Scott Ryan


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MSK:

~ All you say, as put, granted.

~ However, I do not take 'later' as meaning...SO 'later' that they're irrelevent to the very idea of 'redemption.' They may be listed 'later'...but...they're ntl NECESSARY to the whole set of 'steps' NECESSARY for behavioural-Meaning, no? --- Miss a step (in this case, my argued point about your omitted criterion), and...all previous are irrelevent, no?

LLAP

J:D

PS: Mefears that any further debating on this will get hung in circular arguments about a subjective meaning of 'later.' Maybe this subject should be another separate thread. Sorry for picking up on your idea and debating into another subject. Let's get back to Ryan...here.

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~ Yes, such does...for some...but only temporarily, as long as they're continuously monitored when they say "I agree with (or to do) what you demand."

~ How-so-whomever, I wasn't talking about what 'we' should do re getting 'recompense;' I was talking about the volunteered offered/attempt at such (before the 'whip's brought out) as a NECESSARY criterion for considering (by the wrong-doer, as well as the 'wronged') the wrong-doer as 'redeemed.' --- Such has nothing to do with 'punishment' or whip-cracking...wherever such might be relevent otherwise. Let's not segue into irrelevencies.

~ 'Punishment' has nothing to do with Redemption...unless Recompense is considered as 'punishment.' Now, why would anyone think that?

LLAP

J:D

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John,

Here is something to chew on. The essential component of redemption is a value judgment, not an act. The act comes from, and is informed by, the value judgment. That is when true redemption occurs and it is legitimate. Otherwise, it is a charade.

If there is no value judgment on the heart level (let's not quibble over words, you know what I mean by "heart" here), no act of atonement is worth a damn.

Notice that when a person has truly repented of something and goes off on a new and productive path, he needs no sanction from anyone, nor is he shackled by anyone, even those he has wronged. A truly repentant person will go on to produce and live a good life despite anything and anyone.

In this sense, we all control our own redemption.

Michael

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  • 2 weeks later...

MSK:

~ Well, hell: haven't read The Latest Criticism of Rand (er, O'ism) by S. Ryan yet, but, since we're still on the subject of 'redemption'...I'll stick with the tangent here.

~ As usual, I find nothing to disagree with with your (dare I say, carefully worded?) response; just as usual, I find no relevency of it to my last point. Re this subject of 'Redemption', you seem to have a prob with even using the term 'Recompense'...the term being my original point about a missing criterion in your idea of 'Redemption.'

~ Methinks we should distinguish 'twixt the ideas of Redemption-In-One's-Own-Eyes (SELF-Redemption) vs. Redemption-In-The-Eyes-Of-One's-Victims (aka: their Trust); to make a valid point about one is not to make a valid point about the other.

2Bcont

LLAP

J:D

Edited by John Dailey
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MSK:

~ You say "The essential component of redemption is a value judgement [er, Bill Dwyer uses this same terminology quite ambiguousy in his args in RoR about 'determined' volition-choices; you mean something different, I hope], not an act." --- Fine; such is the 'essential component'; you gloss over the fact that such NECESSARILY must be Manifested in some 'act'...to be recognized/identified as redemption-oriented, no? Elsewise, we're just talking about a wish (not even an 'intention'-to-do/act) to be considered as 'valuing.'

~ You clarify that when 'the act' is determined from the 'value judgement', then it is 'true redemption,' elsewise, a 'charade.' True enough, but, if all I'm concerned with is the window-breaker fixing my window, as a victim I couldn't care less what his sorrow/regret/redemption-need was. I just want him to take care of it without my constant monitoring. If he does, I, maybe, can trust him in the future. If he doesn't, I can't.

2Bcont

LLAP

J:D

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~ Methinks we should distinguish 'twixt the ideas of Redemption-In-One's-Own-Eyes (SELF-Redemption) vs. Redemption-In-The-Eyes-Of-One's-Victims; to make a valid point about one is not to make a valid point about the other.

John,

I agree with this.

Still, I have a qualification. In my own view, I see no value in granting the sanction of forgiveness to a person who does not have genuine atonement in his heart. On the other hand, I see no reason to despise one who is truly repentant. If he committed some crime, there is punishment determined by justice. And even such punishment has an end one day, except for life imprisonment and execution. Once a man has fulfilled his punishment, the slate is clean. I see no reason to carry a grudge after that if he is truly sorry for what he did.

Michael

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MSK:

~ Same goes if I'm 12, and s/he (even accidentally) killed my father who was building a birdhouse; s/he O-W-Es...and 'acts' (for whatever 'charade' or 'redemptive' reasons) Recompensatorily...or, s/he doesn't. If s/he doesn't 'act', s/he's not 'redeemed' in my eyes.

~ How s/he could be in their own eyes, and thereby "goes off on a new and productive path", ignoring what they OWE their victims, I have no idea.

~ Methinks you are short-shrifting the NECESSITY (to repeat) the idea of Recompense as a criterion in 'Redemption'...be such in the eyes of one's own, or in the Trust of others.

LLAP

J:D

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MSK:

~ Well, now you bring up the term 'forgiveness'; we are seguing into related, but different territories. I spoke not of such; merely whether or not a former 'perp' will 'act' in a Recompensatory manner...or not. THAT is a NECESSARY 1st-step for them to then be NOW 'trusted' to not-again do what they did.

~ Redemption='Forgiveness'; if the victim doesn't find what's done (or, not) as worthwhile, no 'Forgiveness' there, ergo, no Redemptivity from them. This CAN be considered irrelevent by the 'Perp', in some cases, granted. But, we're not talking about SELF-'forgiveness/redemption' here. We're talking about Trust by a Victim; this is Redemptivity-From-Others.

~ A 'Perp' can't bring back a lost life (or, piece of art!), but, they can accept whatever moral obligations the Victim had; some they should, some they shouldn't; which is what is what an 'active mind' shows its worth about...or not. THIS is what makes Recompense a worthwhile criterion of...Redemption.

LLAP

J:D

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John,

I thought I mentioned justice, crime and punishment.

If you are interested in recompense after that, I have no idea what the standard would be other than subjective liking or disliking.

I am not short-shifting recompense. I am merely assigning it to the proper agency in our society for dealing with it. I don't believe in lynch mobs. (Not saying you do.)

Michael

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~ I don't see what 'subjectivity' there necessarily is to be considered in Recompensing, aka, paying up what one O-W-Es to a VICTIM (or, those dependent upon them.)

~ Unless one can argue the same 'subjectivity' in ignoring such and going on to one's own new 'productive path in life,' (like, a successful bank robber who keeps the spoils and vows to 'never rob again'...since he now has enough.)

LLAP

J:D

PS: Yes, you did 'mention' Justice, Crime and Punishment. Am unclear what arguments these are to my original point about your lack in criteria in your view of 'Redemption.' --- Besides, these are BIG (and quite separate, though related) subjects on their own, as you well know.

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MSK:

~ You see RECOMPENSE as a subject which ONLY 'the proper agency' should be concerned with? Not the 'Perp', nor the 'Vic'?

~ And, what is the proper criteria for determing just WHAT is 'the proper agency?' Whatever our law-making penalty-determining POLITICIANS decide? Or, you have some other idea of 'the proper agency' to determine 'proper' (aka, in this case, clearly meaning only 'Legal')...Recompense?

~ Why you segued from Redemption (a Morality concern) into Legally-Required and Legally-Penalizing territory, I'm not sure, but...it seems you see 'Recompense' as a Legally-Enforcable PUNISHMENT (you've used this term more than once here), and not something relevent to Ethics per se.

~ 'Recompensing' your accidentally breaking your neighbor's window doesn't need the courts...or any other 'agency'...to properly, rationally, 'objectively', un-emotionally, handle it.

LLAP

J:D

Edited by John Dailey
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ADDENDUM:

---Re my last paragraph (couldn't fit the 'edit'-add in)...

~ However, IGNORING/'Evading' such a concern (causing a conflict) thereby does call for some 'proper agency' to decide; but, not until then.

~ Such should not be left for a 'proper agency' to decide...by those concerned with 'REDEMPTION.' --- For those not concerned with Recompense...then yes: someone ELSE need be the decider of 'recompense.' In that case, such 'recompense' IS irrelevent to...Redemption.

LLAP

J:D

Edited by John Dailey
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John,

Let's cut to the chase. Who decides the "recompense" and how much is enough?

I say the law. That's what it is for. The rest is subjective or personal. You are free to think a person did not give enough recompensation and avoid the person and whatnot. You are not free to enforce such recompensation outside the law.

Anyway, suppose you have a situation like Nathaniel Branden and Ayn Rand? He was wrong. he owned up. What could he have given her as recompensation? She didn't want anything. Instead, he made a brilliant career. I say more power to him.

Actually, he did do something. He kept her secret about the affair for years. (Let's not pretend that admitting the affair in public meant the same thing to him as it did to her.)

Some people think human beings are basically good and cut slack to a person who is honestly trying. Others prefer to condemn. As Rand discovered when she tried to block publication of The Psychology of Self-Esteem, the condemnation was particular to her and did not come with any powers. NB had broken no laws. Thus, he was not punished. Instead, he was sorry about what he had done, forgave himself, did not repeat it, moved on and enjoyed a successful and productive career.

That works for me. Condemnation-wise, I am more interested in getting the Hitlers than bashing someone who is redeeming himself.

Michael

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~ Interesting that you bring up NB and AR; I wasn't thinking of them at all, believe it or not. I was concerned with the idea of what Redemption necessarily has to include. Concern for attempts at Recompense was one factor I saw as NECESSARY.

~ Re your "Let's cut to the chase. Who decides the 'recompense' and how much is enough?" concern: Whoever's concerned about getting...or giving...trust/'redemption.' You seem to assume that the vic and perp would automatically, inherently, necessarily disagree; I disagree with that.

~ If there's no concern about giving such by the victim (or their dependents!), aka: nothing would be 'enough', so much for the subject re them. However, IF there is...

~ THEN, if there's no concern about getting such by the perp, s/he clearly couldn't care less about re-acquiring trust/'redemption', in which case so much for the subject re THEM. However, if there is...

2Bcont

LLAP

J:D

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...why does an 'agency'/arbitrator/police-court AUTOMATICALLY have to be assumed as a necessary decision maker herein? They're relevent only if there's a conflict re the above 'ifs.'

~ 'Recompense' CAN be mutually agreed upon (aka: BOTH 'decide'), sometimes, for trust/'redemption' to be re-acquired in the perp's eyes, and re-given in the victim's eyes. When they can't, THAT's when the police 'agency' needs be called.

~ Hope that's clear now.

LLAP

J:D

PS: I see concern for Recompense primarily as a moral one, ergo derivatively and secondarily a legal one; if morals/ethics are irrelevent to it, as you argue, what justification for the legal (when there's a conflict about 'recompense') is there?

Edited by John Dailey
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PS: I see concern for Recompense primarily as a moral one, ergo derivatively and secondarily a legal one; if morals/ethics are irrelevent to it, as you argue, what justification for the legal (when there's a conflict about 'recompense') is there?

John,

Where did that come from? I never stated that, nor even implied it.

I think we are talking past each other on some basic meanings. You started the clarification process by suggesting we distinguish sell-forgiveness from forgiveness by others.

My point on redemption is essentially on a cognitive identification level, not a normative one. Giving an example to illustrate: for as much as Rand and certain acolytes do not forgive Nathaniel for his lapse and consider him to be a moral monster, it is cognitively wrong to call him an evil man. He is a productive achiever with a lifetime of productive achievement to prove it.

Hitler was an evil man with a lifetime of brutality, murder and destruction to prove it.

In that sense, the cognitive identification of the evaluation is what is redeemed. If we are to use reason as our standard, objective observation must always trump hurt feelings and hatred in making identifications (or love, for that matter). Thus there is no way to claim that Nathaniel Branden is an evil man and claim the sanction of reason. Those who claim it use some other standard of good and evil, not rational thought based on concepts that boil down to integrating sensations.

As to conflict, I understand that there is a victim only when there is a conflict. Otherwise, I call it a disagreement between two parties and not an wrong committed by a perpetrator against a victim. Friendly resolution of a disagreement is merely one form a trade.

Interestingly, on musing over this, I can see where at the time an act was committed, it created a perpetrator and victim, but on friendly resolution, it becomes trade once again. "I took xxxxxxx without permission. I am now restoring it and agree to seek permission in the future." That is a form of contract.

Michael

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~ So-o-o...as you see things on this subject...'Recompense' is a form of 'contract' (implicitly, at least, until the perp explains his intentions of making-up to the vic), b-u-t, you consider this as irrelevent to the idea of 'Redemption' (aka: 'Forgiveness' in one's-own-eyes and/or the-others')? --- Interesting perspective!

~ However, it does make irrelevent bringing in some bureaucratic 'agency-arbiter' to decide a legally-required/enforced 'recompense' (which then would really be irrelevent to 'Redemption')...unless there's a conflict/disagreement about the 'contract', no?

LLAP

J:D

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John,

It all depends on what we mean by redemption. I cannot disassociate value from redemption.

Maybe another example helps. If a man gets gangrene on his arm, he has to amputate the arm to save the rest. There is no redemption for the arm. It either goes or it poisons the rest.

If a man had a treatable wound, but it healed on its own, he would return to using the arm as normal. It would be redeemed. It would have the same value it had before the wound.

Isn't that similar to what happens with people who go straight after a spell of being crooked? Churches and recovery groups are full of people like that. They are good people, too. Frankly, I trust a reformed bad guy at the outset more than I do one who has never had to make that choice.

As an aside, there is some ancient Oriental wisdom that says if a man is only partially good, he will only be partially bad when opportunity presents itself. But if he is all good and turns to the dark side one day (for whatever reason), get out of his way. He will do you some serious damage.

I think that applies in reverse.

Michael

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~ I've always had a prob with looking at people (and things) as 'partly' good-bad; this is akin to their being 'partly' worthwhile in time/energy/effort in helping to help-out/hinder or even save-kill. No 'partly' when it comes down to decisions-to-act or not.

~ When things get down to the nitty-gritty of one's decision making about another, there's no 'partly' doing anything about them, just as there's no 'partly'-type of bottom-line evaluation of them...other than a merely academic one, which makes this 'partl' view merely armchair discussion and no more than that. --- A person's as bad-good as their last decision. Summing up an 'average' is no different than doing the same with a steak which has a dash of arsenic; no one would touch it.

~ But, finishing up my part in this debate about Recompense's necessary tie to Redemption, may I suggest checking out RESURRECTING THE CHAMP ? Sam Jackson as never seen before!

LLAP

J:D

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  • 1 month later...

Neil Parille recommended I read Scott Ryan's Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality: A Critique of Ayn Rand's Epistemology (post 17). Well, I did and am not impressed. I read most of it while traveling, not marking anything or taking notes. Also, an awful feature of the book is that it doesn't have an index. This drawback is compounded by Ryan often referring to what he writes elsewhere without saying where. To write a very worthwhile review of it, such as to put here or on Amazon, I would have to reread it, marking parts and taking notes. Ugh! I may do that some day, but I'm not up to it now. All I shall offer in the following are first impressions.

Ryan claims to be a big fan of Brand Blanshard. Ryan's article titled The Rational Temper: Brand Blanshard and What Objectivists Can Learn From Him, is referenced in this thread. It's clear that Ryan did not apply what he learned from Blanshard when it came to Ayn Rand. He regularly tries to debase her, with derisive remarks like "she failed to consider ... ", "she carelessly thought ...", "she wasn't entitled to think ...", and that all her ideas simply stem from a "fear of religion." He is about as gracious to Ayn Rand as Ayn Rand was to Immanuel Kant. Note the book title, and Ryan calls Rand's theory of universals "The Optical Illusion of Objectivsm."

I agree with Ryan here and there. One topic is measurement omission -- no surprise there. Another topic is some issues discussed in Peikoff's analytic-synthetic dichotomy article. But I don't recall reading this book adding to my stock of disagreements with Rand or Peikoff. A big demerit is what Ryan says about the theory (or problem) of universals. Also, Ryan doesn't confine universals to one part of the book. He brings the topic up repeatedly throughout, adding to its detraction. Ryan claims that it is ontological, not epistemological. Wrong, it's both. Then he asserts Rand is a nominalist in ontology but a moderate realist in epistemology. Duh!

He claims Ayn Rand did not even understand the problem of universals. Given what Ryan writes about it, the opposite is true. Rand understood it far better than he does. He claims to agree with Brand Blanshard on universals. However, when I read the Universals chapter of Reason and Analysis, Blanshard is far closer to Rand on the topic than he is to the mish-mash doctrine of universals presented as Ryan's own, which he calls "realist." As an example of the former, Blanshard rejects the Platonic theory and the Aristotelian theory except regarding "specific universals" (RA, IX, 28, 29, 34). Regarding qualitative and generic universals, Blanshard agrees largely with John Locke (RA, IX, 34). Locke's theory is usually regarded as a conceptualist, resemblance theory. It is anti-realist (contra Plato and Aristotle). Indeed, it is much like Rand's.

Strongly related to universals in nearly all accounts is essence. Ryan barely mentions the concept.

Ryan tries to make a big deal of specific universals versus generic and qualitative ones, supposedly getting this from Blanshard. However, Ryan's use of these terms does not match Blanshard's, and in my opinion Ryan even fails to understand Blanshard's distinctions. Blanshard denies the existence of qualitative and generic universals (RA, IX, 14). Ryan does not. Blanshard: "By a generic universal, I mean one whose instances are individual things or persons, for example, man, horse, or stone. By a qualitative universal I mean one whose instances are qualities or characters of one kind, for example, colour, sound, or shape. By a specific universal I mean a quality or character that is incapable of sub-division into kinds, for example, this shade of red or this degree of loudness in a sound" (RA, IX, 14).

In contrast Ryan says: "Thus 'specific universal' is not the the oxymoron it might appear to be. "Specific' is the contrary, not of 'universal', but of 'generic'; the contrary of 'universal' is 'particular'" (p. 54). Note that Blanshard's distinction rests on different instances -- entities ("things") versus attributes ("character" or "quality"), a distinction Ryan fails to make.

That's it for now. Feedback appreciated. If there is an extended discussion of the book here, especially one chapter at a time, it might motivate me enough to re-read it.

Edited by Merlin Jetton
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Neil Parille recommended I read Scott Ryan's Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality: A Critique of Ayn Rand's Epistemology (post 17). Well, I did and am not impressed.

[snip]

Feedback appreciated. If there is an extended discussion of the book here, especially one chapter at a time, it might motivate me enough to re-read it.

Good comments, Merlin. I personally would welcome a chapter-by-chapter discussion of this book, though not until after the second week of July. My schedule is jammed until then.

REB

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Neil Parille recommended I read Scott Ryan's Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality: A Critique of Ayn Rand's Epistemology (post 17). Well, I did and am not impressed.

[snip]

Feedback appreciated. If there is an extended discussion of the book here, especially one chapter at a time, it might motivate me enough to re-read it.

Good comments, Merlin. I personally would welcome a chapter-by-chapter discussion of this book, though not until after the second week of July. My schedule is jammed until then.

REB

I would also welcome a chapter-by-chapter discussion of Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality.

Bill P (Alfonso)

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I'd be interested, too. I always found Ryan irritating when he was posting on Old Atlantis and on OWL, and I never got around to reading his book. But I'd read it if there were a discussion. Though I don't anticipate being impressed by the book, a discussion could be productive.

Ellen

___

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This is a follow-up to post 46. I thought of another topic in Ryan's book -- views of reason. He opens Chapter 8 with some quotes from Rand, with near zero commentary. Included are two versions:

1. Reason is the faculty that perceives, identifies and integrates the material provided by his senses.

2. Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses.

Ryan exploits the difference. I agree Rand was a little sloppy including "perceives" in the first one. Rand's perceptual/conceptual division and other common ones in philosophy like senses/intellect and sensation/reflection justify its exclusion.

He then presents Brand Blanshard's view of reason, which Ryan judges as far better. He says a reader may judge the two views to have a lot in common, but Ryan insists such a judgment is far amiss. After all, Blanshard wrote more than 200 pages on perception and Rand very little. Also, a key element in Blanshard's view is to grasp necessary connections. It seems Ryan was unable to see common ground between "grasp necessary connections" and "identify and integrate". Indeed, Ryan's comments in the entire book barely recognize Rand's wide usage of "integrate" (and other words with the same root). Most of Ryan's comments regarding Objectivism and necessity rely on Peikoff's article on the analytic-synthetic dichotomy.

Edited by Merlin Jetton
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