A Companion to Ayn Rand

[BaalChatzaf]

22 hours ago, Neil Parille said:

The Present King of France (Louis XX) is not bald:

He is NOT the King of France.  He is a Pretender to the Crown.  France is a Republic and does not have a King. 

[Brant Gaede]

Yeah, but he dresses well.

At least they won't be chopping off his head.

--Brant

will they?

[Roger Bissell]

2 hours ago, BaalChatzaf said:

All X are Y in the modern Boolean interpretation does NOT imply there is something in X.   In the traditional Aristotelian  interpretation All X are Y  is taken to imply there is an X.  As a result the square of opposition comes in two flavors:  the traditional   where All S is P  implies  Some S is P   and the modern  which does not assume the existence of S.   It turns out the Boolean Interpretation is more suited for formal or algebraic   presentation of logic.

 

I understand that the modern Boolean interpretation does not RECOGNIZE the implication that there is something in X - but there IS that implication. Whether you say All cows are mammals or All sea serpents are reptiles, you are presuming that there ARE such things as cows and sea serpents - correctly in the former case, and incorrectly in the latter case. You are, IN BOTH CASES, saying IN FULL: All cows are real creatures that are mammals and All sea serpents are real creatures that are reptiles.

Each predicate points to a class of real things that can, in B. Russell's lingo, be "inventoried." When you carry out such a Russellian "inventory," you find that there ARE such things as cows in the class "real creatures that are mammals" - and there ARE NOT such things as sea serpents in the class "real creatures that are reptiles." Which is why the former proposition is true, and the latter proposition is false.

But it is modern, Boolean logic PROPONENTS' failure (or refusal) to incorporate this fact into their model that traps them in the tumerous error known as the doctrine of Existential Import. There's nothing wrong with Boolean logic itself that a little common sense and SAYING IN FULL WHAT YOU MEAN couldn't easily cure.

The problem with the attitude or ideology of Boolean logic's PROPONENTS, however, is another matter. Russell had all the tools handy to take care of the problem of truth value of assertions about the non-existent without grafting on all of this nonsense. Yet, he dropped the ball. And we are still paying the price a century later.

REB

[BaalChatzaf]

1 hour ago, Roger Bissell said:

I understand that the modern Boolean interpretation does not RECOGNIZE the implication that there is something in X - but there IS that implication. Whether you say All cows are mammals or All sea serpents are reptiles, you are presuming that there ARE such things as cows and sea serpents - correctly in the former case, and incorrectly in the latter case. You are, IN BOTH CASES, saying IN FULL: All cows are real creatures that are mammals and All sea serpents are real creatures that are reptiles.

Each predicate points to a class of real things that can, in B. Russell's lingo, be "inventoried." When you carry out such a Russellian "inventory," you find that there ARE such things as cows in the class "real creatures that are mammals" - and there ARE NOT such things as sea serpents in the class "real creatures that are reptiles." Which is why the former proposition is true, and the latter proposition is false.

But it is modern, Boolean logic PROPONENTS' failure (or refusal) to incorporate this fact into their model that traps them in the tumerous error known as the doctrine of Existential Import. There's nothing wrong with Boolean logic itself that a little common sense and SAYING IN FULL WHAT YOU MEAN couldn't easily cure.

The problem with the attitude or ideology of Boolean logic's PROPONENTS, however, is another matter. Russell had all the tools handy to take care of the problem of truth value of assertions about the non-existent without grafting on all of this nonsense. Yet, he dropped the ball. And we are still paying the price a century later.

REB

xx

I recognize no such implication. The modern interpretation permits correct negation of an all proposition applied to an empty set.  The classical interpretation does not.  The Boolean interpretation came about only after George Boole rendered logic into  algebraic form.   The classical version of categorical syllogisms made sense only when interpreted in terms that natural language could  handle. 

-(x)P(x) ==  Es(-P(s).  This could not hold in the classical interpretation. 

Translation: negation of For All x  P(x)   ==  There exists an s such that not P(s)  Where P  is any predicate including predicates that are not true for any individual.  Existential Import was dropped to permit algebraic generality.  It was a trade off. 

In the case of the "king of France"  if all current kings of France are bald is denied one gets there is a king of France who is not bald which implies there is a king of France  which is false.

In the Wiki Article https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism#Existential_import   the example is given  All  flying dragons are mythical.  Suppose this statement is false.  There there is a flying dragon which is not mythical  which implies there is a flying dragon which is not the case.  

[merjet]

Maybe you guys will import  Fred Sommers' views on existential import from section 6 here. 

[BaalChatzaf]

1 hour ago, merjet said:

Maybe you guys will import  Fred Sommers' views on existential import from section 6 here. 

Interesting paper.  Thanks for the lead.  Sommer and Englbretsen  have  reformulated term logic  (a generalization of categorical logic) so it can handle arguments not  handled by Aristotle's   syllogistic  of categorical statements.  Term logic is formulated to  be similar to natural language,  rather the formality of mathematical logic.   

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fred_Sommers

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Term_logic

https://books.google.com/books?id=F5a-US69x78C&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:%22George+Englebretsen%22&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwji7NOI1dLLAhXDmR4KHbj0Bg4Q6AEIJTAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

[Roger Bissell]

44 minutes ago, BaalChatzaf said:

I recognize no such implication. The modern interpretation permits correct negation of an all proposition applied to an empty set.  The classical interpretation does not.  The Boolean interpretation came about only after George Boole rendered logic into  algebraic form.   The classical version of categorical syllogisms made sense only when interpreted in terms that natural language could  handle. 

-(x)P(x) ==  Es(-P(s).  This could not hold in the classical interpretation. 

Translation: negation of For All x  P(x)   ==  There exists an s such that not P(s)  Where P  is any predicate including predicates that are not true for any individual.  Existential Import was dropped to permit algebraic generality.  It was a trade off. 

In the case of the "king of France"  if all current kings of France are bald is denied one gets there is a king of France who is not bald which implies there is a king of France  which is false.

In the Wiki Article https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism#Existential_import   the example is given  All  flying dragons are mythical.  Suppose this statement is false.  There there is a flying dragon which is not mythical  which implies there is a flying dragon which is not the case.  

2

The implication of real being is part of ordinary language, and it is operative whether or not stated explicitly, unless explicitly stated otherwise. It is just as much a buil-in fixture of ordinary language as is the presumption of truthfulness or sincerity in someone's assertion. They are default presumptions of ordinary language, and there is no justification for abandoning them when doing logic.

The example you gave is a perfect case of "explicitly stated otherwise." All flying dragons are mythical. There is an explicit overriding of the ordinary language presumption that real being is being asserted - and instead there is an explicit assertion of mythical being. If someone said All flying dragons are real, there is an explicit assertion of real being (real = real beings or real creatures). If someone said All flying dragons are mythical, there is an explicit assertion of mythical being (mythical = mythical beings or mythical creatures). If someone says All flying dragons are scaly, the assertion is presumptively one of real being.

Take the Wiki example in re negation: All flying dragons are mythical (beings) --> negation --> Some flying dragon is not (a) mythical (being). OK, if the former is true (and it is), then the latter, being the negation of the former, should be false (and it is). There is no problem with truth-value in negation the way I do this example.

But you now raise the very different question of whether the negation "implies" that there is a flying dragon. Well, of course it does, but implication of existence does not entail existence. When we get a logical implication that clashes with reality, we check our premises! In this case, we have to look at what has been negated, since that is the only premise we have in immediate inference - other than the operating background assumption that truth-value is preserved in negation. We start with a presumption that flying dragons do NOT exist, because we EXPLICITLY SAY SO ("are mythical beings"). This is true. Then, when we NEGATE that presumption, were are saying, INCORRECTLY, that flying dragons DO exist. This implication (via immediate inference) is FALSE. 

All current kings of France are bald. (Silly statement, building in multiple simultaneous rulers of one country, but it's your example, not mine. I'll work with it anyway.) This presumes that all current kings of France are presently existing bald men. Do a Russellian "inventory" of the class of "presently existing bald men." See any current kings of France in there? Nope. False assertion. Now negate: "Some current kings of France AR NOT presently existing bald men." Russellian inventory: since the class "presently existing bald men" does not contain ANY current kings of France, the assertion is true!

You can put ANY construct or product of imagination you want in the subject of an assertion, and as long as you specify - or follow standard presumption of real being - then you can assess truth-value accurately, and you can trust that the truth-value will appropriate follow suit with negation. But not when you uncritically follow standard practice and negate predicates (like "bald") rather than negating the copula "is" - and not when you fail (or refuse, as some do) to make clear that you are asserting real being, and negate accordingly. 

I've given enough examples, and decoded and deactivated enough of your examples, that you should be able to get it by now. Follow my suggestions and apply them to a few standard examples. If you run into any problems, let me know.

REB

[Roger Bissell]

2 hours ago, merjet said:

Maybe you guys will import  the author's comments on Fred Sommers' comments on existential import from section 6 here. 

 

Must I analyze the Crisler for Bob, too? <sigh> Sorry, I've given him enough guidance on this.

REB

[BaalChatzaf]

18 minutes ago, Roger Bissell said:

Must I analyze the Crisler for Bob, too? <sigh> Sorry, I've given him enough guidance on this.

REB

My interest in logic is formal and mathematical.  I have so desire to undertake philosophical speculations.  The bread and butter logic of mathematics is first order predicate logic.  All normal mathematical  proofs can be formalized in FOL.  The example I have given concerning denying a universal statement over an empty set   blows up the necessity for existential import.  Falsity  of all the current kings of France are bald implies there is a non-bald king of France which further implies there is a King of France  which is false.  The reductio ad absurdum  carries the proof. 

I find philosophic arguments on these matters to be highly non-useful.  They produce neither science nor mathematics. 

[Brant Gaede]

if there are philosophical speculations then there must be philosophical truths. You have just stated you have no use for philosophical truths. The metaphysics and epistemology of science are the same for Objectivism. Assuming Objectivism says nothing about reality and reason that science doesn't then the speculations you speculate about appertain to ethics and politics. (There does appear to be a lot of churning in Objectivism on epistemological issues, but my interest in epistemology is slight.)

You are trying to have the philosophy you keep trying to eat because science requires a philosophy of science. It even requires things from the ethics department, namely honesty, integrity, truth and courage.

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

1 hour ago, Brant Gaede said:

if there are philosophical speculations then there must be philosophical truths. You have just stated you have no use for philosophical truths. The metaphysics and epistemology of science are the same for Objectivism. Assuming Objectivism says nothing about reality and reason that science doesn't then the speculations you speculate about appertain to ethics and politics. (There does appear to be a lot of churning in Objectivism on epistemological issues, but my interest in epistemology is slight.)

You are trying to have the philosophy you keep trying to eat because science requires a philosophy of science. It even requires things from the ethics department, namely honesty, integrity, truth and courage.

--Brant

Philosophy dithers and bumbles (as it has for 3000 years)   Science succeeds.   It was not philosophy that made this computer conversation possible.  It was science (specifically   physics).  

[Roger Bissell]

1 hour ago, BaalChatzaf said:

2 hours ago, Roger Bissell said:

Must I analyze the Crisler for Bob, too? <sigh> Sorry, I've given him enough guidance on this.

REB

 

My interest in logic is formal and mathematical.  I have so [NO] desire to undertake philosophical speculations.  The bread and butter logic of mathematics is first order predicate logic.  All normal mathematical  proofs can be formalized in FOL.  The example I have given concerning denying a universal statement over an empty set   blows up the necessity for existential import.  Falsity  of all the current kings of France are bald implies there is a non-bald king of France which further implies there is a King of France  which is false.  The reductio ad absurdum  carries the proof. 

I find philosophic arguments on these matters to be highly non-useful.  They produce neither science nor mathematics. 

 

That is a philosophical position, and it is false. If Aristotle, or someone back then, had not engaged in philosophical arguments about the nature of truth-value, meaning, and presumptions of common discourse, there would be no science, mathematics, or modern logic.

All the current kings of France are bald is FULLY expressed as All the current kings of France are actual men who are bald. This is false, and its falsity implies the truth of its negation, which is FULLY expressed as Some of the current kings of France ARE NOT actual men who are bald, which is true. There is NO IMPLICATION in this true assertion that there is, further, a king of France.

Thus, there is no reductio ad absurdum in your string of sentences - only an absurd, traditionalist (i.e., 20th-century traditionalist) persistence in reducing the rich, full content of ordinary assertion to what such assertions DO NOT assert. Why do you object to spelling out the standard presumptions of ordinary discourse, especially when it allows the Aristotelian rules of inference to be fully preserved - instead of ripped to shreds, leaving a skeletal remnant of his original Square of Opposition, as the traditional (i.e., Russellian) modern approach does?

REB

[BaalChatzaf]

2 hours ago, Roger Bissell said:

That is a philosophical position, and it is false. If Aristotle, or someone back then, had not engaged in philosophical arguments about the nature of truth-value, meaning, and presumptions of common discourse, there would be no science, mathematics, or modern logic.

All the current kings of France are bald is FULLY expressed as All the current kings of France are actual men who are bald. This is false, and its falsity implies the truth of its negation, which is FULLY expressed as Some of the current kings of France ARE NOT actual men who are bald, which is true. There is NO IMPLICATION in this true assertion that there is, further, a king of France.

Thus, there is no reductio ad absurdum in your string of sentences - only an absurd, traditionalist (i.e., 20th-century traditionalist) persistence in reducing the rich, full content of ordinary assertion to what such assertions DO NOT assert. Why do you object to spelling out the standard presumptions of ordinary discourse, especially when it allows the Aristotelian rules of inference to be fully preserved - instead of ripped to shreds, leaving a skeletal remnant of his original Square of Opposition, as the traditional (i.e., Russellian) modern approach does?

REB

You miss the point again.  the denial of "all the kings of France are bald"  is there is a non-bald king of France.  Which implies there is a king of France  which is false.  Since the denial leads to a false statement then original statement is true.   Apparently you have a problem with proofs based on the reduction to falsehood or so called indirect proofs.  About half the important theorems of mathematics are gotten by indirect proof. 

This  is basic  quantified predicate logic.  Read any standard text on the subject  and they will explain each and every step.  

[Roger Bissell]

13 minutes ago, BaalChatzaf said:

You miss the point again.  the denial of "all the kings of France are bald"  is there is a non-bald king of France.  Which implies there is a king of France  which is false.  Since the denial leads to a false statement then original statement is true.   Apparently you have a problem with proofs based on the reduction to falsehood or so called indirect proofs.  About half the important theorems of mathematics are gotten by indirect proof. 

This  is basic  quantified predicate logic.  Read any standard text on the subject  and they will explain each and every step.  

1

1. And you are missing my point - which is that All the kings of France are bald, to be correctly interpreted, must spell out fully like this: All the kings of France are actual men who are bald. (I also pointed out the needless complication and absurdity of your positing multiple currently existing  kings of one country. This example is not pedagogically sound or conducive to simple analytical discussion, and it's not the first one you've used that has muddied our exchanges.)

If you deny All the kings of France are actual men who are bald (which is false), you get Some of the kings of France ARE NOT actual men who are bald, which is true. You don't then have to resort to a reductio to "prove" the falsity of the original assertion.

All you have to do is follow B. Russell's lead and perform an "inventory" of the class "actual men who are bald." That class does not include all the kings of France, hence, the first assertion is false. And it is correct that the class does not include some of the kings of France, hence the second assertion is true.

2. Reductio ad absurdum is a very useful tool, when it is appropriate. But although it is often useful, it is also often irrelevant or even misleading - in particular, leading you to believe that you have proved something that needs no proof and is not even capable of proving it, if it did need proof. This is such a case of misapplication of reductio.

Negation is also a very useful tool, when it is done properly. But when it is not done properly, as you and the vast majority of modern logicians (and too many Aristotelian logicians) fail to do, it results in logical illusions that something has been proved when it has not, or that something's being implied results in some sort of commitment to its existence. Again, this is such a case of misapplication of negation.

But whereas the negation simply needs to be done correctly, the reductio is totally unnecessary and misleading. If the negation is done correctly, you see from an assertion already known to be false that its negation is (and must be) true.

3. You seem to be fixated on the predicate "bald," as though that somehow committed us to the existence of whatever is said to be bald. Try in its place the predicate "real" or "existent. All of the kings of France are real, negated, is Some of the kings of France are not real. The first is false; it implies the second, which is true. That is what I am getting at, and that is why I insistently keep inserting "actual men who are" or "real beings that are" between the copula and the predicate.

Focusing instead on "bald," as you do, results in misdirection - but while misdirection is fair game for a magician's routine, it completely derails logical inference. I know that is the furthest from your mind, or your intentions, but it is precisely what you accomplish. Give it up - by which I mean the whole impoverished shadow of logic they so blithely call "modern."

4. You asked previously about what "true blue Objectivists" might say about all this. Binswanger, in his book, seems to think that no matter what you may say about non-existent things, they must be false. Universal positive: All round squares are blue. Particular positive: Some round squares are blue. Particular negative: Some round squares are not blue. Universal negative: No round squares are blue. You keep saying that negating the universal positive one to get the particular negative (underlined) "implies" existence - in this case - the existence of round squares.

This is the modern doctrine that universals don't "imply" existence while particulars do. But this is not correct. All round squares are blue is more fully, correctly stated as All round squares are real things that are blue. This is an assertion of existence, implicit in the original statement, explicit when stated as such. Negation gives you Some round squares are not real things that are blue. This is the denial of existence.

You can only get away with saying a universal's negation into a particular "implies" existence by blanking out, or failing to recognize, that the implication involved in immediate inference by negation is from assertion of existence to denial of existence. If you grasp that, you will realize what a wild goose chase modern logic has taken you on. If you don't grasp it - well, enjoy the ride.

REB

[Roger Bissell]

3 hours ago, BaalChatzaf said:

Philosophy dithers and bumbles (as it has for 3000 years)   Science succeeds.   It was not philosophy that made this computer conversation possible.  It was science (specifically  physics).  

2

Science dithers and bumbles, too, and for much the same reasons. Scientists with agendas or blind spots tell us on alternate Tuesdays that saccharine is harmful or not - that global warming is man-made and/or leading to catastrophe or not - that the universe did not exist before the Big Bang or did.

Yet, we're still here, despite the best attempts of philosophers and scientists to shepherd us into patterns of behavior they approve of or profit from.

Your third and fourth sentences are a non sequitur. They're like saying that it was not hydrogen and oxygen that made my cup of coffee possible. It was liquid (specifically water).

REB

[BaalChatzaf]

11 hours ago, Roger Bissell said:

Science dithers and bumbles, too, and for much the same reasons. Scientists with agendas or blind spots tell us on alternate Tuesdays that saccharine is harmful or not - that global warming is man-made and/or leading to catastrophe or not - that the universe did not exist before the Big Bang or did.

Yet, we're still here, despite the best attempts of philosophers and scientists to shepherd us into patterns of behavior they approve of or profit from.

Your third and fourth sentences are a non sequitur. They're like saying that it was not hydrogen and oxygen that made my cup of coffee possible. It was liquid (specifically water).

REB

Look at the results of physical science:  technology and prosperity.  Look at the results of philosophy.  They range from useless to justifying tyranny.  Plato's republic is a basic guide to the totalitarian regimes that have emerged since.  

[BaalChatzaf]

11 hours ago, Roger Bissell said:

1. And you are missing my point - which is that All the kings of France are bald, to be correctly interpreted, must spell out fully like this: All the kings of France are actual men who are bald. (I also pointed out the needless complication and absurdity of your positing multiple currently existing  kings of one country. This example is not pedagogically sound or conducive to simple analytical discussion, and it's not the first one you've used that has muddied our exchanges.)

If you deny All the kings of France are actual men who are bald (which is false), you get Some of the kings of France ARE NOT actual men who are bald, which is true. You don't then have to resort to a reductio to "prove" the falsity of the original assertion.

All you have to do is follow B. Russell's lead and perform an "inventory" of the class "actual men who are bald." That class does not include all the kings of France, hence, the first assertion is false. And it is correct that the class does not include some of the kings of France, hence the second assertion is true.

2. Reductio ad absurdum is a very useful tool, when it is appropriate. But although it is often useful, it is also often irrelevant or even misleading - in particular, leading you to believe that you have proved something that needs no proof and is not even capable of proving it, if it did need proof. This is such a case of misapplication of reductio.

Negation is also a very useful tool, when it is done properly. But when it is not done properly, as you and the vast majority of modern logicians (and too many Aristotelian logicians) fail to do, it results in logical illusions that something has been proved when it has not, or that something's being implied results in some sort of commitment to its existence. Again, this is such a case of misapplication of negation.

But whereas the negation simply needs to be done correctly, the reductio is totally unnecessary and misleading. If the negation is done correctly, you see from an assertion already known to be false that its negation is (and must be) true.

3. You seem to be fixated on the predicate "bald," as though that somehow committed us to the existence of whatever is said to be bald. Try in its place the predicate "real" or "existent. All of the kings of France are real, negated, is Some of the kings of France are not real. The first is false; it implies the second, which is true. That is what I am getting at, and that is why I insistently keep inserting "actual men who are" or "real beings that are" between the copula and the predicate.

Focusing instead on "bald," as you do, results in misdirection - but while misdirection is fair game for a magician's routine, it completely derails logical inference. I know that is the furthest from your mind, or your intentions, but it is precisely what you accomplish. Give it up - by which I mean the whole impoverished shadow of logic they so blithely call "modern."

4. You asked previously about what "true blue Objectivists" might say about all this. Binswanger, in his book, seems to think that no matter what you may say about non-existent things, they must be false. Universal positive: All round squares are blue. Particular positive: Some round squares are blue. Particular negative: Some round squares are not blue. Universal negative: No round squares are blue. You keep saying that negating the universal positive one to get the particular negative (underlined) "implies" existence - in this case - the existence of round squares.

This is the modern doctrine that universals don't "imply" existence while particulars do. But this is not correct. All round squares are blue is more fully, correctly stated as All round squares are real things that are blue. This is an assertion of existence, implicit in the original statement, explicit when stated as such. Negation gives you Some round squares are not real things that are blue. This is the denial of existence.

You can only get away with saying a universal's negation into a particular "implies" existence by blanking out, or failing to recognize, that the implication involved in immediate inference by negation is from assertion of existence to denial of existence. If you grasp that, you will realize what a wild goose chase modern logic has taken you on. If you don't grasp it - well, enjoy the ride.

REB

statement A:  (x)(P(x)  =>Q(x)).  This is the modern way of saying all P's are Q's.  Not a hint or whiff of existence here.  Nada.  Zip. 

denial of statement A implies  Es(P(s) &  -Q(s))  which implies Es(P(s))  

[Robert Campbell]

On March 21, 2016 at 10:04 AM, Brant Gaede said:

With deduction from her basic principles you get perfectionism as an ideal. This worked in her art. It does not work out there in the big, wide world. Human beings and their societies and interactions are much too complex--and imperfect. John Galt is not a workable man. Ayn Rand crashed and burned in her own life thinking he was and she and those about her were, could be and should be.

Perfection is theorectically possible in metaphysics and epistemology. After all, reality itself is perfect for starters. Then there's logic and its fallacies. But what makes the basic principles work is individualism. In ethics and politics individualism isn't enough. Man is a social animal, not merely a thinking one. That's why Objectivism so far hasn't been enough--that and an intellectual mediocrity who decided to get on top of it and sit on it and occupy its space after Rand died.

Brant,

I largely agree with what you're saying here (for instance, we may be able to specify what epistemological perfection would be, but it won't do as a goal because we human beings won't be able to reach it).

I've actually three articles in mind for a long time, covering major problem areas in Objectivism:

—The doctrine of the arbitrary

—The injunction against psychologizing

— Moral perfection

Only moral perfection gets us into Rand's art, and possible range of references is really broad, which is why I put it off till last.  But the other two are done and published, so...

Robert

[anthony]

I can't get my head around 'thinking individual -versus- social animal'. It seems clear to me that the higher the first, the higher the order of the second. And one won't get there by side-stepping the first straight into the arms of the collective.

AR: "My purpose, first cause and prime mover is the portrayal of Howard Roark or John Galt or Hank Rearden or Francisco D'Anconia *as an end in himself* -- not as a means to any further end. Which, incidentally, is the greatest value I could ever offer a reader."

[Brant Gaede]

2 hours ago, BaalChatzaf said:

Look at the results of physical science:  technology and prosperity.  Look at the results of philosophy.  They range from useless to justifying tyranny.  Plato's republic is a basic guide to the totalitarian regimes that have emerged since.  

The United States of America?

Living for one's own sake?

Individualism?

Laws of logic?

How to think--reason?

The scientific method?

One must conclude you know zip about what you are criticizing. Your swimming pool is empty, but there you are down on the bottom moving your arms and legs going nowhere.

You refuse to acknowledge the simple fact that science comes straight out of the philosophy of science because you are totally married to the idea that philosophy is junk. Just because most philosophy is junk doesn't mean you toss the baby out with the bathwater.

This is a philosophical site. Why are you here except you actually embrace philosophy? I should go to a science site and tell all there science is junk and philosophy is everything?

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

3 hours ago, Brant Gaede said:

The United States of America?

Living for one's own sake?

Individualism?

Laws of logic?

How to think--reason?

The scientific method?

One must conclude you know zip about what you are criticizing. Your swimming pool is empty, but there you are down on the bottom moving your arms and legs going nowhere.

You refuse to acknowledge the simple fact that science comes straight out of the philosophy of science because you are totally married to the idea that philosophy is junk. Just because most philosophy is junk doesn't mean you toss the baby out with the bathwater.

This is a philosophical site. Why are you here except you actually embrace philosophy? I should go to a science site and tell all there science is junk and philosophy is everything?

--Brant

I read Plato's Republic (in translation).  Have you?

[Brant Gaede]

5 hours ago, BaalChatzaf said:

I read Plato's Republic (in translation).  Have you?

And thus you concluded philosophy is junk and which is why you ask me this question for if I had read it I should have also concluded philosophy is junk?

I believe not too long ago you took a course on Aristotle. Does this mean I haven't read Aristotle by not having the same conclusion: philosophy is junk?

All I'm objecting to, Bob, is your obstinate refusal to give philosophy its due--any due--even though you read philosophy and continually expound on philosophy or aspects thereof. Philosophy is words and science is words and numbers. You cannot rip words out of science without ripping philosophy out of science. And there's no science without words. One plus one equals two (1 + 1 = 2). Take out "plus" and "equals" and you take out philosophy.

Logic is philosophy. Mathematical notations of logical statements sans data fails to put logic into science.

--Brant

my late friend Petr Beckmann had the same low regard for philosophy as you do, but he only mentioned it once, as I recall, in his publication, Access to Energy--he didn't ride it like a hobby horse so there was no point in calling him out on it; and so too Richard Feynman, so you're in good company--except Feynman didn't dwell on it either

[Guyau]

 

Opps! Additions to the topic of this thread would now be useless because buried by other off-topic posts. (Unless, perhaps, ya'll were to take it elsewhere and let this thread return exclusively to content of the book.)

.

[Roger Bissell]

1. Brant, very nice reply in re the importance and validity of philosophy. Why, indeed, would someone anti-philosophy want to hang out and argue with those who like the stuff?

2. Stephen, apologies for hijacking your thread. But isn't clarification of one's understanding of reality and life kind of a messy process, tending to spill over into one's other worthy activities? I think the whole thread has been worthwhile, both the points obviously about CAR and those spinning off from it. Do say some more about the book!

REB

[Brant Gaede]

5 hours ago, Guyau said:

 

Opps! Additions to the topic of this thread would now be useless because buried by other off-topic posts. (Unless, perhaps, ya'll were to take it elsewhere and let this thread return exclusively to content of the book.)

.

Okaaaay--back to the thread topic!

--Brant

this never happened and I was never here--hear?