A Bold New Step for Objectivist Scholarship


Dennis Hardin

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I'm not qualified to write a review of a book like this, so I will leave that to you higher level Objectivists. Suffice it to say, I love this stuff and I'm eagerly looking forward to what you all have to say about it.

Hmmmm. . ."Higher level Objectivists". . .That's just not how I think of myself at all.

Higher level human is more like it.

another-breath_the-god-complex.jpg

"What the heck are all those pathetic little things down there, anyway?"

P.S. Mary: If you read the book--especially this book--you are qualified to review it.

By "higher level Objectivists" I meant "more highly educated", or "more knowledgable Objectivists". Got a little careless there with my meanings.

Read your article. I will look forward to seeing your new write up.

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> The main issue that concerns me is the premoral choice to live, and how this appears to put Objectivism’s ethical system on the same capricious footing as existentialism. It still is not entirely clear to me how we can square this notion with Rand’s answer to Hume’s fact-value dichotomy.

Dennis, in my view this falls into the category of 'formulation' issues. It's in part about how you word the answer. A common sense non-philosopher, man on the street would know there is something wrong - whether you call it morally wrong or premorally or practically - with:

1) an animal, a biological entity that chose not to live even on the level of mere survival(outside of excruciating pain or other emergency type issues)as well as something wrong with

2) an animal that chose not to commit suicide or starve itself to death and maybe even wanted to have a prosperous, satisfying, fulfilling life, but was not choosing correctly - whether willfully and defiantly or through being misguided by following the wrong code of values or through 'evasion' - and so was undercutting this . . .or, at the extreme, actually leading toward actual death.

So, it's just a 'formulation' question whether you want to call 1) immoral or premoral.

It doesn't drive one to amoralism or a problem with metaethical validation simply to say something like 1) is wrong biologically or at the root of ethics and 2) is wrong once you have chosen to live.

Call it biological immorality or amorality to choose not to live and substantive or further immorality to be inconsistent with the choice. I don't very much care and it doesn't really matter substantively as opposed to "how you word it".

[Aside: I believe it's actually a mistake of method, analogous to 'analysis paralysis', to confuse yourself by going much further with this issue [footnotes, learned references to Hume and the existentialists, etc.], once one understands that you can say it as simply and directly as I just did.]

Edited by Philip Coates
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By the way, I don't know if it's original with me or not, but the few paragraphs I posted above I would say are an essentially -full- philosophical solution to this issue of whether or not you call a choice not to live or live fully 'premoral' or 'immoral'. You really don't need to say much more, except to perfect what phrase you use to describe what is wrong with course of action 1) and what is wrong with course of action 2).

Edited by Philip Coates
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By the way, I don't know if it's original with me or not, but the few paragraphs I posted above I would say are an essentially -full- philosophical solution to this issue of whether or not you call a choice not to live or live fully 'premoral' or 'immoral'. You really don't need to say much more, except to perfect what phrase you use to describe what is wrong with course of action 1) and what is wrong with course of action 2).

Phil,

If you are satisfied with your answer, let's leave the discussion there. Devote your energies to things you deem important, and I will do likewise.

I don't very much care and it doesn't really matter substantively as opposed to "how you word it".

That's obvious.

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By "higher level Objectivists" I meant "more highly educated", or "more knowledgable Objectivists". Got a little careless there with my meanings.

Read your article. I will look forward to seeing your new write up.

Mary--I'm glad you found the article worth your while.

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> If you are satisfied with your answer, let's leave the discussion there. Devote your energies to things you deem important, and I will do likewise.

Works for me, Dennis. :-)

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By "higher level Objectivists" I meant "more highly educated", or "more knowledgable Objectivists". Got a little careless there with my meanings.

Read your article. I will look forward to seeing your new write up.

Mary--I'm glad you found the article worth your while.

In fact, so much so, that I am planning to take your advice and try reviewing the book after all. I've never done that before and it might be a good exercise.

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The main issue that concerns me is the premoral choice to live, and how this appears to put Objectivism’s ethical system on the same capricious footing as existentialism.

Re the "premoral choice to live" - How can one "choose" something one alread has? Imo it makes no sense choosing a stage (= living) one already is in.

As for a "moral" choice to live - again, choosing something one already has is redundant.

I suppose what is meant by moral choice to live is something like 'choosing to value life'.

But one can also choose not to value life, even to end it, and such subjective choice resulting in death cannot be called a 'whim', not need it be "irrational", or "blindly emotional" (Rand's idea of "subjective").

I have worked out and signed a living will clearly stating, should it ever become an issue, what kind of medical care I don't want to prolong my life at all costs.

From your article: http://culturalbarometer.blogspot.com/2011/02/choice-to-live.html

Peikoff states that Objectivism “holds that facts—certain definite facts—do lead logically to values.

How so? How can one derive from the mere fact that something "is" how something "ought to" be? I cannot think of one single case where an "ought to" is derived from an "is" without a value judgement already contained in the premise.

Example:

"IS": There exist millions of stray dogs in the world.

"OUGHT" derived from the "IS": They ought to be taken to animal shelters where they get good care.

But every "ought" derived from an "is" rests on an premise already containing a value judgement (implying, in the above example, that stray dogs ought to be helped).

Cross-check: Individuals not sharing the value premise that stray dogs ought to be helped will arrive at a different "ought" here:

"IS": There exist millions of stray dogs in the world.

"OUGHT" derived from the "IS": They ought to be killed.

That's what actually happens in many countries where a stray dog's life is considered as of no value by many people.

So again, it is the premise already containing a value judgement which directs the 'ought' from 'is', and not the fact itself.

What ‘ought to be’ can be validated objectively.”

No moral 'ought to be' validation can be derived from an "is" without a specific moral code already directing the mind of the valuer.

So what is claimed to be "objective validation" in truth rests on a moral code influencing the validation.

3 And once validated in this way, what ‘ought to be’ is what man should do.

Isn't a 'one set for all' list of values for everybody the very opposite of individualism?

To hold that the category of what ‘ought to be’ for man includes the option to self-destruct, leaves the entire edifice of the Objectivist ethics dependent on the whim of the individual, and throws it into the realm of the arbitrary.

Translated: man has no option to choose his own values not fitting into the edifice of the Objectivist ethics.

Again, where is the individualism in that?

Edited by Xray
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Re the "premoral choice to live" - How can one "choose" something one alread has? Imo it makes no sense choosing a stage (= living) one already is in.

As for a "moral" choice to live - again, choosing something one already has is redundant.

I suppose what is meant by moral choice to live is something like 'choosing to value life'.

But one can also choose not to value life, even to end it, and such subjective choice resulting in death cannot be called a 'whim', not need it be "irrational", or "blindly emotional" (Rand's idea of "subjective").

Ha, "Ayn Rand debunked by Xray" - I can't wait to read the book.

If you would just give her teensy bit more respect Xray, you would have worked out by now that Rand's "choice to live" is not merely Joe Soap's choice to live, but choosing a life of objective values.

By that same token, a person who has long made that choice, can end his life, too, and by OBJECTIVE standards - and morally.

I ask you seriously, how possibly can you view that choice, by this person, to live, or to die, in the same mundanities you have used?

Tony

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By "higher level Objectivists" I meant "more highly educated", or "more knowledgable Objectivists". Got a little careless there with my meanings.

Read your article. I will look forward to seeing your new write up.

Mary--I'm glad you found the article worth your while.

In fact, so much so, that I am planning to take your advice and try reviewing the book after all. I've never done that before and it might be a good exercise.

It would definitely be a good exercise. In fact, that's a huge part of my motivation to write--putting my thoughts down in words helps to clarify my thinking. If I am confused about something, that's the first thing I do--write it down as clearly as possible.

I will look forward to reading your review.

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Ha, "Ayn Rand debunked by Xray" - I can't wait to read the book.

I'm afraid I can't be of service here - for I already used to 'groan' over having to finish simple term papers. :o

WhYnot If you would just give her teensy bit more respect Xray, you would have worked out by now that Rand's "choice to live" is not merely Joe Soap's choice to live, but choosing a life of objective values.

Now that's not very nice in regard to poor Joe Soap, Tony. Deciding in advance that he can only get hold of the short end of the stick because he is not seen as a "prime mover" ...

A bit like Eddie Willers, the guy who didn't get the girl, and was left out there to perish on the rails. That was really tough to read. The only nice male character in AS (imo, for values are subjective ;)) being denied the entrance to the new world Galt & Co were going to build.

By that same token, a person who has long made that choice, can end his life, too, and by OBJECTIVE standards - and morally.

I ask you seriously, how possibly can you view that choice, by this person, to live, or to die, in the same mundanities you have used?

What you call "mundanities" are merely concrete examples by which one can test the premises of a philosophy. I always look for something to hang my hat on, and nothing works better than examples, the more mundane, illustrative and simple the examples are, the better.

Testing a philosopher's own examples works well too.

Mary Lee Harsha had asked if there are contradictions in Rand's philosophy.

Sometimes posters here say that there are contradictions in Objectivism. But I can't see them myself. I would like to have them pointed out.

Rands "hat" example is one.

In Rand's opinion, exchanging a higher for a lower value goes against the principles of the Objectivist ethics. She calls this a "sacrifice", an action which is to be avoided at all costs.

In the "hat" example, a mother feeds her hungry child instead of buying a hat.

Per Rand, if the mother values the child over the hat, it is not a sacrifice, since she does not excange a higher for a lower value. For the child is the higher value to the mother.

In her counter example, Rand says that to the mother who values buying the hat over feeding her child, and only feeds the child grudgingly and reluctantly, it is a sacrifice, since she has given up a higher value (the hat) for lower value (the child).

Notice what has happened? Rand has abandoned the concept of objective value in these examples! For in these example, what the individual subjectively values higher determines whether an act is seen as a sacrifice or not.

One can exercise it through with other examples of Rand's work. Remember the passage in TVOS where she says a young man giving in to the wishes of his mother when it comes to choosing a careeer is acting against the principles of the Objectivist ethics? (I don't recall the exact words but can look it up if needed).

But when we apply the principle of the "hat" examples here, if the young man values his mother over his career interests - bingo! Everything is okay because he does not 'sacrifice' anything in that case.

Edited by Xray
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Remember the passage in TVOS where she says a young man giving in to the wishes of his mother when it comes to choosing a careeer is acting against the principles of the Objectivist ethics? (I don't recall the exact words but can look it up if needed).

But when we apply the principle of the "hat" examples here, if the young man values his mother over his career interests - bingo! Everything is okay because he does not 'sacrifice' anything in that case.

There you go again, switching objective, for subjective, and visa-versa, at the drop of a hat.( :rolleyes: )

The man gives in "to the wishes of his mother",(AR) not to his "value of his mother"(Xray).

You have conveniently changed the context.

Are the WISHES of his mother his long-term value? No.

What is his mother doing by SUBJECTIVELY insisting on another career, anyway, contrary to the son's OBJECTIVE value in his choice of career?

And if she does, he may, morally, choose to value her less, objectively.

Tony

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In Rand's opinion, exchanging a higher for a lower value goes against the principles of the Objectivist ethics. She calls this a "sacrifice", an action which is to be avoided at all costs.

In the "hat" example, a mother feeds her hungry child instead of buying a hat.

Per Rand, if the mother values the child over the hat, it is not a sacrifice, since she does not excange a higher for a lower value. For the child is the higher value to the mother.

In her counter example, Rand says that to the mother who values buying the hat over feeding her child, and only feeds the child grudgingly and reluctantly, it is a sacrifice, since she has given up a higher value (the hat) for lower value (the child).

Notice what has happened? Rand has abandoned the concept of objective value in these examples! For in these example, what the individual subjectively values higher determines whether an act is seen as a sacrifice or not.

One can exercise it through with other examples of Rand's work. Remember the passage in TVOS where she says a young man giving in to the wishes of his mother when it comes to choosing a careeer is acting against the principles of the Objectivist ethics? (I don't recall the exact words but can look it up if needed).

But when we apply the principle of the "hat" examples here, if the young man values his mother over his career interests - bingo! Everything is okay because he does not 'sacrifice' anything in that case.

I'm sure you, Xray, can properly objectify objective value in the Randian sense before refuting it--as opposed to what seems to be a bad example or two from Rand. That is, as a good debater do a good job arguing the contrary to your own belief. Then move in for the kill!

--Brant

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[quote name='whYNOT' timestamp='1298243616' post='1256}

There you go again, switching objective, for subjective, and visa-versa, at the drop of a hat.( :rolleyes

Tony

Tony, do you have visa-versas in SA too? Ours have "In Flanders Fields" on one side and "Un Canadien Errant" on the other. They cost a little more than the regular visas but are very popular.

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> In fact, that's a huge part of my motivation to write--putting my thoughts down in words helps to clarify my thinking.

Which is exactly why I put down why much of this is not a genuine philosophical conundrum but an issue Objectivists call one of "formulation".

Since they were brief and not jargony, no one can claim they were too difficult to read and integrate. Dennis, in light of this, as presumably a serious person who wants people to deal with his arguments, was unwilling to deal with my arguments.

And simply made a dismissive, anti-intellectual joke.

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Carol,

"Visa-versa".

That has got to be the gentlest correction I have ever received. What a terrific teacher you must be.

Thanks.

Dear Tony, you humble me. I did not think of it as a correction at all but probably a typo, and just grabbed an opportunity to banter. Your comment on my teaching is wonderfully complimentary and perceptive too, it makes me realize that this is in fact the way I make corrections when the chance is there. About half the time in our class is spent laughing. Usually at my outfits though.

Caro

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I have a section in ATCAG on "Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics" (pp. 289ff). Here is how I summarize the distinction:

"Normative ethics" refers to the content, or specific principles, of a moral code, such as the maxims "One ought to be honest" or "One ought to respect the rights of others."

"Meta-ethics" pertains to the criteria and meaning of ethical terms themselves, such as "value," "moral," and "immoral." What is a value judgment? Can value judgments be justified rationally? What does "moral" mean? What does "immoral" mean? How do we know when to apply these and similar judgments? The answers to these and similar questions fall within the scope of meta-ethics. Put simply, normative ethics tells us what we ought to do, while meta-ethics tells us what we mean by the word "ought." Ethical conflicts may occur in either of these areas.

I probably wouldn't change this account today, except I might use "metaethics" instead of "meta-ethics." The hyphenated version was more common when I wrote ATCAG in 1973.

I never got any flak from O'ist philosophers over the distinction between normative ethics and metaethics. It has been a standard distinction in moral philosophy for a long time, though I did write the following in an endnote to my discussion:

10. Some philosophers deny that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between normative ethics and meta-ethics, as these labels are usually conceived. Thus, according to Georg Henrik Von Wright, "There is also a philosophical pursuit deserving the name 'ethics', which shares with a common conception of 'meta-ethics' the feature of being a conceptual investigation and with a common conception of 'normative ethics' the feature of aiming at directing our lives. The Varieties of Goodness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p 6. Cf. Veatch, Rational Man, pp. 17-23.

Ghs

George, I agree with you. But just FYI, and FE'sI, here is what Peikoff said in the Q-A of Lecture 9 of his 1976 lectures on "The Philosophy of Objectivism."

Question: The February 1966 issue of The Objectivist mentions a speech you were to give etitled “The Meta-Ethics of Objectivism.” What does this refer to?

Answer: “Meta-ethics” is the name given by 20th century philosophers to the part of ethics which is concerned with: how do you validate ethical conclusions objectively? How do you establish the foundations of ethics? How do you derive values from facts? And when you have completed that, it’s like the methodology of ethics, laid the base, thereafter they call what remains “normative ethics,” namely, working out how you should live, now that you have a foundation. It is an unnecessary concept.

Interestingly, while Peikoff seems not to have ever reverted to his previous terminology in regard to ethics, he did, in lecture 14 of his DIM course a few years ago, use the term "meta-philosophy." Here is a bit of the context of that usage by him:

DIM is a meta-philosophy. In other words, it’s an approach which helps us understand the philosophies out there shaping the world. There’s people with philosophies, and then there’s people who sit back and classify the philosophies and make statements about the philosophies...That’s a philosophy about philosophy. But...you do not need to know a meta-philosophy, in order to advocate or spread a philosophy.

I recall, on a list long ago and in a galaxy far away (1997, Objectivism-L), a gentleman named Dave Saum posted an essay "Rethinking the Essence of Objectivism." He defines "meta-Objectivism" as: "the view that Objectivism is essentially an objective method of analyzing concepts, and not essentially a philosophic system."

Saum suggests that Meta-Objectivism "does not deny the existence or importance of Rand's philosophic system, but it does deny that the system or its fundamentals in the major branches of philosophy can be its essence." Who is a meta-Objectivist? Anyone who "practice an objective method when dealing with concepts, and not [simply] those in agreement with all or a subset of Rand's philosophic conclusions." Why? Because they "are at least as concerned with the argument behind a conclusion (Rand's or otherwise) than with the conclusion itself." What do meta-Objectivists view as the main thrust in spreading Objectivism? "preading objectivity rather than the major philosophic conclusions of Ayn Rand [per se]." How do we know when new work qualifies as Objectivist, since Rand is no longer around to give it her stamp of approval? "[N]ew Objectivist work must first and foremost be characterized by some application of Rand's objective method." And what is the most important task facing Objectivism today? Saum says that it is "the study and exposition of objectivity."

I don't think that this is necessarily the best focus of everyone's time and energy, but surely it is good and important that ~some~ of us do so. A friend of mine teaches objectivity and critical thinking at a small college in Minnesota. I like to think of him as "doing the Lord's work," and I wish more "of us" were in a position to do it, too. But if wishes were fishes, I'd have quite a few -- and I personally have other fish to fry. :bye:

REB

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Yes, Mary, you should review the book, you are eminently qualified.

And no one chooses just to live for the sake of living itself. They choose to enjoy values which require that they be alive to value them. A person whose highest value is playing tennis will have to have a certain amount of health and wealth and leisure to do so. Or perhaps they do choose ultimate values not consonant with life. But that is their problem, not Objectivism's.

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Yes, Mary, you should review the book, you are eminently qualified.

And no one chooses just to live for the sake of living itself.

You have done a poll? What method did you use?

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Yes, Mary, you should review the book, you are eminently qualified.

And no one chooses just to live for the sake of living itself.

You have done a poll? What method did you use?

Okay, except for Bob Kolker, whose reason for living is not, as you might suspect, kvetching, but the mere continued vegetative metabolism of his vital organs.

Edited by Ted Keer
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I have a section in ATCAG on "Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics" (pp. 289ff). Here is how I summarize the distinction:

"Normative ethics" refers to the content, or specific principles, of a moral code, such as the maxims "One ought to be honest" or "One ought to respect the rights of others."

"Meta-ethics" pertains to the criteria and meaning of ethical terms themselves, such as "value," "moral," and "immoral." What is a value judgment? Can value judgments be justified rationally? What does "moral" mean? What does "immoral" mean? How do we know when to apply these and similar judgments? The answers to these and similar questions fall within the scope of meta-ethics. Put simply, normative ethics tells us what we ought to do, while meta-ethics tells us what we mean by the word "ought." Ethical conflicts may occur in either of these areas.

I probably wouldn't change this account today, except I might use "metaethics" instead of "meta-ethics." The hyphenated version was more common when I wrote ATCAG in 1973.

I never got any flak from O'ist philosophers over the distinction between normative ethics and metaethics. It has been a standard distinction in moral philosophy for a long time, though I did write the following in an endnote to my discussion:

10. Some philosophers deny that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between normative ethics and meta-ethics, as these labels are usually conceived. Thus, according to Georg Henrik Von Wright, "There is also a philosophical pursuit deserving the name 'ethics', which shares with a common conception of 'meta-ethics' the feature of being a conceptual investigation and with a common conception of 'normative ethics' the feature of aiming at directing our lives. The Varieties of Goodness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p 6. Cf. Veatch, Rational Man, pp. 17-23.

Ghs

George, I agree with you. But just FYI, and FE'sI, here is what Peikoff said in the Q-A of Lecture 9 of his 1976 lectures on "The Philosophy of Objectivism."

Question: The February 1966 issue of The Objectivist mentions a speech you were to give etitled “The Meta-Ethics of Objectivism.” What does this refer to?

Answer: “Meta-ethics” is the name given by 20th century philosophers to the part of ethics which is concerned with: how do you validate ethical conclusions objectively? How do you establish the foundations of ethics? How do you derive values from facts? And when you have completed that, it’s like the methodology of ethics, laid the base, thereafter they call what remains “normative ethics,” namely, working out how you should live, now that you have a foundation. It is an unnecessary concept.

Interestingly, while Peikoff seems not to have ever reverted to his previous terminology in regard to ethics, he did, in lecture 14 of his DIM course a few years ago, use the term "meta-philosophy." Here is a bit of the context of that usage by him:

DIM is a meta-philosophy. In other words, it’s an approach which helps us understand the philosophies out there shaping the world. There’s people with philosophies, and then there’s people who sit back and classify the philosophies and make statements about the philosophies...That’s a philosophy about philosophy. But...you do not need to know a meta-philosophy, in order to advocate or spread a philosophy.

I recall, on a list long ago and in a galaxy far away (1997, Objectivism-L), a gentleman named Dave Saum posted an essay "Rethinking the Essence of Objectivism." He defines "meta-Objectivism" as: "the view that Objectivism is essentially an objective method of analyzing concepts, and not essentially a philosophic system."

Saum suggests that Meta-Objectivism "does not deny the existence or importance of Rand's philosophic system, but it does deny that the system or its fundamentals in the major branches of philosophy can be its essence." Who is a meta-Objectivist? Anyone who "practice an objective method when dealing with concepts, and not [simply] those in agreement with all or a subset of Rand's philosophic conclusions." Why? Because they "are at least as concerned with the argument behind a conclusion (Rand's or otherwise) than with the conclusion itself." What do meta-Objectivists view as the main thrust in spreading Objectivism? "preading objectivity rather than the major philosophic conclusions of Ayn Rand [per se]." How do we know when new work qualifies as Objectivist, since Rand is no longer around to give it her stamp of approval? "[N]ew Objectivist work must first and foremost be characterized by some application of Rand's objective method." And what is the most important task facing Objectivism today? Saum says that it is "the study and exposition of objectivity."

I don't think that this is necessarily the best focus of everyone's time and energy, but surely it is good and important that ~some~ of us do so. A friend of mine teaches objectivity and critical thinking at a small college in Minnesota. I like to think of him as "doing the Lord's work," and I wish more "of us" were in a position to do it, too. But if wishes were fishes, I'd have quite a few -- and I personally have other fish to fry. :bye:

REB

Peikoff, in the remark you quoted, gives no reason why metaethics is a "unnecessary concept," so I don't really know what to say. I find the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics useful, and I see no good reason to jettison it. What purpose would be served in doing so?

I don't like the term "meta-philosophy" (which I have seen used by other writers) at all. Philosophy, in my view, deals with fundamental concepts and principles, so the term "philosophy" is all we need.

I also dislike the term "meta-Objectivism." I can't say that I really understand the point that Saum was making. Or, more precisely, I don't understand why he regarded his point as important enough to dub "Meta-Objectivism."

Ghs

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> In fact, that's a huge part of my motivation to write--putting my thoughts down in words helps to clarify my thinking.

Which is exactly why I put down why much of this is not a genuine philosophical conundrum but an issue Objectivists call one of "formulation".

Since they were brief and not jargony, no one can claim they were too difficult to read and integrate. Dennis, in light of this, as presumably a serious person who wants people to deal with his arguments, was unwilling to deal with my arguments.

And simply made a dismissive, anti-intellectual joke.

Here's the post you are commenting on:

By the way, I don't know if it's original with me or not, but the few paragraphs I posted above I would say are an essentially -full- philosophical solution to this issue of whether or not you call a choice not to live or live fully 'premoral' or 'immoral'. You really don't need to say much more, except to perfect what phrase you use to describe what is wrong with course of action 1) and what is wrong with course of action 2).

Phil,

If you are satisfied with your answer, let's leave the discussion there. Devote your energies to things you deem important, and I will do likewise.

I don't very much care and it doesn't really matter substantively as opposed to "how you word it".

That's obvious.

Where is the "dismissive, anti-intellectual joke?"

Apparently you regard anything which involves philosophical terminology--i.e., Can the 'choice to live' itself be judged morally?--as "jargony," since you did not deal with it except to dismiss it. I did not see your post as adding anything worthwhile to the discussion, and did not wish to start a back-and-forth exchange leading nowhere. That's why I politely asked you to leave it there. And I thought you agreed to do that.

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Dennis,

Why didn't you respond to my substantive arguments? I took the time to give a reasoned argument on an issue you claim to have a lot of interest on.

If they were wrong you could have pointed out how, right?

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Dennis,

Why didn't you respond to my substantive arguments? I took the time to give a reasoned argument on an issue you claim to have a lot of interest on.

If they were wrong you could have pointed out how, right?

I can't speak for Dennis, of course, but I know that I often judge my interlocutor in a conversation to have shown so much ignorance or foolishness regarding the issue at hand that I consider it a waste of my time to attempt to educate that interlocutor.

JR

Edited by Jeff Riggenbach
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