My Interview With Adam Smith


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George,

I cannot thank you enough for all the many ways you have enriched my understanding of numerous historical and philosophical topics over the years I have known you. It is a debt I can never repay.

I recall vividly a point you made about the importance of persistence in one of your Principles of Reasoning lectures. I have never forgotten it. So remember that, when I disagree with you, it's because you taught me well. I am not being stubborn and obtuse. I am trying to understand your point of view and why it seems to conflict with mine.

The current issue of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies has an article by Walter Block entitled “Ayn Rand, Religion and Libertarianism,” in which he maintains that “there is nothing incompatible between libertarianism and religious belief and practice.” Much of what he says relates directly to our latest exchange.

I will have more to say on this. There simply are not enough hours in the day. And I often have a hard time getting myself to understand that some of those hours are supposed to be devoted to sleep. Unfortunately, my 63 year old body has a rather unpleasant way of reminding me the next day.

To be continued.. . if your patience and my health can hold out long enough.

Dennis,

Thanks for the kind remarks.

It's good to know that Walter Block finally said something that I agree with. Libertarianism is indeed compatible with religious beliefs, insofar as a religious person believes, for whatever reason, in the validity of individual rights and is motivated to respect them. I want to to say a few more words about this in the way of clarification, but I will speak generally of rights and a free society, which would include capitalism. I do this because I may touch on historical issues like religious freedom, which are not directly connected to the topic of capitalism.

Following many 17th and 18th century natural law philosophers, it is important that we distinguish between the justification of a moral principle (rights, in our case) and the motives that may cause people to observe that moral principle in practice. It is quite possible -- indeed, it happens all the time -- for people to observe a moral principle, and sometimes rigorously so, while holding mistaken beliefs about the ultimate justification for that principle. To maintain that only people with correct beliefs will be highly motivated to respect the rights of other people is contradicted by every page of history, and we can see from our everyday lives that this claim is false. I have met Christians that I would trust far more than some O'ists in this regard.

One of the most fascinating aspects of intellectual history is how so many Christians joined hands with skeptics in the struggle for religious freedom. Indeed, in the early stages the battles for religious toleration were fought almost exclusively by believers of one sort or another. In 18th century England, for example, Protestant dissenters, such as Joseph Priestley, were arguing for the equal rights of atheists long before there were many atheists around to argue for themselves. The core concept in their arguments was the concept of conscience -- a notion that was essential to the Christian worldview (especially Protestantism) and which meant virtually nothing to some religious skeptics, such as Thomas Hobbes.

Over time the idea of conscience, and the inalienable rights of conscience, became secularized (as we see in the writings of Adam Smith) and thereby became more firmly grounded in reason, but conscience nevertheless remained essential to many Christian libertarians and their respect for individual rights. What was important, in this context, was not a particular belief about the origin of conscience and its justification, but rather the strong motives that we find in all the libertarian advocates of religious freedom, regardless of their broader philosophical beliefs.

I just got up, and I need some coffee, so I will continue this later.....

Ghs

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Dennis,

Nothing like three cups of coffee and a "Rock On Energy Shot" to start the day....

I want to develop my earlier argument in more detail by focusing on some historical precedents and examples. But in order to avoid writing a lengthy essay, I will need to do this in the written equivalents of sound bites. I will not always explain the relevance of each part to the overall picture, though I think this will be obvious in most cases. After I lay the groundwork, I will attempt to summarize everything in a later post.

In his magnificent arguments against censorship in Aereopagitica (1644), some of which have never been surpassed, John Milton argued that truth "may have more shapes than one." He continues: "Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions, for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making."

This is a good description of how I view differences of opinion among libertarians -- all of whom agree about the importance of freedom but who sometimes disagree about the ultimate foundations of a free society and how best to defend freedom. If we were to achieve complete unanimity of beliefs among libertarians -- if, for example, all of us agreed 100 percent with Rand -- the result would be intellectual stagnation. Imagine how boring OL would be if all we did was heap praise on Ayn Rand and pat each other on the back for recognizing her brilliance.

Ghs

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In The Philosophy of the American Revolution (Oxford, 1978), the intellectual historian Morton White explores the influence of the early 18th century natural law philosopher J. J. Burlamaqui on the thinking of Jefferson and other colonial Americans. That Burlamaqui and Vattel were widely read in the colonies has long been known (Jefferson often recommended their books), but White goes into considerable detail, much of which is admittedly speculative, about particular points of influence.

White correctly argues that some early natural law philosophers, including Burlamaqui, justified natural rights from a different perspective than we usually find in later libertarian thought. We may summarize the basic difference as follows:

Today we would first justify individual rights (typically with reference to the nature of man and society) and then, since rights and duties (i.e., moral obligations) are correlatives, go on to argue that other people are morally and juridically obligated to respect those rights, i.e., that they have a duty to do so. (I am using "duty" with the same meaning that it carried during the 18th century, without regard for Rand's critique of this word, which was aimed at Kant and Kantians. These philosophers were not pre-Kant Kantians.).

But this was not how Burlamaqui and some of his contemporaries argued. Rather, beginning with the premise that we were created by God for the purpose of living a good life, they maintained that we have a positive duty (not mere a right) to sustain our lives and pursue happiness. And from this fundamental duty, from this statement of what we ought to do, it follows that we must also have a right to preserve our lives and pursue happiness -- a right that others have a duty to respect. (Burlamaqui explicitly discusses "the pursuit of happiness," and some historians believe that Jefferson may have picked up the expression from him.)

Moreover, since our right to pursue happiness is based on a more fundamental duty to pursue happiness, it follows that the pursuit of happiness is an inalienable right, i.e., a right that even its possessors cannot transfer, renounce, abandon, or otherwise alienate.

Although John Locke did not explicitly present this argument, it comes very close to his position. This is why Locke and others in his tradition opposed the right to commit suicide. We are, first and foremost, the property of God, our creator, so no person can have the right to destroy God's property -- whether that person be himself or someone else -- without a just cause. To paraphrase a bit: You don't want to fuck with God's property.

Whatever we may think of this justification for rights, it certainly provides a very strong motive to respect rights.

My reason for mentioning Burlamaqui is that, theological considerations aside, his argument for rights, which derives our rights from our duties, is actually stronger in some respects than the modern approach, which derives our duties from our rights. I think it could plausibly be argued -- again, theological considerations aside -- that Rand approaches rights in a manner similar to Burlamaqui. The soundness of my passing observation rests on how we answer this question: According to Rand, do we have a moral obligation to pursue happiness, or is this merely a right?

I am not going to take a stand on this issue now. I raise the question as a point of interest.

Ghs

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Here is how Morton White (The Philosophy of the American Revolution, pp. 162-63) summarizes Burlamaqui's argument for rights:

Beginning with the nature of man as an individual -- without attention to man's relationship to others -- we can certainly infer, according to Burlamaqui, that God, "by creating us, proposed our preservation, perfection, and happiness." Since God gave us life, he must have proposed the preservation of our life. Since he gave us reason, he must have proposed for us the perfection of our reason. And since he created us with a desire for our own happiness, he must have proposed for us the pursuit of that happiness. In his wisdom and beneficence and power, he would have created us in this way only if he had proposed these as ends for us to attain. Moreover, having proposed these ends for man, God wills that man should labor for his own preservation and perfection in order to obtain all the happiness of which he is capable according to his nature and estate. Here we see the final link in the chain which begins with man's God-created essence, moves to the ends God proposed for him, and from that to what God wants man to do, namely, to man's duties. But once we have shown that we have the duty to preserve our lives, it is easy to deduce that we have the right to preserve them; once we have shown that we have the duty to pursue happiness, it is easy to deduce that we have the right to pursue it; and once we have shown that, having been created members of the same species who are equal by nature and therefore mutually independent, we can know, first, that each of us has a duty not to dominate the other and, secondly, that each of us has a right to preserve this freedom from domination.

As theologically-based arguments go, this one ain't bad at all. 8-)

Ghs

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George,

Thanks for your lucid presentation of Burlamaqui’s viewpoint on rights. One brief comment before I turn in for the night.

In “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism” (in Moral Relativism: A Reader, edited by Paul Moser and Thomas Carson), James Rachels explains that one implication of moral relativism is that the moral code of a society determines what is right and wrong within that society. If the moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, then that action is considered “right” within that society. Cultural Relativism denies that there is any objective standard that could judge one societal code better than another.

Political systems are ultimately based on some code of morality, and that moral code will dictate the society’s political structure. Unless liberty is based on an objective, rational standard—i.e., a man’s right to his own life as derived from his biological nature as a rational being—individual freedom will inevitably be eroded by irrational moral standards. Just one example: If Locke’s moral foundation for rights is based on a moral code which says that suicide is immoral, then people dying from a horribly painful terminal illness will be denied the right to escape their suffering through assisted suicide.

If a society’s respect for individual rights is based on a religious code of ethics, those rights will not remain inalienable for very long. Either a man has the right to exist for his own sake, or he doesn’t. If his life is owned by God, then God’s spokesmen on earth will have a say about when individual rights can or can’t be violated. Human beings will inevitably encounter conflicts in their views on what constitutes their rights--e.g., property boundaries, airwaves, contracts--and how those conflicts are resolved will require a rational, scientific standard, not some arbirary religious assertions.

Further elaboration of this point will have to wait for another time. As much as I love coffee, no amount of that wondrous elixir is going to get me though tomorrow without some blessed sleep.

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. . .

Political systems are ultimately based on some code of morality, and that moral code will dictate the society’s political structure. Unless liberty is based on an objective, rational standard—i.e., a man’s right to his own life as derived from his biological nature as a rational being—individual freedom will inevitably be eroded by irrational moral standards. Just one example: If Locke’s moral foundation for rights is based on a moral code which says that suicide is immoral, then people dying from a horribly painful terminal illness will be denied the right to escape their suffering through assisted suicide.

. . .

I have been lurking and learning on this thread. Thank you George and Dennis. I especially want to register my support of the above paragraph.

One of my major interests has been the derivation of rights. A right is an abstract principle, so I applied Rand's advice to look at the facts that give rise to the principle in order to clarify my understanding. A right summarizes and integrates the proper resolution of particular kinds of conflicting choices of action when the conflict cannot be voluntarily resolved. A single factual instance of such a conflict requires analysis to determine which of the actions is a political freedom, and which of the actions would violate that political freedom. Analyzing choice of action necessarily leads to appeal to a moral code.

My paper, "A Political Standard for Absolute Political Freedom," in the latest issue of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies advocates absolute political freedom and begins with:

This paper advocates a society that unfailingly protects political

freedoms and unfailingly constrains those who would violate a

political freedom. Such is the advocacy of absolute political freedom.

The paper derives the political standard as "protection of vountary consent along an individual's entire politically legitimate valuing chain." Of course, the paper must, and does, explain the meaning of "politically legitimate valuing chain" and derives that meaning from consideration of ethical egoism as the moral foundation.

As Dennis said, a "moral code will dictate the society’s political structure." That structure is built on a framework or rights, and my paper is an attempt to add arguments in support of a political standard based on ethical egoism, a standard that enables understanding of the rights principles that summarize and integrate proper resolution of political conflict.

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Political systems are ultimately based on some code of morality, and that moral code will dictate the society’s political structure. Unless liberty is based on an objective, rational standard—i.e., a man’s right to his own life as derived from his biological nature as a rational being—individual freedom will inevitably be eroded by irrational moral standards.

I may not disagree with this argument, depending on the level of generality we are talking about. A classic argument for a free society, and a very powerful one, is that it permits individuals to pursue their own values in their own way, without coercive interference by others.

One needn't be a Randian egoist, or an atheist, or whatever, to appreciate the value of freedom. Throughout history, for example, Christian advocates of religious freedom have argued that force and faith are inconsistent, and that a belief that one is compelled to accept or act upon has no moral value. Many philosophers with different moral and religious beliefs have agreed that persuasion and voluntary interaction -- i.e., a respect for rights -- are essential preconditions of a moral society. This is why advocates for freedom have been able to work together for centuries, despite their religious and philosophical differences.

If everyone (or virtually everyone) will benefit from a free society based on individual rights, then everyone has a self-interested reason to defend such a society.

Just one example: If Locke’s moral foundation for rights is based on a moral code which says that suicide is immoral, then people dying from a horribly painful terminal illness will be denied the right to escape their suffering through assisted suicide.

The prohibition of suicide was never a "foundation" of the Lockean approach to rights. It was a corollary of his overall approach. It is quite unfair to condemn an entire theory because of glitches like this. I would argue (and have argued) that there are glitches in Rand's theory of rights and government, but I still regard her basic approach as sound.

If a society’s respect for individual rights is based on a religious code of ethics, those rights will not remain inalienable for very long. Either a man has the right to exist for his own sake, or he doesn’t. If his life is owned by God, then God’s spokesmen on earth will have a say about when individual rights can or can’t be violated. Human beings will inevitably encounter conflicts in their views on what constitutes their rights--e.g., property boundaries, airwaves, contracts--and how those conflicts are resolved will require a rational, scientific standard, not some arbitrary religious assertions.

Locke clearly distinguished between our duties in regard to God and our duties in regard to other people. It was in regard to the latter that Locke said that "every Man has a Property in [i.e., a right to] his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself."

As for "God's spokesmen on earth," this was the main point of Deism and Rational Theology generally, as these developed from the seventeenth century onward. The basic argument here was that all that we need to know was given to us by "natural revelation," i.e., by reason and its application to the facts of reality. This approach precluded "prophets" who supposedly were speaking on God's behalf.

Not everyone in this tradition rejected "special revelation," of course, but they insisted that only reason can tell us what should be accepted as divine revelation in the first place. If an assertion conflicts with reason, then it cannot be accepted as having come from God. Hence a major problem with your assertion is that shows no regard to how ideas have actually developed historically. It rests instead on a priori assumptions about what you think will or should happen.

Ghs

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As Dennis said, a "moral code will dictate the society’s political structure." That structure is built on a framework or rights, and my paper is an attempt to add arguments in support of a political standard based on ethical egoism, a standard that enables understanding of the rights principles that summarize and integrate proper resolution of political conflict.

I agree that rights provide the moral framework of a free society. In fact, this has been my point all along. My major disagreement with Dennis has been over his claim that only Randian egoists (in effect) can provide a rational justification for rights. This is incorrect.

Suppose that many people in a free society believe that they have a moral obligation to help other people, but that charity has moral value only when it is given voluntarily --so government has no right whatever to coerce people in this realm. (This position was defended by many early libertarians). Would you say that this "altruistic" belief will ultimately corrode the very freedom in which these people so passionately believe?

Implicit in a theory of rights (as understood by libertarians) is the moral right of individuals to pursue their own interests. In this broad sense, a theory of rights is inherently "egoistic." Nevertheless, many people in a free society may believe that their interests are best served by voluntarily helping others as much as they can, because this is what makes them happy. So how are such people undermining rights? I don't get this at all.

Ghs

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The trick with rights is to understand that the morality--enough of it--is baked right into them (it's right or it's wrong or it doesn't apply enough to think about) and that anyone who gets that can take it and run. The problem with Rand is that would have meant running along side many she personally disliked and the de-emphasis on her philosophy. By blowing off rights' oriented conservatives and libertarians and all others not Objectivist enough (my philosophy will destroy you--stay away) she actually blew away rights themselves by turning most of the locus of her focus elsewhere--to herself--depriving rights of her intellectual, polemical power. Sure, she wrote about them; she had to, but not so much, really. The irony is that what she did was apropos to her post-Atlas world most exemplified by the 1960s and it's hard to say all considered that she could have, should have done it differently. Differently would have meant Atlas Shrugged would have been radically different, meaning not at all. The novel is a pile of the artificial and arbitrary and is structurally fragile. I think any great novel might be, if not has to be, similar that way.

--Brant

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The following is excerpted from my article "Philosophies of Toleration" (in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies). I would like someone to tell me why the arguments presented here could not be consistently defended by a Christian and applied to spheres other than religion, such as charity:

Tertullian (c. 145-225), a former pagan who converted to Christianity late in life, wrote:

t is a fundamental human right, a privilege of nature, that every man should worship according to his own convictions: one man's religion neither harms nor helps another man. It is assuredly no part of religion to compel religion -- to which free will and not force should lead us.

Lactantius (c. 240-320) also called for religious freedom. If pagans wish to convert Christians, they should use arguments, not coercion....Coercion is useless in religious matters.

There is no occasion for violence and injury, for religion cannot be imposed by force; the matter must be carried on by words rather than blows, that the will may be affected...Torture and piety are widely different; nor is it possible for truth to be united with violence, or justice with cruelty.

Like Tertullian, Lactantius believes that faith must be given freely, because this is the source of its moral value. A coerced religion is a contradiction in terms:

If you wish to defend religion by bloodshed, and by tortures, and by guilt, it will not longer be defended, but will be polluted and profaned. For nothing is so much a matter of free-will as religion; in which, if the mind of the worshiper is disinclined to it, religion is at once taken away, and ceases to exist.

Lactantius dismisses a rationale for persecution that, ironically, would later be used by Augustine. Perhaps the beneficiaries of persecution are the victims themselves. Perhaps the true interest of Christians is served when they are compelled to sacrifice to the pagan gods.

The response of Lactantius to such claims is brief but suggestive: "that is not a kindness which is done to one who refuses it." Then comes the persecutor's rejoinder: "But we must consult [the Christians'] interest, even against their will, since they know not what is good." Lactantius easily disposes of this lame excuse. If Romans really care about Christians, then why "do they so cruelly harass, torture, and weaken them....?" Why do Romans destroy "those whose welfare they wish to promote?" True concern for the welfare of others is never manifested in violence.

Ghs

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I would like someone to tell me why the arguments presented here could not be consistently defended by a Christian and applied to spheres other than religion, such as charity:

The problem here is cherry picking quotes. Christians were the persecuted minority when these writers were active, but as soon as Christians had the ability to be the persecutors, they took to it with relish and carried on for well over a thousand years. To explain why these arguments can’t be consistently defended would mean digging into the justifications used by people like Theodosius, Augustine, Ambrose etc. A very long list. Once presented, these counter-arguments ultimately have to be answered by theological means, which, for atheists, becomes a tricky proposition indeed.

Since Constantine, those Christians arguing for rights and/or tolerance have typically been the dispossessed, like Locke in the time of James II. Can you think of some good examples of Christians in positions of power arguing for rights? I bet there are examples, but I’m drawing a blank. If they exist, they were probably temporary truce measures, like when the Turks were invading Hungary, prompting Catholics and Lutherans to lay off each other for a while; this before the Thirty Years War, when they got back to expressing their true feelings for each other.

I think the main idea here is that a theory of rights built on a Christian base is like a house built on sand, as Jesus might have said.

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I would like someone to tell me why the arguments presented here could not be consistently defended by a Christian and applied to spheres other than religion, such as charity:
The problem here is cherry picking quotes. Christians were the persecuted minority when these writers were active, but as soon as Christians had the ability to be the persecutors, they took to it with relish and carried on for well over a thousand years. To explain why these arguments can’t be consistently defended would mean digging into the justifications used by people like Theodosius, Augustine, Ambrose etc. A very long list. Once presented, these counter-arguments ultimately have to be answered by theological means, which, for atheists, becomes a tricky proposition indeed. Since Constantine, those Christians arguing for rights and/or tolerance have typically been the dispossessed, like Locke in the time of James II. Can you think of some good examples of Christians in positions of power arguing for rights? I bet there are examples, but I’m drawing a blank. If they exist, they were probably temporary truce measures, like when the Turks were invading Hungary, prompting Catholics and Lutherans to lay off each other for a while; this before the Thirty Years War, when they got back to expressing their true feelings for each other. I think the main idea here is that a theory of rights built on a Christian base is like a house built on sand, as Jesus might have said.

First, there are many examples of Christians in positions of power who have argued for religious toleration and/or freedom. Lactantius, whom I quoted earlier, was himself an adviser to Constantine.

In 365, St. Hliary of Poitiers condemned the Church's new role as persecutor:

The Church terrifieth with threats of exile and dungeons; and she, who of old gained men's faith in spite of exile and prison, now brings them to believe in her by compulsion....She, who was propagated by hunted priests, now hunts priests in her turn...."

Another example: When the Emperor Charlemagne (c. 782-814) decreed that Saxon heathens must choose between baptism or death, he was opposed by Alcuin, his religious and educational adviser:

Faith is a matter of will, not of necessity. How can you force a man to believe what he does not believe? One can force baptism on people, but not faith. Man, an intelligent being, reasons; disposition and desire for truth ought to bring him to recognize the truth of our holy faith. And prayer, above all, ought to bring down upon him the mercy of Almighty God; for argument echoes in vain, if the dew of grace does not wet the heart of the hearer.

There are many such examples. For example: During the 1570s, under Catholic rule, Poland became the first post-Reformation country to establish a policy of toleration. Poland's grand chancellor, John Zamoyski, remarked: "I would give half my life to bring back to Catholicism those who have abandoned it, but I would give my whole life to prevent them from being brought back by violence." (All of these passages are quoted, with citations, in my article "Philosophies of Toleration.")

Second, it is vital that we distinguish principles and their consistent application from the moral failures of individuals when they are in positions of power. This relates to the old libertarian theme that power corrupts. As John Adams put it in 1772:

Liberty, under every conceivable form of government, is always in danger. Ambition is one of the more ungovernable passions of the human heart. The love of power is insatiable and uncontrollable. There is danger from all men. The only maxim of a free government ought to be to trust no man living with power to endanger the public liberty. Be upon your guard, then, my countrymen.

So what makes you think that O'ists in power would be any more trustworthy than other people? Why do you think that they would not attempt to abuse their power? I see no justification for this assumption, and I cite Alan Greenspan as an example.

Ghs

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An addendum to my last post:

One reason I admire America's Founders is because they did not exempt themselves when they wrote, as they often did, about the corrupting influence of power. As Jefferson put it in a letter to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), after dividing nations into "two classes, wolves and sheep": If people fail to keep a close eye on their rulers, "you and I, and Congress and Assemblies, Judges and Governors, shall all become wolves. It seems to be the law of our general nature, in spite of individual exceptions...."

This kind of honesy is rarely found nowadays. Ironically perhaps, Jefferson did abuse his power after he became president, especially during his second term, when he violated his own principles on a number of issues.

Ghs

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In 365, St. Hliary of Poitiers condemned the Church's new role as persecutor:

I have to disagree about Hilary of Poitiers. He was pushing for the Nicene creed during the reign of Constantius, who was Arian. This was during a time when the Pope (Liberius) was in exile and under house arrest, for not approving the creed of Rimini. In other words, Hilary was among the dispossessed, at least until Julian. His piece against Constantius is a stunning argument for separation of church and state, coming from the church side. Fiery as hell. He may very well have produced it to curry favor with Julian, btw. That's my private theory.

http://www.traditioninaction.org/religious/n055rp_FalseUniy.htm

I’m not as familiar with the other two people you cite. Poland is always an interesting case, fertile ground for exceptions to the rule.

So what makes you think that O'ists in power would be any more trustworthy than other people? Why do you think that they would not attempt to abuse their power? I see no justification for this assumption, and I cite Alan Greenspan as an example.

What makes you think I think that? I suspect a Peikoff or a Binswanger would give Torquemada a run for his money, given the chance. More seriously, the difference is that there’s no theology, and no appeal to the irrational. All other problems remain; I certainly don’t regard Objectivism (or Objectivists) as a panacea to society’s ills.

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I think the main idea here is that a theory of rights built on a Christian base is like a house built on sand, as Jesus might have said.

Okay. Let's then go with a rational, secular, human political-philosophical base.

--Brant

I would never attempt to build a theory of rights on a Christian base, obviously. Nor do I believe that Christianity can provide a completely rational foundation for rights.

My point is that a completely rational foundation is not necessary to sustain a free society, so long as enough people believe in the validity of rights, for whatever reasons. Moreover, when dealing with a hierarchy of reasons, a valid mid-level principle of individual rights can rest on arguments that are not valid in every respect. This is not an either/or situation. There are degrees.

Ghs

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In 365, St. Hliary of Poitiers condemned the Church's new role as persecutor:

I have to disagree about Hilary of Poitiers. He was pushing for the Nicene creed during the reign of Constantius, who was Arian. This was during a time when the Pope (Liberius) was in exile and under house arrest, for not approving the creed of Rimini. In other words, Hilary was among the dispossessed, at least until Julian. His piece against Constantius is a stunning argument for separation of church and state, coming from the church side. Fiery as hell. He may very well have produced it to curry favor with Julian, btw. That's my private theory.

http://www.tradition...p_FalseUniy.htm

I’m not as familiar with the other two people you cite. Poland is always an interesting case, fertile ground for exceptions to the rule.

So what makes you think that O'ists in power would be any more trustworthy than other people? Why do you think that they would not attempt to abuse their power? I see no justification for this assumption, and I cite Alan Greenspan as an example.

What makes you think I think that? I suspect a Peikoff or a Binswanger would give Torquemada a run for his money, given the chance. More seriously, the difference is that there’s no theology, and no appeal to the irrational. All other problems remain; I certainly don’t regard Objectivism (or Objectivists) as a panacea to society’s ills.

Yes, Hilary was writing when the Arians, who were favored by one of Constantine's sons, were persecuting advocates of what would later become the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. But I have seen no evidence that Hilary ever favored persecution of any kind.

As for your view of O'ists, I made my remarks in the context of what I think was your failure to distinguish principles (and their implications) from the inconsistency of individuals. The validity of the pro-freedom principles defended by some Christians is an issue distinct from whether or not some Christians remained true to their own principles.

The real problem here was Augustine, who was the first to develop a systematic defense of persecution -- or "righteous persecution," as he called it. Augustine's defense exercised an enormous influence for centuries thereafter.

Ghs

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As Dennis said, a "moral code will dictate the society’s political structure." That structure is built on a framework or rights, and my paper is an attempt to add arguments in support of a political standard based on ethical egoism, a standard that enables understanding of the rights principles that summarize and integrate proper resolution of political conflict.

I agree that rights provide the moral framework of a free society. In fact, this has been my point all along. My major disagreement with Dennis has been over his claim that only Randian egoists (in effect) can provide a rational justification for rights. This is incorrect.

. . .

Implicit in a theory of rights (as understood by libertarians) is the moral right of individuals to pursue their own interests. In this broad sense, a theory of rights is inherently "egoistic." Nevertheless, many people in a free society may believe that their interests are best served by voluntarily helping others as much as they can, because this is what makes them happy. So how are such people undermining rights? I don't get this at all.

Implicitness is often risky in philosophical analysis. Because Rand left too much implicit in her arguments from egoism to rights, I wrote the paper referred to in post #57 and examined the issue starting from the nature of human judgment and choice.

It lead to, what is to me new and interesting, the concepts of primary and secondary political freedoms, the distinction between politically legitimate valuing chains and ethically valid valuing chains, criticisms of the non-initiation of force principle (NIOF) and the non-aggression axiom (NAA) as inadequate political standards, the rejection of the idea of "limits" to political freedom, and other ideas that I hope can serve as catalyst for fresh thinking by others.

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I think the main idea here is that a theory of rights built on a Christian base is like a house built on sand, as Jesus might have said.

Okay. Let's then go with a rational, secular, human political-philosophical base.

--Brant

I would never attempt to build a theory of rights on a Christian base, obviously. Nor do I believe that Christianity can provide a completely rational foundation for rights.

My point is that a completely rational foundation is not necessary to sustain a free society, so long as enough people believe in the validity of rights, for whatever reasons. Moreover, when dealing with a hierarchy of reasons, a valid mid-level principle of individual rights can rest on arguments that are not valid in every respect. This is not an either/or situation. There are degrees.

Ghs

That's circular and a fallacy revealed by today's world wherein hardly anyone believes in or knows of individual rights.

--Brant

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Ninth,

Over the years I have read many books on the history of religious toleration and freedom. The best overall (so far as modern history is concerned) is the two-volume work by the Catholic historian Joseph Lecler, Toleration and the Reformation (English trans., Longmans, 1960). This work is chock full of quotations that I had never encountered before, and it shoots down the common myth that Protestants were almost always better than Catholics on matters relating to toleration.

I don't think these two volumes are in print any longer. Around seven years ago I was fortunate to locate a boxed set, hardcover and in mint condition, for $50. This would have been a bargain at twice the price.

Ghs

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Implicit in a theory of rights (as understood by libertarians) is the moral right of individuals to pursue their own interests. In this broad sense, a theory of rights is inherently "egoistic." Nevertheless, many people in a free society may believe that their interests are best served by voluntarily helping others as much as they can, because this is what makes them happy. So how are such people undermining rights? I don't get this at all.

Implicitness is often risky in philosophical analysis...

If the right to freedom of action does not imply the moral right to pursue one's own interests, then what could a "right" possibly mean? Even an altruistic defender of rights would concede as much. The reasoning here is no different than the O'ist who views drugs as immoral but who nevertheless defends the moral right of individuals to take self-destructive actions.

Ghs

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I think the main idea here is that a theory of rights built on a Christian base is like a house built on sand, as Jesus might have said.
Okay. Let's then go with a rational, secular, human political-philosophical base. --Brant
I would never attempt to build a theory of rights on a Christian base, obviously. Nor do I believe that Christianity can provide a completely rational foundation for rights. My point is that a completely rational foundation is not necessary to sustain a free society, so long as enough people believe in the validity of rights, for whatever reasons. Moreover, when dealing with a hierarchy of reasons, a valid mid-level principle of individual rights can rest on arguments that are not valid in every respect. This is not an either/or situation. There are degrees. Ghs
That's circular and a fallacy revealed by today's world wherein hardly anyone believes in or knows of individual rights. --Brant

What is "circular"? And what "fallacy" are you talking about?

Ghs

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