Objectivist ethics: Life as the Standard.

[Guyau]

Robert wrote in #66: "I also wonder what Rand's early exposure to 'social Darwinism' was like (and whether it took place before she arrived in the US). She hated Herbert Spencer's ideas (on the basis of what acquaintance I don't know). How did she think Spencer's theories related to more modern evolutionary conceptions?"

Readers might like to see what Ronald Merrill had to say on this in his final essay "Objectivist Ethics: A Biological Critique" in Objectivity V2N5, which is available at Objectivity Archive: www.objectivity-archive.com

Consider, too, which works of Nietzsche Rand read when and consider what Fritz wrote in those works concerning biological evolution and Social Darwinism.

Edited April 19, 2007 by Stephen Boydstun

[Ellen Stuttle]

Readers might like to see what Ronald Merrill had to say [...] in his final essay "Objectivist Ethics: A Biological Critique" in Objectivity V2N5, which is available at Objectivity Archive: www.objectivity-archive.com

I've been reading that article, in the hard-copy version. I'm about halfway through. For a good short synopsis of the status and background of intellectual opinion in the first half of the 20th century on the issue of human nature, see pp. 71 - 77 (1st para.), Sections III, IV, and the start of V. Merrill describes the development and then dominance of the idea that with humans cultural evolution had superceded biological evolution, the viewpoint which Steven Pinker, in a pungent phrase I find amusingly apt, has characterized as "the we in the machine."

I was thinking a couple days ago -- and Merrill's synopsis doubly confirms the thought -- that some of the critiquing of Rand which has been voiced in the discussions here is anachronistic. Although I continue to be of the opinion -- which I've held since early in my acquaintance with Objectivism -- that there's an extent to which Rand's lack of interest in Darwinian theory is odd, she wasn't far out of keeping with the prevailing intellectual trends of her day in viewing humans as having broken with the course of natural selection. The leading schools of thought in sociology, anthropology, and psychology as well, also had this viewpoint on human nature. Where Rand differed from prevailing theories was in being non-determinist, but not in being predominantly non-nativist.

Cricticisms of her for not having been aware of selfish-gene theory -- and of evolutionary psychology -- are especially anachronistic. Atlas Shrugged was published in 1957. The first edition of Dawkins' popular-market work The Selfish Gene wasn't published until 1976. Wilson's Sociobiology, which brought to the attention of the wider intellectual world the type of approach to human behavior now more often called "evolutionary psychology," was published in 1975. The last chapter of the book -- a tome of a book -- talks about human behavior. That chapter is terribly simplistically written; others have done a much better job of the basic approach since. The book caused a huge flap; there was intense warring between environmental determinists, a number of them of Marxist persuasion, and Wilson and others. But I don't know if Rand ever even heard of any of that. By 1975 she'd had her operation for lung cancer, and her husband was in need of chronic care. The commotion occurring in biological thought was going on much too late to have an effect on her basic views about human nature.

Ellen

___

[Guyau]

Hi Ellen,

In his essay, Ronald Merrill argued that Rand's conception of life was not entirely correct and that her ethical theory based on the concept of life therefore stood in need of renovations. He indicated some areas where he expected revisions and extensions would be necessary in Rand's ethical system in order for it to be fully attuned to modern biology. He had not yet formulated specifically what those revisions and extensions ought to be.

In the Remarks section in V2N6 of Objectivity (the issue of Objectivity following the one in which Ron's essay had been published) there were two responses to his essay: one from Phil Coates and one from Marsha Enright. Ron had died before seeing them.

My "True Searcher" piece opening that Remarks section was a remembrance of Ron through our exchanges. We had never met, but as with most of my writers, we had a substantial correspondence concerning essays submitted for publication in Objectivity. I recounted some of that correspondence, including some of our correspondence concerning his "Objectivist Ethics: A Biological Critique."

Here is that portion from "True Searcher."

In May 1997, Ron sent me his "Objectivist Ethics: A Biological Critique." This elicited a seven-page letter, and enclosures, from the Editor and a six-page letter from the Assistant Editor. Let it not be said that Ronald Merrill's ideas were not stimulating. There was one important criticism that he did not address in his revision of the article, but which he hoped to broach in future work.

I had commented that revision of Rand's definition of life to include reproduction could well have profound implications for her basic theory of value. If reproduction is an essential, fundamental part of the philosopher's definition of life, if reproduction is on a par with survival, if reproduction is as much the standard of value as survival of the organism is the standard of value, what becomes of the proposition that every man is an end in himself? What becomes of egoism? Should not interests other than the individual's---interests of the family or the population or other biological systems beyond the individual organism---then be appropriate moral criteria, perhaps alongside self-interest?

Ron had hoped to address this line of questioning in a future article or series of articles in Objectivity. To that end, he proposed to dig further into contemporary biology and to issue in the end a revised egoism, one explicitly harmonizing organism and gene, survival and reproduction.

In autumn 1997, . . . [Ron wrote to me] "My next project will be the paper on reproduction and Objectivist ethics. (Tentative title: 'Reproduction and Egoism'.) To my mind, this will mean examining, at a deeper level of rigor than is usually adopted, Rand's metaethical argument. Already I am beginning to see that a key issue will be her parable of the 'indestructible robot'." He evidently did not then know that the cancer he had fought for nine years was making its final assault. Who will take up Ron's unfinished work in basic ethical theory?

I am pleased to say that another of the Objectivity writers, Kathleen Touchstone, has risen to that challenge. Her answer is set out in her mighty tome Then Athena Said (2006).

Stephen

[nealelehman]

Michael:

>"Come on. Everyone knows there are cases where 1+1=3."

After receiving the traditional "ridiculous," etc., I was challenged to provide one case where this was true. I replied:"Sex."

But this is a perfectly reasonable objection, at least prima facie, and one made by Popper himself against deductive logic,you willl be happy to know. Another one is putting 5 drops of water in a test tube, which makes 1+1+1+1+1=1!

But these do not in themselves invalidate logic. (arguments are required as well as examples) They only demonstrate that even logic itself - at least in the mathematical sense - is open to question and challenge.

But this is all quite beside the point.

Deductive logic is the rules for making valid inferences between statements. It's like the rules of a game, though obviously far more important, and like other human rule-bound games it has been subject to millenia of refinement to the point where, while not perfect, it's still damn useful. Now, using the game analogy, Hume is playing chess. Hume's problem is a chess problem. I have been talking about chess. The "other philosophers" Rand mentions are talking about chess. Now chess is not an "absolute." But I fail to see a. how Victor's solution succeeds as chess or b. why it would be any better if, as you suggest below, he is actually playing Scrabble!

>Well, that's that. Aristotelean logic is deductive logic. Period. There is no sense in arguing about it. Everyone is forced to agree on this point because it is that way by Aristotle's own definition. (Aside to Victor: Please take note of this. This is really, really important when discussing logic with someone philosophically knowledgeable outside of Objectivism.)But there is a little devil in these details, and it applies directly to Hume's problem and to the "man qua man" thingie that is driving this thread (going on the premise that it is OK to apply Aristotelean logic for both sides). The devilish little detail is the phrase "things supposed" or "premise." You see, deductive logic starts from a position of prior knowledge.

Yes, that is why even logic is not an absolute. But we have to agree we are playing chess, not Scrabble! And if we are playing chess, we have to play by the rules.

>There is another thing. Deductive logic needs at least two premises ("things supposed") in order to operate correctly....So with Hume's problem of deriving "ought" from "is," but excluding the reality of the agent, you are committing two errors within the methodology of deductive logic alone:

Not necessarily. You can introduce as many factual premises as you like. But at any rate, all you are saying here is that you can't logically derive an "ought" from an "is"!

I agree! Hume agrees! Victor doesn't! Rand doesn't! It seems apparent from her claim(ie from the fact that man is determines what he ought to do) she thinks she's solved it. She doesn't merely "dismiss" it as unsolveable.

>The point is that when you both use the term "logic," there is this fundamental difference that leads you to talk past each other. Both agree that the deductive logic part is included, but the Objectivist view adds something to it. It includes induction as a starting point, a premise of deduction so to speak, whereas your definition does not.

Look,we are not talking past each other. We are trying to solve a famous chess problem, if you like, and what is the point of considering an argument which so vague it might quite possibly be talking about Scrabble?(it is clearly incorrect as chess!) Plus, making an observation is not "induction". Let's get clear on that. Induction is a separate theory of truth from deduction. Induction is the attempt to predict the future based on past occurences.

-Addition by Neale- Provided that relevant condition are the same in both past and future occurrences.

And the problem is exactly that you can't have both! Induction is deductively false. The two methods clash. You can't just wave your hand and say it's magically "included". It's actually an either/or.

This is problem of induction: that you can't have your cake and eat it too!

>Yet the system of deductive reasoning allows for 2+2=4 only. So in order to align your observations with this kind of reasoning, you get 2+2=7,577.0387. And that sucks. Something has to give.

All that is required is not for logic to be some perfect method of knowing reality - it is not - but for people who want to use logic to, by the same token, have the strength to accept its conclusions, even when they conflict with their most dearly held beliefs.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Neale,

Welcome to OL!

I admire anyone who tries to use the quote function at the start. Now to get the details right, I suggest looking at the following tutorial (it takes about 5 minutes): Quote Feature.

I will try to fix your post so you can look at the difference.

Michael

[dan_edge]

Victor Pross, Objectivist Ethics: Life as the Standard, 2007

"In modern times we don’t accept any of these means of argument to reconcile a factual question such as whether the earth revolves around the sun. Why should we accept them in determining moral questions? How should we determine the truth of moral dilemmas?"

"Ayn Marx", post on Google Group 'Study of Religion,' 2006

"Post enlightenment many of these modes of argument

would not be accepted as ways of solving questions such as, say,

whether the earth revolves around the sun. Why then are we beginning

again to accept them in determining moral questions? If we want to

avoid regressing to such modes of 'thought' as determining moral

questions how should we determine the truth of a moral dilemma?"

Victor Pross, Objectivist Ethics: Life as the Standard, 2007

"...Rand attacked the problem by going to the root, to the question of meta-ethics’ and that instead of asking “Which morality is correct?”, she asked “Just what is morality?” "

"Ayn Marx", post on Google Group 'Study of Religion,' 2006

My approach is to attack the problem of morality/ethics by going to

what I see as the root, that is to meta-ethics. Instead of asking,

which morality is correct I begin in the Randian manner and ask 'Just

what IS morality'?

Victor Pross, Objectivist Ethics: Life as the Standard, 2007

"A morality—any morality—be it the Christian morality or Utilitarianism or the Kantian imperatives—is a set of rules to guide the actions of an individual human being. This is the only thing any morality has in common. Given this, asked Rand, why should there be any morality at all? Why not simply dispense with the whole subject all together? Why should we accept any morality?"

"Ayn Marx", post on Google Group 'Study of Religion,' 2006

"A morality- any morality- is a set of rules to guide the actions of an

individual human being. This I suggest is the only thing all possible

moralities have in common. Given this, let's ask what I take to be a

normative question, why should there be any morality at all? Attempting

to re-phrase this in factual terms; what we may ask would happen if

humanity practiced no morality?"

Victor Pross, Objectivist Ethics: Life as the Standard, 2007

"1, Living beings—and only living beings—have values (goals).

2, Man, being volitional, must choose his values.

3, Values (goals) may be means to an end, but must lead to some ultimate end. An infinite chain of means leading to no final end would be meaningless.

4, Life is the ultimate end, and the only ‘end in itself.’

5, Therefore, the only meaningful values a man can choose are those which serve to sustain his life.

The logical inference which leads to the conclusion is sound. Premises 1, 2 and 3 don’t seem open to serious attack. The battle is over premise 4."

"Ayn Marx", post on Google Group 'Study of Religion,' 2006

"1: Living beings, and only living beings, have values, goals.

2: Man, being volitional, must choose his values.

3: Values-goals- may be a means to an end, but must lead to some

ultimate end . An infinite chain of means leading to no final end would

, I suggest , be meaningless and impossible.

4: Life is an ultimate end, and furthermore I want to claim, it is the

only possible ultimate end, the only 'end in itself'.

5: Therefore the only meaningful or justifiable values we can choose

are those which serve to sustain life.

I'm aware premises 1,2 & 3 can be challenged but suggest they cannot be

seriously debunked.

The real challenge is in defending premise 4."

-----------------

There's more, but that should be enough. Pross lifted virtually this entire article from the "Ayn Marx" post.

--Dan Edge

Note from MSK: Thank you, Dan. Duly edited. Some of the material from "Ayn Marx" was also used by Pross here.

LATER NOTE (July 12, 2007): Apparently "Ayn Marx" was also plagiarizing. Her posts on other forums are from Ronald E. Merrill's The Ideas of Ayn Rand (see here).

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dan,

Thank you for uncovering the plagiarism.

The site you referenced is the first that comes up on a Google search, but it is a site in Arabic from Morocco (post contents in English, though). The same group and discussion, with identical posts, is copied for domains in other countries, so it is most likely that while the plagiarism came from "Ayn Marx," the actual site used for copying was another.

Here is a list of what I found. All post texts are in English, but the surrounding information is in the native language. (Some of them look kinda cool, like Bangladesh. Afghanistan is a mess, even for Google Groups.) Although the same discussion is given for all countries, some links land only on the post of March 29, 2006, not the full thread. This was due to the text string I used in my search. At this point and for the present purpose, I saw no reason to correct this.

Google Group: "Study of Religion"

Thread: "oneness"

Started by: "ram_yogi"

Note: There are only 14 posts in this thread between two posters, the other being "Ayn Marx." The first post by ram_yogi is dated March 12, 2006 and the last by Ayn Marx is March 29, 2006.

Cambodia

Belize

USA

Bangladesh

Tonga

Guyana

Micronesia

Kenya

Botswana

Singapore

Libya

Niue

Norfolk Island

The Gambia

Afghanistan

More coming after I examine the Pross/Ayn Marx texts comparatively. I will make use of the USA version.

Michael

LATER NOTE (July 12, 2007): Apparently "Ayn Marx" was also plagiarizing. Her posts on other forums are from Ronald E. Merrill's The Ideas of Ayn Rand (see here).

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The following paragraph from the essay was plagiarized from Robert Bass, The Rights (and Wrongs) of Ayn Rand.

Rand’s definition of life is “a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action.” This sounds as though she is implicitly using the concept ‘value’ to define…’life’—for how can one explain “self-sustaining action” without the concept of action to “gain and/or keep” something? But if ‘life’ is, defined in terms of ‘value’, then in what sense is the latter conceptually dependent on the former?

Second, given Rand's own definitions of value (that which one acts to gain and/or keep) and of life (a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action), the claim that the concept of life is epistemologically prior to the concept of value collapses. "he is implicitly using the concept value to define life. How could one explain self-sustaining action without the concept of action to gain and/or keep something? But if life is, directly or indirectly, defined in terms of value, then in what sense is the latter conceptually dependent on the former?"

OL extends it deepest apologies to Robert Bass.

I do not own a copy of The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts by Harry Binswanger, but a footnote was added on March 26 to the essay as given below, so I imagine some of the text was lifted from that work.

*Read Harry Binswanger’s The biological Basis of Teleological Concept.

This post has been edited by Victor Pross: Mar 26 2007, 06:20 AM

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The entire essay, which I deleted from the start of this thread, is given below with sections that have been identified as plagiarisms. Texts from Ayn Marx can be seen here? and the paragraph from Robert Bass can be seen here. The texts of Ayn Marx identified by Dan Edge above are so indicated in the quote box. Texts that are not plagiarized from Ayn Marx or Robert Bass are given in italics.

Note: Some of the material from Ayn Marx was also used by Pross here.

LATER NOTE (July 12, 2007): Apparently "Ayn Marx" was also plagiarizing. Her posts on other forums are from Ronald E. Merrill's The Ideas of Ayn Rand (see here).

Michael

Objectivist ethics: Life as the Standard.

Note: The purpose of this thread is a summary and answering of some of the criticism of the Objectivist ethics (from other threads) and the issues have been isolated here for consideration.

Ayn Rand has made a significant contribution to philosophical thought in the field of ethics. It is my claim that she provided a feasible solution to one of the fundamental problems of ethics: deriving normative from factual statements—or, as prevalently put, deriving ‘ought’ from ‘is’. This has been a long standing problem in philosophy.

Let’s briefly cover some background and the nature of the query before proceeding to the Objectivist ethics.

Every human society has had ethical instruction, declaring that one ‘ought’ to do—or not do—certain things. How were these claims justified? The historical justifications have been varied and wide-ranging: “You ought to because God, as revealed in scripture, says so.” Or: “You ought to because a vote was taken and majority rules.” Or: “You ought to because if you don’t we’ll chop your head off.” Or: “You ought to because others need you to and they’ll benefit.” Or: “You ought to because it will give you pleasure.”

History tells us that all human society has had ethical precepts, that is, claims that one 'ought' to do, or not do, certain things. Justification for these claims have taken such forms as 'You ought to, because I say so', 'You ought to because God, speaking through me, says so' or 'You ought to because the rest of us took a vote and the majority says so'.

In modern times we don’t accept any of these means of argument to reconcile a factual question such as whether the earth revolves around the sun. Why should we accept them in determining moral questions? How should we determine the truth of moral dilemmas?

Post enlightenment many of these modes of argument would not be accepted as ways of solving questions such as, say, whether the earth revolves around the sun. Why then are we beginning again to accept them in determining moral questions? If we want to avoid regressing to such modes of 'thought' as determining moral questions how should we determine the truth of a moral dilemma?

The whole field, it would seem, has been muddied with the influence of mysticism and emotivism.

I have made great efforts on other threads to point out that…

… Rand attacked the problem by going to the root, to the question of meta-ethics’ and that instead of asking “Which morality is correct?”, she asked “Just what is morality?”

My approach is to attack the problem of morality/ethics by going to what I see as the root, that is to meta-ethics. Instead of asking, which morality is correct I begin in the Randian manner and ask 'Just what IS morality'?

This approach alone made her a radical in philosophical inquiry.

Let's set the ground work: …

A morality—any morality—be it the Christian morality or Utilitarianism or the Kantian imperatives—is a set of rules to guide the actions of an individual human being. This is the only thing any morality has in common. Given this, asked Rand, why should there be any morality at all? Why not simply dispense with the whole subject all together? Why should we accept any morality?

A morality- any morality- is a set of rules to guide the actions of an individual human being. This I suggest is the only thing all possible moralities have in common. Given this, let's ask what I take to be a normative question, why should there be any morality at all? Attempting to re-phrase this in factual terms; what we may ask would happen if humanity practiced no morality?

This is a normative question, so let’s place it in a factual framework:

In the quest to answer this question, let’s imagine what would happen to a man who practiced no morality whatsoever.

A man who practiced no morality would be a man whose behavior was guided by no rules or principles at all?

A man who practiced no morality would be a man whose behavior was guided by no rules at all.

What would happen to this amoral—but very mortal—man? He would die.

This demonstratively indicates that there is a link between factual and normative standards and it is man’s life. Man needs morality if he wants to live. Man ought to take certain continuous actions because they are necessary in order for him to be. He ‘is’ because he does what he ‘ought.’

If accepted, this suggests a connection between the factual and the normative, and that it is life itself. We need morality in order to live. That is, we ought do certain things, because they are necessary for us to be. We are because we do what we ought.

Life is the standard. Ethics is reduced to a matter of engineering, in a manner of speaking. To survive requires a complex and organized structure of action.

VALUES:

Ayn Rand defined a ‘value’ as ‘that which one acts to gain and/or keep.” So we could ask the following question: “What values or goals ought one choose? Rand emphasizes that only living creatures have, or can have, values. Furthermore, she claims that there can be no meaningful values except those which are aimed at the preservation of the individual’s life. But this is where we run into problems.

So, let us define a value as 'that which one acts to gain and/or keep'; that is,value as an object of human action. Here I want to rephrase the fundamental question of ethics as, 'What values or goals ought one to choose?' In a given context ethics should specify some value to pursue. Therefore, the concept of value and what that concept implies needs a more detailed elucidation.

My fundamental ethical argument is the assertion that value, in the ethical sense, is both practically and conceptually dependent on life. That is, only living creatures have, or can have, values.

Further, there can be no meaningful values except those which are aimed at the preservation of the individual's life.

Rand makes an argument for life as the standard of ethics which is analogous to the argument for the validity of logic in epistemology. Just as one cannot demand a proof of the validity of logic, since the concept of ‘proof’ already assumes the validity of logic--so one cannot challenge life as the standard of ethical value, since the concept of ‘value’ already assumes that one is talking about a living being. The concept of value is seen to be epistemologically dependent on the concept of value.

Here’s where charges of circularity come into the picture.

Epistemologically the argument can be put thus. Just as one cannot demand a proof of the validity of logic, since the concept of 'proof' already assumes the validity of logic; so one cannot challenge life as the standard of ethical value, since the concept of 'value' already already assumes one is talking about a living being. So, I see the concept of value as epistemologically dependent on the concept of life. Admittedly, one can't rely too heavily on such argument however due to its circularity.

Rand’s definition of life is “a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action.” This sounds as though she is implicitly using the concept ‘value’ to define…’life’—for how can one explain “self-sustaining action” without the concept of action to “gain and/or keep” something? But if ‘life’ is, defined in terms of ‘value’, then in what sense is the latter conceptually dependent on the former?

Second, given Rand's own definitions of value (that which one acts to gain and/or keep) and of life (a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action), the claim that the concept of life is epistemologically prior to the concept of value collapses. "he is implicitly using the concept value to define life. How could one explain self-sustaining action without the concept of action to gain and/or keep something? But if life is, directly or indirectly, defined in terms of value, then in what sense is the latter conceptually dependent on the former?"

MEANS AND ENDS

Let's examine the basic structure of her argument explicitly. I assert that her line of reasoning is sound. Let’s summarize the steps:

1, Living beings—and only living beings—have values (goals).

2, Man, being volitional, must choose his values.

3, Values (goals) may be means to an end, but must lead to some ultimate end. An infinite chain of means leading to no final end would be meaningless.

4, Life is the ultimate end, and the only ‘end in itself.’

5, Therefore, the only meaningful values a man can choose are those which serve to sustain his life.

The logical inference which leads to the conclusion is sound. Premises 1, 2 and 3 don’t seem open to serious attack. The battle is over premise 4.

1: Living beings, and only living beings, have values, goals.

2: Man, being volitional, must choose his values.

3: Values-goals- may be a means to an end, but must lead to some ultimate end. An infinite chain of means leading to no final end would, I suggest, be meaningless and impossible.

4: Life is an ultimate end, and furthermore I want to claim, it is the only possible ultimate end, the only 'end in itself'.

5: Therefore the only meaningful or justifiable values we can choose are those which serve to sustain life.

I'm aware premises 1,2 & 3 can be challenged but suggest they cannot be seriously debunked. The real challenge is in defending premise 4. I'll now attempt to do so.

Is life an ‘end in itself’? Is it the ONLY possible end itself? Let's take a look at that.

THE ALPHA AND OMEGA OF ETHICS:

Classic philosophy dating back to the Greeks mulled the question of “ultimate end” in human action. The argument runs along these lines:

Consider a goal, alpha. This goal actually is a means to an end, another goal, beta. But beta is itself a means to another goal, gamma, and so forth. Can we find some ultimate end, such as omega, which is an end itself, not a mean to any other end? If we can show that that every goal is ultimately a means to omega, then we can have a basis for ethics. As it stood, the proposed ethical “end-in-itself” has always been identified as with the glory of 'God' or 'justice' and so on. But this is not satisfactory.

Did Ayn Rand offer a satisfactory answer? Is life an end-in-itself? Do humans never regard life as a means to some end? Do human beings never seek any other value for its own sake? This is where Rand has been attacked by opposing thinkers.

It must be understood, however, that Rand is not employing the term ‘end in itself’ in the traditional manner.

Rand: “Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action.”

Rand is saying this: life is an ordered collection of activities, which are means to achieving an end…which is those activities. Every action taken to sustain life is simultaneously a means (because it supports life) and an end (because life is by definition simply the collection of such activities). *

Rand’s idea of ‘life’ as a self-contained vortex of values which are (in chorus) ends AND means allows us to reverse the traditional line up:

Consider a goal, Z. Obtaining this goal is dependent on an other goal, Y, which is a means to Z. Y, in turn, is dependent on another means, X, and so on. Is there some ultimate means, A, which is a means for all other goals? Yes. Life is a prerequisite for pursuing any other goal. Whether or not life is the only ultimate end or not, (happiness has been a proposed hypothesis) it is an end which is a necessary means to any and all other ends. Thus, by the very nature of "value," any code of values must hold life as the ultimate value. Remaining alive is the goal of values and of all proper action.

Consider a goal, Z. Attaining this goal is dependent on another goal, Y, which is a means to Z. Y in turn is dependent on another means, X, and so on.........Is there some ultimate means, A, which is a means to all other goals? Here I suggest there is: Life is a prerequisite for pursuing any other goal.

LIFE AS THE STANDARD FOR MAN QUA MAN.

This line of reasoning puts the Objectivist ethics on very strong grounds. Rand has demonstrated that life is at the root of all values, but then she goes on to specify the standard of value as “the life of man qua man.” We have made a transition from ‘life’ (meaning pure biological survival) to “life of man qua man”. The critics protests that something other than life (pure survival) is being tacked on, hence all the charges of Rand’s “fudging.” The critic has demanded classification and identification for this seemingly added quality that makes life the “life of man qua man.”

Rand has met up to the challenge: there is no distinction between the ‘simple biological survival’ of a human being and the “life of man qua man” She applies an Aristotelian metaphysical principle: to exist is to have identity. To survive as a living organism IS to live the kind of life appropriate to that type of organism. To survive as a man IS to live the life of man qua man. There is no generic survival which comes in a box. A human being cannot survive like a fish or wolf. To survive as a man is to live the life of MAN QUA MAN.

So much for the critics of Ayn Rand’s ethical thought.

**********

*Read Harry Binswanger’s The biological Basis of Teleological Concept.

This post has been edited by Victor Pross: Mar 26 2007, 06:20 AM

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I just received an e-mail back from Robert Bass thanking me for identifying the plagiary of his work (I had notified him, as I am doing with all plagiarized authors).

He did tell me a very interesting thing about the above passage by "Ayn Marx": that it is a word-for-word excerpt from Ron Merrill's The Ideas of Ayn Rand, pp. 102-104. He wrote the following to me (and I doubt he would be against me quoting it, but I am notifying him anyway):

Now, unless "Ayn Marx" is a pseudonym for either Ron Merrill or for Victor Pross, then you've got a plagiarist plagiarizing another plagiarist!

Dayaamm!!!

I even notified Ayn Marx and apologized to her!

Rob Bass also mentioned that on further examination, he saw that Pross had independent acquaintance with Ron Merrill's book because other parts of it were plagiarized, although he did not say which passages were plagiarized. I will look into this when I return from my trip.

Many thanks to Robert Bass.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Quick thought.

Pross and Ayn Marx might have plagiarized Ron Merrill as separate plagiarisms.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

The plot is thickening...