code of values?

[Brant Gaede]

Did you [Daniel] not think that the exchange between Ellen and myself hurled a breakthrough on the issue? (# posts 42, 44). It seems that a light bulb went off over her head.

HUH???

Ellen

___

Wel, that solves any reading light problem. Unless it's a strobe.

--Brant

[Ellen Stuttle]

I think it's possible to read her as you indicated, but I don't find this reading flattering because it would involve her having played a word game on "determines" and "implies," changing the meaning from the context she'd said, in the first sentence of the several-times-quoted paragraph, she was writing "in answer to."

Ellen,

This is as I think. I too think it isn't flattering, but it is consistent with an integrated approach (as in "fully integrated system" as Rand and others have claimed for Objectivism) where at least Rand kept to her basic definitions.

If we agree that volition is to be included, let's call deriving or deducing "ought" from "is" something like "compelled volition." As Rand did not formally build anything in her philosophy on the "compelled volition" principle, maintaining free will as a cornerstone throughout the entire philosophy, this is another reason I think she meant the passage in the manner I stated and not as simply deduced. That's in theory and it is supposed to be that way in practice. But in practice in her personal life, from all accounts except those of ortho-Objectivists, she did adhere to the "compelled volition" principle in her dealings with her inner circle: you agreed with her of your own volition (mere agreement was not enough) or you were out.

Sometimes Rand was more artist than philosopher. I have no problem with identifying specific places like this and still agree with the fundamentals of Objectivism.

Michael

Michael,

Although I think I understand your 1st and 3rd paragraph, I can't say I understand the 2nd.

I've been thinking tonight of a comparable example from the history of thought -- and this one a big-time major example in debates about scientific epistemology ever since Newton: Newton's "Hypotheses non fingo," roughly translated as "I propose [or fling out or offer; there have been debates over his exact Latin meaning] no hypotheses." In fact, he did fingo, however one translates the word exactly, hypotheses, even in the section wherein he used that sentence. His editor for the 1713 revision of the Principia tried hard, politely -- Newton was so swell-headed by then, one had to be very polite -- but unsuccessfully to get Newton to drop this sentence, pointing out that it wasn't accurate. Newton was stubborn and kept it. Hundreds, possibly even thousands, of essays, debates wouldn't have transpired if Newton had heeded Coates' advice.

I think this situation is similar. (And, btw, Harriman and Peikoff, in their attempt to hold Newton up as "O'ist scientific exemplar," wouldn't have a case without that crucial sentence.) I think that Rand was addressing a context which would have been well understood by the audience at the time she gave the talk, February 9, 1961. I'd already heard a whole lot about that context in my very first course on scientific psychology, the fall quarter of 1960 at Northwestern. I think she was addressing this -- well-known to a philosophy audience at so prestigous a university as the University of Wisconsin -- issue. I thus think that what she meant in the first sentence, though didn't say, was "no entailment relation." I figure she wouldn't have liked, on a stylistic basis, including the word "entailment."

I further think that, just as in the case of Newton's unfortunate not listening to his editor's advice, much Objectivist subsequent debate could have been eliminated if she'd just deleted the paragraph, and the subsequent "to a living consciousness, every 'is' implies an 'ought'." I think she goofed, which is the most flattering interpretation I can give.

Ellen

Edited for spelling errors. Getting so I can't proofread the type size in the preview box.

___

Edited March 21, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

You are right that my second paragraph is not very clear. I reread it and I can say that it was not my finest moment. I was trying to speculate:

1. What would happen had Rand's intention actually been to try to deduce "ought" from "is" with volition thrown in.

2. What one could possibly call such a process.

3. As a further indication that this was not her real intention, I mentioned that she did not build on this premise anywhere.

To finalize, I mentioned that she actually did deduce "ought" from "is" in her personal relations. As an example, just think of the idea of deducing someone's artistic preferences based on their sense of life or vice-versa.

I hope that is clearer.

Michael

[Brendan Hutching]

Victor was human and he died.

MSK was human and he died.

Darrell was human and he died.

[and so on...]

*Observed past regularities will always continue into the future.*

Therefore, the next human being will die--as all humans must die.

This argument is only as valid as the inductive premise – “observed past regularities will always continue into the future” – and the challenge is to justify that premise. The inductive premise cannot be justified by appeal to observed regularities, ie by induction, for two reasons.

First, because appealing to observed regularities presupposes that the future will be like the past, which is the very principle one is seeking to establish. Hence the argument is circular.

Second, the inductive premise goes beyond the evidence. What we know from the observational premises is that a finite number of people have died. This is merely the enumeration of events, and doesn’t establish what we need to know: a universal claim that is necessarily true.

So inductive arguments in favour of induction are failures. The only other option is an argument from deduction, but to date there have been no convincing arguments from that quarter either.

A note about Hume. As I understand it, he did not deny the fact that people may in fact engage in a procedure that appears to be induction. What he claimed was that induction is not a form of reasoning.

But regardless of whether or not people do engage in the type of thinking we call induction, this is not the only means of acquiring knowledge. An equally used method is what is commonly termed ‘trial and error’, which does not depend on induction. This method is especially helpful in circumstances where there is no clear or obvious solution to a problem, and we are probing our way.

Brendan

[Victor Pross]

I’m venturing here to put forth a tentative hypothesis regarding those philosophical stances that fuels the is-ought issue, and one such issue is the supposed dichotomy between concepts and percepts. The “practical” can be defined as "that which reaches or fosters a desired result." Historically, a dichotomy between morality and practicality (which has is-ought implications) has been sermonized by dozens of philosophers. This argument is ingrained in the age-old dichotomy between concepts and percepts, which has been closed by the Objectivist theory of concept-formation, and this has fueled the is-ought split, but not this alone. But Objectivism defines a practical set of virtues which are, by definition, the behavior patterns required to achieve values that support individual human life.*

(Note from MSK:

* Phrase plagiarized from Luke Setzer. See here.

The plagiarized passage is identified in bold and linked to its detection and disclosure. The post is left up out of respect to the posters on this thread, so as not to make hash out of their discussion. OL extends its deepest apologies to Luke Setzer.)

Edited June 28, 2007 by Michael Stuart Kelly

[Daniel Barnes]

Laure:

>Daniel, I don't think there's a problem with Darrell's logic here. Substitute an alcoholic being "on the wagon" for "being rational." In order to be on the wagon, the alcoholic must choose not to drink alcohol. But he might choose to drink alcohol. But then he would no longer be on the wagon. No logic problem there.

Hi Laure,

Apologies for not replying earlier, but your example does not quite match with Darrell's for a number of reasons that hopefully I can make clear.

I will lay the problem out:

Darrell seems to argue there are two human 'states of mind', if you like, that govern our choices: being 'rational' and being 'irrational'. Made from the "rational" state, he seems to be saying, our decisions all must be rational ie:backed by logically sound arguments, and also honed by the lessons of experience. . From the "irrational" state we are not bound by any such requirements - we can arrive at our decisions any way we choose, through intuition, emotion, imagination, faith etc.

This is clear enough as far as it goes, but this then raises the problem of how these two 'states of mind' come to be in the first place. How does one come to be 'rational', or 'irrational'? To say they are merely states "chosen" by the individual is to miss the point, for obviously we are looking for why such a choice is made in the first place. To say, as Darrell seemed to be saying at first (his position seems to be less clear in later posts), that the choice to be rational must be a rational one, is to accidentally commit a logical error; for it means that only rational people can make the choice to be rational, and this is a circularity! The flip side of this is that it appears that the situation is likewise for the irrationalist - they obviously cannot decide to be rational on a rational basis, as this would mean they were not really irrationalists in the first place!

Faced with this dilemma, the problem then is often driven down to a level of mere genetic determinism: some people are simply born rational - perhaps, using a Randian version of rationality, like the conveniently sui generis Howard Roark - and others are not. This is a potentially nasty turn in a number of respects, however, first and foremost because it totally destroys any any moral claim to rationality - because if you are simply born this way, you had no choice in the matter, therefore you cannot claim any moral credit for it! Obviously the other nasty turn is that if you define 'rationality' as the sole criterion of humanity, you will effectively start defining irrational people as "subhuman" - and that they are born that way, like dumb animals, so they have as much moral or ethical value as a cow or sheep. This is a slippery slope indeed.

Of course this is all highly unsatisfactory, so it means clearly we should take another look at our premises - whether it is in fact possible to be "fully rational" in the first place, and if in fact the only alternative is "full irrationality." I will do that in a later post when I have a moment.

>If you want a real logic problem, explain to me the line from that Rush song, "I will choose free will."

Fortunately rock'n'roll is not all that logical!

Edited March 22, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Darrell Hougen]

The point seems to be: if ethics were logically derivable, we'd be forced to proceed from particular factual situations into particular ethical acts (or conclusions). There is no ethical weight to acts that are forced upon you, however, so it is just as well that ethics (or more generally, decisions) are not logically derivable! That's it in a nutshell. This opens the door to a degree of freedom of choice, but also a degree of human - pause for scary word - subjectivity, as of course both facts and logic are objective, but as Hume shows, together they are not adequate to derive an ethical system.

You've got it backwards. If an ethical system is necessarily subjective, then it is impossible for a person's decisions or actions to carry any ethical weight. That is, if there are no right or wrong answers, if there are no decisions that are objectively better than any others, then ethics is irrelevant to the choices a person makes.

Darrell

[Rodney]

The point seems to be: if ethics were logically derivable, we'd be forced to proceed from particular factual situations into particular ethical acts (or conclusions). There is no ethical weight to acts that are forced upon you, however, so it is just as well that ethics (or more generally, decisions) are not logically derivable!

It's the evasion of logic that is the root of immorality--when you know something is right, but still talk yourself into not doing it.

Edited March 23, 2007 by ashleyparkerangel

[Darrell Hougen]

And so forth. So clearly, saying one has "established a relation" between is/ought, and leaving it there, is not saying a great deal. What kind of relation is the issue. As the famous problem is one of the logical relation between is/ought - and recall that deductive logic the premises determine the conclusion, which seems to be the situation Rand is setting up in the first sentence quoted, where the "is" determines the "ought" - it seems only too likely that this problem is exactly the one she is talking about (as I show above, if you are just establishing a 'relation" there is no problem!). Further, it seems equally clear by this end sentence that she considers the problem to be solved by the prior sentence - so much for that!, she is saying. But if we all agree - and as even Darrell says - that a decision (ought) cannot be derived from a fact (is), no matter what that fact is, then we must agree that the first of the two sentences cannot be a correct solution. Her dismissal is cavalier; she has missed the point at best.

Rand didn't fail and you're misunderstanding what I'm saying. She did not say that an "is" implies only one "ought," nor do I think that Hume was asking for a one-to-one mapping. From an ethical standpoint, it may be that there are several or many equally valid choices that one can make. All of them may lead equally to the maintenance or achievement of one's values, to the preservation and enhancement of one's own life, etc. And, often it is difficult to tell a priori, which is the best choice. Within the level of existing uncertainty, all of the choices may be equal. If so, then, within the bounds of a set of equally valid choices, the selection is no longer an ethical choice.

Take the situation of the typical starving college student. The student may be faced with difficult choices between, for example, continuing to be a student full time and sometimes going hungry, working part time and taking longer to finish college, quitting college and working full time, or, like the main character in Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, murdering the lady next door and taking her money. The first three choices are all ethically proper and equal choices because it is difficult to know, a priori, which course of action is best. Killing the neighbor is not proper because it is of provably lower value. So, choosing among the first three possibilities may be a subjective choice, but the fourth option is objectively worse. That is what Rand was saying and that is what I am saying.

Darrell

[Rodney]

Take the situation of the typical starving college student. The student may be faced with difficult choices between, for example, continuing to be a student full time and sometimes going hungry, working part time and taking longer to finish college, quitting college and working full time, or, like the main character in Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, murdering the lady next door and taking her money.

Come on, Darrell: it's more to the point, and more realistic, to say that he might simply kick back and be lazy. And that would be just as objectively wrong.

[Daniel Barnes]

Darrell:

>You've got it backwards. If an ethical system is necessarily subjective, then it is impossible for a person's decisions or actions to carry any ethical weight. That is, if there are no right or wrong answers, if there are no decisions that are objectively better than any others, then ethics is irrelevant to the choices a person makes.

No, you're merely asserting a case that you then deny in the next breath, which is very odd. That is: one moment you agree that the combination of objective facts and objective logic is insufficient to derive an ethical system - that you cannot logically derive decisions from facts, which obviously includes ethical decisions - then the next minute you try to say that this is not the case. I'm not sure what your point is here. In fact, I think it is you who have the argument entirely backwards - if people did not have their own subjective goals, feelings, values, or emotions, it would not matter in the least how you treated them! There would be no need for ethics in the first place.

[Daniel Barnes]

>Rand didn't fail and you're misunderstanding what I'm saying. She did not say that an "is" implies only one "ought,"

But this is exacty what "determines" means, Darrell - what a man "is" determines what he "ought" to do.

Unless, as I said earlier and Ellen also pointed out with perfect accuracy to Michael, you're going to bend the word "determines" to mean "implies" or some other kinda-sorta vagary. In which case I'm happy to accept reformulation along the lines of my previous post:

"The fact that man is kinda sorta has something to do with what he ought to do"

This is what you're saying here. I agree, but it is not saying very much.

Edited March 23, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Darrell Hougen]

I thought you were claiming that Rand had solved the problem of deriving decisions, and thereby ethics, from facts (ought from is). But obviously you're not doing that. Thus we agree on the central issue of the fact/decision dualism, which as I said is very encouraging.

She did solve the problem. It is not necessary to derive decisions from facts in order to base ethics on facts. Not all decisions or alternatives are questions of value.

> Why do you believe rationality is important?

Because it seems to me our best hope for peace and freedom.

So, why do you want peace and freedom? What if I want war and subjugation?

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

If the first sentence summarises your position, then the answer to the second sentence must be "no": a choice can't be "determined" in any strict sense by examining any fact. Only in the loosest or vaguest possible sense of "determined" you might perhaps get to "yes"; as in "partly determined" or "somewhat influenced", or similar.

In which case, we would also agree. So the situation is promising indeed.

If you are conceding that there is a relationship between fact and value, then the situation is indeed promising.

Darrell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Darrel and Daniel,

Why are you guys even addressing the word "determine" for Rand's stance on is/ought? She used "establish" (a relation) and "validate," not "determine" or "deduce."

See here for a small discussion of this if you haven't already. I linked to Ellen's post because she excerpted the pertinent part of my previous long post.

Michael

[Darrell Hougen]

Here’s an illustration to indicate the gap between the debaters:

Victor was human and he died.

MSK was human and he died.

Darrell was human and he died.

[and so on...]

*Observed past regularities will always continue into the future.*

Therefore, the next human being will die--as all humans must die.

Now an Objectivist cannot deny the conclusion if we accept the truth of the premises.

“Not necessarily!” says Hume and Daniel. :yes:

See the problem at all?

Victor,

You are not correctly representing the Objectivist view on this subject and I certainly do not agree with the above derivation. Hume and Popper are correct in saying that the past is sometimes a poor predictor of the future. Their argument cannot be easily dismissed. I would like to have a discussion of Popper at some point. I have read his essay (that was linked) and it is very interesting. However, I will be out of town all next week and may not check in, so I'll have to defer my participation in any discussion until I get back.

Darrell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Darrell,

The time element cuts right to the heart of induction. I have been doing some reading on this. Put on your thinking cap while you are away. I want to do an in-depth discussion on induction later.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Darrell:

>If you are conceding that there is a relationship between fact and value, then the situation is indeed promising.

What great intellectual achievement do you think establishing "a relationship" between fact and value represents? See my #101, replying to Michael K's same argument:

He wrote:

>Michael K: Establishing a relation and deducing a relation are two different things. So where is Rand actually claiming to have solved Hume’s problem? And, as both you and I have mentioned, where is the problem anyway?

I replied:

>Well, to demonstrate let me take a moment to "establish a relation" or two between "is" and "ought" myself:

1) They are both English words

2) They both have vowels in them

3) I have used them regularly

4) They often appear in philosophy textbooks

5) They are both in a sentence in The Objectivist Ethics

>And so forth. So clearly, saying one has "established a relation" between is/ought, and leaving it there, is not saying a great deal. What kind of relation is the issue.

So, what kind of relation are you talking about?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I replied:

>Well, to demonstrate let me take a moment to "establish a relation" or two between "is" and "ought" myself:

1) They are both English words

2) They both have vowels in them

3) I have used them regularly

4) They often appear in philosophy textbooks

5) They are both in a sentence in The Objectivist Ethics

>And so forth. So clearly, saying one has "established a relation" between is/ought, and leaving it there, is not saying a great deal. What kind of relation is the issue.

Daniel,

I am glad you excerpted this because it saved me from having to go back and hunt for it. I was (and still am) going to prepare a more extended comment on some of your previous points.

The relation one establishes with the other is complete dependency for any possibility of action. All "oughts" completely depend on the "is's" in order for action to be performed. No "is" depends on any "ought" except for one: the agent himself. And this goes beyond what "ought" usually means, except it is volitional. The agent has to think ("ought to think") in order to correctly make a concept of an actual existent. The agent can choose not to engage his rational faculty as an act of will (after maturity, of course). That's what makes this an "ought" and not an automatic "is" like instinctual or involuntary behavior (heartbeat, sleep cycles, etc.).

"Is" and "ought" is a relation of codependency, not derivation. Frankly, qua concept, one cannot exist without the other if you include the existence of the agent in the very act of thinking as part of the whole situation.

Michael

[Victor Pross]

Here’s an illustration to indicate the gap between the debaters:

Victor was human and he died.

MSK was human and he died.

Darrell was human and he died.

[and so on...]

*Observed past regularities will always continue into the future.*

Therefore, the next human being will die--as all humans must die.

Now an Objectivist cannot deny the conclusion if we accept the truth of the premises.

“Not necessarily!” says Hume and Daniel. :yes:

See the problem at all?

Victor,

You are not correctly representing the Objectivist view on this subject and I certainly do not agree with the above derivation. Hume and Popper are correct in saying that the past is sometimes a poor predictor of the future. Their argument cannot be easily dismissed. I would like to have a discussion of Popper at some point. I have read his essay (that was linked) and it is very interesting. However, I will be out of town all next week and may not check in, so I'll have to defer my participation in any discussion until I get back.

Darrell

Darrel,

For the record, I’m not happy with the above derivation either. To start anew and remedy my post, let’s consider the below presentation and see how it meats with our worthy opponents.

The three laws of logic may be stated in different ways, depending on whether they refer to things, classes or propositions. Here is the formulation from a standard text on logic by Lionel Ruby’s Logic: An Introduction.

1.The Law of Identity: for things, the law asserts that “A is A,” or “anything is itself.” For propositions: “If a proposition is true, then it is true.”

2. The Law of the Excluded Middle: For things: “Anything is either A or not A.” For propositions: “A proposition is true, then it is true.”

3. The Law of Contradiction: For things: “Nothing can be both A and not-A.” For propositions: “A proposition, P, cannot be both true and false.”*

These principles are straightforward enough, and few people would challenge them directly. It has been said that the laws of logic cannot be proved, but what does this mean? Formal proof involves an inference from a set of given premises, and in the case of logical laws, there are no available premises from which they can be derived.

Fore example, any attempt to prove the Law of Identity would result in question begging, as any attempted proof would presuppose the Law of Identity. The laws of logic are incapable of proof. We cannot prove them because any they are presupposed by the very concept of “proof,” and to demand proof for them is to commit the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept.

Victor

(Note from MSK:

* Phrases plagiarized from an unknown poster named BattleGear on another discussion forum. See here.

The plagiarized passages are identified in bold and linked to their detection and disclosure. The post is left up out of respect to the posters on this thread, so as not to make hash out of their discussion. OL extends its deepest apologies to the poster named BattleGear.)

[Ellen Stuttle]

Darrel and Daniel,

Why are you guys even addressing the word "determine" for Rand's stance on is/ought? She used "establish" (a relation) and "validate," not "determine" or "deduce."

See here for a small discussion of this if you haven't already. I linked to Ellen's post because she excerpted the pertinent part of my previous long post.

Michael

Michael,

SHE is the one who used the word "determines," in exactly the paragraph which has been quoted and quoted and in a sentence which you quoted in the post you linked:

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do."

Maybe if I write the "determines" all in caps...

"The fact that a living entity is, DETERMINES what it ought to do."

That is where the "determines" is entering the picture: from her. And I've explained at length the academic context of the time, which I don't think she was so ignorant as not to have been aware of. (If she had been that ignorant, why would she have said anything addressing "those philosophers" at all?) I've also explained that the relationship "those philosophers" were talking about was an entailment relation, not just any relation.

Ellen

___

[Victor Pross]

Ayn Rand has provided a viable solution to the is-ought issue.

On some other post, I argued that Rand attacked the challenge of ethics by going to the root, to the question of “meta-ethics" and other philosophers have failed to do this.

Instead of asking “Which morality is correct?”—she asked, “Just what is a ‘morality’, anyway?”

There are many contenders, many possible moralities which are postulated: The Ten Commandments or ‘seek the greatest good of the greatest number or ‘the moral ideal is service to society’, etc. But what do all moralities have in common? Let’s ask Rand’s meta-ethical question: What is morality?

A morality—any morality—is a set of rules of conduct to guide the actions of an individual human being. THIS—and only this—is what all possible moralities have in common. As Rand put it: “A code of values to guide man’s choices and actions.”

Rand asked, Why should there be any morality at all? (This is a question that has been put to Daniel who has failed to answer it). Rand’s question is a normative question, so let’s rearticulate it in a factual provisos: What would happen to a man who practiced no morality? (This echoes Rand’s “immortal robot”).

A man who practiced no morality would be a man whose behavior was guided by no rules at all. Our immoral man’s brain, say, is perhaps connected to a random number generator. But such a man, if he were mortal, would die. This is evidence that the connection between factual and normative statements is MAN’S LIFE. Man needs morality to live. But just any moral system will NOT do it.

Rand outlined the basic structure of her ethical system, and I want to summarize it while standing on one logical foot:

A, Living beings, and only living beings, have values (goals).

B, Man, being volitional, must choose his values.

C, Values may be means to an end, but must lead to some ultimate end. (An infinite chain of means leading to no final end would be meaningless).

D, Life is an ultimate end, the only ‘end in itself.’

E, Therefore, the only meaningful of justifiable values a man can choose—objectively—are those which serve to sustain his life. Man cannot survive by any random means.

Rand: “Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action."

Man ought to do certain things—because they are necessary for him to be.

He ‘is’ because he does what he ‘ought.’

-Victor

(Note from MSK:

* Phrases plagiarized from "Ayn Marx" (pseudonym) Ronald E. Merrill. See here.

The plagiarized passages are identified in bold and linked to their detection and disclosure. The post is left up out of respect to the posters on this thread, so as not to make hash out of their discussion. OL extends its deepest apologies to "Ayn Marx.")

LATER NOTE (July 12, 2007): Apparently "Ayn Marx" was also plagiarizing. Her posts on other forums are from Ronald E. Merrill's The Ideas of Ayn Rand (see here). OL extends its deepest apologies to the heirs of Ron Merrill.

Edited July 12, 2007 by Michael Stuart Kelly

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor

>Rand asked, Why should there be any morality at all? (This is a question that has been put to Daniel who has failed to answer it).

Where? As I recall, I was asked why we have ethics, and replied because people have interests, and our interests often clash.

[Victor Pross]

Victor

>Rand asked, Why should there be any morality at all? (This is a question that has been put to Daniel who has failed to answer it).

Where? As I recall, I was asked why we have ethics, and replied because people have interests, and our interests often clash.

Daniel,

That men’s interests clash and the need for conflict resolution is more in the realm of politics, the realm of the law courts. Politics is the science that defines the principles of a proper social system, including the proper functions of government. It defines man's relationship among each other by applying ethics to social questions.* But I’m talking about the question of ethics—normative and meta-ethics. A lone man on a deserted island would have no need for politics, but his need for a morality (a certain moral code—not just anyone) would not be greater in this situation. If you take the question of morality in the manner applied above, the need does become clearer and urgently needed. If this lone man simply acted in any random manner, he would not be an “is” for too long.

If, however, you ascribe to the altruist ethics (or whatever else) you will not see my point at all. And it is no wonder that we are all banging heads on the is-ought issue if you accept any other moral contenders. If morality is ultimately mystical, social, subjective—then the is-ought issue remains everything you say it is.

edit:

Let's ground the argument: If argued from the Objectivist perspective, plants and animals have no choice in their pursuit of values: they follow them automatically based on their ingrained survival mechanisms driven by sensations and percepts. Because human beings, on the other hand, are volitional and conceptual -- they follow no automatic course of action. Thus, unlike all other organisms, human beings require a code of fundamental values accepted by choice in order to survive.*

Morality, it as been stated numerous times, is that code of values. A valid moral code must address human needs long-range, conceptualizing the requirements of human survival into an integrated, hierarchically structured, non-contradictory system of reliable principles. Such a code must hold human life as its standard of value*—and that is why this approach to the question is applicable to a single man on a deserted island, or a self-sustaining farm

-Victor

(Note from MSK:

* Phrases plagiarized from Luke Setzer. See here.

The plagiarized passages are identified in bold and linked to their detection and disclosure. The post is left up out of respect to the posters on this thread, so as not to make hash out of their discussion. OL extends its deepest apologies to Luke Setzer.)

Edited June 28, 2007 by Michael Stuart Kelly

[Brendan Hutching]

This argument is ingrained in the age-old dichotomy between concepts and percepts, which has been closed by the Objectivist theory of concept-formation...

I’m not sure how the Objectivist theory of concept-formation “closes” the dichotomy between percepts and concepts, or what you mean by dichotomy, but there’s no doubt that percepts are quite different from concepts.

An act of perception requires the proximity of both object and perceiver, and produces actual perceptual qualities, eg in the case of a red ball, redness, roundness, size and so on. In order to have a perception of a red ball, I must be in the presence of the object.

However, I can easily think about and discuss red balls without having to be in the presence of a red ball. Therefore, percepts and concepts must be qualitatively different, unless you believe that percepts are somehow stored in the brain, to be summoned forth when one wants to discuss red balls.

So whatever concepts are, they are not percepts. This qualitative difference is the reason why the relationship between the two is a long-standing philosophical problem.

Brendan