[Dragonfly]

On Daniel Barnes' blog I found a link to an interesting article by Michael Huemer about Objectivist ethics. It discusses some of the big holes in the theory I've mentioned in earlier posts. Something for our Michael to chew on.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Victor,

If you include reason among other things, OK. My quibble is with "the ONLY means of survival."

I can think of many, many examples of man surviving attacks in the wild without using reason. Simple running like any prey is a great example. I read recently of one case in Germany recently where a drunk man was attacked by a Rottweiler and bit the dog to death.

Foraging for food often does not entail reason. The cavemen lived according to a more perceptual level than reason level and it took a hell of a long time for the use of even basic things like fire and simple weapons to develop.

EDIT - I am not being patronizing. I'm actually trying to be protective. Seriously.

Michael

[Victor Pross]

Dragonfly, you wrote in some other post: How do you know we aren't parasites by nature?

What, in the same manner that parasites are? You don’t see any difference between actual parasites and human beings? Try making observations as any scientist does. Yes, some people live parasitically and others don’t. Parasites live on hosts—the hosts being those who don’t live as parasites. Ah, context-dropping supreme! (Come on, Dragonfly, I talk this way, but I'm not being a bastard here. I like you and I just talk smack like any biker dude).

And then you wrote: “The error is to suppose that there is only one aspect of human nature (the Objectivist aspect, surprise, surprise). In fact human nature is characterized by many different aspects, not only those that we like and admire, but also those that we don't like at all but which we can't reason away by calling them irrational or exceptions.”

Let’s break this sentence down to its essence. Human beings are complex. That's what you are saying—and that is precisely what Objectivism (and science) understands and acknowledges. But that we are complex is not an argument against the fact that there is a rational code of ethics--as to be discovered, not invented. How would it be?

Victor

This post has been edited by Victor Pross: 10 March 2007 - 03:36 AM

[Victor Pross]

Michael Stuart Kelly, on Mar 10 2007, 02:17 AM, said:

Victor,

If you include reason among other things, OK. My quibble is with "the ONLY means of survival."

I can think of many, many examples of man surviving attacks in the wild without using reason. Simple running like any prey is a great example. I read recently of one case in Germany recently where a drunk man was attacked by a Rottweiler and bit the dog to death.

Foraging for food often does not entail reason. The cavemen lived according to a more perceptual level than reason level and it took a hell of a long time for the use of even basic things like fire and simple weapons to develop.

EDIT - I am not being patronizing. I'm actually trying to be protective. Seriously.

Michael

Michael,

Of course I agree that it is hardly productive to simply reprise the “standard Objectivist summaries” as it is not productive to reprise the standard objections to Objectivism—which is what I meant by re-inventing the wheel. Aside from that, I saw inconsistencies in Dragonfly’s thoughts and drew attention to it—but I’m not gunning for the man. Finally, I am not ignorant of general philosophy. I look forward to an interesting exchange to not only raise objections where the situation calls for—as anybody does—but to also learn. I'm here to read, not just post.

-Victor

[Ellen Stuttle]

Dragonfly, on Mar 10 2007, 06:51 AM, said:

Ellen Stuttle, on Mar 8 2007, 08:13 PM, said:

its how any animal could act in a way which endangers its own survival while conferring some survival benefit upon another or others of its group.

Ellen! It's not its, it's it's!

So it is, Dragonfly. (It now is; I fixed it.)

Similarly:

Dragonfly! It's not elses, it's else's. ;-)

Dragonfly, on Mar 10 2007, 06:48 AM, said:

The things I do that don't affect other people are my business and no one elses.

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

Mike Hardy, on Mar 10 2007, 08:35 AM, said:

Ellen Stuttle, on Mar 8 2007, 01:13 PM, said:

Why would the individual organism ever risk its own skin in a way that benefits another or others of its kind? That's the question hard to answer from a Darwinian standpoint.

Is it really? Cannot a Darwinian say that species some of whose
members do that have more offspring that survive long enough to
procreate? -- Mike Hardy

In a way, yes, Mike, but not in the way in which you put it. The issue isn't survival of the species. A species isn't an organism, and there's nothing advantageous for the individual organism in keeping the type of which it's a representative continuing to be represented amongst the living. The question is what benefit is conferred on the organism which is taking the risk to its own survival such that such risk-taking behavior would evolve? The answer which was come up with is that the focus of evolution isn't precisely on the individual organism but instead on the genome -- The Selfish Gene -- and sometimes (the details are mathematically complex to work out) there is increased replication of the genome if the organism carrying the genome evolves risk-taking behavior.

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

Dragonfly, on Mar 10 2007, 06:49 AM, said:

An earthworm also "ought" to eat if it wants to survive, but I think it would be silly to call the behavior of an earthworm who for some reason doesn't eat "unethical". Ethics concerns our behavior towards other people; only a religion will condemn you for committing suicide or for sexual behavior that doesn't harm other people. That Objectivism tries to extend morality to purely personal and private concerns is in my opinion one of its most revolting aspects. We've just freed ourselves from similar dictates by the church and now we should deliver ourselves to the next religion. Thanks, but no thanks.

That comment was like a lightning stroke which suddenly illuminated a contrast I've wondered about for years and never seen with precision, that between the ethical "guidebook," as I called it, which I developed for my own use when I was a freshman in college and the ethics of Ayn Rand. When I read Atlas, I thought for some while that what she was saying was just a more adult-language -- i.e., more sophisticatedly stated -- form of the same insight I'd had. But later I realized that there was a difference, had to be, because Objectivism time and again leads in practice to duty-dominated attitudes.

I'll get specific later -- tomorrow if I have time; otherwise, next week. But I wanted to commemorate the moment when the bolt of lightning flashed.

Ellen

___

[Dragonfly]

Ellen Stuttle, on Mar 10 2007, 10:40 AM, said:

Dragonfly! It's not elses, it's else's. ;-)

Thanks, I fixed that too. I wasn't sure about it, but when I found 1.2 million hits on the Internet for "someone elses" I thought I'd be safe in using it...

[Dragonfly]

Ellen Stuttle, on Mar 10 2007, 11:11 AM, said:

I'll get specific later -- tomorrow if I have time; otherwise, next week. But I wanted to commemorate the moment when the bolt of lightning flashed.

Madam, you're welcome.

Jupiter Tonans

[Stephen Boydstun]

Victor, I think you give a true summary of Rand’s basic theory of moral value in your post #78 when you write:

“All living organisms, she observed, face the issue of life versus death. Life is always conditional. Unless an organism takes appropriate actions to survive--it will die. Most plants, for example, survive by water and nutrients and growing to the sun for the benefits of photosynthesis. Simpler animals have rigid ‘built-in behavior blueprints’ that they follow to survive. Higher animals, such as cats or chimpanzees, have more intricate behavior patterns that they use along with more learned behavior. As we know, they cannot form concepts and are limited to the perceptual level of knowledge. That is why they have an abridged range of survival methods compared to human beings.

“As recognized in Objectivism, humans possess a conceptual faculty, and this gives them a ‘wide open’ set of survival options. Human beings survive and flourish by using their rational faculty to solve problems. All living things are mortal and will die eventually. Ethics applies only to those who are alive and able to make choices, and so it does not apply to animals at all. Animals do not live as human beings do—and human beings cannot live as animals do. This is an observable fact. Rand defined a value as ‘something any living thing acts to gain possession of or to keep’--BUT whether or not these values keep the entity alive and flourishing is the objective standard by which existence continually tests all their values. Reality has the last word here.”

Here is a further connection within Rand’s thought and a connection to the thought of one other philosopher that may be of interest to some readers here:

You write that in Rand’s account, nonhuman higher animals “cannot form concepts and are limited to the perceptual level of knowledge. That is why they have an abridged range of survival methods compared to human beings.” Rand remarked in her 1961 essay FNI: “An animal has no critical faculty. . . . To an animal, whatever strikes his awareness is an absolute that corresponds to reality---or rather, it is a distinction he is incapable of making: reality, to him, is whatever he senses or feels.”

Humans do have a critical faculty very powerful and very volitional. Rand wrote that her philosophy rested on a single axiom “existence exists” and a single choice: to live. If one continues to choose life for oneself, one will encounter definite internal and external constraints on the range of possible attainments open to one. If one continues to value living, one will normally have a range of things to pursue much wider than the range had by other animals, but there will remain stubborn constraints on what one can really value and in what orders and interconnections. I concur with Rand on those propositions.

In his 1981 Philosophical Explanations, Nozick set out five different relations that our relation to values might be. One of them---the one he thought most likely sound---was the relation he called Realization. The Realization mode of relationship to value is this: we choose that there be value, but its character is not entirely up to us. What can be valuable is not something entirely at our say-so, even though whether there is value at all hangs on a choice from us. Rand’s theory of value might be rightly taken as a genre of the Realization mode of value.

Of course Rand and Nozick disagreed somewhat on what was the objective basis for the character of valuable values. For Nozick it was the structure of organic unity, whereas for Rand it was the structure of life.

[Bob_Mac]

"In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends and values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value for which any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgements is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the relationship between "is" and "ought."
- Rand, 'The Objectivist Ethics', VOS, italics in original."

That's one of those passages, when I read it the first time, it was concerted effort of will power not to throw the book across the room and into the trash bin. Not only is it a dismissal of a very important and real philosophical problem, the attitude reveals a inappropriate contempt in my opinion.

"So much for the relationship between "is" and "ought."

Ridiculous, not to mention wrong. It seems she hasn't even tried to understand why the is/ought problem is a tough one.

Bob

[Bob_Mac]

Stephen Boydstun, on Mar 10 2007, 08:24 AM, said:

Humans do have a critical faculty very powerful and very volitional. Rand wrote that her philosophy rested on a single axiom “existence exists” and a single choice: to live. If one continues to choose life for oneself, one will encounter definite internal and external constraints on the range of possible attainments open to one. If one continues to value living, one will normally have a range of things to pursue much wider than the range had by other animals, but there will remain stubborn constraints on what one can really value and in what orders and interconnections. I concur with Rand on those propositions.

Aha, now I see clearer, and I agree up to a point.

"If one continues to choose life for oneself, one will encounter definite internal and external constraints on the range of possible attainments open to one. "

Fine, but notice the one critical word - "IF". Very important - Rand didn't like that word much. I contend that man is free to choose what he values and we're guided by our rational faculties and our biologies. Usually life is at or near the top of the priority list, but not always, and it is not mandatory. I can choose to value a family member's life over my own, maybe temporarily, maybe permanently - it's up to me. Maybe I choose to serve my King as value #1. Whatever. The point is that there is no objective basis for evaluating one priority list over another.

The logic of evolution and humans as gene-replicators (albeit sophisticated ones) makes so much more sense in explaining our behaviour and morality than Rand's does. So much so that I can confidently dismiss Rand's ideas on this as nonsense.

"and a single choice: to live."

Nope. Way too simple. False dichotomy life or death - there's infinitely many ways to "live".

Bob

[Stephen Boydstun]

Here is a contemporary and important book addressing issues raised in this thread concerning objective values and the fact-value dichotomy:

The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy
2002
Hilary Putnam

From the Introduction:

"The idea that 'value judgments are subjective' is a piece of philosophy that has gradually come to be accepted by many people as if it were common sense. In the hands of sophisticated thinkers this idea can be and has been developed in different ways. The ones I shall be concerned with hold that 'statements of fact' are capable of being 'objectively true' and capable, as well, of being 'objectively warranted', while value judgements, according to these thinkers, are incapable of object truth and objective warrant. Value judgments, according to the most extreme proponents of a sharp 'fact/value' dichotomy, are completely outside the sphere of reason. This book tries to show that from the beginning these views rested on untenable arguments and on over-inflated dichotomies. And these untenable arguments had, as we shall see, important 'real world' consequences in the twentieth century.

"Although I have criticized the fact/value dichotomy in chapters of previous books, this is the first time I have tried to examine the history of the dichotomy from David Hume to the present day. . . .

"In the first of these lectures (Chapter 1), . . . I discuss the phenomenon of the elevation of what look like harmless distinctions into absolute dichotomies by philosophers in a more general setting. In particular, I show how the idea of an absolute dichotomy between 'facts' and 'values' was from the beginning dependent upon a second dichotomy of 'analytic' and 'synthetic' judgments. . . . This book tries to show that these two dichotomies, 'fact versus value judgment' and 'fact versus analytic truth', have corrupted our thinking about both ethical reasoning and description of the world, not least of all by preventing us from seeing how evaluation and description are interwoven and interdependent."

[Darrell Hougen]

This has turned into a fascinating discussion of one of my favorite topics, the is-ought problem. I am convinced that Ayn Rand successfully solved the problem, though she didn't always express the solution clearly (in my view).

First, it is necessary to decompose what she meant by the phrase, "the life of man qua man." The life of man qua man means life as a rational animal or life as a rational being. So, a morality appropriate for man is a morality appropriate for a rational being. Rationality is man's essential characteristic, so the life of man qua man means a life lived in a manner consistent with this essential characteristic, that is, a life consistent with reason.

Another important aspect of the explanation is the volitional nature of consciousness. Every action of body and mind is an act of choice. One must decide, at each moment in time, not merely what to do, but what to think. And, if a person is rational, an action is always chosen that is consistent with a higher value in preference to a lower value.

That brings us to the value of reason itself. If a person holds some goal or end to be of higher value than reason (or rationality), then that person is, perforce, irrational. A person may encounter a circumstance in which he must either believe a conclusion that is consistent with reason or a conclusion that is consistent with some other end. And, if that other end is more valuable than the value placed on reason, then the illogical conclusion will be chosen in preference to the logical one.

Now, it is clear that if a person knows that he may, based on his values, choose an irrational conclusion over a rational one at some time in the future, he has already abandoned reason and has, therefore, already become irrational.

Nor is it possible to choose one day to be irrational and the next day to be rational. Once a person has abandoned reason as his sole means of comprehending reality, there is no guarantee that he will ever regain a rational perspective on life in the future as there is no means for an irrational person to reason consistently to any end. If a person returns to rationality at some time in the future, that is his good fortune, but there is no way for him to rationally choose to become rational when he is, in fact, irrational. Once a contradiction has been embraced, it destroys the logical consistency of all thought and makes rational thought impossible. That is why reason is man's highest value and virtue.

As an illustration of this principle in practice, consider the religious person who chooses to believe in creationism in preference to the theory of evolution. Although the creation story is clearly irrational, the religious person chooses to believe it because it satisfies his desire to believe in God which he holds as his highest value, in preference to the value of reason. As long as a person holds his belief in God to be more valuable than reason, he is, of necessity, irrational.

Now, in order to be rational, a man must be rational. That means that he must continue to exist, which means that he must continue to live and, therefore, must take the actions necessary to live. Among the actions that he must take is the action of setting up a moral code for himself --- that is, a code of values that define and delineate the proper course of action for him to take in order to survive. And, if he is to survive, the code must be rational and must therefore place rational life at the top of the hierarchy. All other actions and goals must be consistent with that value which is taken to be the end in itself. Therefore, the life of man qua man is the proper end for a rational being.

Now, you may argue that people have survived in the past and continue to survive without being totally rational. That is true. But the ease of survival is certainly related to the degree of rationality. During the Middle Ages, when religion was dominant in the West, survival was much more difficult than it is today. Moreover, it is clear that people with irrational ends survive in spite of their morality, not because of it, and they do so by smuggling some degree of rationality into their behavior in a manner that is inconsistent with their ultimate goals or ends. In addition, such a person cannot be termed a rational being because such a person does not hold consistent, rational values.

In conclusion, the fact that man is a rational animal implies that he ought to act in a manner consistent with reason.

Darrell

[ashleyparkerangel]

Quote

That comment was like a lightning stroke

Only in the sense that it illuminates in a flash, and puts in relief, the author's lack of comprehension of AR's argument.

[Darrell Hougen]

Dragonfly, on Mar 9 2007, 04:48 PM, said:

I completely agree with Dawkins on that point. Morality concerns only how we treat other people. The things I do that don't affect other people are my business and no one else's. Other people may approve or disapprove what I do but they shouldn't try to tell me that I have moral obligations to behave like they want. That would be the typical behavior of a religion, not a philosophy.

The purpose of morality is to guide your thoughts and actions at every moment of every day. That doesn't mean that other people should be sticking their noses in your business. What it means is that you are responsible for how you spend your time even when no one is watching.

Dragonfly, on Mar 9 2007, 04:48 PM, said:

That is a non sequitur. The question whether you can generalize it is irrelevant. That would imply that you couldn't earn a living as a baker as you can't generalize it: if everyone became a baker the whole society would collapse. The fact that there are so many succesful parasites is proof that it can be a rational strategy.

Actually, that is a non-sequitur. Just because many people have won the lottery does not imply that it is rational to spend your money buying lottery tickets. What you need to show is that there is a high probability of success --- that the probability of success as a parasite is higher than the probability of success as something else.

Now, there are a couple kinds of parasites, those that steal from the productive without their consent and those that have the voluntary consent of their supporters. The former include bank robbers and convenience store thieves while the latter include welfare recipients and those that mooch off of their relatives and friends.

Now, it is clear that most parasites of the first kind are not very successful. Most bank robberies net about $1000 (the last I heard) and most bank robbers rob 2 or 3 banks before they are caught. Hardly sounds like a career to me. Convenience store thieves and burglars don't fair any better, on average. I think the average theft of a convenience store yields about $120 and the number of successful robberies is generally less than 20. Burglars probably do even worse.

So, that leaves us with moochers. Now, it is true that in a society in which welfare is readily available and others are happy to be victims that moochers can live relatively well. But, I would argue that such behavior is still not proper for a rational being because of the nature of the thinking process. For the same reason that a slave cannot live a life proper for a rational being, a moocher doesn't either. In the first case, the slave is not allowed to use his mind in the sense that he can never test his conclusions and therefore gives up thinking because it is useless. In the second, the moocher doesn't bother to test his conclusions and therefore gives up thinking.

But, I think Rand understood the nature of the parasite problem, which is why she loudly decried the giving of money to those that don't deserve it --- the sanction of the victim. In a society in which people generally acted in their own rational, self interest, it would be much more difficult for parasites of the second kind to even survive.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

Dragonfly, on Mar 9 2007, 04:48 PM, said:

Quote

I want to answer one other point, the idea that parasitism could be rational. The reason this is not true is because you can't generalize it and have it work. You can't say that it's OK for everyone to be a parasite, because for parasitism to work, you have to have producers to feed off of.

That is a non sequitur. The question whether you can generalize it is irrelevant. That would imply that you couldn't earn a living as a baker as you can't generalize it: if everyone became a baker the whole society would collapse. The fact that there are so many succesful parasites is proof that it can be a rational strategy.

There is one other point I'd like to make regarding the above, namely, that Laure's point is valid insofar as we are seeking general principles according to which all people can live. Clearly, everyone can live if everyone is productive but it is not possible for anyone to live if everyone is a parasite. Therefore, parasitism doesn't work as a general principle but productivity does.

The reason this is important is because, early on in life, a person must develop the habits of mind and action that will be used throughout life for survival. Now, if there happen to be enough opportunities for parasites to survive, then learning the mental habits of a parasite might be a successful survival strategy, but if there aren't, then the parasite will have a hard time surviving later because he has not learned or developed the principles necessary for productive existence. The productive person doesn't have that problem because there aren't limited opportunities for a productive person to survive. There is always more room for wealth creators, but there might not be more room for moochers.

Darrell

[Brant Gaede]

Darrell Hougen, on Mar 10 2007, 01:26 PM, said:

Nor is it possible to choose one day to be irrational and the next day to be rational. Once a person has abandoned reason as his sole means of comprehending reality, there is no guarantee that he will ever regain a rational perspective on life in the future as there is no means for an irrational person to reason consistently to any end. If a person returns to rationality at some time in the future, that is his good fortune, but there is no way for him to rationally choose to become rational when he is, in fact, irrational. Once a contradiction has been embraced, it destroys the logical consistency of all thought and makes rational thought impossible. That is why reason is man's highest value and virtue.

As an illustration of this principle in practice, consider the religious person who chooses to believe in creationism in preference to the theory of evolution. Although the creation story is clearly irrational, the religious person chooses to believe it because it satisfies his desire to believe in God which he holds as his highest value, in preference to the value of reason. As long as a person holds his belief in God to be more valuable than reason, he is, of necessity, irrational.

Darrell

You are giving no credit for a person's ability to compartmentalize--to be rational in one area and irrational in another. Much of what you are saying seems to be long on logical inertia and short on empirical data.

--Brant

[Mike Hardy]

Ellen Stuttle, on Mar 10 2007, 03:56 AM, said:

Mike Hardy, on Mar 10 2007, 08:35 AM, said:

Ellen Stuttle, on Mar 8 2007, 01:13 PM, said:

Why would the individual organism ever risk its own skin in a way that benefits another or others of its kind? That's the question hard to answer from a Darwinian standpoint.

Is it really? Cannot a Darwinian say that species some of whose
members do that have more offspring that survive long enough to
procreate? -- Mike Hardy

In a way, yes, Mike, but not in the way in which you put it. The issue isn't survival of the species. A species isn't an organism, and there's nothing advantageous for the individual organism in keeping the type of which it's a representative continuing to be represented amongst the living. The question is what benefit is conferred on the organism which is taking the risk to its own survival such that such risk-taking behavior would evolve?

But you said "hard to answer from a Darwinian standpoint." From a Darwinian standpoint, I don't see that the question is what benefit is conferred on the individual organism. -- Mike Hardy

[Mike Hardy]

Dragonfly, on Mar 9 2007, 06:49 PM, said:

That is still no reason to extend morality to simple physiological functions, that would be a form of "greedy reductionism".

I agree!

Dragonfly, on Mar 9 2007, 06:49 PM, said:

Ethics concerns our behavior towards other people;

I entirely disagree on this one. Ethics should be egoistic.

Dragonfly, on Mar 9 2007, 06:49 PM, said:

only a religion will condemn you for committing suicide or for sexual behavior that doesn't harm other people. That Objectivism tries to extend morality to purely personal and private concerns is in my opinion one of its most revolting aspects.

Here is a misunderstanding. It's as if you thought ethics is about condemnation of that which merits it, rather than about how to live. Ethics is in a sense ONLY about personal and private concerns. My conscience doesn't exist in order to help YOU; it exists in order that __I__ can use it and be guided by it. Suppose someone writes about how to balance your checkbook or manage your investments. Will you say "Financial advice is about how you deal with OTHER people and avoid stealing their money; one of the most revolting aspects of this book is that it condemns you for mismanaging your finances when you're not harming other people.

This is simply no reason to be honest or just in dealing with OTHER people except that it is necessary in order to live one's own life rationally and purposefully. -- Mike Hardy

[Daniel Barnes]

Stephen:
Here is a contemporary and important book addressing issues raised in this thread concerning objective values and the fact-value dichotomy:

The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy
2002
Hilary Putnam

Stephen, are you able to briefly summarise Putnam's argument against Hume?