One of my views that frequently raising eyebrows among Objectivists, and raising questions as to my bone fides as an Objectivist, is my view on free will or “volitional consciousness.” Some have gone so far as to accuse me of campaigning against free will. This is not accurate. I just don’t hold the same view of free will that they do (or think they do).

What I argue for is conditional free will—the view that you could have done otherwise than you did in a given situation, IF you had WANTED to. This is in contrast to the standard Objectivist concept of free will, which is really more of a Kantian outlook, and which I have characterized as categorical free will—the view that you could have done otherwise than you did in a given situation, period, i.e., EVEN IF you HADN'T wanted to.

In this respect, I am no more against free will than Ayn Rand was against necessity in morality. In regard to ethical necessity, she said, "Reality confronts man with a great many ‘musts,’ but all of them are conditional: the formula of realistic necessity is: ‘You must, if—’ and the ‘if’ stands for man’s choice: ‘—if you want to achieve a certain goal.’ ” (“Causality versus Duty,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, pp. 118-119)

Similarly, in regard to free will, I say: Reality confronts man with a great many “cans,” but all of them are conditional: the formula of realistic freedom (of will) is: “You can, if—” and the “if” stands for man’s desires: “—if you want to achieve a certain goal more than you want to achieve some other goal” (i.e., if you value a certain thing more than you value another thing). I think that, in order to remain consistent with her Aristotelian, anti-Kantian outlook, Rand ought to have defined free will as I have, as conditional free will—not as Peikoff (in Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand) and others have, as categorical free will.

I realize that it’s standard practice in Objectivist circles to refer to Kant as a destroyer of reality, reason, morality, you name it, and that the effect of his theory of categorical necessity was to destroy moral responsibility (“Causality versus Duty,” p. 121). Well, I think a case could be made that Rand’s categorical freedom has a similar effect.

Specifically, if as Peikoff says (Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 60), there is no reason or explanation for focusing, one just focuses or not for no reason, then it must be clear that all of one’s actions (to the extent they flow from one’s focusing) become arbitrary. The inescapable implication is that categorical free will a la Peikoff (and Rand?) destroys the possibility of moral justification.

In the interest of dialogue and mutual exploration—i.e., sincere truth-seeking—I would gladly set aside such judgments so that some reasoned intellectual discussion could take place. But that presupposes people who are willing to be objective (whether or not they are card-carrying Objectivists)—i.e., people are more interested in discovering truth than being right and defeating their opponents.

So, if someone wants to delve into this issue with me, whether in a public discussion forum or in private email, I am all for it. But I refuse to engage in rhetorically heated debates, particularly not with people who have already amply demonstrated that their chief goal and pleasure in life is to distort the views and tear down the character of others. Life is too short for that.