[Stephen Boydstun]

I take metaphysics to be the comprehension of widest existence, where the concrete existents encompass any and all concretes, physical or mental or whatever. Those of us who are physicalists take all concretes to be physical concretes.* Still, even for the physicalist, it remains that metaphysics is comprehension of widest existence, where the concrete existents encompass any and all: concretes of ordinary experience (including history and inventions) or concretes of this or that empirical science.

The topic of metaphysics, in my meaning, is concrete existence, whether those concretes are entities, attributes, actions, or relations, whether actual or potential. This conception of metaphysics is consistent with Rand’s views that all existents have particular and specific identities (AS 1016, 1035–37; IOE 6, 240), that “everything that man perceives is particular, concrete” (IOE 1, 199), and that “‘things as they are’ are things as perceived by your mind” (AS 1036).

To fully comprehend the concrete, we require the abstract. To fully comprehend the actual and the potential, we require the possible.

Rand conceived of logic as “the art of non-contradictory identification,” and she held that “logic rests on the axiom that existence exists” (AS 1016). Recall that Rand’s first axiom for metaphysics is the affirmation that existence exists. Two further axioms are manifest to one in the act of grasping the statement “existence exists.” These are that something exists which one perceives and that one exists and possesses consciousness of existing things (AS 1015). We have the following:

(E) Existence exists.
(E1) Something exists which one perceives.
(E2) One exists and possesses consciousness of existing things.

I concur with the preceding, and to Rand’s E-axioms I would add a related supposition, which I call my epsilon-premise:

(epsilon) There is nothing in existence whose existence cannot be asserted.

If something exists, its existence can be asserted. Then because (E1) and (E2) are implicit in the act of grasping the assertion that any particular thing exists, there is nothing in existence that is not potentially the subject of acts of consciousness.**

Rand also takes as axiomatic that “to exist is to be something, as distinguished from the nothing of nonexistence, it is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes” (AS 1016). A thing is itself, it is what it is. An object is of one sort or another, it possesses certain attributes and not others, and its actions are certain ones and not others. In three words,

(I) Existence is identity.

Every existent is with identity. If something exists, then it is not without identity.

The identities of existents exist with them. Adding (epsilon), we may conclude (iota): all identities of existents can be asserted. Any identity of an existent that is so can be asserted to be so. Implicit in the act of grasping the statement that a certain identity is so, of a certain existent, is the fact that some identity holds which one perceives and that one exists as a consciousness of identities.

Concerning consciousness, taken as the act of perceiving that which exists, Rand poses the further axiom:

(C ) Consciousness is identification.

The art of noncontradictory identification is logic, in Rand’s conception of it, and “logic rests on the axiom that existence exists” (AS 1016). Then it is not a logical possibility that nothing exists.

Rand presents (E) expressly as an axiom. She does not present (I) and (C ) expressly as axioms, though she strongly suggests that they are axioms. They are introduced as completing the traditional law of identity, the principle that a thing is itself, or A is A (AS 1016). Rand takes (I) and (C ) to state primary facts and to be immediate and most important elucidations of the three concepts she takes to be axiomatic expressly: existence, identity, and consciousness (IOE 55–56).

Our standard modern logic has come to be called classical logic. This logic expanded and revised the logic of Aristotle as it had been developed up to the time of Kant. Classical logic, as taught in texts such as R. L. Simpson’s Essentials of Symbolic Logic and W. V. O. Quine’s Methods of Logic, is the culmination of innovations by Boole, De Morgan, Jevons, Peirce, and above all, Frege (1879).

Standard modern logic is called classical to distinguish it from extensions of it in modal logics and from rivals of it, such as intuitionist logic, many-valued logics, paraconsistent logics, fuzzy logics, quantum logics, and relevance logics. This last and modal logic, as well as the ways in which classical logic improves on Aristotelian logic (e.g., existential fallacy), stand out as promising productive integration with Rand’s metaphysics and conception of logic.

Predications are conceptual identifications. Edward Zalta takes the discipline of logic to be “the study of the forms and consequences of predication” (2004, 433).*** That conception of logic fits well with Rand’s conception of logic as “the art of non-contradictory identification.” The ramifications of Rand’s idea that “logic rests on the axiom that existence exists,” combined with her E-, I-, and C-axioms, need to be charted through the terrain of classical logic, modal logic, and relevance logic.

Within the course of discussion appending this post, we can tackle the topic of the kinds and degrees of necessity and impossibility (cf. ##88, 488, 490 in the Analytic-Synthetic thread), the kinds and nature of membership relations, and the various types of logical consequence. This new thread is also a good setting within which to tackle the character of mathematical existence.

~~~~~~

*That does not mean the sciences traditionally not counted among the physical sciences should be thought of as subdivisions of the physical sciences.

**There are things no longer in existence which were not subjects of consciousness during their existence and which are now no longer potential subjects of consciousness.

*** “In Defense of the Law of Non-Contradiction” in The Law of Non-Contradiction, Priest, Beall, and Armour-Garb, editors (Oxford). Two beginning works have addressed how predication can be taken under Rand’s thesis “existence is identity.” These are the final section (IX) of my 1991 Objectivity essay “Induction on Identity” (V1N3) and David Kelley’s paper “Concepts and Propositions” read at the 1996 summer seminar of the Institute of Objectivist Studies.

This post has been edited by Stephen Boydstun: 29 June 2007 - 07:53 AM

[Stephen Boydstun]

It was claimed that “there are things no longer in existence . . . which are now no longer potential subjects of consciousness.” Not even potentially subjects of consciousness indirectly? No, not even indirectly.

“Consider the water about to tumble over Niagara Falls. Consider a single particular milliliter of that water. Indefinitely far in the past—one year ago, say—it was determined that this milliliter would now exist just as it does. So goes the full determinism story. The milliliter was predetermined to have just the temperature and turbidity and place in the river that it now has as it approaches the fall. Whether it will now fall to the lower river or break into mist was already determined a year ago.

“Full determinism has to go. . . .

“One reason that one-year predetermination of the milliliter of water is so implausible is our sense of how impossible it would be to predict such a result in the course of nature. Beyond such epistemological considerations are metaphysical considerations, and the metaphysical are what we seek here. . . .

“Every physical system—from elementary particle to dust particle to rock or river—has its own natural time scales at various levels of system. A fairly familiar characteristic time in fluids is typical time between molecular collisions, the mean free time, say. This time scale is called the kinetic scale. At atmospheric pressure, kinetic time for a hydrogen gas, for example, would be on the order of 10(exp minus 9) seconds. Well below that scale, at around 10(exp minus 12) seconds, in the same system, would be the characteristic time over which a collision occurs; this is the time from the initial molecule-molecule contact at the beginning of a collision to their final contact at the end of that collision. Far above the kinetic scale, at 10 (exp minus 4) seconds, is the hydrodynamic time scale; this is the order of magnitude over which macroscopic changes in the thermodynamic characteristics of the gas occur.

“These time scales are not human impositions. They are not from any of our requirements for observation, measurement, or calculation. . . . Rather, these time scales are simply there naturally in the physical process.

“Particular collisions are occurring at some time t in a hydrogen gas. At a time later by the amount of the hydrodynamic time interval (or greater), nearly all information, all trace, all ‘memory’, of those particular collisions at t is gone (contrary to the supposition of Leibniz). It is not that we are simply unable to find the traces. They have been truly rubbed out. Physics, not epistemology.”

(From the essay “Volitional Synapses” in Objectivity V2N5, pages 185–86)

[Stephen Boydstun]

For reference and in hope of development later in the year:

Quote

Sticking to Rand’s idea that logic rests on the axiom that existence exists, I would say that all logically possible worlds are relatable to the actual world and that all logically possible worlds are relatable to each other via the actual world. That is, the appropriate modal logic for broadly logical necessity is some variety of S5, which is a normal modal logic.

In view of the implications I wrought from Rand’s further metaphysics and epistemology in my “Universals and Measurement” (JARS V5N2), we should readily notice also that although metaphysical possibilities are wider than physical possibilities, they are not wider than logical possibilities. For in Rand’s metaphysics, all concretes stand in some measurement relations to some other concretes in at least the ordinal-scale (or ordered-geometry) levels of measurement relations. And mathematical possibility will not extend further than logical possibility. (#488 in the Analytic-Synthetic thread 6/21/07)

Quote

As example of a metaphysical necessity, I’m thinking of the proposition “It cannot be that various existents have never existed.” That would be affirmed I imagine by one holding “There are existents, not all the same.”

An example of a mathematical necessity would be as in the proposition “An angle cannot be trisected using only a straightedge and compass.”

An example of a physical necessity would be as in “It is impossible to construct a device that will extract only heat from its environment and produce mechanical work equal to the amount of heat extracted.”

The question of which modal logics are appropriate for those three kinds of necessity, as well as for logical necessity, is a part of contemporary philosophical investigation. I think this investigation may be able to deepen and precise our understanding of how logic figures differently in these different mutually supportive ways of comprehending existence. (#490 6/22/07)

Chapter 7 “The Constructibility Theory” of Charles Chihara’s A Structural Account of Mathematics.

Chapter 3 “Necessity and Contingency” of Robert Nozick’s Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World (especially the Notes).

Chapter 3 “Normal Modal Logics” of Graham Priest’s An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic.

[Stephen Boydstun]

Recall the notation from the initial post of this thread “Parsing Existence.”

(E) Existence exists.
(I) Existence is identity.
(C ) Consciousness is identification.

Recall, too, this paragraph:
“Rand presents (E) expressly as an axiom. She does not present (I) and (C ) expressly as axioms, though she strongly suggests that they are axioms. They are introduced as completing the traditional law of identity, the principle that a thing is itself, or A is A (AS 1016). Rand takes (I) and (C ) to state primary facts and to be immediate and most important elucidations of the three concepts she takes to be axiomatic expressly: existence, identity, and consciousness (ITOE 55–56).”

I take the proposition (I) as an epigram encapsulating identity postulates on existence, such as “to exist . . . is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes.” This latter statement is a ramification intended under (I). Three years ago, led by Rand’s text, I began drawing forth other identity postulates on existence, other ramifications contracted into (I). I have constructed proofs that some of these universally true statements are axiomatic in Rand’s sense. I will here share a couple of these axiomatic statements under (I), as well as my proofs that they are axiomatic.

A philosophic axiom “is a statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others, whether any particular speaker chooses to identify it or not” (AS 1040). Rand’s axioms, then, cannot be proven without circularity. Her axioms affirm such things as the fact of existence, the fact of one’s consciousness, and the fact of one’s existence. These cannot be proven without recurrence to themselves if Rand has found axioms that truly meet her requirement of absolute fundamentality in reality and in any knowledge of reality.

The E-axioms are implied in any conscious action, including in any claims denying those axioms (AS 1016). More generally, for any of her axioms, Rand maintains that one has to “accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it” (AS 1040). One cannot deny the truth of these axioms without some form of self-contradiction. Pose any such axiom as false, there will be contradictions with what one retains as real or there will be contradictions with presuppositions of the activity of rational deduction.

A. Exclusions of Non-Contradiction: Entities
Rand states her finer structure for the law of identity as follows. “Whatever you choose to consider, be it an object, an attribute, or an action, the law of identity remains the same. A leaf cannot be a stone at the same time, it cannot be all red and all green at the same time, it cannot freeze and burn at the same time. A is A. . . . A contradiction cannot exist. An atom is itself, and so is the universe; neither can contradict its own identity; nor can a part contradict the whole” (AS 1016).

Rand’s law of identity entails that objects come in some exclusive kinds. Leaf and stone are kinds that are exclusive with respect to each other. Any object is also of kinds that are not exclusive of each other: a leaf is a kind of plant part, it is a kind of light catcher, and it is a kind of drain clogger. To say that an object is a leaf and a stone violates identity in Rand’s sense; it is a contradiction. But to say that an object is a leaf and a drain clogger is no contradiction. Objects come in some exclusive kinds, and it is sensitivity to these sets of kinds that is written into Rand’s conception of noncontradiction concerning the kind-identity of an object. (Cf. Plato’s Sophist 252e–54b.)

Rand clearly intends that what is here proposed for objects is to be generalized to entities. Every entity is of some kinds that are exclusive relative to other kinds of entity. Rand uses the term entity in the paragraph preceding the object examples of leaf and stone. That is, she uses entity in the initial statement of her law of identity: “To exist is to be something, . . . it is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes” (AS 1016). On that page, it is clear that she takes for entities not only what are ordinarily called objects such as leaf, stone, or table, but micro-objects such as living cells and atoms, super-objects such as solar system and universe, and substances such as wood.

Now we have a modest problem. If we say “to exist is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes,” we seem to say that attributes are either entities or are not existents. Consider for attributes “the shape of a pebble or the structure of the solar system” (AS 1016). To avoid the patent falsehood that the shape of a pebble does not exist, shall we say that not only the pebble is an entity, but its shape is an entity? Rand reaches a resolution by a refinement in her metaphysics nine years after her first presentation. In 1966 she writes “Entities are the only primary existents. (Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities; relationships are relationships among entities)” (ITOE 15). Let us say then that to exist is either (a) to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes or (b ) to be some specific character in the nature of entities.

In ITOE Rand also makes the refinement of taking materials, physical substances, to be not fully specific entities. “Materials exist only in the form of specific entities, such as a nugget of gold, a plank of wood, a drop or an ocean of water” (ITOE 16). Materials, for Rand, would seem to fall under both (a) and (b ), and I do not see any defect in that.

Let us now expose self-contradictions that obtain in denial of the ramification of (I) that entities are always of some exclusive kinds. Suppose an entity exists and is not of any kind that excludes it being any other kinds. If the supposed entity is nothing but existence itself, then there is no contradiction; one is simply talking about existence as a whole. So suppose an entity exists and is not of any kind that excludes it being other kinds and is not existence as a whole.

Then the supposed entity could be one with any other entities that are of exclusive kinds (just as a leaf that is a drain-clogger could be one with a leaf that is dead, maple, and wet). For it is not an entity of any kind excluding it being other kinds. But to say that an entity is not of any exclusive kind and that it is one and the same with another entity that is of some exclusive kind(s) is a contradiction. (Non-A is A.) Indeed if some entity were not of any exclusive kind, then it could be one with the person who supposes such an entity. Then to suppose an entity that is not of any exclusive kind is to suppose that one’s person could be an entity not of some exclusive kinds. But that supposition contradicts the presupposition that one is of the exclusive kind person, a person who makes the (errant) supposition. (Cf. Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1007b19–1008a28.)

So I have argued the axiomatic standing of “existence is identity,” where the existents are entities and the identity is kind-identity. All entities are of some exclusive kinds—a leaf cannot be a stone at the same time—and this postulate must be accepted on pain of self-contradiction.

B. Exclusions of Non-Contradiction: Actions
Rand’s law of identity entails that actions come in some exclusive kinds in the following sense. Burning of a leaf and freezing of a leaf are kinds of actions that are exclusive with respect to each other. However, to say that a leaf is burning and floating is no violation of identity, no contradiction. Some actions of objects—burning and freezing in the case of leaves—are exclusive with respect to each other. Rand’s conception of noncontradiction concerning actions pertains to these. (Cf. Republic 436b, 436e; Metaphysics 1061b35–62a1.)

Rand’s law of identity also entails that every entity that has actions has certain actions and not others. A green leaf manufactures chlorophyll; a stone does not. Rand’s conception of noncontradiction concerning actions pertains to these exclusions as well. “The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature” (AS 1037). (Cf. On Generation and Corruption 338b15)

I want to prove axiomatic the truth that every action-bearing entity bears certain kinds of action and not others. Suppose an entity could bear any kind of action without restriction of the kind of action. Then it could bear all the acts of a leaf and a stone. Indeed, it could bear all the acts of all the kinds of entity there are. Such an entity would be the conjunction of all the kinds of entity there are with respect to their possible actions.

It would be more. Not only could this super-acting entity bear all the actions of, say, a leaf. It could also burn and freeze at the same time. Yet, having all the possible actions of a leaf, its burning excludes its freezing at the same time. Our super-acting entity is capable of burning and freezing at the same time, and it is incapable of burning and freezing at the same time. Our super-acting entity can float on water, like a leaf, and yet, like a stone, it cannot float on water. These are contradictions. No such entity can exist. There is no entity that can bear any kind of action without restriction of the kind of action.

Moreover, let a person suppose there could be an entity that could bear any kind of action without restriction of the kind of action. Such an entity could bear the act of supposing its existence, just as a person might do. But unlike a person, the super-acting entity could suppose at the same time that such an entity is impossible. But this contradicts the presupposition of a person that contradictories are false.

So I have argued the axiomatic standing of “existence is identity” where the existents are action-bearing entities and the identity is restriction of the kinds of actions of those entities. Rand’s thesis that any entity that exists has a specific nature [“to exist . . . is to be an entity of a specific nature . . .” (AS 1016)] has now been proven to be axiomatic insofar as the action nature of entities is concerned. The postulate that every action-bearing entity bears certain kinds of action and not others must be accepted on pain of self-contradiction.

It should be noticed that I have not proven that, for every action-bearing entity, some of the kinds of action it bears are exclusive with respect to each other. I leave open the possibility that some kinds of entities can bear all the kinds of actions in their repertoire simultaneously. Certainly a leaf is not such an entity.

[general semanticist]

Stephen Boydstun, on Oct 6 2007, 12:59 PM, said:

Her axioms affirm such things as the fact of existence, the fact of one’s consciousness, and the fact of one’s existence. These cannot be proven without recurrence to themselves if Rand has found axioms that truly meet her requirement of absolute fundamentality in reality and in any knowledge of reality.

So, in other words Rand requires that we accept 'existence' and 'consciousness' as undefined. Well I for one cannot do this. These terms are far too vague for me to accept as undefined. Perhaps we could explore what various people mean by these terms in an attempt to find some terms more universally acceptable as undefined. In particular, Korzybski felt that 'consciousness' by itself lacked content and felt that we need to specify some content as in conscious of what?

[Stephen Boydstun]

An excerpt from my series of articles at RoR on the papers for the Ayn Rand Society 2005:

Quote

In the present communication, I would like to tell you a little about the first paper and to point to earlier, published works in which a comparison between Aristotle and Rand has been made concerning the nature of philosophical axioms and how they are validated. . . .

Professor Lennox first presented Rand’s views on axiomatic concepts, then Aristotle’s view on axioms and their validation. He then briefly compared their views in this area.

Lennox stressed that Rand draws her philosophic axioms so as to be highly abstract, yet to be based on concretes given in perception. As is well-known to readers here, Rand’s axiomatic concepts are existence, identity, and consciousness. It was incumbent on Rand to explain “how these concepts, the most abstract of all concepts, are related to the perceptually given” (AV 4). Rand’s answer: The axiomatic status of these concepts derives from the character of their referents. The facts identified by these concepts are directly perceived, and they are fundamental givens implicit in any knowledge or proof procedure. As readers here know, the truth of these identifying concepts cannot be proven, but their axiomatic status can be shown by showing that they are presupposed in any attempt to deny them.

On Rand’s view, these axioms are implicit in every state of awareness of any sentient animal. For humans the axiomatic facts of existence, identity, and consciousness are “perceived or experienced directly, but grasped conceptually.” Explicit conceptual identification of these axiomatic facts provides an ever-present widest conceptual context for all one’s conceptual constructions concerning reality.

Aristotle’s indemonstrable starting points for knowledge are the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of excluded middle. These principles are presuppositions of all demonstration. Aristotle says “we come to know the primaries [of a special discipline such as geometry] by induction; for that is in fact how perception produces the universal in us.” He seems to think the same faculty of reason enables us to know both the starting points of a special discipline and the fundamental principles of demonstration, which are non-contradiction and excluded middle. [Note from SB: For more on this, see Leonard Peikoff’s (1985) “Aristotle’s Intuitive Induction” in The New Scholasticism 59(2):185-99.]

For Aristotle these two principles identify fundamental facts of reality. Because these are the most fundamental facts about reality, cognizance of them is required to comprehend anything of the more special characters of things. Aristotle knows one cannot prove the truth of non-contradiction or excluded middle, but because these truths hold in every area of knowledge, one can always show their merit by showing the dissolution of thought that follows on their denial.

Both Rand and Aristotle see philosophical axioms as explicit identifications of fundamental facts of reality. Lennox goes on to observe that, also for both these philosophers, “anyone who knows anything and anyone seeking to prove anything has grasped, at some tacit level, these fundamental facts. Both insist that any attempt to deny such fundamental truths is self-refuting” (AV 13).

An obvious difference between Aristotle and Rand on philosophic axioms is in their selection of which facts are the axiomatic ones. Rand does not select non-contradiction and excluded middle as the most basic facts of reality. Beneath both of these, Rand sees the fact of identity: to be is to be something specific. That difference between Aristotle and Rand is a harmonious one. Lastly, Lennox sees Rand’s axiom of consciousness—that anyone who makes claims implicitly affirms their own consciousness of existence—as propounded also by Aristotle.

Earlier works on Rand and Aristotle concerning philosophic axioms and their validation are these:
Douglas Rasmussen (1973). “Aristotle and the Defense of the Law of Contradiction”
The Personalist (Spring).
Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen (1984). “Ayn Rand’s Realism” in
The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand.
Leonard Peikoff (1991). Chapter 1 of Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand.
Tibor Machan (1992). “Evidence of Necessary Existence” Objectivity 1(4):31–62.
———. (1999). Chapter 2 of Ayn Rand.
Fred Seddon (2005). “Implied Axioms” in
Rebirth of Reason http://rebirthofreason.com/Articles/Seddon...ed_Axioms.shtml

[general semanticist]

Stephen Boydstun, on Oct 6 2007, 02:12 PM, said:

It was incumbent on Rand to explain “how these concepts, the most abstract of all concepts, are related to the perceptually given” (AV 4). Rand’s answer: The axiomatic status of these concepts derives from the character of their referents. The facts identified by these concepts are directly perceived, and they are fundamental givens implicit in any knowledge or proof procedure. As readers here know, the truth of these identifying concepts cannot be proven, but their axiomatic status can be shown by showing that they are presupposed in any attempt to deny them.

On Rand’s view, these axioms are implicit in every state of awareness of any sentient animal. For humans the axiomatic facts of existence, identity, and consciousness are “perceived or experienced directly, but grasped conceptually.” Explicit conceptual identification of these axiomatic facts provides an ever-present widest conceptual context for all one’s conceptual constructions concerning reality.

So I can't deny that I'm conscious because I need to be conscious to deny anything? I don't deny that I'm conscious, the problem is I don't know what it means in this context. There has been a great deal written about 'consciousness' and I don't believe one can realistically expect we all just know what it means and move on. One might accept a term like 'similarity' or 'difference' as undefined, but 'consciousness' is too complex for this, in my opinion.

[Bill P]

general semanticist, on Oct 7 2007, 05:47 AM, said:

So I can't deny that I'm conscious because I need to be conscious to deny anything? I don't deny that I'm conscious, the problem is I don't know what it means in this context. There has been a great deal written about 'consciousness' and I don't believe one can realistically expect we all just know what it means and move on. One might accept a term like 'similarity' or 'difference' as undefined, but 'consciousness' is too complex for this, in my opinion.

If you have an opinion, then you are conscious.

Alfonso

[general semanticist]

Alfonso, on Oct 6 2007, 10:54 PM, said:

If you have an opinion, then you are conscious.

Alfonso

Oh, so is this how you define conscious, the ability to voice an opinion? From wikipedia;

Consciousness is a quality of the mind generally regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and one's environment.

That's alot of stuff to be just taking for granted and assuming we all know what it means.

[BaalChatzaf]

general semanticist, on Oct 7 2007, 07:44 AM, said:

Alfonso, on Oct 6 2007, 10:54 PM, said:

If you have an opinion, then you are conscious.

Alfonso

Oh, so is this how you define conscious, the ability to voice an opinion? From wikipedia;

Consciousness is a quality of the mind generally regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and one's environment.

That's alot of stuff to be just taking for granted and assuming we all know what it means.

He said holding an opinion -implies- being conscious. He did NOT say that holding an opinion -defines- consciousness. Read what he wrote.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[general semanticist]

BaalChatzaf, on Oct 7 2007, 10:43 AM, said:

He said holding an opinion -implies- being conscious. He did NOT say that holding an opinion -defines- consciousness. Read what he wrote.

Ba'al Chatzaf

6 of one, half dozen of the other.

[Bill P]

general semanticist, on Oct 7 2007, 07:44 PM, said:

Alfonso, on Oct 6 2007, 10:54 PM, said:

If you have an opinion, then you are conscious.

Alfonso

Oh, so is this how you define conscious, the ability to voice an opinion? From wikipedia;

Consciousness is a quality of the mind generally regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and one's environment.

That's alot of stuff to be just taking for granted and assuming we all know what it means.

Try functioning in the world without some degree of "self-awareness, sentience, sapience and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and one's environment," if you would like. The experiment will be instructive.

Alfonso
]

[general semanticist]

"Something exists which one perceives."

How does Objectivism handle postulated particles, like electrons? In particular, if one can't perceive something then does it not exist?

[Bill P]

general semanticist, on Oct 8 2007, 04:08 AM, said:

"Something exists which one perceives."

How does Objectivism handle postulated particles, like electrons? In particular, if one can't perceive something then does it not exist?

Your perception does not alter reality.

Check out The Ayn Rand Letter, The Metaphysical versus the Man-Made, in the issue of March 12, 1973 - Volume II, Number 12 for a detailed discussion of this.

Alfonso

[BaalChatzaf]

Alfonso, on Oct 7 2007, 04:25 PM, said:

general semanticist, on Oct 8 2007, 04:08 AM, said:

"Something exists which one perceives."

How does Objectivism handle postulated particles, like electrons? In particular, if one can't perceive something then does it not exist?

Your perception does not alter reality.

Check out The Ayn Rand Letter, The Metaphysical versus the Man-Made, in the issue of March 12, 1973 - Volume II, Number 12 for a detailed discussion of this.

Alfonso

Are man-made real things any less real than natural real things?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Bill P]

BaalChatzaf, on Oct 8 2007, 05:24 AM, said:

Alfonso, on Oct 7 2007, 04:25 PM, said:

general semanticist, on Oct 8 2007, 04:08 AM, said:

"Something exists which one perceives."

How does Objectivism handle postulated particles, like electrons? In particular, if one can't perceive something then does it not exist?

Your perception does not alter reality.

Check out The Ayn Rand Letter, The Metaphysical versus the Man-Made, in the issue of March 12, 1973 - Volume II, Number 12 for a detailed discussion of this.

Alfonso

Are man-made real things any less real than natural real things?

Ba'al Chatzaf

You will want to actually read the article so that you know what the terms in the title mean. That will answer your question.

Alfonso

[Stephen Boydstun]

Thomas, you might like to check out also my essay "Between Realism and Constructive Empiricism" in the Science and Mathematics forum.

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...?showtopic=4191

This post has been edited by Stephen Boydstun: 08 October 2007 - 01:26 AM

[BaalChatzaf]

Stephen Boydstun, on Oct 8 2007, 03:13 AM, said:

Thomas, you might like to check out also my essay "Between Realism and Constructive Empiricism" in the Science and Mathematics forum.

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...?showtopic=4191

There is no doubt about it. You are the smartest guy in this discussion group. If you were typical of the Objectivist Movement, the world would be a much different place. Unfortunately you are rather singular. I wish there were more like you. You and Travis Norsen are choice folks.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[general semanticist]

Stephen Boydstun, on Oct 8 2007, 04:13 AM, said:

Thomas, you might like to check out also my essay "Between Realism and Constructive Empiricism" in the Science and Mathematics forum.

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...?showtopic=4191

Thanks, I did. While very interesting, I don't see anything in it that deals with my question about how Objectivism deals with postulated entities.

[BaalChatzaf]

Alfonso, on Oct 7 2007, 07:00 PM, said:

You will want to actually read the article so that you know what the terms in the title mean. That will answer your question.

Alfonso

Is the article online anywhere. If so, can you give the URL. If not, can you suggest a place where I might get access to a copy? Thank you.

Ba'al Chatzaf