Objectivism and Anarchocapitalism

[studiodekadent]

The standard Objectivist rebuttal to Anarchocapitalism is, essentially:

"Ancaps are rationalists that context-drop: they take the concept of competition and apply it outside its context. The context of competition is within a state monopoly protecting individual rights."

This argument has merits. For one, many Ancaps are rationalists. The intellectual father of Rothbardian anarchism was von Mises (a Kantian Rationalist), and Rothbard certainly had significant rationalistic streaks in spite of his overall closeness to Objectivist ideas.

However, I believe that this argument against anarcho-capitalism is deficient in that it does not identify the context, or potential contexts, of the concept. Under what circumstances can capitalistic competition arise? The standard Objectivist answer: "only under a monopoly government," is deficient. My answer is that capitalistic competition can arise under any circumstance under which there is respect for individual rights. The more of the latter that is present, then the more of the former will arise.

A minarchic state is one mechanism by which individual rights can be protected. The reason these rights need to be protected is because not everyone respects these rights. Hence, the actual context of monopoly minarchy is "when individual rights require protection from outside threats." Threats, of course, are other agents (or agencies) that do not respect individual rights.

Hence, Rand's justification of minarchic statism is contextual. I agree that, within the context Rand assumed, minarchic statism is the best we are going to get (I believe that, however, a Hayekian model is the most sustainable minarchy). If we change the context, however, to a set of people that all (or at least the vast, vast, vast majority) respect individual rights, say a "real Galt's Gulch," then anarchocapitalism would be viable, and moral.

In short, my argument is:

Context: People as they are = Minarchy

Context: People as they should be = Anarchy

The latter context may not be likely, but it is possible.

[Danneskjold]

I'm not counting on a whole nation of pure producers such as the ones who were in Galt's Gulch. I mean for christ's sake, I can't pick out ten people from my school who would have a chance in hell at being picked to go there. Not to mention, there was a reason that Galt's Gulch was a secret place, you think they had an organized military?

[studiodekadent]

I'm not counting on a whole nation of pure producers such as the ones who were in Galt's Gulch. I mean for christ's sake, I can't pick out ten people from my school who would have a chance in hell at being picked to go there. Not to mention, there was a reason that Galt's Gulch was a secret place, you think they had an organized military?

Im not doubting the unlikelyhood, Im simply saying such a community is a possibility (however remote).

[Chris Grieb]

Galt's Gulch had the ray screen so nobody knew about the place. Ayn Rand is supposed to have said that since the Gulch had a very small number of people the method of orgranzing would not work for a large country.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

In short, my argument is:

Context: People as they are = Minarchy

Context: People as they should be = Anarchy

The latter context may not be likely, but it is possible.

This is absolutely correct. However, I do not agree with the part about it being possible, but not for the standard reasons.

Rand defined man as "rational animal." She concentrated the vast majority on the rational part and only dealt with the animal part where there was no other explanation possible. This usually took the form of proclamations like "man has no choice about...," or "man's nature requires...," etc.

(I personally say that man is a "rational biped primate" since I believe this is much more precise in essential characteristics.)

It is the animal part of our nature, like the urge to herd, competitiveness among members, some of the negative emotions, etc., that make protecting against the use of force necessary. I call this animal part "species considerations."

The concept of "people as they should be" is a very dangerous one. It presumes that philosophy is a form of indoctrination that will produce "proper" people. The communists did this and look what happened. Here is your formulation a little differently:

Context: People as they are = Minarchy

Context: People as they should be = Communism

The latter context may not be likely, but it is possible.

That is exactly the logic communists used for years.

The focus of philosophy, when it is beneficial, is on man as he is. Any improvement in the species must be done on the individual level and let natural selection take its course. That means any collective "people as they should be" formulations for establishing political rules or law are actually encroachments on individual rights, or inevitably result in such violations.

Remember that a "thing" has no rights. It just is. Individual rights are for human beings as they exist, i.e, according to their essential nature. That includes the animal genus, not just the rational differentia.

Michael

[studiodekadent]

As I should have made clear before, I am not doubting that anarchocaptialism is unworkable under current conditions. I am simply saying that under a certain set of conditions, namely, everyone (or the absolute vast majority) shares Objectivist values. I know this is unlikely to happen, nor do I advocate Objectivist indoctrination to make it happen.

I certainly agree with Michael that there can be a danger with regards to enforcing values on others. I just hope he realizes that I do not wish to enforce my values.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Andrew,

Of course I understand you do not wish to force anybody to do anything. That's one of the reasons you are an anarchist.

I am merely trying to point you toward a deeper problem with government, which is that a social system is made for people, and they have a specific nature, some of which can get pretty nasty.

If you think sharing Objectivist values leads to peace, I invite you to take a look around at some of the Objectivist discussion boards. Some of them harbor some of the nastiest people attitude-wise I have ever encountered. (There are many wonderful people, also.) I have no doubt that some of the more deranged ones would be quite dangerous in a system of complete freedom if they were armed.

There is something you might not be aware of. A critic of Ayn Rand, Greg Nyquist pointed the following out. There are two approaches to philosophy in terms of human nature. One is what he calls utopist and the other is naturalist (I think those terms are correct).

The utopist is one who believes that man is perfectible with the right programming. Communism was a prime example. First there was a "dictatorship of the proletariat," during which time selfishness was supposed to be bred out of people, then the withering of the state because perfect people do not need government. We saw that the first phase only ended when communism collapsed.

Objectivism comes very close to this "breeding" idea with the concept of "moral perfection." As time went on, Rand's claims (and her orthodox followers really took this to the outer limits) started moving out of the field of philosophy and into the field of biology. For example, Rand claimed that it was possible to increase one's IQ through conscious rational thinking (correct programming). Or that it was possible to eliminate emotions that were based on wrong ideas through volitional rational thought (correct programming). Things of this nature.

If a naturalist approach is taken (and please do not confuse this with Rand's term "naturalist" for art), the nature of man is defined by observing the way he is and gearing philosophy to that. I remember Nyquist focusing on man's volatile nature, using the term imperfection in a manner tailor-cut to irritate Objectivists, but his point is correct. So long as man has volition and a conceptual faculty, he will make mistakes. In this case, Objectivist philosophy becomes a series of principles to help him make fewer mistakes and better choices. He can become "perfect" I suppose in sincerity, in correcting errors as quickly as possible, etc., but he will never train his valuing faculty (and emotions) to never make mistakes. Sometimes he will simply act in his own worst interest by choice and on purpose. He would have to be omniscient, have full godlike control over external reality, and have a biological organism that never oscillated in hormones and chemical balances in the brain, etc., for that not to happen.

The point is that full anarchy could only work if man bred the capacity to make morally wrong decisions out of himself. There is a utopist line of Objectivism that teaches precisely this and, incredibly, still defends the need for minarchism (to defend against the unfortunates who were unable to breed correctly, I imagine). But, technically speaking, a perfect race that never made moral errors would have no need of government.

Accepting the view of seeing man as he actually is, and on top of that, seeing Objectivism as a philosophy for how he could and ought to be, I hold that man's basic nature includes making morally wrong decisions at times for a variety of reasons and acting on them. Where my view of "perfection" comes in (the part about how man "could and ought to be") is that I hold that it is always possible for a man to use reason to later judge the act according to a "perfect" standard, correct it to the extent possible and morally correct himself.

This is not a license to do wrong. It is merely an admission of reality-based limitations and a system for addressing them when they impact behavior. I hold that it is possible to want to always do right as a strategy, but fail on the tactics at times. I guess it is possible to be morally perfect on a strategy level (although I do not like to think in these terms—I don't think of life as a static state). The number of variables beyond the control of any volitional individual makes this impossible to achieve on the tactics level, though.

So we need some government (organization that employs force to enforce laws) to protect individual rights even among the best of men because we are not omniscient in employing tactics. Sometimes we just screw up. In a momentary lapse—which our "strategy level" corrects after a while if we are highly moral—we could choose to harm someone if there were no rationally devised restraints to make us pause.

Michael

[studiodekadent]

Michael,

Thankyou for clarifying. I should add, I do not consider myself an Anarchist, in terms of practical politics. I am a Hayekian Minarchist in that area (as in, that is the political program that I believe would be best under current circumstances). However it is correct that I have anarchist sympathies.

I do, however, believe that at least in principle humans are morally perfectible. I do not believe this requires omniscience, all it requires is living first hand, being as rational as possible and not violating others individual rights. I do not think humans are inherently predisposed towards evil... for me an idea of that nature is disturbingly close to Original Sin.

I totally agree, however, that reason is not infallible, and humans will never totally 'breed out' the ability to make cognitive mistakes. But as I attempted to demonstrate before, the only thing required for capitalistic competition is respect for individual rights (which is more a cultural-philosophical thing (cf Hayek) than anything demanding a coercive state). I agree, the vast majority of the time, this respect (unfortunately) has to be secured by force. But, since I believe humans can reach moral perfection, or at the very least totally refrain from violating individual rights, without a threat of force backing things up (i.e. be morally perfect in that sense), then I dont believe a coercive state based minarchy is the only possible context within which capitalistic competition can flourish. What I am really trying to prove here is that acontextual rejection of anarchocapitalism is not essential (and probably not even compatible) with Objectivism. Anarchocapitalism can, however, be rejected contexually, which is precisely what I am doing.

And yes, some alleged Objectivists are most hostile in demeanour, but I would argue (and Im sure many of the people here would agree with me) that they are rationalistic intrinsicist cultists rather than actual Objectivists.

[Selene]

I'm not counting on a whole nation of pure producers such as the ones who were in Galt's Gulch. I mean for christ's sake, I can't pick out ten people from my school who would have a chance in hell at being picked to go there. Not to mention, there was a reason that Galt's Gulch was a secret place, you think they had an organized military?

Might you remember Ragnar Daneskold? I'm sure he had some of his members on shore leave from time to time. Additionally, we have historical records of "militia" in the Revolutionary War who were about as non-organized as one could possibly imagine[see The Swamp Fox Francis Marion]. Finally, in the global collapse, the central military was just as incompetent as the rest of the culture.

[tjohnson]

The focus of philosophy, when it is beneficial, is on man as he is. Any improvement in the species must be done on the individual level and let natural selection take its course. That means any collective "people as they should be" formulations for establishing political rules or law are actually encroachments on individual rights, or inevitably result in such violations.

But when you define man as a rational animal are you not implying that the more rational we are the more human we are and that we should strive to be more rational? Would you be opposed to laws about teaching "rationality" to school children in an effort to produce rational adults?

[Roger Bissell]

The focus of philosophy, when it is beneficial, is on man as he is. Any improvement in the species must be done on the individual level and let natural selection take its course. That means any collective "people as they should be" formulations for establishing political rules or law are actually encroachments on individual rights, or inevitably result in such violations.

But when you define man as a rational animal are you not implying that the more rational we are the more human we are and that we should strive to be more rational? Would you be opposed to laws about teaching "rationality" to school children in an effort to produce rational adults?

Teaching "rationality" to school children is far too....rationalistic. For instance, you wouldn't teach little children algebra, for that is far too abstract. You start with learning numbers, counting, adding and the rest of arithmetic, and then having them rise to the abstract level. Similarly, you wouldn't teach them the virtue of honesty or rationality first, but instead touch on lots of concrete situations and examples. Once they're prepared in this manner, then they can make the inductive leap to the more abstract level of whatever subject you're teaching them. A lot of recent trends in public school teaching turn this on its head, which explains why so many kids have been exposed to ideas, but so few understand them -- whether in academic subjects or in moral and philosophical areas.

REB

[tjohnson]

Teaching "rationality" to school children is far too....rationalistic. For instance, you wouldn't teach little children algebra, for that is far too abstract. You start with learning numbers, counting, adding and the rest of arithmetic, and then having them rise to the abstract level. Similarly, you wouldn't teach them the virtue of honesty or rationality first, but instead touch on lots of concrete situations and examples. Once they're prepared in this manner, then they can make the inductive leap to the more abstract level of whatever subject you're teaching them. A lot of recent trends in public school teaching turn this on its head, which explains why so many kids have been exposed to ideas, but so few understand them -- whether in academic subjects or in moral and philosophical areas.

I was thinking about adolescents. I would think they could understand theories about rationality and it's importance in human life.

[Wolf DeVoon]

I'm not counting on a whole nation of pure producers such as the ones who were in Galt's Gulch. I mean for christ's sake, I can't pick out ten people from my school who would have a chance in hell at being picked to go there. Not to mention, there was a reason that Galt's Gulch was a secret place, you think they had an organized military?

Might you remember Ragnar Daneskold? I'm sure he had some of his members on shore leave from time to time. Additionally, we have historical records of "militia" in the Revolutionary War who were about as non-organized as one could possibly imagine[see The Swamp Fox Francis Marion]. Finally, in the global collapse, the central military was just as incompetent as the rest of the culture.

Suspiciously rational.

W.

Note to OL: I admit to ancapping now and then for 30 years or so.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

But when you define man as a rational animal are you not implying that the more rational we are the more human we are and that we should strive to be more rational? Would you be opposed to laws about teaching "rationality" to school children in an effort to produce rational adults?

GS,

"Rational" is a differentia in the Objectivist definition. It is a specific feature that can be measured that stands out from other features of other existents. It is not a substitute for the existent. "Animal," for example, is the genus and a fundamental part of the Objectivist definition of human being. One would not say that the more "animal" one is, the more human he is. Both genus and differentia are needed.

The main pillar of Objectivist concept formation is measurement omission. Some feature can be measured but a specific measurement is not used within the concept. All measurements for that feature fall within the concept as possibilities (although a range of possibilities is usually established by other er... concepts ).

This includes degrees. "More rational" and "less rational" are measurements. They fall within ordinal-type measurements. Is it beneficial to a person as a human being to be more rational? Of course. Think of a parallel: strength. Which is more beneficial, stronger or weaker?

As for laws about teaching, I am against such laws on principle. Look at the near-illiteracy rate of high-school graduates in the USA to see one reason why.

Michael

[syrakusos]

Over in Rebirth of Reason, I posted quite a few essays and opinions, based on the way the real world of capitalism actually works. This is not medieval Iceland or some utopian construct. We actually do have these so-called "anarchocapitalist" institutions functioning here and now. These are market alternatives to government, not just private parks or private streets, but workable, profitable police and adjudication. They work across governmentalist bounderies as well as within them because for them, government is irrelevant.

Furthermore, I do not cite the Von Rockbard Society or whatever, but actual law enforcement and criminal justice institutional agencies, such as <wait for it> The United States Department of Justice.

THE HALLCREST REPORTS

The Hallcrest Report I: Private Security and Police in America by William C. Cunningham and Todd H. Taylor, Butterworth-Heinemann, Boston, 1985. ("This publication reports a 30-month descriptive research project performed by Hallcrest Systems, Inc., MacLean, Virginia, under a grant from the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.")

The Hallcrest Report II: Private Security Trends 1970 to 2000, by William C. Cunningham, John J. Strauchs, Clifford W. Van Meter, Butterworth Heineman, Boston, 1990. ("This publication, The Hallcrest Report II: Private Security Trends (1970 to 2000), presents the results of a descriptive research project performed in 1989 and 1990 by Hallcrest Systems, Incorporated of MacLean, Virginia, under a grant (89-IJ-CX-0002) from the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.")

See also:

"Can Police Services be Privatized?" by Philip E. Fixler, Jr., and Robert W. Poole, Jr. in The Private Security Industry: Issues and Trends, special editor, Ira A. Lipman.THE ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 498, July 1988.

THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLICING: TWO VIEWS by Brian Forst and Peter K. Manning, Georgetown University Press, 1999.

Since 1893, the Hague Conference on Private International Law, a melting pot of different legal traditions, develops and services Conventions which respond to global needs in the following areas:

International Protection of Children

International Protection of Adults

Relations between (Former) Spouses

Wills, Trusts and Estates

International Judicial and Administrative Co-operation

Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments

Contracts

Torts

Securities

Trusts

Recognition of Companies

http://www.hcch.net/

To meet the needs of parties involved in labor disputes, the American Arbitration Association, which resolves 14,500 labor-management disputes annually ... Founded in 1926, the American Arbitration Association offers a wide range of services, including education and training, publications and the resolution of a wide range of disputes through mediation, arbitration, elections and other out-of-court settlement techniques. ... While many of the more than 230,255 cases administered by the American Arbitration Association in 2002 were resolved through mediation or arbitration, less formal methods of dispute resolution -- such as fact-finding, mini-trial and partnering -- are clearly coming into wider use. ...

http://www.adr.org/

[BaalChatzaf]

And yes, some alleged Objectivists are most hostile in demeanour, but I would argue (and Im sure many of the people here would agree with me) that they are rationalistic intrinsicist cultists rather than actual Objectivists.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_true_Scotsman

Ba'al Chatzaf

[syrakusos]

The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security

Deborah D. Avant

George Washington University, Washington DC

Paperback (ISBN-13: 9780521615358 | ISBN-10: 0521615356)

Published August 2005 | 322 pages

17:24 GMT, 25 July 2006)

The legitimate use of force is generally presumed to be the realm of the state. However, the flourishing role of the private sector in security over the last twenty years has brought this into question. In this book Deborah Avant examines the privatization of security and its impact on the control of force. She describes the growth of private security companies, explains how the industry works, and describes its range of customers - including states, non-government organisations and commercial transnational corporations. She charts the inevitable trade-offs that the market for force imposes on the states, firms and people wishing to control it, suggests a new way to think about the control of force, and offers a model of institutional analysis that draws on both economic and sociological reasoning. The book contains case studies drawn from the US and Europe as well as Africa and the Middle East.

• The first serious attempt to grapple with the difficult trade-offs involved in controlling private security in the global market

• Suggests a new way to think about the control of force that makes a significant contribution to civil-military relations

• Offers an institutional model that bridges the 'rationalist/constructivist' divide

Contents

1. Introduction; 2. Private security and the control of force; 3. State capacity and contracting for security; 4. Dilemmas in state regulation of private security exports; 5. Private financing for security and the control of force; 6. Market mechanisms and the diffusion of control over force; 7. Conclusion; Bibliography.

Reviews

'Deborah Avant has written a sensible corrective to the hype and hyperbole that has accompanied the study of 'mercenaries'. She shows how private military companies are a part of the everyday workings of national military establishments, and provides prescient warnings about the impact of excessive outsourcing in this area. Avant provides an alarming message that over-reliance on private forces undermines the spirit and commitment that make effective national militaries work. In doing so, Avant shows how a public ethic is an integral part of what makes national militaries successful and how this is missing in private military companies.' William S. Reno, Northwestern University

'Professor Avant gives us a comprehensive, balanced, yet ultimately disturbing look at the growing use of private security companies. Her cases cover the gamut of private security services and the widely varied circumstances of their use, while her theoretical framework links overarching trends to major concerns like military effectiveness, professional standards, and the control of force in the international system. Although she sees the good as well as the worrisome in the ever-widening use of such companies, overall her analysis raises serious questions about the wisdom of allowing market forces, as opposed to states and multi-national institutions, to shape the use and professional conduct of forces around the world.' Thomas L. McNaugher, Vice President for Army Studies, RAND Corporation

'Avant has performed a great service. There is much hype and hyperbole regarding the growth of private security forces, with many suggesting that these are warriors running wild. By sifting through the evidence and deploying a range of organizational theories, Avant generates develops a nuanced understanding of this sector, identifying how these forces are controlled and alerting us to when and where there remain legitimate concerns. Avant tackles the interesting development of the privatization of security. Over the last several decades privatization has moved into the security theater with substantial force. This is fascinating for theoretical, political, and normative reasons. The monopolization of the means of violence is a defining feature of the state and distinguishes the modern sovereign state from organizational rivals. Yet we find that states are knowingly and gladly devolving control. Why they should do this, and with what consequences, is important and fascinating. Avant wants to examine the consequences by examining the impact on state control. Toward that end, she unpacks the functional areas in which security is being privatized and considers different areas of state control. To illustrate these claims, she examines three cases of state privatization and non-state actors hiring private security forces to provide different functions. The implications of these developments for how politics is now being played out, who controls the means of force, and democratic accountability, are tremendous.' Michael N. Barnett, University of Minnesota

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