QUOTE
Q&A: E-Voting Security Results 'Awful,' Says Ohio Secretary of State"
Computerworld (10/08/08) ; Friedman, Brad
Ohio voters who do not trust touch-screen systems to properly record their votes will be given the option of a paper ballot thanks to a policy dictated by the results of Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner's Evaluation & Validation of Election-Related Equipment, Standards, & Testing (EVEREST) analysis, which uncovered "critical security failures" in every system evaluated by teams of both corporate and academic computer scientists and security specialists. Brunner says in an interview that the results of the EVEREST tests exceeded her worst expectations. "When I finally saw the results of our [EVEREST] tests, I thought I was going to throw up," she says. "I didn't think it would be that bad. And it was--it was awful." Vote dropping was observed in the tabulators of systems manufactured by Diebold's Premier Elections Solutions subsidiary. At the federal level, voting systems have to be certified as an entire end-to-end unit, and certification by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) requires companies to submit every piece of hardware and software to a single unit in order that tests can ascertain whether they all function together without problems. The EAC recently overhauled its certification process, but Brunner calls the process "very cumbersome." She notes that Ohio's boards of elections are instructed to tally the votes by hand if necessary, and sees value in such a practice, at least as a pilot program. "I'm not so sure I'd want to experiment during the presidential elections," Brunner says
http://www.computerworld.com/action/articl...ticleId=9116465
Computerworld (10/08/08) ; Friedman, Brad
Ohio voters who do not trust touch-screen systems to properly record their votes will be given the option of a paper ballot thanks to a policy dictated by the results of Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner's Evaluation & Validation of Election-Related Equipment, Standards, & Testing (EVEREST) analysis, which uncovered "critical security failures" in every system evaluated by teams of both corporate and academic computer scientists and security specialists. Brunner says in an interview that the results of the EVEREST tests exceeded her worst expectations. "When I finally saw the results of our [EVEREST] tests, I thought I was going to throw up," she says. "I didn't think it would be that bad. And it was--it was awful." Vote dropping was observed in the tabulators of systems manufactured by Diebold's Premier Elections Solutions subsidiary. At the federal level, voting systems have to be certified as an entire end-to-end unit, and certification by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) requires companies to submit every piece of hardware and software to a single unit in order that tests can ascertain whether they all function together without problems. The EAC recently overhauled its certification process, but Brunner calls the process "very cumbersome." She notes that Ohio's boards of elections are instructed to tally the votes by hand if necessary, and sees value in such a practice, at least as a pilot program. "I'm not so sure I'd want to experiment during the presidential elections," Brunner says
http://www.computerworld.com/action/articl...ticleId=9116465
