Art and Subobjectivity

[Danneskjold]

I'm talking to anyone who cares to respond.

[reason.on]

Previous stuff on photography:

On photography as a "re-creation of reality":

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/GeneralForum/0784.shtml#19

Photography is a good hard question, and one I've certainly grappled with in my own way over the years. At one point in my life, I would have flat out said "no, photography is not art" (craft, yes, but not art). But the more I think about it, the more photographers I encounter in galleries and museums, the more great cinematography I encounter, and the more photos I take myself, the more I'm inclined to say "yes" (though, this still isn't written in stone for me).

Even the attentive, and re-creative process of selecting the "shot" from the available span of the universe is almost enough for me to say "yes" these days, without even considering all of the other interesting variables.

But, as I've mentioned elsewhere, I don't feel that I have a truly adequate definition or even criteria for what can properly be classified as "art" (nor do I believe Rand had one), so the question for me remains open.

RCR

Edited January 9, 2007 by R. Christian Ross

[Ellen Stuttle]

I just had a thought. Maybe instead of cognitive and normative, which is problematic for several cases I have already been thinking about, she tried to impose the Objectivist concept of these things as the species instead of letting "Objectivist" be the differentia, while usurping the "species word" exclusively for the Objectivist version.

Art as given in Objectivism then becomes the same thing as all art.

Rights as given in Objectivism then become the same thing as all rights.

Businessmen as given in Objectivism then become the same thing as all businessmen.

Philosophy as given in Objectivism then becomes the same thing as all philosophy.

Michael, the sort of procedure you're talking about there Roger Bissell has written quite a bit about under the rubric "the fallacy of the frozen abstraction." He might even have a paper about this on his website. I know he wrote a lot about it on Atlantis (1 and 2) at various times. The designation might have been borrowed from Rand (I can't recall for sure), but Roger has elaborated on it and contributed original material discussing it even if he got the idea from her. The fallacy consists in substituting a member of a species for the species, thus "freezing" the abstraction to one type of what's properly a wider category.

I don't think I'd say that what Rand does with her definition of art is to commit "the fallacy of the frozen abstraction." I think I'd stick with simply saying that the definition is wanting -- i.e., that it commits the simple error of being an inadequate definition. But I'd agree that in her applications her definition leads to "frozen abstraction" issues because it did become used as the criterion of what is and isn't to be included as examples of "art" (in the "fine arts" sense).

I couldn't say if in process of forming the definition, Rand had in mind, either consciously or subconsciously, a goal of limiting the category to what she considered "real" art. But I think that to an extent doing this sort of thing is probably inevitable. When I form a definition, I do have in mind the sort of specimens I think of as members of the category I'm trying to define. For instance I wouldn't form a definition which I was aware would cut either more or less broadly than the boundaries I thought were the right ones. Seeing if the definition works to include what you think should be included while excluding what you think shouldn't be included is part of the testing for adequacy of a definition. Thus I wouldn't fault, of itself, gearing a definition to include/exclude what one believes are genuine specimens of a category. (A famous example: "featherless biped" is soon shown to be inadequate for "human" by producing the specimen of a plucked chicken.) Where I would fault her though is in having had a causistic goal in theorizing about art, a goal of bring art into alignment with her views on ethics. I don't think she approached the subject of art with an attempt at "impartiality," with a curiosity to understand the nature of art on its own terms, let the chips fall where they may.

But the fact remains that there is such a thing as Impressionistic Art, where "Art" is the species and "Impressionistic" is the differentia (presuming, of course, that "Impressionistic" is properly defined to mean something). Using this criterion, you get Romantic Art, Classical Art, Baroque Art, Modern Art, Post-Modern Art, etc.

You have one species and separate differentia. That's the way definitions are made under Objectivism.

There can be no such thing as Objectivist Impressionistic Art, if nothing else than for historical reasons (Ojbectivism did not exist back then). But under this "shifting concepts for the same word" manner of thinking, "Objectivist" suddenly becomes a fundamental characteristic of art. So when you say Impressionistic Art, you are actually saying Objectivist Impressionistic Art.

There are enough philosophical points in common to fudge this one a bit (especially as Impressionism was mainly representational), but there is nothing to fudge with at all when we come to Modern Art or Post-Modern Art. Objectivist Post-Modern Art is practically a contradiction in terms, and as Post-Modern Art under this thinking would implicitly include "Objectivist" in the species, it simple cannot be art. The species is always more important than the differentia for resolving any contradiction.

I don't think the details of the way you presented that are what she did. She still kept the standard art-historical terms for the various periods and styles of art. She considered the style types prior to "modern art" subspecies of her overarching definition. But as of "modern art," she thought of this -- playing on the biological analogy -- as a monster mutant that no longer belonged in the lineage.

Ellen

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[Danneskjold]

I don't think I'd say that what Rand does with her definition of art is to commit "the fallacy of the frozen abstraction." I think I'd stick with simply saying that the definition is wanting -- i.e., that it commits the simple error of being an inadequate definition. But I'd agree that in her applications her definition leads to "frozen abstraction" issues because it did become used as the criterion of what is and isn't to be included as examples of "art" (in the "fine arts" sense).

What is the reason behind the statement that you find her definition inadequate?

[Ellen Stuttle]

The notion "anti-concept" is another example of bad rhetoric on the part of Rand. Let's have a look at some examples of what she calls "anti-concepts": "polarization", "extremism", "duty", and "simplistic". Now why shouldn't these be valid concepts? Rand gives for example the following argument for "polarization":

One of today's fashionable anti-concepts is "polarization". Its meaning is not very clear, except that it is something bad - undesirable, socially destructive, evil - something that would split the country into irreconcilable camps and conflicts. It is used mainly in political issues and serves as a kind of "argument from intimidation": it replaces a discussion of the merits (the truth or falsehood) of a given idea by the menacing accusation that such an idea would "polarize" the country - which is supposed to make one's opponents retreat, protesting that they didn't mean it. Mean - what? [] The use of "polarization" as a pejorative term means: the suppression of fundamental principles. Such is the pattern of the function of anti-concepts.

In effect Rand says: many people think that polarization is a bad thing, that is quite wrong, however, and therefore it is an invalid concept, an "anti-concept"! This is of course a non sequitur, if you look up the term in the dictionaries, you'll find neutral definitions which describe a perfectly valid concept. Rand could have said: polarization is a good thing, we should debate the fundamental principles! But instead she did something similar to the tactic of the PC police: if a term has negative connotations you don't like, you just declare the term invalid and replace it by a new term (which unavoidably in the course of time gets the same negative connotations, as these don't depend on a particular word, but on that what is designated by that word). So Rand declares the perfectly adequate concept "polarization" invalid, as it has for many people negative connotations, and she disagrees with them. The same applies to the other examples given. It is part of her method to use disqualifiying labels like "irrational", "evasion", "evil", etc. as rhetoric devices, not to mention "anti-concepts" like "anti-art" or even "anti-concept" itself.

I agree that "anti-concept" was another of "those." Her penchant for coming up with such things was part of what made her dramatically fascinating while she was alive. But excrescences of that sort make scraping down to the genuine philosophy to be found in her work difficult.

Nonetheless, though I agree with the objection to the notion of "anti-concept," my point still holds: She wasn't thinking of the usages she considered examples of "anti-concepts" as being themselves types of "concepts." She had standards of what she thought classified as a proper concept, and she was disincluding "anti-concepts" as members of the species "concept." She was classifying them instead in the species "term." (Similarly, she was disincluding "anti-art" as being of the species "art" and classifying "anti-art" as a type of "item," a type which she thought was falsely labeled in being referred to as "art.")

Ellen

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[reason.on]

I don't think I'd say that what Rand does with her definition of art is to commit "the fallacy of the frozen abstraction." I think I'd stick with simply saying that the definition is wanting -- i.e., that it commits the simple error of being an inadequate definition. But I'd agree that in her applications her definition leads to "frozen abstraction" issues because it did become used as the criterion of what is and isn't to be included as examples of "art" (in the "fine arts" sense).

What is the reason behind the statement that you find her definition inadequate?

I can't speak for ES (although, she did explicate some of her views in the post snipped from above and elsewhere in this thread...), but from my perspective one of the key issues is this idea of "represenationalism" in the visual arts. It seems unreasonably limiting to suggest that only visual works which are "representational" can properly qualify as "art". This can lead to all sorts of problems, not the least of which is demonstrated by the FLW glass art I posted. It is plain as day to me that the middle piece "represented" a flower (it is called the "tulip" design, btw). However, it wasn't so plain to Victor or Jeff. So whose visual acuity is more objectively correct? Not any easy question to answer with anything resembling objectivity. Further, many people don't "see" water lilies...so does that mean that Monet wasn't creating "art"?

Further, if "representationalism" is the key distinguishing factor of what is and isn't properly "art" (in the visual sense), then we'd be stuck saying that the first piece below is "art", while the others are not, and I don't mind saying I'm just not happy with that.

RCR

Edited January 10, 2007 by R. Christian Ross

[Dragonfly]

So why is there a dislike for Ayn Rand's definition of art? What do you think a better but equally restrictive definition of art would be? Do you think that a definition of art should be restrictive? What are key elements in any definition of art?

I think the whole quest to give an accurate definition of art is a waste of time. We'll have to live with a rather general definition, somewhat like Michael's definition. As soon as you try to be more restrictive, you'll introduce subjective preferences, which will only lead to futile discussions between adherents of different definitions (such as on this forum), which I can guarantee you will never be solved, as there is no objective criterion to decide which definition is the correct one. The problem with Rand's definition is the condition that it should be a selective recreation of "reality". So what reality does music recreate? I still haven't heard an answer to that question. The argument from tradition that that was how art was made during thousands of years doesn't hold; that would imply that art couldn't be innovating and that you never could introduce new art forms and new techniques. Anyway, that tradition has significantly changed during the last century. Neither is the argument that it opens the way for charlatanism valid, as that would imply that literature and music aren't art either.

[reason.on]

So why is there a dislike for Ayn Rand's definition of art? What do you think a better but equally restrictive definition of art would be? Do you think that a definition of art should be restrictive? What are key elements in any definition of art?

I think the whole quest to give an accurate definition of art is a waste of time. We'll have to live with a rather general definition, somewhat like Michael's definition. As soon as you try to be more restrictive, you'll introduce subjective preferences, which will only lead to futile discussions between adherents of different definitions (such as on this forum), which I can guarantee you will never be solved, as there is no objective criterion to decide which definition is the correct one. The problem with Rand's definition is the condition that it should be a selective recreation of "reality". So what reality does music recreate? I still haven't heard an answer to that question. The argument from tradition that that was how art was made during thousands of years doesn't hold; that would imply that art couldn't be innovating and that you never could introduce new art forms and new techniques. Anyway, that tradition has significantly changed during the last century. Neither is the argument that it opens the way for charlatanism valid, as that would imply that literature and music aren't art either.

I'm really just curious, but would you, Peter, consider something resembling a painting that was created by an elephant or a cat to be "art"?

RCR

[Dragonfly]

I'm really just curious, but would you, Peter, consider something resembling a painting that was created by an elephant or a cat to be "art"?

My point is that I wouldn't bother with the question whether it is officially art, I would just judge the product. Now I think it is very unlikely that I would find a "painting" by a cat or by an elephant very moving or inspiring. On the other hand there are sometimes beautiful things made by animals, like the web of a spider. I'd tend not to call such things art, while they are not made by humans, and the general consensus is that art is a typical human product. But in fact this is also arbitrary, I can imagine that someone just wants to call it animal art. Another borderline case is art made by computers. In some cases the computer can be considered just to be an instrument of the human artist, like a modern version of the brush and paint, but in other cases it is the computer that does most of the job. There are for example breathtakingly beautiful computer images of fractals; are these made by the programmer or by the computer? So far the programmer still has to select the method to create a picture, but the details are filled in by the computer. The programmer or the user of the program then still has to make the selection, so that would at least be a typical artistic activity, but the boudaries are vague. Therefore I think it's useless to rack your brains over the question whether it is "real" art or not, that question is not interesting, and I'm happy to leave that to the bureaucrats who have nothing better to do.

[Jonathan]

There's been something of a surge toward realism in elephant painting lately:

J

[Ellen Stuttle]

What is the reason behind the statement that you [ES] find her [AR's] definition inadequate?

I can't speak for ES (although, she did explicate some of her views in the post you've snipped from and elsewhere in this thread...), but from my perspective one of the key issues is this idea of "represenationalism" in the visual arts. It seems unreasonably limiting to suggest that only visual works which are "representational" can properly qualify as "art". This can lead to all sorts of problems, not the least of which is demonstrated by the FLW glass art I posted. It is plain as day to me that the middle piece "represented" a flower (it is called the "tulip" design, btw). However, it wasn't so plain to Victor or Jeff. So whose visual acuity is more objectively correct? Not any easy question to answer with anything resembling objectivity. Further, many people don't "see" water lilies...so does that mean that Monet wasn't creating "art"?

Further, if representationalism is the key distinguishing factor of what is and isn't properly "art" (in the visual sense), then we'd be stuck saying that the first piece below is "art", while the others are not, and I don't mind saying I'm just not happy with that.

I'm reluctant to get much into my own views on art, as I lack the time for doing that. I'd have been more accurate if I'd described my opinion of AR's definition as not just wanting but partly wrong.

I'll repeat her definition, again from memory (no one corrected me, at least that I've noticed thus far, when I rendered it as):

"Art is a selective recreation of reality according to an artist's metaphysical value judgments."

The part I find "wanting" is the last part; I think it's too narrow; it limits art to a particular type of guiding principle whereas in fact art is "according to" many more aspects of experience than what Rand was talking about with her term "metaphysical value judgments." See Elizabeth's post starting this thread for some thoughts on that issue. I could add a lot more along those lines.

The part I find outright wrong, as near as I can get any intelligibility from it, is the first part. I don't think that art "recreates reality" at all. Instead I think that it creates a symbolic form which evokes what the meaningful-process aspects of experience are like. The "representation" problem I think applies more widely in regard to Rand's views than specifically to the domain of the visual arts. She makes all art a type of "representation" (with fudges in regard to music and architecture, to the extent she considered architecture "art"). Earlier in the thread I quoted a comment I read somewhere, I don't remember where or who said it. The person was referring to the visual arts in particular, but I think that the point made can be extended to other art types. I might not have the exact wording, but the comment went something like this: The function of art is never representational even when it uses representational means. The art work isn't a depiction but instead an evocation which affects the person contemplating the art work through arousing an imaginal response. (I think that Roger might have been getting at something along these lines in a couple of his essays, but unfortunately I never have yet gotten around to reading those.)

As to the type of symbol an art work is, I have to refer to the esthetic theories of Susanne Langer, whose theories I've mentioned in an earlier post. Art is what she calls "presentational form." In very brief (this is such a long subject) presentational form is distinguished from discursive form.

In discursive form each symbol used in the form has denotation; it can be given a definition; it means "such and such." Discursive form is the form of factual discourse, of science, of mathematics, of attempts to state the "what it is" of whatever subject is the referent.

In presentational form, on the other hand, the entire work is the symbol. No part of the work has denotation; no part of the work expresses an element in isolation. And the work in total does not have precisely definable meaning either. The whole thing evokes; it does not state. What it evokes is the qualitative aspects of existence, the "what life is like" aspects, none of which aspects can be conveyed discursively. They have to be conveyed experientially. As Ursula le Guinn says in a marvelous essay about literature -- I might not have the exact words right -- a novelist uses words to say what cannot be said in words. Non-verbal art forms use other modalities besides the verbal modality likewise to say what cannot be said in words, what can only be aroused in the responder through a form which sets the imagination going.

I think that maybe how I'd define art is "presentational form which evokes what meaningful process is like." I don't know if I'd stick with that. I've felt reluctant to try to give a definition, having witnessed all the troubles Rand's definition has led to.

I don't actually recall if Langer herself gave a formal definition. It's been more than twenty years since I last read one of her books. Far too long. Re-reading Langer is on a kind of constantly simmering back-burner in my thoughts. But I have a certain number of other books I feel I must read first, because of their direct relevance to subject areas I'm working on, and I'm afraid that if I even open the cover of one of Langer's books to look for such an entry as "definition" in the index, I won't be able to put the book down without getting hooked on re-reading it. So I'll have to wait to refresh my memory as to whether or not she braved a definition. If she did, I expect it would have been something along the lines of what I said.

Ellen

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Edited January 10, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Danneskjold]

I don't think I'd say that what Rand does with her definition of art is to commit "the fallacy of the frozen abstraction." I think I'd stick with simply saying that the definition is wanting -- i.e., that it commits the simple error of being an inadequate definition. But I'd agree that in her applications her definition leads to "frozen abstraction" issues because it did become used as the criterion of what is and isn't to be included as examples of "art" (in the "fine arts" sense).

What is the reason behind the statement that you find her definition inadequate?

I can't speak for ES (although, she did explicate some of her views in the post snipped from above and elsewhere in this thread...), but from my perspective one of the key issues is this idea of "represenationalism" in the visual arts. It seems unreasonably limiting to suggest that only visual works which are "representational" can properly qualify as "art". This can lead to all sorts of problems, not the least of which is demonstrated by the FLW glass art I posted. It is plain as day to me that the middle piece "represented" a flower (it is called the "tulip" design, btw). However, it wasn't so plain to Victor or Jeff. So whose visual acuity is more objectively correct? Not any easy question to answer with anything resembling objectivity. Further, many people don't "see" water lilies...so does that mean that Monet wasn't creating "art"?

Further, if "representationalism" is the key distinguishing factor of what is and isn't properly "art" (in the visual sense), then we'd be stuck saying that the first piece below is "art", while the others are not, and I don't mind saying I'm just not happy with that.

RCR

We've got a stickman, then a question mark because the image didn't show up, then a flower, then something that I don't consider art, then something else that I don't consider art, then a sunrise. So actually I'd say three out of five that showed up are art, two our of the three that are art are good, and out of the two that aren't I'd say the first one is okay.

[Ellen Stuttle]

What?

In the case of new things, say I define a tree as x, then y comes along which is fundamentally different than x, I have to change x to fit y because somebody wants it to be that way instead of accepting it as something different completely?

That doctrine seems kinda backwards and subjective to me. If a tree is a tree, and something is found that is similar yet fundamentally different to a tree, should we find a new definition for tree that encompasses it? Or should we just define that new thing?

Miscommunication, Jeff. Suppose you're the person forming a definition of a category of phenomenon instead of reading a pre-fabbed definition in a dictionary. You begin with a sense of the sort of thing which belongs to the category, and then you try to find a definition which best expresses what makes that category uniquely different from any other. (This is very sketchy; I'm not going into formal details of species and genus, etc.) Suppose you've observed a category of entities which are forms of vegetation which produce leaves and have bark and have a central trunk from which branches emerge, and you call these objects "trees" and then try to form a definition which would distinguish "trees" from "bushes" and "grasses." And suppose you think that height is a significant aspect to something's being a "tree" and you include height as part of your definition. And then you learn of the existence of bonzai, a practice which grows trees which are stunted and might be shorter than many bushes. If you say, those can't be trees because my definition says trees are tall, this is the wrong way of doing it. Instead you alter the definition to take account of there being entities which fit in the category but aren't includable in your previous definition.

I hope that helps.

Ellen

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[Danneskjold]

Ok, I can agree with that. If you couldn't tell I tend towards taking things at face value.

Edited January 10, 2007 by Jeff Kremer

[reason.on]

We've got a stickman, then a question mark because the image didn't show up,

I included a new image ref for the second piece, hopefully, this one will stick.

RCR

[reason.on]

Therefore I think it's useless to rack your brains over the question whether it is "real" art or not, that question is not interesting, and I'm happy to leave that to the bureaucrats who have nothing better to do.

...interesting enough to have you posting on this thread, on multiple occasions.

RCR

[Victor Pross]

R. Christian Ross,

Well, I hesitate calling the stick man ‘art’ as well. Maybe it's bad art, but a good graphic symbol. It looks like a symbol for the Men’s room. Hey, care to show us what the symbol for the ladies room would look like? Come on. You can do it.

Let’s see if you are able to represent something so easy. Or is it?

-Victor

[reason.on]

Another borderline case is art made by computers. In some cases the computer can be considered just to be an instrument of the human artist, like a modern version of the brush and paint, but in other cases it is the computer that does most of the job. There are for example breathtakingly beautiful computer images of fractals; are these made by the programmer or by the computer? So far the programmer still has to select the method to create a picture, but the details are filled in by the computer. The programmer or the user of the program then still has to make the selection, so that would at least be a typical artistic activity, but the boudaries are vague.

I agree about computers and the artist, completely...

As it happens I have some experience working with fractal patterns as well as fractally-based image manipulation tools. Nothing too fancy, KPT tools through Photoshop and Corel. Anyway, creating certain images through the process of the tools was fascinating, and I was in some ways shocked at how completely unfamiliar fractally driven forms can evolve through a process of choice into familiar forms. One of the more interesting fractally-based tools generated some form, and then showed maybe an 6x6 grid of slight variations in the form, based upon certain type selections. The variations would be by degrees, but occasionally there would a mutant form in the mix. The possible transformations, given enough selections towards a certain end, were amazing.

I have one presentation of some graphics I created some years ago using this tool, but they are all strung together, in a cheezy digitally created frame, and it isn't greatest quality. If you can zoom in w/ your browser you can get a better look at the individual graphics. They may seem banal, but the fascinating part to me is that each of these forms was generated from unrecognizable blobs through a simple conscious selection process atop a purely algorithmic physical transformational process (as described above).

I also enjoyed playing around with other fractally based generation and manipulation tools.

Despite finding these images interesting to look at and contemplate, it really is difficult for me (especially after having dabbled in painting) to consider any of this as "art", mostly because the degree of actual intentionality in the final product isn't sufficiently high to merit it, that is to say the tools did most of the work. It is true, as Peter points out that I made key selections in the creative process, but the bulk of the details which make up the image were crafted by mathematical processes. Like Peter, I think these kinds of designs are borderline cases; consequently and contrary to Peter, I find thinking about what those borders actually are to be an interesting endeavor.

RCR.

Edited January 10, 2007 by R. Christian Ross

[Danneskjold]

Ironic, your argument more or less comes full circle and is highly reminiscent of Victor's that the latin root word of "art" is "skill".

[Victor Pross]

Ironic, your argument more or less comes full circle and is highly reminiscent of Victor's that the latin root word of "art" is "skill".

One common notion [typical of 20th century Modernism] is the curious idea that art cannot be defined—that is should not be "limited" by definitions, and that anything that "expands the definition of art" is good. My standpoint is directly opposing to this view, and here I agree with Rand when she stated that “definitions are the guardians of rationality.”

[Danneskjold]

I think that is what you and I have been trying to get across the entire time. However, a broad definition is a poor guard. It's like employing one guard to guard a museum. It's too big and as a result many unwanted things get in (robbers).

[Ellen Stuttle]

Despite finding these images interesting to look at and contemplate, it really is difficult for me (especially after having dabbled in painting) to consider any of this as "art", mostly because the degree of actual intentionality in the final product isn't sufficiently high to merit it, that is to say the tools did most of the work. It is true, as Peter points out that I made key selections in the creative process, but the bulk of the details which make up the image were crafted by mathematical processes. Like Peter, I think these kinds of designs are borderline cases; consequently and contrary to Peter, I find thinking about what those borders actually are to be an interesting endeavor.

RCR.

Interesting and attractive, BUT...that ineffable inexpressible border. At the Symmetry conference in Budapest this last August, as you might expect, were gathered physicists, mathematicians, computer experts, all with interests to which computer-generated design programs were relevant. On display were some very intricate and visually enticing products of feeding into a computer program various initial starting conditions which proliferated -- some of them I looked at for quite awhile; I did find them absorbing to look at and "attractive." But none really had what any Escher tiling does have. On a bus excursion through the Hungarian countryside (to a town which dates way back, Gyrogy -- I've probably spelled it wrong; in English it's pronounced like Drur), one of the visual artists attending and I talked for about an hour about just what it was -- those little details of intention, of vagaries in the pattern -- which made the Escher tilings "alive," and in both our opinions "art," and which the computer-generated designs lacked.

Ellen

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[Victor Pross]

decorative design and/or computer graphics...is this art? No. Of course design and decoration can be creative and beautiful, but they are not art per se. Mind you, design and decoration can sometimes include works of art inside them and that may confuse matters. For example, a wallpaper might include images of an artistic painting as one of its elements, but that doesn't make the design a work of art any more than a frame that contains a painting a work of art.

At The Academy of Art and Design, [one school I studied at] I was taught that the purpose of design and decoration is to embellish something to make it more useful, pleasing, or attractive. This seems reasonable to me. This is true of objects such as rugs, flatware, wallpaper, or furniture, etc. The purpose of art is not embellishment--but expression in its own right, art it is to be contemplated for its own sake. Art is an end in itself. And that's the heart of the difference between art and design.

Edited January 10, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Ellen Stuttle]

Therefore I think it's useless to rack your brains over the question whether it is "real" art or not, that question is not interesting, and I'm happy to leave that to the bureaucrats who have nothing better to do.

...interesting enough to have you posting on this thread, on multiple occasions.

RCR

Yeah. It does occasion doubts as to protestations of non-interest to see someone posting on a question regarding which he or she professes unconcern.

E-

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Edited January 10, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Victor Pross]

Now I really think about, Elizbeth’s post—cutely titled “Art and Sub-Objectivity” tells me that she is perhaps confused regarding the significance and interaction between objectivity and subjectivity [emotion, in this usage of the word]. The real question is: is art inherently subjective? Ultimately, this might be her question. If so, the answer is no. Of course we experience art in a direct and tangible way that might be expressed in an emotional way---but how is that different from anything else we experience in life? Just to pick a highly emotional non-artistic observation as an example: many of us have a very strong personal emotional reaction when it comes to spiders, but this does this make us incompetent of making rational evaluation about their danger, if such is the case? No, it does not. Here’s another example: someone might have strong personal feelings about an engagement ring, but this does not necessarily impede one’s ability to appraise the financial value, its material composition, or craftsmanship. Likewise, it is quite possible to set aside our personal prejudices if we wish to and evaluate works of art based on their objective qualities rather than merely how we react to them [such as theme or subject matter] at a personal or emotional level.* This is the mistake many people make when judging art. This is no less true, in a different context, when it comes to abstract painting: many people think, 'Gee, I really like the colors. They are soooo pretty---therefore it's art!' [??!!]

(Note from MSK:

* Phrase in bold plagiarized from Brian K. Yoder, Q&A: "Isn't art inherently subjective and therefore impossible to evaluate in any general way?." See here for corrected text and source details. The post is left up out of respect to the posters on this thread, so as not to make hash out of their discussion.

OL extends its deepest apologies to Brian K. Yoder.)