Why does man need a code of values?

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael K (my apologies for short responses, but I don't even have time for my own blog right now):

>For instance, Daniel does not say, “some of Rand’s arguments are confused rather [than] enlightened.” He merely says “her arguments are confused rather [than] enlightened.” This implies all of Rand’s arguments (or at least the fundamental part of them).

OK, then: "most" or "many" of her arguments if you will.

>Also, there is his complaint against Rand’s phrase, "contextual absolute," that he has voiced more than once. I got to thinking, is this merely a semantic quibble or is there something of substance here? Is it really an oxymoron as he says?

Yes it is. An oxymoron is an oxymoron, regardless of what it applies to (definitions or whatever). This is not to say some meaning cannot be extracted from it, of course - a "deafening silence", for example, is not meaningless. One can produce, say, ironic effects with an oxymoron via the clash of meanings. But I feel sure Rand was not being ironical with "contextual absolute." Hence AFAICS she is simply clashing meanings without noticing this is all she is doing. After all, there is no such thing as a real "deafening silence" - likewise a "contextual absolute"

>We are doing is/ought on another thread, but I cannot deal with this issue without at least alluding to it. If I understand the issue correctly so far (and I admit I have not been able to do the reading on Hume, Popper, etc., just yet), the whole problem seems to be how to take choice out of volition. And the answer, of course is that you can't.

The point seems to be: if ethics were logically derivable, we'd be forced to proceed from particular factual situations into particular ethical acts (or conclusions). There is no ethical weight to acts that are forced upon you, however, so it is just as well that ethics (or more generally, decisions) are not logically derivable! That's it in a nutshell. This opens the door to a degree of freedom of choice, but also a degree of human - pause for scary word - subjectivity, as of course both facts and logic are objective, but as Hume shows, together they are not adequate to derive an ethical system. There it is. Boo! As a Popperian, I have no problem with subjectivity, btw, as we acknowledge the objectivity of logic and the physical world also. This subjectivity seems to be to me an inescapable component of free choice (ie: choice not 100% determined by logic or physics), so we might as well face up to it.

>So here are three components that are not present in Hume's statement: the "if," the individual chooser, and the context of that chooser. If your goal is to rationally derive principles for making choices, I don't see how these elements rationally can be left out.

They aren't left out, AFAICS. Both the chooser and their context are facts, so we know where they fit. It's the "if" that adds the indeterminate element, perhaps. Anyway, so long as we focus on the lack of derivability of decisions from facts, and we all agree on that, then we are a good deal on the same page.

>Rand:"The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought."

>Michael K: Establishing a relation and deducing a relation are two different things. So where is Rand actually claiming to have solved Hume’s problem? And, as both you and I have mentioned, where is the problem anyway?

Well, to demonstrate let me take a moment to "establish a relation" or two between "is" and "ought" myself:

1) They are both English words

2) They both have vowels in them

3) I have used them regularly

4) They often appear in philosophy textbooks

5) They are both in a sentence in The Objectivist Ethics

And so forth. So clearly, saying one has "established a relation" between is/ought, and leaving it there, is not saying a great deal. What kind of relation is the issue. As the famous problem is one of the logical relation between is/ought - and recall that deductive logic the premises determine the conclusion, which seems to be the situation Rand is setting up in the first sentence quoted, where the "is" determines the "ought" - it seems only too likely that this problem is exactly the one she is talking about (as I show above, if you are just establishing a 'relation" there is no problem!). Further, it seems equally clear by this end sentence that she considers the problem to be solved by the prior sentence - so much for that!, she is saying. But if we all agree - and as even Darrell says - that a decision (ought) cannot be derived from a fact (is), no matter what that fact is, then we must agree that the first of the two sentences cannot be a correct solution. Her dismissal is cavalier; she has missed the point at best.

>This makes me start to believe that there is a willingness to try to belittle Rand’s thinking on this point, regardless of the facts.

It is the facts that push me toward this decision, tho of course they cannot possibly determine it...;-)

Edited March 20, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

Darrell:

Apologies for answering points for a couple of posts at once here. Anyway, you write:

>You're missing the point. I'm not saying there is a, "higher level logic." I'm saying that you can step outside of a logical system and view it as an object of inquiry. But, that doesn't imply that you are not using logic to analyze the system. In fact, as beings that "reprogram" ourselves, we do it all the time.

Ok, so you're using ordinary logic, and you're saying : "Of course decisions cannot be derived from facts."

Well, so am I, and so do I. Perhaps it has got lost in the discussion, but what exactly are we disagreeing over again?...;-)

I thought you were claiming that Rand had solved the problem of deriving decisions, and thereby ethics, from facts (ought from is). But obviously you're not doing that. Thus we agree on the central issue of the fact/decision dualism, which as I said is very encouraging.

>I'm still waiting for you to answer the original question that I posed back in post #47. Why do you believe rationality is important?

Because it seems to me our best hope for peace and freedom.

Edited March 20, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

In fact, Darrell, you answer your own question in this para:

Darrell:

>No one is arguing that there is no dichotomy between facts and decisions. Of course decisions cannot be derived from facts. The decider has to make a choice. He is volitional. No one is disputing that.

So clearly, from this sentence you claim no decison or choice can be logically derived from facts.

>The question is whether the best choice --- the choice that one ought to pursue --- the decision that one ought to make --- can be determined by examining the facts of reality.

If the first sentence summarises your position, then the answer to the second sentence must be "no": a choice can't be "determined" in any strict sense by examining any fact. Only in the loosest or vaguest possible sense of "determined" you might perhaps get to "yes"; as in "partly determined" or "somewhat influenced", or similar.

In which case, we would also agree. So the situation is promising indeed.

[Daniel Barnes]

So, given the above, I will now take the bold step of rewriting Rand to clarify her position once and for all:

"The fact that a living entity is, sort of or kinda determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought."

[Victor Pross]

Daniel,

This is just as I predicted: the debate has shifted from the conversation at hand—namely ethics, to epistemology. That is fine. Philosophy is primarily epistemological, epistemology determines method and therefore content and conclusion. A debated subject is often an indicator, a surface symptom of a more basic underlying disagreement. Unless this area is explored, unless some agreement is reached as to methodology—conflicts and confusion will abound on the subject of ethics, and “intellectual atrophy” will continue. You can take that to the bank.

Now, I am not saying that your approach is so brazenly different than that of a religionist, and both you and Darrel speak of “employing reason”, but I still believe there is a major difference between you and Darrell within the field of epistemology and the questions therein, e.g. logic, inductive reasoning and the like.

You see, I am watching the debate with a god like oversee and I can see that there is a communication breakdown. This is not a surprise to me at all--as Darrell (and presumably Michael) have a different epistemological approach than you. In the effort to bring everybody on an equal footing, let me ask you: do you know (and know well) the Aristotelian/Objectivist approach to logic?

-Victor

Edited March 20, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

>You see, I am watching the debate with a god like oversee and I can see that there is a communication breakdown.

But, oh God-like one, no divine intervention is needed as we actually seem to be in agreement.

From what Darrell's saying, we are on exactly the same page on this one.

It's all good, don't go stirring up trouble in heaven.

>Do you know (and know well) the Aristotelian/Objectivist approach to logic?

If by that you mean the standard rules of bi-valent deductive logic, of course. I regard them as highly important.

[Victor Pross]

Victor:

>You see, I am watching the debate with a god like oversee and I can see that there is a communication breakdown.

But, oh God-like one, no divine intervention is needed as we actually seem to be in agreement.

From what Darrell's saying, we are on exactly the same page on this one.

It's all good, don't go stirring up trouble in heaven.

>Do you know (and know well) the Aristotelian/Objectivist approach to logic?

If by that you mean the standard rules of bi-valent deductive logic, of course. I regard them as highly important.

Daniel,

I don't see agreement at all, not even between me and you on that question. There is little agreement. As for my 'god-like' remarks, I don't want to be misunderstood. So here we go: (does this icon indicate my playful intention?) As for stirring up trouble, that is not at all like you to say this unless you take MSK too seriously. Let's not toss our friendly banter just becuase of the god who oversees me, okay?

Now, what do YOU mean by "bi-valent deductive logic"? Is this what you consider to be the Objectivist approach?

-Victor

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

>I don't see agreement at all, not even between me and you on that question.

C'mon into the fact/decision dualism, the water's fine!

>Now, what do YOU mean by bi-valent deductive logic"? Is this what you consider to be the Objectivist approach?

AKA Classical logic.

[Victor Pross]

Victor:

>I don't see agreement at all, not even between me and you on that question.

C'mon into the fact/decision dualism, the water's fine!

>Now, what do YOU mean by bi-valent deductive logic"? Is this what you consider to be the Objectivist approach?

AKA Classical logic.

Daniel,

Hell, I thought that was cleared up already. Did you not think that the exchange between Ellen and myself hurled a breakthrough on the issue? (# posts 42, 44). It seems that a light bulb went off over her head. If not for you, I will be happy to refute you further and make some kind of breakthrough. :turned:

-Victor

Edited March 20, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Victor Pross]

Daniel,

Given that we are having this exchange due to David Hume, let’s proceed from the crux of his approach. The skeptic holds to the view that we should “suspend judgment” about everything. Such a position, to say the least, is hard to live by: How, for example, can we go about our lives while refusing to accept the validity of inductive inferences? Hume, (the disconcerting philosopher) who first purported the impossibility of justifying induction, found that when he left his philosophical study, he was unable to prevent himself from believing in the procedure! (There were those moments when he thought this irrational of himself and took to drink.) This conflict of "practical action" and “theoretical belief” has bothered generations of thinkers familiar with Hume's skeptical writings...* and it goes on to this day as seen in this debate.

You see, what I am really getting at here is the radical difference between this epistemological approach and Objectivism. So it is no wonder that you and Darrell (and myself) are looking at one another across the Grand Canyon.

Here’s an illustration to indicate the gap between the debaters:

Victor was human and he died.

MSK was human and he died.

Darrell was human and he died.

[and so on...]

*Observed past regularities will always continue into the future.*

Therefore, the next human being will die--as all humans must die.

Now an Objectivist cannot deny the conclusion if we accept the truth of the premises.*

“Not necessarily!” says Hume and Daniel. :yes:

See the problem at all?

-Victor

(Note from MSK:

* Phrases plagiarized from Max More. See here.

The plagiarized passages are identified in bold and linked to their detection and disclosure. The post is left up out of respect to the posters on this thread, so as not to make hash out of their discussion. OL extends its deepest apologies to Max More.)

Edited June 28, 2007 by Michael Stuart Kelly

[Darrell Hougen]

Darrell,

We are usually on the same page, so I am confused by this all of a sudden. For instance, you wrote:

"1. Parasites and crooks can be very rational ...

In order for that statement to stand, it must be the case that for those people, the odds of being successful going in were better than the odds of being successful doing something legitimate.

Why did you chop off the qualification and take it out of context? Like I said, you are discussing something else. Don't you think parasites and crooks have goals? I gave you one: holding up a bank. That's a goal. That's not a good goal, but it's a goal.

Michael,

We are definitely operating on different wavelengths here. Obviously, parasites and crooks have goals and could pursue them using logical means, but that was never the issue. The issue regarding parasites and crooks is whether, if man takes his life as his ultimate value, that is sufficient to tell him how to behave or whether "the life of man qua man" has to be interpreted in some broad sense (such as flourishing) in order to make the case. Dragonfly's original claim in post #5 on his thread was that it is not sufficient because a crook or parasite can live successfully as such:

The question is: how do you know what your rational self-interest is? Presupposing the answer is no proof. The clearest example is Rand's surreptitious switch from "life qua existence" to "life of man qua man". The first refers only to life as such, survival as a living being, and Rand's argument is that man's ultimate value is his life. But then her argument fails, because someone who lives as a parasite or as a criminal can be very succesful in prolonging his life, and sometimes a quite comfortable life as well. Obviously this is not what Rand wants to prove, so now she suddenly switches from "life qua existence" to "life of man qua man" (read: life according to the Objectivist ideal). But that is just putting the desired answer into the argument which constitutes no proof at all, so the whole argument breaks down. The problem is that many people like Rand's answers so much that they blindly believe her claim that she can prove them, but that is an illusion. You cannot prove an "ought" from an "is".

Later, Victor said:

Regarding your last paragraph, what do we have here? To use the Objectivist lingo, have we a stolen concept or context dropping? Parasites, by definition, cannot live except by feeding off a host—a host that is, we can presume, rational!

To which Dragonfly responded (in post #28):

So what? Does that make the parasite any less rational? You've fallen in the Randian trap of equating "rational" with "according to Objectivist principles" (which makes many Objectivists so insufferable, as they maintain that only they are thinking and acting rationally). However, rationality has nothing to do with what your purpose is, but how you try to realize it. So parasites or murderers can be very rational in planning how to live off other people or how to kill someone. That certainly doesn't mean that we have to approve their choices or methods (I don't). Neither can we prove that the choice of their goals is irrational by relating it to the striving towards to some ultimate goal. If that ultimate goal is to survive, many of them certainly succeed in doing so. You can claim that their goal should be to survive as "man qua man", but then we're back to square one, as we presuppose the answer without proving it.

My claim has always been that being a crook or parasite is not a successful strategy, so choosing to be a crook or parasite is not rational (regardless of how cunningly devious their plans or operations may be).

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

I agree with you that being a criminal is not a good thing, or even a rational choice.

Then, it sounds like we are in agreement on this point, though I'll let you rethink your exact statement now that I have provided the context of the argument that I was having with Dragonfly.

Darrell

[Victor Pross]

I agree with you that being a criminal is not a good thing, or even a rational choice.

Then, it sounds like we are in agreement on this point, though I'll let you rethink your exact statement now that I have provided the context of the argument that I was having with Dragonfly.

Darrell

Criminals amaze me. The “brainy” ones that is. They can be so dubiously clever, so “rational”--and they spend so much time and energy in trying to avoid a productive career…when that same energy and time could be spent in pursing a life where there is much less hazards and dangers. All that energy and brain power…to avoid a life of using their brains. It’s kind of funny.

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor opined:

>*Observed past regularities will always continue into the future.*

>Therefore, the next human being will die--as all humans must die.

>Now an Objectivist cannot deny the conclusion if we accept the truth of the premises.

>See the problem at all?

Yes, the problem is that if, from the observations (or premises) you have made of people dying, you then try to draw the conclusion "all humans die", your conclusion will be invalid according to classical logic. Your inference would be invalid, because the truth of the conclusion exceeds the truth of the premises, and that is a no-no. Further, any attempt to form a separate "logic" or "principle" of induction based on induction - i.e. that induction will work in the future, because it worked in the past - turns into another logical no-no, an infinite regress. Them's your problems, my friend.

Of course, if I were you and about to discuss this seriously, I'd withdraw that definition of induction above for starters. It's just too weak (eg: the comedy "Cheers" was once regularly observed at a certain time, but is no longer). I'd recommend you start with either of these two definitions, from the wikipedia:

1. generalizing about the properties of a class of objects based on some number of observations of particular instances of that class of objects (for example, "All swans we have seen are white, and therefore all swans are white", Hume's Problem of Induction, 18th century, before the discovery of Cygnus atratus in Australia); or

2.presupposing that a sequence of events in the future will occur as it always has in the past (for example, the attractive force described by Isaac Newton's law of universal gravitation, or Albert Einstein's revision in general relativity).

Have you read the first part of that Popper article I recommended a while back? Might save me a bit of typing if you have.

Edited March 20, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Victor Pross]

Daniel,

The above is very interesting, thanks. Whatever the merits (or demerits) of your claims here, I wanted to demonstrate, for the time being, the chasm between yourself and the Objectivist approach—epistemologically speaking. I didn’t intend you to rush to the podium to make a speech about “practical rationalism.” I had put forth the observation that any communication breakdown on the subject of ethics will always yield disagreement and miscommunication--given the radical differences in epistemological approach—which is fundamental. Epistemology is the second major branch of philosophy. In fact, when I think about it, the name of this thread should have been: Epistemology—back to basics. Then we move on from there. That's all I'm saying.

-Victor

P.S.

I am now re-visiting Hume and brushing up on him. I will read the Popper article and get back to you.

Edited March 20, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Daniel Barnes]

All roads lead to epistemology in Objectivism!

Check it out and give us your thoughts. Don't rush to any conclusions. Ponder, consider, reject, accept, try on like a new leather jacket etc. I'm not around for the next couple of days, so mull.

[Victor Pross]

All roads lead to epistemology in Objectivism!

Check it out and give us your thoughts. Don't rush to any conclusions. Ponder, consider, reject, accept, try on like a new leather jacket etc. I'm not around for the next couple of days, so mull.

Daniel,

Alright, I will. I will give it due consideration. "See" you later.

-Victor

[bmacwilliam]

Laure:

>Are you saying that we don't really need a code of ethics, but it's sort of hard-wired into us in the form of empathy? Or that we need ethics to form a basis for laws to sort out the conflicts of men's interests?

The latter. I also would hesitate to generalise about empathy being 'hardwired'; there is some good evidence emerging that some altruistic behaviour is 'hardwired', but it is scarcely conclusive.

I guess I wouldn't say 'conclusive' either yet. But digging into this, more and more, the hard-wired altruistic tendencies seem hard to deny. You say 'good' evidence, I'd say 'damn good'. When you can mathematically show that altruism can become pro-species even when it's anti-individual, it seems powerful to me.

From the link that MSK posted:

"Sober argues that, even if we accept an evolutionary approach to human behaviour, there is no particular reason to think that evolution would have made humans into egoists rather than psychological altruists. On the contrary, it is quite possible that natural selection would have favoured humans who genuinely do care about helping others, i.e. who are capable of ‘real’ or psychological altruism."

Bob

Edited March 20, 2007 by Bob_Mac

[Laure]

The point seems to be: if ethics were logically derivable, we'd be forced to proceed from particular factual situations into particular ethical acts (or conclusions). There is no ethical weight to acts that are forced upon you, however, so it is just as well that ethics (or more generally, decisions) are not logically derivable!

If ethics are logically derivable (and I think they are), AND if we have perfect knowledge of all the facts going into the equation, THEN we would be forced to come to a particular CONCLUSION. We would never be forced to DO a particular act, though. We could always decide to do the wrong thing. When you say there is no ethical weight to acts that are forced upon you - I agree. If you are forced to shoot someone, there's no ethical weight to that act. BUT, if you are "forced" to conclude logically that "doing X is right", there sure IS still an ethical weight involved in actually doing X!

Bob Mac seems to be of the opinion that altruism must be a good basis of morality because it has evolved in us: Even if we assume that what's hardwired must be good, ... well, aggression is hardwired in people too. Can we decide that it's a good basis of morality? The hidden premise is the standard of value of your ethical system. Is your standard of value the evolutionary success of your species? That's not my standard. If your standard of value is the furtherance of your own life and happiness, well, some of your hardwired traits may promote that, and others may be harmful.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael,

Responding to part of your very long post #91, the part specifically pertaining to the Humean is/ought problem and Rand's comments thereon in her speech "The Objectivist Ethics" (she originally delivered that as a written paper at the University of Wisconsin Symposium on "Ethics in Our Time," February 9, 1961).

Again, I apologize for the tiger-striping, which I know you don't like. On the other hand...your longy was a bitch for me, so I guess it's "turn about is fair play." (In order to read your #91, I had to copy it into Word, reformat to get rid of the glaring large boldfaced type used for "contextually absolute," and break the text into sections.)

Starting with some quotes from your post #36:

[MSK] A proper moral code ALWAYS includes the statement:

"If you want this result, you will do that."

This is basically what "should" or "ought" mean. There is no way to remove this statement without stepping outside of ethics altogether. It is like removing discrimination from definitions or numbers from mathematics.

If I understand Hume's problem so far (and, after some heavy thinking these last couple of days, I admit that I have yet to detect a problem per se), he wants to be able to formulate a moral principle, exclude choice from it, and say that it was logically derived. Like I said, you can't. You have removed a fundamental part.

[....]

So when a person says life is a standard to use in a syllogism for deriving a moral principle, he also has to say "whose life" and "if that person wishes to keep that life." The choice (in itself) of whether to keep his life is not a moral principle. [....]

[....]

So here are three components that are not present in Hume's statement: the "if," the individual chooser, and the context of that chooser. If your goal is to rationally derive principles for making choices, I don't see how these elements rationally can be left out.

Next, quoting the Rand paragraph the meaning of which is being contended:

[You give this as p. 18; I don't know what edition you have;

it's pp. 7-8 in my hardbound NAL edition.]

[Rand] In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought."

So where did she include an "if" or a context? This is leaving aside whether she's correct in saying "the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life." (I think she's correct in the claim that "values" only exist in the context of life -- although I'd say life processes -- and in her claim, not made in this paragraph, that the concept "value" genetically rests on the concept "life." I do not think the second half of her assertion is correct. But just taking the paragraph as given for the moment, where did she include an "if" or a context?) She uses the word "necessitates" and then says "The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do."

Daniel wrote in his post #48:

[DB] Whatever the source of her confusion, her belief that she resolved Hume's "is/ought" dualism is clearly false. So we can say with some confidence that she did not solve - and IMHO the evidence indicates she did not understand - either of Hume's "is/ought" or his problem of induction.

You write in your post #91:

[MSK] I am not so sure that Rand did not understand the problem so much as reject it wholesale as a problem. [....]

QUOTE(Michael Stuart Kelly @ Mar 12 2007, 08:34 AM)

. . . I just read the Wikipedia article Is-ought problem where it gave a quote from Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, said to be the start of the problem:

[Hume] In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

[MSK] Now it is true that Hume talked about relations (and affirmations), but he specifically mentioned “deduction” as the means to arrive at them.

Here is the Rand passage that Daniel (and others) find objectionable.

[Rand] In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought.

[MSK] Establishing a relation and deducing a relation are two different things. So where is Rand actually claiming to have solved Hume’s problem? And, as both you [ES] and I have mentioned, where is the problem anyway?

If the issue is deducing the relation between “is” and “ought,” Rand simply ignored it. If the issue is establishing a relation between “is” and “ought,” Rand certainly did that, however I have no idea of whom “those philosophers” she mentioned are.

Now Daniel stated above: “This would again indicate she did not understand the problem. Whatever the source of her confusion, her belief that she resolved Hume's ‘is/ought’ dualism is clearly false.” You also have stated that Rand did not understand Hume’s problem, but believed that she had solved it. Where did she say she believed she did that? You stated above: “The IF remains fully there; she hasn't eliminated it.” Where did she claim to have eliminated it?

I have been unable to find any of these claims in Rand’s writings and I have been searching all morning. I remember reading over the years something by one of her intimates, probably NB, that she had solved the “age-old” problem that had been plaguing philosophers for centuries. But I don’t even remember if “is and ought” was the problem. I think it was where values come from (which, at least, is related).

Still, both Daniel and you have stated that you think Rand did not understand Hume. Why isn’t it possible for her to have understood him, but thought he was silly, so she dismissed him rather than refuted him? And her rhetoric above was a form of bypassing the need to acknowledge the problem as he stated it? I see no indication of the fact that she did not know that Hume was talking about deduction.

Excerpts from the above:

[MSK] Establishing a relation and deducing a relation are two different things. So where is Rand actually claiming to have solved Hume’s problem? [....]

If the issue is deducing the relation between “is” and “ought,” Rand simply ignored it. If the issue is establishing a relation between “is” and “ought,” Rand certainly did that, however I have no idea of whom “those philosophers” she mentioned are. [....]

Still, both Daniel and you have stated that you think Rand did not understand Hume.

Did I say that I thought Rand didn't understand Hume? I'm not finding where I said that, if I did. I spoke of "her sweeping aside the is/ought problem as if she'd solved it [and] her mistake in indicating that she'd solved the Humean problem."

One does have some latitude of interpretation as to whether she's "sweeping aside" the problem "as if she'd solved it" or whether she's dismissing it without giving evidence of having understood it. My belief is that she knew enough about the history of philosophy to have known what the problem was.

You write that "Establishing a relation and deducing a relation are two different things." They aren't identical, although deducing a relation is a subcategory of "establishing a relation." But the relation that "those philosophers" to whom she refers were talking about was a relationship of logical entailment, and I'd expect that she knew this. She didn't specify, granted; thus there's an unclarity as to what she means. But, to repeat, I would assume that she did have some knowledge of the history of what she was talking about.

The word "entailment" wouldn't have been used by Hume himself, judging from the OED. The date 1829 is given for first use of "entail" as meaning "to necessitate; to involve logically." This was 53 years after Hume's death. But what Hume was saying he couldn't find between "is" statements and "ought" statements is what came to be called an entailment relationship. So I'd expect that this is what Rand meant when she spoke of "those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality." (I know of no philosopher who's literally said what she wrote, that there's NO relation.)

As to who "those philosophers" are (you wrote: "however I have no idea of whom 'those philosophers' she mentioned are"): philosophers starting with Hume who were attempting to address the issues which modern science presents for ethics.

The respect in which I might say that Rand didn't understand Hume's problem would pertain to the context in which Hume was thinking, a context which had been radically affected by Newton's work, especially Newton's Principia. Rand dismisses earlier, Christianity based, views on ethics as ethics based on "whim." She says this because it was "the will of God" which decreed ethics. But she isn't there empathizing with the context as people would have experienced it. Ethics decreed by God was seen as an absolute. There was an authority -- a supernatural authority -- which "laid down the law" as regards ethics. Thus there wasn't the problem, where does an "ought" come from? "Ought" came from God.

But Hume was born in 1711, when the modern scientific approach to answering questions was well underway. The 3rd, and final, edition of Newton's Principia was published in 1726, the 2nd (majorly revised) edition in 1713, the first in 1687. The framework of philosophic problems was changing when Hume began philosophizing. The question of how one could get certainty about ethics in a world governed by natural law came to be important. Hume and subsequent philosophers working in the context of science saw no way to answer this question. That's the problem Rand is talking about, the problem she sweeps aside with a "so much for that." But meanwhile, all in one brief paragraph, I think she has claimed to have solved it when she says: "the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do."

To repeat, notice that she says nothing about an "if" clause or a context in which a choice is made. I read her as stating that an "ought" can be directly gotten ("determin[ed]") from an "is."

And notice that she says a few pages further on: "Knowledge, for any conscious organism, is the means of survival; to a living consciousness, every 'is' implies an 'ought'." Again, I read this as indicating direct logical entailment.

--

I won't have time for any further long posting until Saturday at earliest. I'll be away from home almost all day tomorrow and Friday, and there are still details to tend to for the "do" Friday. (Dick Lindzen will be in Storrs for a U. Conn. science-faculties colloquium on global warming, him presenting, Larry MC'ing.) If you have succinct questions about the above, I'll try to answer those; but otherwise I don't expect to be posting again before Saturday. There are things I hope I'll have the chance to address about issues Stephen Boydstun is raising, but I'll have to wait on those.

Ellen

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[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

You seduced me into addressing this. I promised myself that I would not write about it until I finished some work that is behind. But I will be short this time (I hope).

Did I say that I thought Rand didn't understand Hume? I'm not finding where I said that, if I did. I spoke of "her sweeping aside the is/ought problem as if she'd solved it [and] her mistake in indicating that she'd solved the Humean problem."

I guess I interpreted your remark that Rand indicated that she had "solved the Humean problem" and calling that a mistake as an indication of her not understanding the problem. It was a derived conclusion. But I see that your conclusions are similar to mine: that Rand understood the issue but dismissed it.

(I know of no philosopher who's literally said what she wrote, that there's NO relation.)

This is the BIG issue with Rand to me. Rand accused "those philosophers" (whoever they are, and I am at a loss to find them) of claiming that there is no relation at all between "is" and "ought." If people were complaining about this with Rand, I would have no problem with that. Her remark was simply out of line. Chalk up another one that needs to be disregarded (which I don't find all that serious in appreciating Rand's work).

But people are stating that she claimed she solved the is/ought problem and they sneak in the laws of deduction in her writing to prove that she didn't. She never claimed to have been able to deduce the "ought" from the "is." She did claim to show a causal relation with living beings.

As to who "those philosophers" are (you wrote: "however I have no idea of whom 'those philosophers' she mentioned are"): philosophers starting with Hume who were attempting to address the issues which modern science presents for ethics.

I hope my last comment shows what I meant by "those philosophers." I was referring to her making a broad generality where not one such philosopher existed. She did not say "those philosophers" who addressed the problem. She said "those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality."

But she isn't there empathizing with the context as people would have experienced it. Ethics decreed by God was seen as an absolute. There was an authority -- a supernatural authority -- which "laid down the law" as regards ethics. Thus there wasn't the problem, where does an "ought" come from? "Ought" came from God.

Frankly, this is exactly how I have interpreted the Hume quote. He was in effect stating that "ought" came from God as you said, not from reality. So, in effect, there is a minor contradiction with Hume's statement. There is one "is" from which he did derive and deduce all "oughts." That "is" was "God exists," with "God decrees" being part of God's identity.

I think he was merely trying to separate the difference of God's will from reality and attributing God's will with the prescriptive and reality with the descriptive. I do not think he was trying to deny causality (as Rand claimed in a few places), but attribute it to the supernatural instead.

That's a subtle difference, but an important one. I don't think Hume was trying to destroy reason. As I read it, he was trying to establish part of its existence independently from God. I fully agree with you on your statements about Hume's context.

But meanwhile, all in one brief paragraph, I think she has claimed to have solved it when she says: "the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do."

To repeat, notice that she says nothing about an "if" clause or a context in which a choice is made. I read her as stating that an "ought" can be directly gotten ("determin[ed]") from an "is."

And notice that she says a few pages further on: "Knowledge, for any conscious organism, is the means of survival; to a living consciousness, every 'is' implies an 'ought'." Again, I read this as indicating direct logical entailment.

Once again, I have difficulty in equating other words with "to deduce." I find it just as difficult to equate "establish" with "deduce" (as I had mentioned before) as I do to equate "validate" with "deduce." If Rand is taken to task for what she did write, OK. But to be taken to task for what she did not write is unfair.

On the "if clause," all of Rand's statements should be analyzed within the context of her writings. Just because something is not present in a particular statement does not mean that it is lacking elsewhere when she discussed intertwined issues. Rand's IF is implicit in setting up survival (or "man qua man") as a standard. I don't think she ever meant that a living being was forced to perform innate volitional behavior (talk about an oxymoron!) because of its nature. Just because she left her standard unstated in her is/ought statement does not mean that it is absent in her meaning. Below I quote her own statement and include the missing standard:

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do" [if it is to survive].

OR

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do" [if it is to exist qua living entity].

This IF comes from Rand defining life as having a conditional existence. Here are her own words.

The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that faces a constant alternative: the issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies; its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of existence.

There is the IF formally stated ("IF an organism fails in that action, it dies...")

As Rand's definition of man includes volition, "want" also comes into the picture when applying the above statements to man:

"The fact that man is, determines what he ought to do" [if he wants to survive].

OR

"The fact that man is, determines what he ought to do" [if he wants to exist qua man].

Rand hammered the idea over and over that "to be" was "to be something" (with an identity). So when she said "is," she was also including the "what is" and its characteristics. With living entities, this means conditional existence. With man, this means both conditional existence (as a living entity) and volition.

I do not see why those definitions should be eliminated in examining Rand's statement about is/ought (and thankfully there were blessed few such statements). I admit that she left the door wide open for misinterpretation by leaving them out in those statements, and that the rhetorical itch in those statements was stronger than the itch for clarity, but eliminating her definitions of life and man would take her statements completely out of the context of everything else she ever wrote.

So I admit that the IF is a derived IF from using her definitions, but I think it is definitely part of her formulation.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Once again, I have difficulty in equating other words with "to deduce." I find it just as difficult to equate "establish" with "deduce" (as I had mentioned before) as I do to equate "validate" with "deduce." If Rand is taken to task for what she did write, OK. But to be taken to task for what she did not write is unfair.

On the "if clause," all of Rand's statements should be analyzed within the context of her writings. Just because something is not present in a particular statement does not mean that it is lacking elsewhere when she discussed intertwined issues. Rand's IF is implicit in setting up survival (or "man qua man") as a standard. I don't think she ever meant that a living being was forced to perform innate volitional behavior (talk about an oxymoron!) because of its nature. Just because she left her standard unstated in her is/ought statement does not mean that it is absent in her meaning. Below I quote her own statement and include the missing standard:

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do" [if it is to survive].

OR

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do" [if it is to exist qua living entity].

This IF comes from Rand defining life as having a conditional existence. Her are her own words.

The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that faces a constant alternative: the issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies; its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of existence.

There is the IF formally stated ("IF an organism fails in that action, it dies...")

As Rand's definition of man includes volition, "want" also comes into the picture when applying the above statements to man:

"The fact that man is, determines what he ought to do" [if he wants to survive].

OR

"The fact that man is, determines what he ought to do" [if he wants to exist qua man].

Rand hammered the idea over and over that "to be" was "to be something" (with an identity). So when she said "is," she was also including the "what is" and its characteristics. With living entities, this means conditional existence. With man, this means both conditional existence (as a living entity) and volition.

I do not see why those definitions should be eliminated in examining Rand's statement about is/ought (and thankfully there were blessed few such statements). I admit that she left the door wide open for misinterpretation by leaving them out in those statements, and that the rhetorical itch in those statements was stronger than the itch for clarity, but eliminating her definitions of life and man would take her statements completely out of the context of everything else she ever wrote.

So I admit that the IF is a derived IF from using her definitions, but I think it is definitely part of her formulation.

Michael

Michael,

I think it's possible to read her as you indicated, but I don't find this reading flattering because it would involve her having played a word game on "determines" and "implies," changing the meaning from the context she'd said, in the first sentence of the several-times-quoted paragraph, she was writing "in answer to."

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

Did you [Daniel] not think that the exchange between Ellen and myself hurled a breakthrough on the issue? (# posts 42, 44). It seems that a light bulb went off over her head.

HUH???

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

When you can mathematically show that altruism can become pro-species even when it's anti-individual, it seems powerful to me.

Not "pro-species." Pro the perpetuation of a genome. A species isn't an entity and can't be naturally selected for survival. Also, "altruism" as defined by evolutionary theorists isn't the same meaning as "altruism" in Rand's definition. As used by evolutionary theorists, it means behavior which involves survival risk for the organism engaging in it while possibly improving the chances of survival of other organisms in that organism's immediate group.

Ellen

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[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I think it's possible to read her as you indicated, but I don't find this reading flattering because it would involve her having played a word game on "determines" and "implies," changing the meaning from the context she'd said, in the first sentence of the several-times-quoted paragraph, she was writing "in answer to."

Ellen,

This is as I think. I too think it isn't flattering, but it is consistent with an integrated approach (as in "fully integrated system" as Rand and others have claimed for Objectivism) where at least Rand kept to her basic definitions.

If we agree that volition is to be included, let's call deriving or deducing "ought" from "is" something like "compelled volition." As Rand did not formally build anything in her philosophy on the "compelled volition" principle, maintaining free will as a cornerstone throughout the entire philosophy, this is another reason I think she meant the passage in the manner I stated and not as simply deduced. That's in theory and it is supposed to be that way in practice. But in practice in her personal life, from all accounts except those of ortho-Objectivists, she did adhere to the "compelled volition" principle in her dealings with her inner circle: you agreed with her of your own volition (mere agreement was not enough) or you were out.

Sometimes Rand was more artist than philosopher. I have no problem with identifying specific places like this and still agree with the fundamentals of Objectivism.

Michael